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EDITOR'S NOTE
When this issue of the University of Denver Water Law Review was in
production in the Fall of 2008, the nation .was in a debate .about
"change" versus "experience." It was somethmg of a false chotee, of
course, because the two terms are not simple binaries like "open" and
"closed." The economic turmoil of late 2008 erupted before the nation could choose between the two, and it now appears, with all the
chips on the table, the nation just wants something that works.
There is a lesson in the election cycle of 2008 for anyone who has
systems in place ready to work when they are needed most?
The five articles in this issue of the University of Denver Water Law
Review have a few suggestions.
In "The Importance of Freshwater Conservation in the Context of
Energy and Climate Policy: Assessing Progress and Identifying Challenges In the Western United States," Adell Amos, Assistant Professor
and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program at the University of Oregon School of Law, closely examines the
current water law regime in Oregon with an eye on climate and energy policy. Is Oregon's statutory and regulatory regime ready for paradigmatic shifts like climate change? Professor Amos gets at this
fundamental question through a thorough examination of nearly
every level of Oregon water law.
In "Less is More: A Limited Approach to Multi-State Management
of Interstate Groundwater Basins," James Davenport returns to the
Water Law Review to tackle the question of interstate groundwater law
and what happens when the law stops at the state line but the
groundwater resource stretches into two or more jurisdictions. With
a notion for flexibility for future concerns, Davenport suggests that
less regulatory structure might be more effective in the long run.
Turning the question of transboundary groundwater to international law, Paul Kibel looks at the current legal controversy surrounding the lining of the All-American Canal in his article "A Line Drawn
in the Water: Aquifers Beneath the Mexico-United States Border."
Kibei suggests that in this case, less may in fact just be less, pointing
out the ramifications of key deficiencies in the water treaties between
the United States and Mexico for managing groundwater resources.
Another international perspective takes us to Kazakhstan, where
~drew Allan and lise Steyl examine the role of stakeholders in basin~VIde. plannin.g in their article "Encouraging Stakeholder Participation
m River Basm Management: A Case Study From the Nura River in
Kazakhst " B
·
an.
Y companng the structure in place in Kazakhstan with

other countries, the authors suggest ways to improve stakeholder participation in basin-wide planning.
Finally, Charles Howe, University of Colorado Professor Emeritus
of Economics, Senior Scholar, Environment & Society Program, Institute of Behavioral Science, and former member of the Nobel Peace
Prize winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
asks the difficult question of the economic implications of shutting
down junior water uses in times of shortage in his article "Water Law
and Economics: An Assessment of River Calls and the South Platte
Well Shut-Down." Is it time to take into account the economic value
of users as well as their priority date?
I hope you enjoy the wide range of issues presented in this issue of
The University of Denver Water Law Review. If the economic and political upheavals of the last few months have taught us anything, it is that
there is no time like the present to ask the hard questions - if for no
other reason than you can never know exactly when the answer might
be demanded of you. I hope you will reflect on the hard questions
presented in this volume, and take the time to ask a few questions of
your own.
Paul Tigan
Editor-in-Chiq
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INTRODUCTION
Many, if not all, governmental entities today are facing tough and
controversial questions involving energy demand and consumption. In
the western United States, these energy questions are often inextricably
linked to water resource issues. With increased population and development pressure, the challenges involving energy and water will only
continue and intensify. Impacts from changes to climate and weather
patterns in various areas of the country will cause changes to precipitation patterns, drought cycles, storm events, snow pack and spring melt,
among other hydrologic changes. These climate change pressures will
exacerbate the pressure on water supplies and challenge the relationship between energy and water policy.' Unfortunately, the laws and
policies that deal with energy and those that address water have developed as independent and separate bodies of authority. Often, various
pieces of applicable law and policy reside at different jurisdictional
levels of government - the municipal land use board may have authority to approve or disapprove a new housing development, but the state
government has the authority to grant or deny water rights associated
with the development and the federal government may ultimately run
the reservoir system that could provide the water or energy needed to
support the development. Both within and among most jurisdictions
the connections between energy and water policy are too often absent.
The Secretary of Energy received a letter in 2004 from the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Subcommittee on
Energy and Water Development Appropriation requesting a report
focusing on threats to national energy production resulting from li-

1.

See generally, Kathleen A. Miller, Climate Change and Water in the West: Complexities,

Uncertainties and Strategies for Adaptation, 27

JoURNAL OF LAND,

RESOURCES AND

87 (2007) (summarizing the impacts of climate change on water
resources in the West and explaining the inability of models to predict specific details).
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mited water supplies.2 In 2005, Congress provided funding in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818) for a report on the interdependency of energy and water. The U.S. Department of Energy submitted their report to Congress in December of 2006. Also in 2006, the
Environmental and Energy Study Institute in Washington, DC sponsored a congressional briefing entitled "Understanding the EnergyWater-Climate Nexus: Implications for Policy. '4 This briefing offered

members of Congress information on the connections between the
continued security and economic health of the United States and the
presence of a sustainable supply of energy and water.' The presenters
recognized that water and energy needs are inextricably linked.'
"[T] he production of energy requires large volumes of water while the
treatment and distribution of water" requires large quantities of energy.' For example, "[e]lectricity production requires about 136 billion
gallons of freshwater per day, accounting for over 40 percent of all daily freshwater withdrawals in the nation. ' On the energy side, "[i]n
2000, the United States used 123 billion [kilowatt-hours] to supply water and treat wastewater, just under four percent of total electricity
sales.

'

The significance of the relationship between energy and water policy comes into clear focus as governments face the challenges of adopting new policies to address climate change. As we adapt to the inevitable changes that our cities, towns, states and communities will face in
coming decades, it is extremely important to look at how we adapt." If
we are not careful about how we adapt, we may inadvertently and with
good intentions, compound the very problems we set out to address.
For example, assume that increases in average annual temperatures,
caused by warming of the atmosphere, result in increased water evapo-

2. Energy Demands on Water Resources: Report to Congress on the Interdependency of Energy and Water, (Dec. 2006) available at http://www.sandia.gov/energywater/docs/121-RptToCongress-EWwEIAcomments-FINAL.pdf
3. Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Understanding the Energy-WaterClimate
Nexus:
Implications
for
Policy
1
(Sept.
13,
2006),
http://www.eesi.org/briefings/2006/Energy&Climate/9.13.06-Energy-WaterClimate/9.13.06_energy-water-climateNotice.htm (This document was taken down
during a re-organization of EESI's website. A copy of the document is on file with the
University of Denver Water Law Review).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9.
10.

Id.
Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer

World, 34 ECOLOGYL.Q.61, 61 (2007).
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ration from reservoirs, lakes and other water supplies." In response to
water shortages, governmental entities turn to proposals to desalinate
seawater. Using existing technology, the desalinization of seawater
requires huge quantities of energy, currently generated primarily
through the burning of fossil fuels." Burning more fossil fuel increases
the carbon emitted into the atmosphere and exacerbates the warming
cycle in the atmosphere.'" As a result, a decision made regarding water
policy has enormous impacts on energy policy and only contributes to
the source of the initial problem. One can find another example in
proposed alternatives to fossil fuel usage. If policy makers determine
that ethanol is the best alternative to carbon-based fuels, they should
consider ethanol's impact on water resources. Corn, one source of
ethanol, and the process used to convert corn to ethanol, are water
intensive." If policynakers propose increased corn production in
areas of the country that already face water shortage concerns, then
again, the lack of understanding the relationship between energy and
water policy may exacerbate the problem we set out to solve.
Ultimately, the goal is to ensure in the face of climate change and
increased demand on our natural resources that we make our communities and ecosystems resilient and able to deal with change. A recent summary issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change ("IPCC") states, "[n]on-climate stresses can increase vulnerability to climate change by reducing resilience and can also reduce
adaptive capacity because of resource deployment to competing
needs."'5 Telling perhaps, making communities resilient to climate
change often looks very similar to good conservation practices. For
example, maintaining intact flood plains and functional watersheds,
promoting efficient energy use, conducting comprehensive land use
planning and establishing urban growth boundaries to concentrate
population centers all help make communities more resilient." By
making the connections between water policy, land-use development
11. Envt'l Prot. Agency, Precipitation and Storm Changes (Dec. 29, 2007),
("Increasing temperahttp://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/recentpsc.html
").
tures tend to increase evaporation ....
12. See generally PETER H. GLEIcK, THE WORLD'S WATER 2006-2007: THE BIENNIAL
REPORT ON FRESHWATER REsOURcES

69-70 (2006).

2008),
29,
(Oct.
Information
Basic
Agency,
Prot.
13. Envt'l
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html ("If greenhouse gases continue to
increase, climate models predict that the average temperature at the Earth's surface
could increase from 3.2 to 7.2°F above 1990 levels by the end of this century.").
14. Andy Aden, Water Usage for Current and Future Ethanol Production, Sw.
HYDROLOGY, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 22.
15. NEIL ADGER ET AL., CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE SUMMARY
available at
2007),
eds.
et
al.
Parry
(M.L.
19
POLICYMAKERS
FOR

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
16. See generally id.
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and energy policy, decision makers help ensure that communities are
prepared to deal with change. As we face the challenges of increased
demand on natural resources, decision-makers must also consider the
ethical and moral dimensions of increased demand. All too often, the
greatest impact falls on disenfranchised and lower income segments of
the population." Good adaptation and resiliency strategies will account for the need to allocate and share natural resources among all
the members of our communities.
One piece of any resiliency strategy concerns the role of freshwater
protection and conservation. With increased pressure on the hydrologic system, freshwater conservation can easily fall to the wayside as
communities try to adapt to change. Some observers have offered that
efforts "to allocate more water in situ environmental uses may literally
evaporate" as the pressure from climate change puts demands on our
energy and water consumption.18 In fact, the policy response may need
to be the exact opposite-one of promoting freshwater conservation
and water resource management as tools for reducing the overall demand on the hydrologic system. In a time when new interest in expanding water supply capacity is on the rise, perhaps policymnakers
should look instead at the impacts water conservation initiatives could
have on demand reduction and increased energy efficiency. A serious
investment in many of the conservation mechanisms detailed in this
article may be a cheaper alternative and more energy efficient approach to increased demand than increasing storage capacity or building desalinization plants.
Recognition of the importance of freshwater conservation is a relatively recent development in the history of the prior appropriation
doctrine in the western United States. Oregon is one of the leaders in
freshwater conservation and was one of the first western states to recognize the value of minimum perennial stream flows and ultimately
declare instream flow to be a beneficial use.'9 In many respects, the
Oregon Water Code and accompanying administrative regulations set
a standard for many western states to follow.
In broad terms, this article provides several examples of the important connections between energy and water policy and encourages national, state, municipal and local governments to begin to coordinate
the exercise of their various authorities. Not only will elected leaders
and policy makers benefit from making connections between energy,
land-use, and water policy at their jurisdictional level, but efforts to
integrate energy and water policy through the various levels of local,
17.
18.

Id. at 12.
A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24
LOYOLA L.A. LAw REvrEw 979, 980 (1991).
19. Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United
States, 1 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 177, 180-81 (1998).
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state and national government will serve communities well. By way of
specific example, the article examines the doctrine of prior appropriation, particularly the provisions found in the Oregon Water Code, to
investigate the places where existing water law may be able to address
questions of conservation, energy efficiency and land-use. The article
concludes by offering some specific water policy ideas that state water
agencies, particularly those in the western United States, may want to
explore. Finally, the article draws the connection and calls for integration of energy, climate and water policy.
The article uses the Oregon Water Code as a case study to delve into the details of freshwater conservation in the context of specific statutory provisions. Despite the use of the Oregon Water Code as the case
study, the lessons and challenges discussed in the article are applicable
to any state that follows the prior appropriation doctrine. In Oregon,
like all western states, a combination of statutes, administrative rules,
agency policies, and case law make up the framework for water management. Accordingly, the article isolates and examines provisions of
the Oregon Water Code that impact freshwater conservation and discusses how the legislature, state administrative agencies, and the courts
have interpreted these laws.
Section I details the basic administrative system governing new appropriations for surface and groundwater rights as well as transfers.
Section II addresses the so-called "public interest review" in Oregon
water law that is designed to address many of the concerns and issues
around freshwater conservation. Section III covers enforcement of
water rights including principles of beneficial use, forfeiture, and
waste. Section IV analyzes the specific tools available to establish legally protected instream water rights in Oregon. Section V delves specifically into groundwater management in Oregon. Section VI explores
various water-management mechanisms that impact the use of Oregon's water resources. Section VII is devoted to hydroelectric power
and its relationship to freshwater conservation. This article provides a
resource for those working on the ground on these issues. After each
detailed section, the article identifies the implications and discusses
the challenges of existing law and emerging trends. The article only
briefly touches on the significant role of the federal government. A
more detailed discussion of the role of the federal government will be
part of future work on this topic.
Throughout this article, several overriding themes emerge. First,
the energy, elfort and emphasis placed on freshwater conservation in
the western United States has been and continues to be significant in
comparison to earlier decades. That said, there is certainly more work
to do, particularly on the enforcement, monitoring and maintenance
of instream flow rights and the implementation of other freshwater
conservation initiatives. Second, the impacts of climate change and
increased drought cycles in the western United States will inevitably
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drive many of the reform efforts in the area of water resources over the
next decade. In the context of this effort, it will be increasingly important to make sure that the conservation of freshwater resources stays at
the forefront of energy and climate policy discussions and debates.
Third, and closely related to addressing climate and energy policy, is
the need to look at water resources from a comprehensive planning
approach. Taking a more comprehensive view of water resource management in the western United States will integrate many of the most
challenging problems we face including species extinction, conjunctive
management of ground and surface water resources, depleting supplies of freshwater, health and safety issues as well as the increasingly
acknowledged relationship between land-use planning and water-use
planning. Finally, prior appropriation in coming years may prove its
value or its failure as a tool for the management of water resources as

opposed to mechanism for allocating water rights. The urgent question is whether the doctrine of prior appropriation has the agility and
flexibility to deal with the changing landscape at the intersection of
water, energy and climate policy. In the modern era, states have allocated many, if not all, of the water rights, so the prior appropriation
doctrine now must be a tool, not an impediment, to make a system of
managing those allocations work for all of the citizens of the west. As a
result, we may see the exploration and utilization of principles in every
state water code, like waste, injury, beneficial use, and the rules for
transferring water rights play an increasingly important role as state
agencies and individuals become more focused on balancing various
needs rather than securing new water rights.
I. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE BASICS
A.

STATE WATER LAW IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

As any water lawyer knows, the basic building blocks for the allocation and management of water resources in the West are found in state
administrative law. In fact, what separates the common law system of
riparian rights found in the eastern United States from the more predictable prior appropriation systems in the West is the introduction of
water code and an administrative permit system to deal with competing
demands for water."° The Oregon Revised Statutes ("ORS") broadly
govern Oregon water law. Those portions of ORS dealing with water
include general legislative purposes related to the use and manage-

20.

JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, 215-16, 330-331.

(4th ed. 2006).
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ment of water resources as well as a delegation of administrative authority to certain agencies.
Many state agencies are involved in managing various aspects of
Oregon's water resources. Like most states, the legal and administrative structure governing water resources is fragmented and often uncoordinated. The Water Resources Commission ("Commission") uses
its rulemaking powers to set state water policy." The Commission is
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Oregon Senate. 2
The Water Resources Department ("Department") implements the
Commission's rules and issues orders in the form of water right permits, transfers, adjudications and other actions.2 4 The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife ("ODFW") also plays a significant role in
the water allocation process in the state, particularly as a commenter
on permit and transfer applications where there is an impact on fish
and wildlife.2 ' During the Department's initial review of a permit or
transfer application, the Department often incorporates ODFW's
comments into the proposed final order on the application before the
public review process." In addition, ODFW, along with the Parks and
Recreation Department, and the Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"), may request instream water rights to further their purposes.2 ' These and other state agencies administer laws and regulations
that affect water management as well. For example, the Parks and
Recreation Department administers the state Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, 8' DEQ administers the federal Clean Water Act and parallel state
law,' the Department of Agriculture is responsible for agricultural water quality,"0 the Health Division administers the Safe Drinking Water
21. Don't Waste Or. Comm. v. Energy Facility Siting Council, 320 Or. 132, 136-37
(Or. 1994).
22. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 536.025(1), .027(1).
23. Id. § 536.022(1).
24. Or. State Archives, Or. Blue Book: Or. Water Res. Dep't (2008),
http://buebook.state.or.us/state/executive/Water-Resources/water-resources-dutie
s.htm.
25. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-033-0120; see alsoJoy Ellis, DraftingFrom an Overdrawn Account:
Continuing Water Diversionsfrom the Mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers, 26 ENVrL. L.
299, 312 (1996).
26. Interview with OWRD (Nov. 2007); see generally OR. ADMIN. R. 690-033-0000 to
690-033-0340 (2008); see infra Section I.C.2. (complete discussion of permitting

process).
27. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.336 (2007).
28. See Or. State Archives, Or. Blue Book: State Parks and Recreation Dep't: Agency
History (2008),

http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/executive/Parks-Recreation/parks-recreation-hist
ory.htm.
29. See OR. ADMIN. R. 340-041-0002(1), (4) (2008).
30. Or. Dep't of Agric., Water Quality Program,

http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/NRD/water-quality-front.shtml#Program-overview
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
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Act ' and the Department of Land Conservation and Development implements the land use program."
As this description of the agencies
in Oregon demonstrates, states rarely have a single agency of Department to address water issues.
Federal agencies play a role in Oregon's water resources as well.
Broadly, the Bureau of Reclamation manages reservoirs that provide
water for irrigation projects and power generation.33 The United States
Army Corps of Engineers maintains waterways for navigation purposes,
undertakes flood control projects, builds and operates hydropower
facilities, and operates irrigation and flood control projects. 4 The
Bonneville Power Administration, an agency of the United States Department of Energy, markets electrical power generated in part from
federal and nonfederal hydropower generation facilities located on the
state's rivers . 35
In addition to managing physical water works, federal agencies also
assert regulatory authority over certain Oregon waters. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency interacts with the State of
Oregon based on its responsibility to implement various federal statutes, most significantly the Clean Water Act. 6 The United States Fish
and Wildlife Service, within the Department of the Interior, and the
National Ocean and Atmospheric Agency ("NOAA") Fisheries, within
the Department of Commerce, both play a role in state water law
through the application and implementation of the Endangered Species Act and other federal authorities. Finally, all of the federal landmanagement agencies, which manage over 50 percent of Oregon's
lands, 7 interact with state water law as they seek to secure water rights,
instream or otherwise, to carry out federal purposes on federal lands."

31. Beaverton Public Works, Drinking Water Program,
https://www.beavertonoregon.gov/departments/pubIicworks/utilities/drinkingwater.
aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
32. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.040 (2008).
33. See 43 U.S.C. § 390b (a)-(b) (2006).
34. U.S. ARMY CoRPS or ENG'RS, Civil Works Overview, in WATER RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT IN OREGON 2000, 1-10 (2000), available at

https://www.nwp.usace.army.mil/pa/wrdb2000.asp (follow "Civil Works Overview"
hyperlink).
35. See Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1066 n.7
(9th Cir. 1995); Bonneville Power Administration, http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
36. See33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(1)-(2)(2006).
37.

U.S.

DEPT. OF AGRIc.

NATURAL

RES. CONSERVATION

SERV.,

HIGHLIGHTS

OF

NATURAL RESOURCE CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN OREGON FROM 1982 TO 1997 1 (2006),

http://www.or.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/nri/Oregon%20NRI%2Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
38. See Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963); Cappaert v. United States,
426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); U.S. v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978) (all finding

that federal reserved water rights apply to federal lands for particular purposes).
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At the government-to-government level, the State of Oregon interacts with adjacent states that share freshwater rivers and lakes.39 Oregon also interacts with Indian tribes that hold claims to water that often pre-date statehood and many senior water users in the State." Because of the senior status of many tribal claims to water and their dependence and connection to aquatic species that need freshwater to
survive, the tribes of Oregon are major players in the water resources
area.41
B. WHO ARE THE ACTORS AT THE STATE LEVEL?

While many agencies play a role in Oregon's water management,
the Water Resources Department and the Department of Environmental Quality function as the primary regulatory authorities at the state
level. Broadly dividing water resources into two categories, quality and
quantity, the DEQ maintains jurisdiction over water quality while the
Water Resources Department regulates water quantity.
Although different agencies manage them, and different statutes
govern them, water quality and quantity are interrelated. The quantity
of water flowing in a stream affects pollutant assimilation, while stream
velocity, volume, flow, and groundwater inflow influence water temperature. Simplifying the relationship between water quality and
quantity, more water in the streams equals less concentrated pollutants
and lower temperatures, two main indicators of enhanced water quality.43

1. Department of Environmental Quality
The DEQ regulates water quality by issuing water quality permits,
administering onsite sewage system programs, implementing (jointly
with the Department of Health Services) the state-wide drinking water
source assessment and protection program, certifying drinking water
protection plans for public water supply systems, and administering an
underground injection control program and an underground storage
tank program." In addition, the DEQ plays a role along with the De39.
40.

See 41ArATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 43.01 (Robert Beck ed., LexisNexis 2004).

41.

Id.; see generally OR. REV. STAT. § 539.310 (2007).

See id. § 37.02 (b).

42. OR. REV. STAT. § 468.035(1) (2007) (explaining that the Department of Environmental Quality functions to preserve water quality); id. § 536.025 (explaining the
Water Resources Commission establishes the policies for the Water Resources Department); id. § 540.145 (explaining that the Water Resources Director may act through
the Water Resources Commission to make rules about water distribution).
43. See Reed Benson, A Watershed Issue: The Role of Streamflow Protection in
Northwest River Basin Management, 26 ENvnL. L. 175, 178, 200 (1996).
44.

OR. DEP'T OF ENVrL. QUALITY, DEQ REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: GROUNDWATER

QUALITYIN OREGON 18 (2007), availableat
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partment as the state continues to explore Aquifer Storage and RecovThe DEQ is also responsible for carrying out
ery Projects ("ASR").
the State's obligation under the federal Clean Water Act.46
Section 303(d) of the federal Clean Water Act requires states to
identify and list water bodies that do not meet water quality standards."
The state will set a total maximum daily load ("TMDL") for water bodies that do not meet the quality standards, and the TMDL will calculate the maximum amount of pollutants that can be discharged into
the water body while still meeting the statutory standards." The TMDL
will include, among other criteria, "9 an identification of the pollutants
causing the water quality impairment and an identification of the basin's beneficial uses and specific water quality standards."°
Beginning with its 2002 Integrated Report,"' the DEQ ceased placing water bodies that became impaired due to flow modification on the

http://www.deq.state.or.us/pubs/legislativepubs/GroundwaterQualityLegReport2007.
pdf.
45. Water Res. Dep't, Aquifer Storage and Recovery,
http://egov.oregon.gov/OVRD/mgmt-asr.shtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). For
general information about Aquifer Storage and Recovery in Oregon, see Jen Woody, A
Preliminary Assessment of Hydrogeologic Suitability for Aquifer Storage and Recovery
(ASR) in Oregon (Nov. 20, 2007) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, Oregon State University),
availableat http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/dspace/handle/1957/7453.
46. See OR. ADMIN. R. 340-041-0002(1), (4) (2008). For a more detailed discussion,
see infra Section VIII.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2006).
48. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-042-0030(15) (2008).
49. In addition to the criteria listed in the text, a TMDL will include the name and
location of the area for which the TMDL is developed, the water body's loading capacity and excess load, the pollutant's source, wasteload and load allocations that determine what portions of the water bodies' load capacity are allocated to point and nonpoint sources of pollution, a margin of safety, an accounting for seasonal variation in
stream flow and pollutant loading, a reserve capacity allocating for increased pollutant
loads due to future growth and new or expanded sources (a TMDL may allocate zero
reserve capacity), and a Water Quality Management Plan. Id. at 340-042-0040(4) (a),
(d) to (1).
50. Id. 340-042-0040(b) to (c). "Beneficial uses" in the water quality context are
similar to, but slightly different than, beneficial uses in the water quantity context.
When the water quality statutes refer to beneficial stream uses they are referring to
basin-specific criteria that are compiled basin-by-basin in Oregon Administrative Rules
sections 340-041-0101 through -0350. Specific water quality standards may include
dissolved oxygen, water temperature, coliform bacteria concentrations, dissolved
chemical substances, toxic materials, radioactivity, turbidities, color, and odor. Id. 340041-0007(1).
51. Section 305(b) of the federal Clean Water Act requires each state to submit to
Congress and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency a biennial report describing
various elements of in-state water quality. 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b) (2006). An "integrated
report" includes both the 303(d) list and the 305(b) report. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
GuIDANCE FOR 2004 ASSESSMENT, LISTING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS PURSUANT TO
SECTIONS 303(d) AND 305(b) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 1, (2003), available at

http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/tmdlOlO3/2004rpt-guidance.pdf.
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303(d) list." The DEQ now classifies water bodies previously included
on 303(d) lists because of flow modification as "water quality limited
'
As a result, these waters no longer require
but not by a pollutant.""
development of a TMDL.5 In general, however, regulators must take
flow into account when establishing a TMDL for other pollutants.'
This requirement relates to the authority of DEQ to apply for instream
flow rights to protect flow as part of a water quality standard as discussed below.
The DEQ also issues Water Pollution Control Facilities ("WPCF")
permits that regulate discharge to non-navigable waters and National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits that govern point source discharge to navigable waters. The DEQ categorizes permits into levels I through IV based on their "environmental and
public health significance." Public notice and participation requirements vary according to the category with Category IV requiring the
greatest level of public notice and opportunity for public participation."5
In addition to water quality permits, the DEQ may apply for instream flow rights to protect and maintain water quality standards."
Instream water rights protect and maintain water quality standards by
protecting existing quantities from appropriation, which dilutes pollu-

52. OR. DEP'T OF ENVrL. QUALrIy, CONSOLIDATED ASSESSMENT AND LISTING
METHODOLQGY FOR OREGON'S 2002 303 (d) LIST OF WATER QUALITY LIMITED
WATERBODIES AND INTEGRATED 305(b) REPORT 31 (2003), availableat
http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/assessment/docs/methodology02.pdf
53. Id.
54. Id. In 2000, the United States Environmental Protection Agency published a
final rule to strengthen the TMDL program and require more comprehensive 303(d)
lists, but E.P.A. withdrew the rule before it took effect, resulting in part from concerns
from states and industry groups. Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems Under Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 199, 222-24
(2005).
55. See OR. ADMIN. R. 340-042-0040(4) (d) (2008).
56. See OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(2) (2007).
57. See id. 340-045-0015(1) (a)-(e) (stating that without a permit, a person may not
discharge any waste from industrial or commercial establishments into waters of the
state; construct, install, modify, or operate a disposal system or any new outlet to discharge waste into state waters; or discharge greater quantities or concentrations of
wastes than an existing permit allows). DEQ issues WPCF permits for discharges such
as using wastewater for land irrigation, wastewater lagoons, onsite sewage disposal systems, and underground injection control systems. Or. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Water
Questions,
Asked
Frequently
Permit
Program
Quality
http://vww.deq.state.or.us/wq/wqpermit/permitfaqs.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
58. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-045-0027 (2008).
59. Id. 340-045-0027(1) (2008).
60. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(2) (2007). The Oregon State Environmental Quality
Commission establishes the water quality standards in section 467B.048 of the Oregon
Code.
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tion concentrations.6 ' If granted, the Department holds the instream
water rights in trust for DEQ purposes." The DEQ's regulatory policy
directs the agency to apply for an instream water right when the right
benefits the public uses of recreation, conservation, pollution abatement, or navigation. 3 The DEQ's policy further directs it to protect
streamflows of specially designated water bodies" and to maintain
stream flows of water quality limited streams to assimilate the TMDL of
pollution. The DEQ filed a series of instream flow rights on small
streams in the northern Willamette Basin in the early 1990s.' To date,
the DEQ applied for and received approximately 35 instream flow
rights for water quality purposes. 7 From the perspective of the Department, the DEQ comments relatively infrequently on new permit
and transfer applications."
2. The Water Resources Commission and The Water Resources
Department
Turning to the quantity side of the administrative equation, the
Water Resources Department oversees the amount of water flowing
through, and being diverted from Oregon's water bodies." The Water
Resources Commission oversees the Water Resources Department,
which sits within the executive branch of state government. Technical61. See infra Section IV. for a detailed discussion of instream flow.
62. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2007).
63. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-056-0100 (2008) (14) (2008).
64. Id. 340-056-0015(1)(d) ("It is the policy of the Environmental Quality Commission... [t]o protect streamflows as needed in Outstanding Resource Waters and High
Quality Waters to ensure that water quality standards are maintained and beneficial
uses are protected."). Outstanding Resource Waters are those waters that the Environmental Quality Commission has designated as an outstanding state or natural resource based on their extraordinary water quality or ecological values, or that require
special protection to maintain critical habitat areas. Id. 340-041-0002(44) (2008).
High Quality Waters are those waters that support the propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife; recreation; and other designated beneficial uses. Id. 340-041-0002(23).
65. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-056-0015(1) (2008) ("It is the policy of the Environmental
Quality Commission . . . [t]o maintain streamflows in water quality limited receiving
streams to assimilate the identified total maximum daily pollution load.").
66. See OR. WATER RES. DEP'T DATABASE, available at
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/uploads/for -deq/Instream wr stateDEQreport.p
df (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (about thirty on small streams).
67. Interview with Dwight French, Water Rights Adjudication Adm'r, Or. Water
Res. Dep't; see infra Section VIII. for an additional discussion about the federal Clean
Water Act).
68. Interview with Or. Water Res. Dep't. (Nov. 2007).
69. The Water Resources Department has undergone name and structural changes
throughout the years. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
ADMINIsTRATIVE OvERvtEw 1 (2007) availableat

http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/recmgmt/sched/specia/state/overview/20060002wrdad
ov.pdf [hereinafter ADMIN. OVERVIEW].
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ly, by statute, the Commission is the body charged with carrying out
state water law and policy, but in practice, the Commission has delegated most of its authorities to the Department. Essentially, the Commission reserved some direct authorities, but outside of these, the
Commission functions much like a board of directors.
The Department consists of five divisions: (1) Water Rights and Adjudications, which administers the surface and groundwater permitting
systems; (2) Field Services; (3) Technical Services; (4) Administrative
Services; and (5) the Oregon Water Resources Director's (Director)
Office.

The Department operates under the Water Resources Commission
("Commission") that sets policies, adopts rules, and delegates authority
to the Department.72 The Commission consists of seven members, all
of whom the governor appoints and the Senate confirms.7- Commis-

sioners serve four-year terms, and no commissioner may serve more
than two consecutive terms.74 Oregon law divides its watersheds basins
75
into five regional river management basins, with one member ap7
The governor appoints
pointed to the Commission from each basinY.

70. See generally id. § 536.039.
71.
ADNIIN. OVERVIEW, supranote 69, at 3.
72. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.025-536.027 (2007). Oregon Revised Statute section
536.050 provides that the Water Resources Department may collect fees associated with
permits and sets a fee schedule. Id. § 536.050. Water well constructor's fees, gifts,
grants, and appropriations finance the operating fund. See id. § 536.009(2). The Department is funded through general funds appropriated by the legislature and application fees, and these fees generally cover about one third of the application processing
costs according to the Department. Interview with Or. Water Res. Dep't, supranote 68.
The operating fund is separate from the General Fund, which also contributes resources to the Department. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.009(1) (2007). The operating fund
pays for the water rights program and the administrative expenses that the Commission and Department incur while carrying out the provisions of Oregon Revised Statute chapters 536 (water resources administration) 537 (appropriation of water generally) 540 (distribution of water; watermasters; change in use: transfer or forfeiture of
water rights) and 541 (watershed enhancement and protection; water development
projects; miscellaneous provisions on water rights; stewardship agreements). Id.
73. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.022(1) (2007).
74. Id. § 536.022(2).
75. For purposes of appointing Commission members, the state's drainage basins
are divided into the following five areas: (a) Upper Northwest Region (Lower and
Middle Willamette, North Coast, and Sandy drainage basins, and the Columbia River
drainage basin below Bonneville Dam); (b) Southwest Region (Rogue, Klamath,
Goose, and Summer Lakes drainage basins and South Coast drainage basins south of
the Rogue River's mouth); (c) West Central Region (Umpqua, Mid Coast, Upper Willamette, and South Coast drainage basins north of the Rogue River's mouth); (d)
North Central Region (Umatilla, John Day, Hood, and Deschutes drainage basins, and
the Columbia River drainage basin above Bonneville Dam); and (e) Eastern Region
(Owyhee, Malheur, Grande Ronde, Malheur Lake, Middle Snake, and Powder drainage basins). Id. § 536.022(3).
76. Id. § 536.022(1) (2007).
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the remaining two commissioners "at large," one from the east side of
the Cascades and the other from the west side."
The Director of the Water Resources Department acts as administrative head of the Department and the Commission may give the Director the authority to act in the Commission's name and, when acting
officially, bind the Commission." The Director has the power to hire
and fire personnel, administer and enforce state water laws, represent
Oregon citizens in matters concerning water resources, enter onto private property when performing official duties, and, when the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board ("OWEB") approves watershed enhancement projects, coordinate the Department's involvement in
those projects with other state and federal agencies.' State watermasters are arms of the Department's staff, distributed throughout the
state. The Department appoints one for each of the 21 water districts
in the state, and each of which are employees of the Oregon Water
Resources Department."° Watermasters regulate the distribution of
surface and groundwater between water right holders."
The Commission's enabling legislation enacted in 1955, requires
the commissioners to "proceed as rapidly as possible to study" the
state's water resources, conservation and augmentation measures, wa-

77. Id.
78. Id. § 536.025(2). While the Commission has general rulemaking authority, the
Water Resources Director has exclusive authority over water rights adjudications. See
id. § 539.021(1) ("The Water Resources Director upon the motion of the director, or
in the discretion of the director, upon receipt of a petition from one or more appropriators of surface water from any natural watercourse in this state shall make a determination of the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters of that watercourse.").
79. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.037(1) (b)-(f) (2007). While the statutes list coordination
of the OWEB as a function of the Director in practice, the Commission often undertakes this function. See id. § 536.037(1) (f).
The legislature created the OWAEB in order
to promote the restoration and enhancement of Oregon's watersheds, which OWEB
does by granting funds for watershed restoration projects, assessments, monitoring
efforts, support for watershed councils, and education and outreach activities. Id. §
541.370 (c), (e); OREGON STATE ARCHIVES, OREGON BLUE BOOK: OREGON WATERSHED

91 (2008),
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/executive/watershed/watershedduties.htm. The
Board consists of seventeen members, including one member each from the Environmental Quality Commission, the State Fish and Wildlife Commission, the State Board
of Forestry, the State Board of Agriculture, and the Water Resources Commission. OR.
REv. STAT. §§541.360(1)-(2) (2007).
80. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.020(1) (2007); State of Or. Water Res. Dep't, Or. Water
Res. Field Offices, http://wwv.oregon.gov/OWRD/offices.shtml (last visited Oct. 9,
2008). Counties assist watermasters by funding staff and office space. Id. §§
540.075(1), 540.080(1).
81. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.045(1)(a) (2007). They do so, in part, by regulating, adjusting, and fastening the headgates, valves, or other means of controlling the local
water works. Id. § 540.045(1)(c). In reality, the enforcement of water rights by watermasters is a delicate and complicated process.
ENHANCEMENT BOARD: PRESENT DUTIES
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ter needs and uses, and other related subjects such as drainage, reclamation, floodplains, and reservoir sites."2 The Commission has the authority to conduct public hearings, issue subpoenas for matters before
the Commission, administer oaths, and take depositions.83 The Commission does not have the authority to interfere with the internal affairs of any other state agency or public corporation, alter any existing
water right or priority date, or modify any standard or policy prescribed in Oregon Revised Statutes section 536.310."
The Commission may delegate its power (other than the power to
adopt rules), its duties, and its functions to the Director. 5 Once the
Commission has held at least one public hearing in the affected river
basin, it may also grant the Director the authority to conduct public
hearings concerning the adoption or amendment of a basin program,
but the Commission may not delegate the authority to actually adopt
or amend a basin program."
The Oregon legislature created the Commission in order to establish operating policies for the Department, 7 to adopt and enforce rules
to protect groundwater, and to govern the construction and maintenance of wells.88 The Commission carries out these objectives by exercising its rulemaking authority.89
C. BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION OF THE WATER RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT

1. Rulemaking Process and Participation
The Commission adopts rules and standards that enable it to perform the functions the legislature assigned it.98 The Oregon Statutes
include a policy statement that calls for public involvement in policy
development and rule drafting." The Oregon legislature "encourages
agencies to seek public input" before giving notice of intent to adopt a
rule and also authorizes the agency to appoint an advisory committee
82. Id. § 536.300(1).
83. Id. § 536.026(1).
84. Id. § 536.320. Section 536.310 of the Oregon Statute sets out the purposes and
policies that the Commission shall consider when formulating the state water resources

program. Id. § 536.310.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 536.025(2).
Id. § 536.025(3); id. § 536.300(3).
Id. § 536.025(1).
GARY BRYNER & ELIZABETH PURCELL, GROUNDWATER LAW SOURCEBOOK OF THE

88.
WESTERN UNITED STATES 46 (2003) (citing OR. Rv. STAT. §537.780 (2001)).

89. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.027(1) (2007).
90. Id. §§ 536.025-.027(1).
91. Id. § 183.333(1) ("The Legislative Assembly finds and declares that it is the
policy of this state that whenever possible the public be involved in the development of
public policy by agencies and in the drafting of rules.").
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to represent the interests of persons likely to be affected by the rule.92
If the agency chooses not to appoint an advisory committee, it must
explain its decision in the notice of rulemaking.93
2. Water Right Permitting-Administrative Basics
Oregon's Water Code follows the prior appropriation doctrine,
which provides an administrative answer to questions of priority. The
foundation of the system is the idea that waters of the state belong to
the public, and the state may vest in people the right to use water by
granting a water right permit. 4 Prior appropriation functions as a firstin-time, first-in-right priority system. 5 Under this system, senior uses
take priority over junior uses of water. Thus, the priority date associated with a particular water use is extremely important. In principle,
a senior user takes their full right before ajunior user receives any water. Prior appropriation is also based on principles of beneficial use. A
water user cannot secure a water right unless the use is deemed beneficial, and the user carries out the use without waste. Finally, prior appropriation operates on a use or lose system. So, if a water user fails to
put water to beneficial use, the user may forfeit or abandon their right
due to non-use. The legislature codified the water code in various sections of Oregon Code, in Chapters 536, 537, 538, and 540.
Prior to 1909, the common law governed water rights and generally
followed principles of prior appropriation. When the Oregon legislature enacted the water code in 1909, the code's provisions pertained
only to surface waters, not groundwater." Starting in 1927, the state
required permits to use groundwater east of the Cascades,9 but the
Oregon Legislature did not enact a statewide groundwater permitting
code until the Groundwater Act of 1955.9
Before 1909, Oregon recognized water rights based on prior appropriation as a matter of common law with some recognition of riparian interests. ' Pre-code rights are unique in that appropriators put
92. Id.
93. Id. § 183.335(2) (b) (F).
94. Id.§§ 537.110,.130(1)-(2).
95. Jedediah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U.
MIcH.J.L. REFORM 1021, 1026 (2007) (describing the prior appropriation system).
96. CHAPIN CLUK, SURVEY OF OREGON WATER LAws 93-97 (Oregon Law Institute,
1983).
97. See Id.
98. See
Or.
State
Archives,
Water
Res.
Dep't
Records
Guide,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/archives/state/water/hist/histnarr.htm
(last visited Oct.

15, 2008).
99.

100.

See OR. REV. STAT.

§ 537.505

(2007).

Joseph Q. Kaufman, An Analysis of Developing Instream Water Rights in Oregon, 28
Wi
TrAETTE
L. REV. 285, 291-92 (1992); CHAPIN D. CLARK, SURVEY OF OREGON'S WATER
LAws 94-95 (1974); see, e.g., Morgan v. Shaw, 83 P. 534, 535 (Or. 1906) (noting that
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the water to beneficial use before obtaining a permit.'°' When the
Oregon legislature first established the prior appropriation-based water
code in 1909, it was conscious of water users who had been appropriating water prior to the code's establishment. To account for the precode or inchoate rights, ' the legislature created a section in the water
code dedicated to pre-1909 surface water appropriators.' 3 That section
protected pre-code rights by stating that nothing in the Water Rights
Act was to affect the relative priorities established by court decrees
pending on or established prior to February 24, 1909.04
Any person or agency that put surface water to beneficial use before this date, as a riparian user or under the authority of a riparian
owner, was able to obtain a vested water right.' If an appropriator had
not yet begun to divert water, but had begun constructing diversion
works, the legislature deemed that the water right was vested with the
riparian proprietor."' However, the proprietor had to complete the
works within a "reasonable time" after February 24, 1909.07 The provision allowing water users to convert riparian rights into vested surface
water appropriative rights had a sunset date-any person or governmental agency claiming an undetermined vested right had to do so
before December 31, 1992, or the Department assumed the riparian
However, any person or agency
owner had abandoned the right.'
Oregon recognizes "the common-law doctrine of riparian rights, as modified by the
rule of prior appropriation"); Brown v. Baker, 39 P. 799, 801 (1901) ("The first settler
upon public land through which a stream of water flows may either divert the water,
and use it for a beneficial purpose, or exercise the common-law right prevailing in the
Pacific Coast states, where the modified rule of riparian ownership is still in force, and
insist that the stream shall flow in its natural channel undiminished in quantity, except
when applied to the natural use of the upper riparian proprietors, and for irrigation if
the stream affords a sufficient quantity of water for the latter purpose.") (citing Low v.
Schaffer, 33 P. 678 (1893); North Powder Mill. Co. v. Coughanour, 54 P. 223 (1898)).
The federal Desert Land Act of 1877 severed riparian water rights from public lands,
making the water available for appropriation. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 160-61 (1935); Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083, 1097 (Or.
1909), overruled on other grounds by 102 P. 728 (Or. 1909).
101. State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard, 570 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
102. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-028-0010(10) (2008); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 536.007(11)
(2007) (defining an "undetermined vested right" as a "water right claimed under ORS
539.010 as having vested or as having been initiated before February 24, 1909, that has
not been determined in an adjudication proceeding under ORS chapter 539 nor is
evidenced by a permit or certificate issued under the Water Rights Act").
103. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 539.005-.350 (2007).
104. Id. § 539.010(3).
105. Id. § 539.010(1).
106. Id. § 539.010(2).
107. Id. The Director could extend the "reasonable time" after taking into consideration, the good faith of the appropriator, the appropriation costs, the market for water
or power to be supplied, the present demands, and "the income that may be required
to provide fair and reasonable returns upon the investment." Id. § 539.010(5).
108. Id.§539.240(1), (3).
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claiming a pre-code appropriation had one year following. this date to
rebut the abandonment presumption."°
Similar to how the water code dealt with existing surface water uses,
when the legislature enacted the Groundwater Act of 1955 it provided
a registration mechanism for existing groundwater uses."' Registration
provided a way to integrate groundwater uses that were occurring prior
to the Act's passage in 1955 into the permit system."' The Act created
a statutory window of three years from August 3, 1955, during which
time any person or public agency could come forward to register their
existing, beneficial use of groundwater."2 If people or agencies failed
to register their groundwater use within the three-year period, the Department presumed that they had abandoned the claim." 3 If they did
register their groundwater use, the certificate of registration is evidence of the holder's right to appropriate groundwater" 4 and the registration's priority date is the date on which the well construction began."5
While the Commission sets rules and policies regulating water
permitting, the Department carries out those rules and issues the actual permits."' This section provides an overview of the permitting
process and the roles of the Department and Commission in that
process. The overview covers both surface and groundwater permitting and highlights differences in the two similar, yet distinct
processes.
Oregon Revised Statutes sections 537.130 to 537.220 govern surface
water permitting, while Oregon Revised Statutes sections 537.615 to
537.635 govern groundwater permitting."8 Both provisions entail a
seven-step process consisting of: (1) filing the Department's "Application for a Permit to Use [Surface or Ground] Water"; (2) a determination of whether the application is complete and whether the proposed
use is prohibited by statute; (3) an initial review to determine whether
water is available and whether the proposed use is restricted or limited
by statute; (4) public notice of the application and a thirty-day comment period; (5) a proposed final order explaining the proposed decision to approve or deny the application; (6) another public notice with
a 45 day period for the filing of a protest or standing statement; and
(7) a final order approving, rejecting, or approving with modifications
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. § 539.240(4).
Id. § 537.585.
See id.
Id. § 537.605(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.§ 537.610(3).
Id. § 536.025(1)-(2); see also id. § 537.130(1).
See infra Section V. for a more detailed discussion of groundwater.
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.130-.220, 537.615-.635 (2007).
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the proposed final order."' Although the process for surface and
groundwater permitting is similar, the Department uses different standards of review when considering the important public interest aspect
of surface and groundwater permitting.'
a. Application
Applicants begin the process by filing the Department's application
form with the Department.'' The form requires applicants to provide
their name and address; information on the proposed use, location,
and amount of water; contact information for land owners whose land
will be crossed by the proposed diversion ditch or canal; a statement of
whether the applicant may access the diversion structures on nonowned land; a construction timeline; a map and description of the
proposed diversion and use; and all other information and data that is
required in the application form or that the Department deems necesGroundwater applications require
sary to evaluate the application.'
information on the water table depth and well specifications.''
b. Completeness Determination
Within fifteen days after receipt of the application, the Department
must undertake a "completeness determination" to evaluate whether
the application includes all of the necessary information. ' If the application is complete and no statute prohibits the proposed use,2 5 the
priority date for any resulting permit will be the date on which the department received the application.'
119. See id. §§ 537.140(1)(a), .150(1), (3)-(4), (6)-(7), .153(1), (7), (8)(a), .170(6)
(setting forth the procedure for surface water permitting); id. §§ 537.620(2)-(4), (6),
(7), .621(1), (6)-(9), .625(1) (setting forth the procedure for groundwater permitting).
120. Compare id. §§ 537.153(2)(b)(A)-(B), .170(8) (surface water), with id. §§
537.621(2) (a)-(b).

121.
122.
(2008).

Id. § 537.140(1)(a).
Id. § 537.140(1) (a) (A)-(I), (3)-(4) (2007); see also OR.

ADMIN.

R. 690-310-0040

The statutes and regulations contain additional requirements for reservoirs

and water storage projects, agricultural purposes, power purposes, municipal water
supplies, and mining purposes. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.140(1) (b)-(f) (2007); OR. ADMIN.
R. 690-310-0040(c)-(h) (2008).

123.
124.
ADMIN.

OR. REr. STAT. § 537.615(1), (2)(g)-(j) (2007).
Id. § 537.150(1) (surface water); id. § 537.620(2) (ground water); see also OR.

R. 690-310-0070(1) (2008).

125. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0070(4) (2008). If any statute does prohibit the proposed use, the Department will reject the permit application and return all fees to the
applicant. Id. One such statute is Oregon Revised Statute chapter 538, which withdraws certain water from appropriation. OR. REv. STAT. § 538.101-450 (2007).
126. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.150(2) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.620(2) (groundwater).
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c. InitialReview
Upon determining that the application is complete, the Department undertakes an "initial review."'' 7 At this stage, one of five caseworkers in the Department's water rights section reviews the application to determine whether a statute or rule restricts the proposed use,
whether the requested amount of water is available, whether any other
issues would preclude permit approval, and, in the case of groundwater
application, whether the proposed use is located in a designated critical groundwater area and thus restricted.'28 Division 410 of the administrative rules provides various statewide water resource management
policies. These policies include several provisions, namely Oregon
Administrative Rules 690-410-030 and 690-410-070, which address vaious instream values that the Department should consider when evaluating applications for new water rights." The Department has no
formal step for evaluating the policies but includes these considerations as part of the public interest review discussed later in this section. "'
During this review phase the Department consults with other agencies such as the state Departments of Fish and Wildlife and Environmental Quality.'' The Department provides a specific comment form
to these agencies and often incorporates comments into the proposed
final order in advance. 2 The goal of the OWRD is to avoid a formal
protest by working out potential issues at this stage in consultation with
the resource agencies.'
The OWRD reports that the ODFW is a far
more active participant than the DEQ' 34 The Department must complete the initial review and inform the applicant of its preliminary decision no later than thirty days after determining the application is complete.'
Applicants may choose to withdraw their permit application
within fourteen days of receiving the Department's preliminary decision notice. 1' If the applicants choose not to withdraw their permit

127. Id. § 537.150(4) (surface water); id. § 537.620(4) (groundwater).
128. Id. § 537.150(4) (surface water); id. § 537.620(4) (groundwater); see also Interview with Dwight French, supra note 67.

129. "OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-030(1), -0070(1) (2008).
130.

See generally infra Section II. for a discussion of the public interest review.

131.

RIcK BASTAScH, THE OREGON WATER HANDBOOK 93 (rev. ed. 2006).

132.

Interview with Or. Water Res. Dep't, supra note 68.

133.
134.

Id.
Id.

135. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.150(5) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.620(5) (groundwater); but see Interview with Dwight French, supra note 67 (According to the OWRD, it
often takes longer than thirty days to complete the initial review, but the review is
usually complete within forty-five days).
136. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.150(5) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.620(5) (groundwater).
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application, the Department must give public notice of the application
within seven days.' 7
d. Public Notice
The Department publishes water right public notices weekly on its
website.' 8 The notice must include a request for comments;. a note
on what type of water use is being considered; the county in which the
water will be used; the application file number; the applicant's name
and address; the amount of the proposed water use in gallons per
minute, cubic feet per second, or acre feet of storage; the common
name of the basin; the nature of the use; and the location of the proposed point of diversion."'° The Department must transmit the notice
to federal, state, and local agencies (including local planning departments) that may be affected by the application.'' The Department
must also send notice to any property owners whose land may be
crossed,' 2 affected Indian tribes, and people on the Department's
weekly mailing list.'3 Written comments are due to the Department
thirty days after publication.'
e. ProposedFinal Order
After receiving public comments, the Department will review the
application and, within sixty days of completing the initial review, issue
a proposed final order approving or denying the application or approving the application with modifications or conditions.'5 The Department must include findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
proposed final order, including, but not limited to:
, a confirmation that the determinations made in the initial review
are still correct, or a note on modifications to the initial review;

137. Id. § 537.150(6) (surface water); id. § 537.620(6) (groundwater).
138. Or. Water Res. Dep't, http://www.wrd.state.or.us/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
You may sign up to automatically receive email notification when the weekly notice is
posted by visiting http://www.oregon.gov/OWRD/PUBS/subscriptions.shtml and
clicking on subscription option number 6, "OWRD Public Notice."
139. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.150(6) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.620(6) (groundwater).
140. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0090(1) (2008).
141. Id. 690-310-0090(2)(a).

142.

This is primarily a concern for surface water applicants whose proposed ditch

or canal will cross another's land. See id. 690-310-0040(1)(a) (F), -0090(2)(b).
143. Id. 690-310-0090(2)(b)-(d).
144. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.620(7) (2007).
145. Id. § 537.153(1) (surface water); id. § 537.621(1) (groundwater).
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a brief statement explaining what criteria the Department considered relevant, including the applicable basin program and the
proposed use's compatibility with applicable land use plans;
a water-availability and water-use assessment;
an assessment of whether the proposed use would injure existing
water rights;
an assessment of whether the proposed use would ensure the
preservation of the public welfare, safety, and health ("public interest");
a draft of the permit to be issued, including any proposed conditions or, alternately, a recommendation to deny the application;
whether the Department has established the rebuttable presumption that the proposed use preserves the public interest;
the date by which the Department must receive protests; and
for groundwater, the flow rate and duty, when applicable, of water that the permit will allow. When setting the flow rate, the
Department will apply the general basin-wide standard unless
the applicant provides information demonstrating the need for a
higher flow rate and duty or less if requested by applicant.'46

As of the late 1990s, the statute allows the presumption that the
public interest is satisfied. 4 ' Thus, the Department presumes a water
right application is in the public interest if five criteria are met. These
criteria are: (1) no statute prohibits the water use; (2) no rule or policy
prohibits the water use; (3) there is water available for the use; (4) the
use complies with the rules of the Commission, including the applicable basin program; and (5) the new water use does not injure existing
rights.' 48 This article discusses each of these in more detail below. The
presumption in favor of a new water right is rebuttable and can be
overcome by a preponderance of evidence that any one or more of the
criteria have not been satisfied.' 9 The Department then issues a proposed final order recommending issuance of the permit subject to any
appropriate modifications or conditions.' 5° If the public interest presumption is not satisfied, the Department's proposed final order will
deny the application."'

146. Id. § 537.153(3) (surface water); id. § 537.621(3)-(4) (groundwater).
147. Id. § 537.153(2). See infra Section II. for further discussion of the public interest review process.
148. Id. § 537.153(2).

149. Id. § 537.153(2)(a).
150. OR. ADNN. R. 690-310-0140(4) (2008)(groundwater); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-3100120(3) (surface water).
151. Id. 690-310-0140(5) (groundwater); 690-310-0120(2) (a) (surface water).
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f Notice of ProposedFinal Order
Within seven days of issuing the proposed final order, the Department again gives public notice in its weekly notice bulletin. Any person who supports the proposed final order may request standing to
participate in a contested case hearing,' 3 and any person that opposes
the order may submit a protest.' A person that opposes the proposed
final order must submit a protest in order to preserve her standing to
participate in a contested case proceeding.'55 If a person submits
comments during the initial comment period but does not submit a
protest following the release of the proposed final order, she will not
have standing to participate in a contested case proceeding.'
A nonapplicant must pay a $350 fee to submit a protest to the Department 7
and a separate fee to request standing.' 8
Interested parties, including but not limited to individuals, other
agencies, and nonprofit groups, may comment on the application during either the initial review period or following the release of the proposed final order.5 5 The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife
("ODFW") plays a particularly important role at the initial review stage
through operation of the Division 33 rules on the public interest review with regard to sensitive, threatened or endangered species. '
While the ODFW is not mandated to review each new application, the
agency does possess significant authority to address water rights applications.'"' A more thorough discussion of the Division 33 rules follows
below in the public interest section.'
g.Final Order

152. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.153(4) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.621(5) (groundwater).
153. Id. § 537.153(5); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0160(2) (2008) (surface water); OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.621(6) (2007) (groundwater).
154. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.153(6) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0160(1) (2008)

(surface water); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.621(7) (2007) (groundwater).

Requests for

standing and protests must be submitted within forty-five days of the when department's notice is publicized. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.153(7) (2007) (surface water); id. §
537.621(8) (ground water). OR. ADMIN. R 690-310-0160(1), (3) (2008) set forth the
requirements for requesting standing and submitting a protest.
155. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(2) (c) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-002-0010(6) (2008).
156. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(2)(c) (2007).
157. Id. § 536.050(1)(j).
158. Id. § 536.050(1) (n).
159. Id. § 537.150(7) (surface water); id. § 537.620(7) (ground water).
160. OR. ADMIN. R.690-033-0000(1) (2008).
161. See id. 690-033-0000(2).

162.

See infraSection II.D.3.
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Within sixty days after the close of the protest period, the Director
must either schedule a contested case hearing or issue a final order.'
The Department will hold a contested case hearing if it received a protest and if the Director finds there are significant disputes related to
the proposed water use." An administrative law judge oversees the
hearing and determines what issues the hearing will consider.'65 The
statute limits those allowed to participate in the hearing to the applicant, any person who files a timely protest, and any person who files a
timely request for standing and requests to intervene before the proceeding starts.'" The rules allow for "any person" to request standing
or submit a protest; thus a person need not have participated in the
first round of comments or be a water right holder to oppose or support the order.'6 7 The Oregon Administrative Procedures Act governs
the hearing, with the exception that the water code does not allow for
interlocutory appeal."
The Director will issue a final order if there is no protest or, if
there is a protest, after the contested case hearing.'" The final order
may approve or reject the permit application, or the order may condition the approval based on modifying and/or restricting the permit.'7 °
When developing the final order, the Director must consider all of the
comments and protests that the Department received, but the final
order does not need to address each comment and protest separately.' 7' If the Department approves the application, it issues a permit to
appropriate water and the permittee may begin constructing diversion
works.'
The permittee must complete the construction within five
years.

163. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.153(8) (2007) (surface water); id.§ 537.621(9) (groundwater).
164. Id. § 537.153(8) (b) (A) (surface water); id. § 537.621(9) (b) (A) (groundwater).
165. Id. § 537.170(1) (surface water); id. § 537.622(1) (groundwater).
166. Id. § 537.170(2) (surface water); id. § 537.622(2) (groundwater).
167. Id. § 537.170(2) (b)-(c) (surface water); id. § 537.622(2) (b)-(c) (groundwater).
168. Id. § 537.170(3) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.622(3) (groundwater). The
Oregon Administrative Procedures Act is codified at OR. REv. STAT. §§ 183.310-.690
(2007). An interlocutory appeal is an appeal that occurs before the trial court has
made a final ruling on the entire case. BLAcK's LAw DIcIONARY (8th ed. 2004). "Some
interlocutory appeals involve legal points necessary to the determination of the case,
while others involve collateral orders that are wholly separate from the merits of the
action." Id.
169. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(6) (2007) (surface water); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0200
(2008) (groundwater).
170. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(6) (2007) (surface water); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0200
(2008) (groundwater).
171. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0220(2) (2008).
172. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.211(1) (2007).
173. Id. § 537.230(1). If the permit is for municipal water use, the user must complete construction within twenty years. Id. § 537.230(2).
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After completing construction, the permit holder must perfect the
right by putting the water to beneficial use, and hire a water right examiner to survey the appropriation.'74 At this point, the permittee can
request a water right certificate from the Department.'75 The Department's issuance of a certificate completes the water right process, and
the right holder may use the water for beneficial purposes in accordance with the certificate's terms."'
D. APPLICATION PROCESS FOR WATER RIGHT TRANSFERS

In Oregon today, virtually all of the surface water has been appropriated.'7 Thus, to meet changing and increasing water demands, parties will necessarily rely more heavily on the water rights transfer
process. If a right holder wishes to use water for a purpose other than
her water permit allows, use the water in a different location, or divert
the water from a different spot, the right holder must file a transfer
application with the Department. 7 ' A surface water user may also
transfer her point of diversion to appropriate groundwater. 9 Only
certain rights may be transferred, namely those that
" have been adjudicated and have received a court decree;
" have received a water right certificate;
" have a permit for which a request for issuance of a water right
certificate has been received and approved; or
* the Department has approved a previous a transfer for and satisfactory proof of completion has been filed with the Commission.'

174.
175.
176.

Id. § 537.230(4).
Id. § 537.250(1).
Id. § 537.250(3).

177.

OR. WATER RES. DEP'T, WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON: AN INTRODUCTION TO

OREGON'S WATER LAWS 15 (2008), availableat

http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/aquabook.pdf.
178. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.520(1) (2007). Oregon Statutory Chapter 540 codifies the
requirements and process for transferring a water right. A water right holder may
apply for a permanent or temporary transfer; the Department will grant a temporary
transfer for a period no longer than five years. Id. §§ 540.520-.523; OR- ADMIN. R.
690-380-2000 (2008).
179. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.531(1) (2007). However, the Department must find that:
(1) the aquifer is hydraulically connected to the surface water, (2) the change will not
result in enlargement or injury to existing water rights, (3) the change will affect the
surface water the same as the authorized use, and (4) the proposed groundwater use is
located within 500 feet of the surface water, and when the surface water is a stream, is
also located within 1,000 feet upstream or downstream of the original point of diversion. Id. § 540.531(2) (a).
180. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.505(4) (2007).
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The application for a transfer must include: the applicant's name,
mailing address, and telephone number; how the applicant previously
used the water; a description of the premises where the water is used; a
description of the premises where the application proposes to use the
water; the water's proposed use; the reasons for making the proposed
change; and evidence that the water has been used over the past five
years, such that it is not subject to forfeiture.'8 ' Furthermore, if the
applicant is filing for a change in the point of diversion, the right
holder must provide a proper fish screen at the new point of diversion
if the Department of Fish and Wildlife requests one. "2 For a temporary
transfer, the Commission may require the applicant to include any
other information the rule may require."'
After an applicant has filed for a transfer, the Department usually
publishes a public notice in a local newspaper for three weeks and in
the weekly notice published by the Department.'84 After the final notification, a thirty-day protest period begins.'85 During this time, any person may file a protest with the Department.'
Essentially, any filing
that shows a relationship to the water source and contains the appropriate fee constitutes a protest.' 7 A protest triggers the contested case
process. 88 Following the opportunity for protest, and contested case
hearing if applicable, there is a three-month appeals period, after
which the transfer order may not be challenged.'
The Department's criteria for a transfer application differ from its
criteria for a new permit application. For example, during the transfer
process,
the Department does not conduct a water availability analy9
sis.

0

Also, except for analyzing injury to existing water rights and

checking for compliance with statewide planning goals, the Department does not conduct a full public interest review during the transfer
process.'
The Department is mainly concerned if the transfer will
result in enlargement or injury to existing rights.' The instream trans181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. § 540.520(2); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-3000 (2008).
OR. REv. STAT. § 540.525 (2007); OR. ADNN. R. 690-380-5060 (2008).
OR. REV. STAT. § 540.523(1) (d) (2007).
Id. § 540.520(5).
Id. § 540.520(6).
Id.
Id. § 537.153(6).
Id. § 537.153(8); interview with Or. Water Res. Dep't, supranote 68.
Kerivan v. Water Res. Comm'n, 72 P.3d 659, 665 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 540.505-.560 (2007); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-4010

(2008).
191. See infra Section II. for the public interest analysis of new permit applications.
See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 540.505-.560 (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-4010 (2008);
BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 136.
192. Interview with Bob Rice, Water Res. Dep't (Mar. 4, 2008). See also OR. ADMIN. R.
690-380-4010(2) (c)-(d) (2008). In point of diversion transfers, the holders of the in-

jured water rights can consent to the proposed change; the Department must get a

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 12

fer procedure includes the same application process as other transfers,
9
but-the Department evaluates the application with additional criteria.
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

Though detailed and complicated, the administrative process in
Oregon, like most western states, represents the mechanism by which
water users, those impacted by water use, and the state agencies responsible for various resources can engage the system and participate
in determining how water resources will be used in the state.
As western states begin to tackle the relationship among energy,
water, land-use and climate policy, policymakers should evaluate the
effectiveness of the planning and allocation systems envisioned in the
water code both through the prior appropriation system and through
the 1955 basin-planning program. Many commentators express frustration at the lack of coordination, for example, between land-use
planning and water planning in the state of Oregon, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 6 of this article. In adopting the 1909
water code, the legislature focused on creating a system that would
allocate water rights, and the current situation may demand a system
that manages and conserves water. Understanding the basic administrative structure and authorities allows individuals to evaluate the potential for existing law to meet our modern needs.
In particular, the transfer process becomes extremely important as
the state looks to moving uses of water to those that are more critical or
in higher demand in the state. Because there is very little unused or
unaccounted for water left to allocate, the primary tool for shifting
water use toward conservation and emerging consumptive needs will
be the transfer process. As part of the transfer process, the Department
must evaluate whether the transfer will injure existing right. The contours and factors in the injury analysis are critical because they will determine whether established existing uses lock in water or whether users can transfer it to more efficient or higher demand current uses.
The extensive administrative process set out above also demonstrates that the Oregon Water Resources Department, or any water
allocation agency in the western United States, does not stand as the
sole state agency with an important role to play in freshwater conservation. Too often, the scrutiny of freshwater conservation focuses directly on the agency responsible for water allocation. In fact, the Department of Environmental Quality plays a significant role in protecting
consenting affidavit from every holder of the injured water right. Id. 690-380-5030(1).
If the proposed transfer will injure an instream right, the Department may consent to
its injury only if it receives a recommendation from the agency that requested the instream right. Id. 690-380-5050.
OR. ADNnN. R. 690-077-0075(1)-(5) (2008). For a further discussion of instream
193.
right transfers, see infra Section IV.C.
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and preserving the water quality attributes of our freshwater systems
and has some authority to use instream rights to meet and achieve water quality standards. In addition to the DEQ Parks and Recreation
and the ODFW possess similar authorities to secure instream rights.
Some agencies have explored these authorities more than others. Further, as part of the initial review process for water rights, the DEQ
Parks and Recreation and the ODFW can provide comments with regard to the impact of a proposed water right or change to the resources they are responsible for managing and protecting. In addition,
water utilities and the Health Division also have a role to play in water
source protection. The freshwater conservation community does not
typically consider these entities part of the freshwater conservation
community, but that perspective may change as they emerge as an important component of the overall legal and regulatory authorities that
deal with the protection and conservation of water resources. These
agencies and their authorities may be even more relevant as states look
for ways to build resilience into systems as a method for dealing with
climate change. In the end a thorough understanding of the basics of
administrative law and the relevant administrative agencies will benefit
those interested in freshwater conservation and those pursuing a more
integrated energy and water policy.
H. WATER RIGHT PERMITTING: PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW
Beyond an in-depth understanding and appreciation for the administrative law context for freshwater conservation, it is important for
policymakers to engage the substantive details of state water codes in
the western United States. Perhaps the most important, but often underutilized and sidelined principle embedded in western water codes is
the notion of the public interest review. In nearly every western state,
the water rights appropriation process includes a public interest review.'94 These reviews recognize that granting appropriations of water
rights impacts the entire public and that the State, as the trustee for
the water resources of the state, carries an obligation to evaluate the
appropriations in light of the overall public interest. The public interest review may hold the most promise for providing the mechanism, in
the existing water code to integrate energy and climate issue into water
policy. Unfortunately, in many states the public interest review has
been diminished or ignored.'95

194. D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses: The
History of Conflict, the Prospectsfor Accommodation, 21 ENvr.. L. 1,7 (1991); Douglas L.
Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation in the West, 9 UNIV. OF DENY.

WATER L. REv. 488, 488, n. 1 (Spring, 2006).
195.

See Generally, Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review in Water Alloca-

tion in the West, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 485 (2006).
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In Oregon, when the Water Resources Department determines
whether or not to issue a water right permit, the public interest review
functions as perhaps the most critical finding and encompasses many
of the other findings required by the water code.' 6 For a surface water
right, the Department will presume that a proposed surface water use
preserves the public welfare, safety and health if: (1) the use is allowed
in the applicable basin program ' or is statutorily preferred;. 8 (2) water
is available;"n (3) the use will not injure other water rights;2 9 and (4)
the use complies with Water Resources Commission rules.20 ' The pre-

sumption is rebuttable, however, and may be overcome upon either
the Department's finding that one or more of the criteria for establishing the presumption is absent or that public comments, a protest, or a
Department finding specifically show, by a preponderance of evidence,
an aspect of the public interest that the proposed use would impair.°0
2 did not presume
Before 1995, the Department or Commission 03
that a proposed use was within the public interest.2 4 Instead, Oregon
statutes required the Commission to consider whether the proposed
use impaired the public interest.2 5 The change was due to the 1995
water-focused Oregon legislature, which passed 60 water-related bills.0
In particular, Senate Bill 674 was the changing force for the public
interest standard. 7 Before the bill was passed, the Commission considered seven factors to determine whether the proposed use would im-

196.
See BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 73.
197. Basin programs are established pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. §§ 536.300, .340
(2007) and governed by OR. ADMIN. R. sections 690-500-0005 to 690-520-0600 (2008).
The Water Resources Commission has adopted basin programs for the following basins: North Coast Basin; Willamette Basin; Sandy Basin; Hood Basin; Deschutes Basin;
John Day Basin; Umatilla Basin; Grand Ronde Basin; Powder Basin; Malheur-Owyhee
Basins; Goose and Summer Lakes Basin; Rogue Basin; Umpqua Basin; South Coast
Basin; Mid Coast Basin; Columbia River; Middle Snake River Basin. Id.
198. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.310(12) (2007).
199. Id. § 537.621(2).
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.; see also id. § 536.153(2) (applying the same principles and presumptions to
groundwater appropriation).
The law changed over the years as to which agency, the Commission or De203.
partment, conducted the public interest analysis. See Gail L. Achterman & Peter D.
Mostow, Senate Bill 647: Increasingthe Flow Rate of Oregon's Water Rights PermittingProcess,
32 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 187,193 (1996).
204. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170 (1993) (amended by S.B. 674, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 1995)). See also Achterman & Mostow, supra note 203, at 202-03.
205. 41 Or. Op. Att'y Gen. 61 (1980) (the attorney general wrote, "[t]he director
must determine whether the proposed application prejudicially affects the public interest.").
206. Achterman & Mostow, supra note 203, at 187.
207. S.B. 674, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995) (codified at OR. REV. STAT §§ 537.170,
.173 (2007)); Achterman & Mostow, supranote 203, at 187.
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pair the public interest.2" Following the state's enactment of SB 674,
the Department now applies these seven factors only if the protestor
rebuts the presumption of public interest."' SB 674 shifted the burden
of proof from the new appropriator to the protestor 2 " Now, the burden is on the protestor who believes the proposed use is detrimental to
the public interest."' Arguably, SB 674 also changed the state's water
allocation focus. Before 1995, the state's focus as on protecting the
public interest; after 1995, the focus shifted to allocating the state's
water resources. 212
The public interest review is, at least in theory,213 stricter for
groundwater permits than for surface water permits because the statutory language contains an affirmative obligation not present in the surface water provisions."' When reviewing an application for surface water withdrawal, the Department must consider whether the proposed
208.

OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5) (1993) (amended by S.B. 674, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Or. 1995)). The seven factors were: "(1) conservation of the highest use of the water
for all purposes, (2) maximum economic development, (3) control of water for all
beneficial purposes, (4) water availability, (5) prevention of waste, (6) existing water
rights, and (7) the state water resources policy." Actherman & Mostow, supra note 203,
at 210.
209. Achterman & Mostow, supra note 203, at 210.
210. Id.
211.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.153(2) (b) (2007) (mandating that the burden of proof for
determining when a proposed use will hinder the public interest is by a preponderance
of the evidence); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(5) (1993) (amended by S.B. 674, 68th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995)) ("If in the judgment of the Water Resources Commission, the
proposed use may prejudicially affect the public interest ... the commission shall hold
a public hearing.").
212. One of the motivations to pass SB 674 was to speed up the process of the water
right permitting process. Achterman & Mostow, supra note 203, at 196-97.
213. BASTAsCH, supra note 131, at 75 (citing CHAPIN D. CIARKI, OR. WATER REs.
REsEARCH INST., SURVEY OF OREGON'S WATER LAWS 195 (1974)). Bastasch writes that, in
practice, the Department has not applied the stricter standard. Id. Oregon statutory
section 537.621(2) affirmatively provides that the Department must determine "whether the proposed use will ensure the preservation of the public welfare, safety and
health." OR. REv. STAT. § 537.621(2) (2007). Bastasch recognizes that in practice the
Department has not applied the standard in the more stringent manner. See BASTASH,
supra note 131, at 75. Some commentators actually observe less scrutiny applied to
groundwater applications and note that in a situation where the Department has no
information regarding the public interest, the Department simply grants the permit.
See generally id.
214. The statute regarding groundwater reads: "the department shall determine whether the proposed use will ensure the preservation of the public welfare, safety and health....
[t]he department shall presume that a proposed use will ensure the preservation of
public, welfare, safety and health if" the same criteria as surface water provision is met.
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.621(2) (2007) (emphasis added). The statute regarding surface
water contains no language like the italicized language above, but rather moves directly to the presumption, reading: "the department shall presume that a proposed use will
not impair or be detrimental to the public interest if the proposed use is" allowed in
the basin program, water is available, use causes no injury, and use complies with rules
of Water Resources Commission. Id. § 537.153(2).
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use would impair the public interest, employing the presumption in
favor of finding the public interest has been satisfied. 1 ' In contrast,
when reviewing a groundwater application, the Department must affirmatively show that the proposed withdrawal will preserve the public
welfare, safety, and health."6 This stricter standard of review, in theory,
could make the burden on a groundwater applicant greater than the
burden on a surface water applicant. In practice, however, parties may
experience no difference in the burdens between groundwater and
surface water applications." 7
Once the Department determines that the application meets the
presumption of public interest preservation, the Department evaluates
any information available in its files and any comments received from
the public or other interested agencies to determine if any of that information overcomes the presumption."8 The Department may also
consult with state and federal agencies and local governments and
must consider at least the following factors: water use efficiency and
avoiding waste; threatened, endangered, or sensitive species; water
quality; fish or wildlife; recreation; economic development; local comprehensive plans (including supporting provisions such as public facilities plans); and, for groundwater sources, stability of groundwater levels and thermal characteristics of the groundwater source. 1 Based on
information gathered from the foregoing sources, the Department may
overcome the presumption, and deny the permit, if a preponderance
shows that the proposed use will not preserve the public
of evidence
20
interest.

If the Department finds that the preponderance of evidence does
not overcome the presumption, the Department will issue a proposed
final order recommending that it issue the permit subject to any apIf the presumption is not sapropriate modifications or conditions.'
tisfied, the Department's proposed final order will deny the application. 2
215. Id. § 537.153(3) (e) (2007) ("The proposed final order shall cite findings of fact
and conclusions of law and shall include... [a] n assessment of whether the proposed
use would impair or be detrimental to the public interest... ").
216. Id. § 537.621(2) ("In reviewing the application ... the department shall determine whether the proposed use will ensure the preservation of the public welfare,
safety, and health .... ").
217. See generally BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 75.
218. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0140(3)(a) (2008) (groundwater); id. 690-3100120(3) (a) (surface water).
219. Id. 690-310-0140(3)(b)-(c) (groundwater); id. 690-310-0120(3)(b)-(c) (surface
water).
220. Id. 690-310-0140(3) (a) (groundwater); id. 690-310-0120(3) (a) (surface water).
221. Id. 690-310-0140(4) (groundwater); id. 690-310-0120(4) (surface water).
222. Id. 690-310-0140(5) (groundwater) ("If the Department finds under section (4)
of this rule that the presumption is overcome, the Department shall issue a final order
in accordance with OAR 690-310-0190 denying the application unless the Department
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When the Department engages in the public interest review it considers the following factors discussed in the following sections. These
factors provide most of the substantive evaluation of a new water right.
As a result, the public interest review serves as the vehicle for addressing many of the important freshwater conservation issues.
A. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA: BASIN PROGRAMS AND STATUTORY
PREFERENCE

"Basin programs are administrative rules which establish water
management policies and objectives and which and govern the appropriation and use of the surface and groundwater within the state's major river basins."2 3 These programs supplement the statewide rules
governing water use and allocation by withdrawing streams in some
basins from further appropriation and greatly limiting the allowable
uses in others.2 4 Basin program rules enforce these limitations by classifying surface and groundwater according to permitted uses. The
rules may establish preferences among uses, withdraw surface and
groundwater from further appropriation, reserve waters for specified
future uses, and establish minimum perennial stream flows. 2 5 In 1955,

basin plans were prepared for every basin in the state, 6 but the state
has not updated these plans on a regular basis despite the statutory
directive.
B. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA: WATER AVAILABILITY

If the basin program does not prohibit the proposed water use, the
Department next determines if there is water available to appropriate."' The Department measures surface and groundwater availability
differently. 8 While a detailed formula exists for measuring surface
water, the Department uses no such formula for groundwater unless

makes specific findings to demonstrate that the issuance of a permit will ensure the preservationof
the public welfare, safety and health." (emphasis added)); id. 690-310-0120(5) (surface
water).
223. Id. 690.500.0010(2).
224. Id. For a more detailed discussion on basin management plans see infra Section VI.A.
225. OR. ADMIN. R. 690.500.0010(2) (2008).
226. See Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achterman, Symposium Article, Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon'sInstream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVrL. L. 1125, 1141 nn.92-93
(2006).
227. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.150(4)(a)-(b) (2007).
228. See supra Section II (elaborating on the bifurcated system of laws established for

both ground water and surface water).
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there is the potential for substantial interference with surface water,
2
and then the Department employs surface water formulas. "
To begin the water right application process, the Department determines if water is available from the proposed source.23 ° The availability determination implements the broad policy goals underlying the
state's water allocation system: (1) water must be available and not
over-appropriated; (2) the Department must allocate water consistent
with principles of public ownership; and (3) appropriations must use
water for beneficial use without waste. 23

1. Surface Water Availability; Water Must Not Be Over-Appropriated
In general, the Department determines water availability by calculating the natural stream flow of a particular water source and then
instream flow
subtracting existing water rights, storage rights 3and
2
fights. The Department uses the following formula:
I

~WA= QNSF- ST

-

CU

-

IS

The formula subtracts the existing storage (ST), the out of stream
consumptive uses (CU) and the instream demands (IS) from the natural stream flow (QNSF) in order to arrive at the amount of surface water available for appropriation. 3
As the administrative rule specifies, the Department determines
water availability for appropriation based on the "eighty-percent exceedance rule. 2 4 This exceedance rate means that water is available
for appropriation if, at a given time, there would be enough water in

229. See OR. ADNN. R.690-009-0010 to -0050 (2008) (describing the procedures for
determining "substantial interference" with surface water and the applicable standards
to be applied).
230. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.150(4)(b) (2007) (mandating that this determination
must come after a finding that the use is not restricted or limited by statute or rule,
and there is no other issue the Department identifies which may preclude approval of
or restrict the proposed use).
231. OR. ADMN. R. 690-410-0070(1) (2008) (setting forth that the general policy
behind the state's process on water availability is "[t]he waters of the state shall be
allocated within the capacity of the resource and consistent with the principle that
water belongs to the public to be used beneficially without waste ...[the waters] shall
be protected from over-appropriation.").
232. RIcHARD M. COOPER, DETERMINING SURFACE WATER AVAILABILrTY IN OREGON 1
(2002), availableat http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/reports/SW02-002.pdf.
233. Id.
234. OR. ADMIN. R.690-400-0010(11) (a) (A) (2008); see also id. 690-400-0010(11)(b)
(stating that these standards apply to all water availability determinations for permit
applications submitted afterJuly 17, 1992).
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the stream at least 80 percent of the time. In theory, at full appropri
ation, the most junior water right holder can expect water 80 percent
of time during that period. 6
The Department bases allocations for instream and storage rights
on the 50 percent exceedance natural stream flow. 2 37 The Department

also uses the 50 percent exceedance as a proxy when calculating the
estimated average natural flow ("EANF") since the 50 percent exceedance represents the median flow.2 "8 The exceedance standard increases

the potential for the Department to issue instream rights.2 3 Because
the Department need only find that there is enough water to meet an
instream right's demands 50 percent of the time, it may grant instream
rights when there is-less water in the stream. 4 °
For either exceedance level, the Department cannot allocate new
water rights unless there is enough water available to avoid overappropriation as the Administrative Rules define it. 41

In reality, how-

ever, whether water is available in a given year depends on hydrology,
not on exceedance levels. Even when a stream is over-appropriated,
the Department may allow some additional uses if the uses further the
public interest and are conditioned to protect instream values. 42 Occasionally, the Department receives requests to appropriate elevated or
peak flows that occur even less frequently than the 50 percent or 80
percent exceedance levels.4 3 With increased demand on freshwater,
many observers anticipate that the Department will see more of these
applications in the future.
The Department calculates water availability using either gaged
stream flows or estimated stream flows at the downstream end of spe235. Id. 690-400-0010(11) (a) (A) (2008) (defining "over-appropriated" water allocation as that in which the quantity of surface water available during a specified period is
not sufficient to meet the expected demands from all water rights at least 80 percent of
the time during that period).
236. COOPER, supra note 232, at 2.
237. Id. at 1. It appears that the Department has used its discretion to come up with
the 50 percent exceedance standard; the Department mentions the standard in its
publication, but the Oregon Revised Statutes and Oregon Administrative Rules do not
explicitly include it.
238. See generally id.
239. Id.
240. See E. GEORGE ROBISON, OR. DEP'T OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, CALCULATING CHANNEL
MAINTENANCE/ELEVATED INSTREAM FLOWS WHEN EVALUATING WATER RIGHT APPLICATIONS
FOR OUT OF STREAM AND STORAGE WATER RIGHTS 35 (2007) [hereinafter ODFW Report].

241. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0070(2)(a)
(2007).
242. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0070(2) (a)
(2007).
243. ODFW Report, supra note 240, at
increase, proponents of water development

(2008); see also

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 536.241

(2008); see also

OR. REV. STAT.

§ 536.241

1 ("Since demand for water continues to
projects are beginning to look to the use of

higher flood flow (or peak flow) storage as a way to further utilize water available less
frequently than the 50% or 80% exceedance will allow.").
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cific watersheds called Water Availability Basins ("WABs"). " Generally,
the Department defines WABs above the mouths of significant tributaries, on main channels above significant tributaries, and for all instream demands.4 " WABs are not the same as the administrative basins
discussed in Section 6 of this report, but exist within the boundaries of
the administrative basins. 246 On average, there are approximately 150
to 250 WABs within each administrative basin.2 17 The Department has

not established WABs in all areas of administrative basins, and does not
calculate water availability in these watersheds. 48
a. NaturalStreamflow
In the Water Availability formula, natural stream flow is the flow
that consumptive use or storage does not affect, and represents "prehistoric" natural conditions. 49 The formula calculates natural stream
flow as an 80 percent exceedance flow,

20

and "[e]xceedance flows are

determined directly from gage records, or for ungaged streams by estimation through modeling. 2

5'

On gaged water sources, the Depart-

ment calculates a monthly 80 percent exceedance flow based on measured mean daily flows for that month for the period of record.2 52

To

account for variability in flow from wet to dry periods, the Department
calculates exceedance flows for a common base period: 1958-1987. 3
The Department uses the base period because it makes " [t] he assumption that past stream flow can be used as a predictor of future stream
flow.. . . "15 When the period of record for a gage does not coincide
244. COOPER, supra note 232, at 1, 4.
245. Id. at 4 (defining watershed in this context as "all lands draining to the stream
upstream o the point of diversion or the downstream end of an in-stream water right
reach.").
246. See id. at 4-6.
247. Id. at 5.
248. Id. at 4, 6, 9.
249. Id. at 3.

250.
251.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 1.

252. Id. at 11-12; see also Or. Water Res. Dept., Web Mapping Glossary (2008), available at http://map.wrd.state.or.us/apps/wr/wrmapping/glossary.htm (describing the

use of an 80 percent exceedance flow).
253. COOPER, supra note 232, at 9, 12. The Department chose the years 1958-1987 as
the common base period. Id. at 11. Depending on how long the gage has provided
records the Department uses different methods to correct to this base period. Id. at
12. Gages that have measurements that coincide with the base period are called index

records. Id. at 11. Gages that do not have records that coincide with the base period
are called short records. Id. The Department compares short records to index records
to correct to the base period. Id.
254. Id. at 7. The Department uses the phrase "prehistoric" not to refer to the age
of dinosaurs but rather to a stream flow condition in its unaltered, pre-development
condition. In the face of precipitation changes due to climate change, the assumption
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with the base period, the Department corrects the exceedance flows to
the base period. 55 Upstream consumptive uses commonly affect gaged
stream flows and the exceedance flows derived from them.

156

Accor-

dingly, "[t]o obtain natural stream flow, the average consumptive use
during the period of record for the gage is estimated and added to the
exceedance stream flow derived from the gaged stream flow."5 7 Because upstream consumptive uses lower a measurement, the Department calculates the upstream uses and adds that number to the downstream measurement.2 8 The added upstream uses consist of all water
lost to consumptive uses, including water lost to evaporation and
transpiration, but not storage, as the Department does not use measured stream flows significantly affected by storage in its analysis.2 59
When determining the appropriate time period to measure the natural
flow, the Department states "[t]ypical statistics are mean daily flow,
mean monthly flow, mean annual flow, ten-year flood event, and median monthly flow. The statistic chosen must have meaning in the con' 0
text in which it will be used.""
Because most WABs do not have gages, a regional regression analysis estimates most of the stream flows in Oregon.26 The Department
bases the regression analysis on the assumption that watershed characteristics influence stream flow. " For example, if other factors like precipitation remain equal, stream flow increases with watershed size. "6'
While the Department has the ability to estimate 93 watershed characteristics, the regression analysis most often uses ten characteristics:
(1) watershed area; (2) maximum watershed relief; (3) mean watershed slope; (4) mean slope aspect; (5) mean elevation; (6) mean
January precipitation; (7) mean July precipitation; (8) mean July minimum temperature; (9) mean January maximum temperature; and
(10) soil permeability. 24 The Department enters these measurements
into a mathematical equation 265 that derives the water source's exceedance flow, which indicates the exceeding stream flow at any given perthat past stream flow can be used to predict future stream flow may be completely
incorrect.
255. Id. at 11.
256. Id. at 9.
257. Id. at 24.
258. See id. at 10.
259. Id. at 24, 40.
260. Id. at 3.
261. Id. at 28.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 27, 32.
3
265. Id. at 29 (Q.,F = exp(-12.2)A ,2 S 0, As 1.62 E- 03 jnPl.8 j1P.6 7 jXT,
, SPo '5
(where: QNs = Natural Stream Flow, A = Area, S = Mean Slope, As = Mean Aspect,
E = Mean Elevation, JnP = Mean Jan Precipitation, JliP = Mean Jul Precipitation,
JXT = Mean Jan Max Temperature, SP = Mean Soil Permeability).
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cent of the time.2 6 Generally, the known stream flow statistics used in
developing the regression equations should represent natural stream
flow. 67 "Flow regulation by reservoirs or withdrawals from the stream
cannot be accounted for in the regression model. Including them results in a poor regression model that gives biased stream flow estimates."2 "
In some instances, artificial changes to streams have precluded the
In these cases,
Department from obtaining natural measurements."
the Department does not calculate availability based on prehistoric
condition, rather it adjusts its calculation to account for the change."'
For example, "the isolation and draining of Lower Klamath Lake [has
caused the Department to measure the natural stream flow] as though
the lake never existed even though this does not represent the true
prehistoric condition of the watershed.2 7'
b. Storage
Once the Department determines the natural stream flow, the next
step involves subtracting the amount of stored water.7 2 The formula
subtracts stored water from natural flow because it "diminishes availa2'
bility both upstream and downstream of the point of diversion.

Sto-

rage diminishes available upstream water because water must remain in
the stream in order to be available for storage further downstream. 4 It
diminishes downstream flow because storage impounds water rather
than leaving it flowing in the stream.21 "Where records are available,
storage; otherwise, it
the expected storage demand is base on historical
2 76
is based on the full amount of the water right.

c. Consumptive Uses
The Department's next step in determining water availability involves calculating the consumptive use on a stream and deducting that
volume from the natural stream flow.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7

Consumptive use includes any

276. Id. at 40.
277. Id. at 3. The Department's consumptive use calculation to determine water
availability at this stage is slightly different than the consumptive use calculation it uses
to correct "measured flow to natural flow." See id. at 9-10.
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diversion that results in a net reduction in stream flow.

78

Many domes-

tic uses such as showering or dishwashing result in very little overall
water loss since most of the water eventually returns to the stream,
though questions remain about where and when the water returns. 278
The Department focuses on "water withdrawn from a stream [that, due
to] evaporation, transpiration, or [being] transferred out of the watershed" will not return to the stream.8 0
For the purposes of the Water Availability calculation, the Department places consumptive uses into three major categories: (1) municipal; (2) irrigation; and (3) a catch-all category that includes all other
consumptive uses, such as water used for domestic purposes or livestock watering.8 ' In some basins, the Basin Management Plans, which
this article describes in Section VI.A, divide consumptive use into more
detailed and specific categories. 212 For example, in the Upper Deschutes Basin Management Plan, consumptive uses include: "domestic,
livestock, municipal, irrigation, power development, industrial, mining,
recreation, wildlife and fish life uses" in the Upper Deschutes Basin.2 21
Similar to stored water, available upstream water is reduced because it
must be left in the stream to be available for the downstream consumptive use.8 4 Moreover, upstream consumptive
uses reduce available
28 5
downstream water by diminishing stream flow.

i. DeterminingAvailability with Actual Consumptive Use
Measuring actual consumptive use versus merely subtracting the
permitted quantity can result in substantially different determinations
of a stream's available flow. This dynamic is described as the difference between "paper water" and actual "wet water." Water right holders may divert and/or consume less than their full appropriation ("paper water"), therefore the Department bases its water availability calculations on actual consumptive use rather than the permitted amount."'
Irrigation water rights provide a good example of the dynamic between paper and wet water and the impact of using actual consumptive
278.

Id. at 40.

279.

Id.

280.
281.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.

282.
283.
284.

OR. ADMIN. R. 690-500-0010(2) (2008).
Id. 690-505-0000(1) (a).
COOPER, supra note 232, at 3-4.

285.

Id. at 4.

286. Id. A consumptive use is "[t]he amount of water consumed by a particular use
and thus unavailable for further use." A diversion is the "extraction of water from its
natural source . . . " SAx supra note 20 AT 1081-82. An appropriator does not always
consume the full amount of water that he diverts. For example, a farmer may divert 10
cfs and 3 cfs may seep back to the stream as return flow. Therefore, the diversion
equals 10 cfs, but the consumptive use equals only 7 cfs.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 12

use to calculate water availability. When the Department subtracts irrigation in the formula, it calculates the actual use. Many growers do not
exercise their full paper right, irrigate as many acres as their permit
allows, or follow agricultural practices such as crop rotation, thus using
less water than the permit allows. 8 ' To account for the discrepancy
between the amount of water that is permitted and how much water is
actually being used, the Department uses information on the actual
number of acres irrigated and the crops grown on those acres, and
derives the consumptive use based on crop water requirements. 8" The
Department derives the actual use based on reports issued from the
United States Geological Survey ("USGS")."' The Department uses
USGS information that presents the "number of irrigated acres and
total annual consumptive use." ' By using actual consumptive use to
determine availability rather than the permitted amount, the Department can potentially issue permitted rights that exceed the water available in the stream if all users maximized their permits." l As result,
there can be more paper water rights than available water in a given
basin.
The state also allows some water users to apply for and receive water rights beyond the amount currently used. Though somewhat controversial in terms of what the law requires, this practice allows municipalities to hold rights to more water than they currently use with the
expectation that as population and water demands increase over time,
the municipalities will grow into their full rights. 92 Additionally, some
government agencies can reserve water for future uses." For instance,
any local government, local watershed council, or state agency may
request to reserve unappropriated waters for future storage for economic development. 4 In these situations, water is physically available
and the appropriator is not currently using it, but the water is nonethe-

287.

Id. at 46.

288. The Department uses USGS reports to determine a formula for the amount of
water used based on the type of crop. Id. at 43-44.
289. The USGS reports are generated from the USGS Portland office, "which reports water use in the state every five years." Id. at 43-44. The USGS provides information by collecting, monitoring and analyzing the surface water, groundwater and water
quality of Oregon. For more information visit http://www.usgs.gov/aboutusgs and
http://or.water.usgs.gov/index.html.
290. Id. at 44.
291. Id. at 46, 49.
292. Id. at 38.
293. Id.
294. OR. Rrv. STAT. § 537.356(1) (2008). An individual may also make a water reservation request as long as he is cooperating with one of these local agencies. The request is filed on a form provided by the Department but must gain Commission approval so as to initiate the rulemaking process. See also id. §§ 537.249, .490.
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less off-limits to any other appropriation in terms of determining water
availability in the stream."
d. InstreamFlows
After calculating the amount of water dedicated to storage and the
amount consumptively used, the Department then determines the
amount dedicated to instream flow. The Water Availability formula
accounts for both instream water rights and scenic waterway flows."6
The Department uses the full amount of each instream water right
or scenic waterway flow when determining availability."3 "Instream demands generally refer to a specific length of stream, or reach, but occasionally refer to a single point on the stream.""0 Unlike storage and
consumptive uses, instream demands only diminish water availability
upstream, not downstream, of their allocated reach."' Furthermore,
because instream water rights may diminish as they flow downstream
on account of natural losses, their impact, if anything, is lessened
downstream."' In making this availability determination, nonestablished/non-water "righted" instream values are not accounted
for.'"' Rather instream values, associated with high or peak flows, for
example, are considered later in the application process when the Department evaluates whether a particular water rights application meets
the public interest criteria."' These provisions come into play when
the Department is considering whether to allow over-appropriation in
a particular basin."' Once the Department calculates the natural
stream flow and deducts storage, consumptive use, and instream flow,
then it knows the amount of water available for appropriation.3 4
2. Groundwater Availability
Because the Department conjunctively manages groundwater and
surface water in some circumstances, the groundwater availability analysis depends on whether or not the proposed groundwater withdrawal-most often from a well-has the potential to substantially interfere
with a surface water source.0 As is further discussed in section V.C.,
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

COOPER, supra note

303.

OR. ADMIN.R. 690-410-0070(2) (a).

232, at 38.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0075 (2) (b) (D).

ODFW Report, supra note 240, at 3.
Id. at 2; OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0030(2) (a).

304. COOPER, supra note 232, at 3.
305. OR. ADMIN. R_ 690-009-0050(2) (charging the Department with processing
groundwater applications according to rules "similar to or compatible with, but not
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groundwater pumping has the potential to substantially interfere with
surface water when the pumping lowers surface water flows and impairs surface appropriation. Thus, the Department will use the surface
water review process in order to determine groundwater availability if
any one of the following four conditions are met:
(1) The proposed well is horizontally less than one quarter mile
from a surface water source;... or
(2) The proposed well's appropriation/pumping rate is more than
five cubic feet per second and the well or other point of appropriation is horizontally less than one mile from a surface water
source;

or

(3) The rate of appropriation is greater than one-percent of the
minimum perennial stream flow or instream water right with a
senior priority date, or greater than one percent of the discharge that is equaled or exceeded eighty percent of the time,
3°
and the well is less than one mile from a surface water source; 8
or

(4) The appropriation, if continued for thirty days, would deplete a
surface water source by more than twenty-five percent of the
rate of appropriation, and the well is less than one mile from
the surface water source. 309
If an application does not meet any of the above conditions and
there is no potential for substantial interference, the Department will
undertake a groundwater availability review. ' "° In comparison with the
Department's analysis to determine surface water availability, its
groundwater availability analysis is relatively simple. Groundwater is
available, according to the rules, if the source is not over-appropriated
during any of the time for which the applicant seeks to use the water."'
A source is over-appropriated if any new withdrawals would cause the
aggregate level of withdrawals to exceed the aquifer's annual recharge
and thus cause the water table to drop, or if new withdrawals would
cause less water to flow into over-appropriated surface waters.""
If the source is over-appropriated, the Department may nevertheless find that water is available if the applicant can meet one of two
requirements: (1) the proposed use only requires water during a time
more restrictive than" surface water rules if there is a potential for substantial interference).
306. Id. 690-009-0040(4) (a).
307. Id. 690-009-0040(4) (b).
308. Id. 690-009-0040(4)(c).
309. Id. 690-009-0040(4) (d).
310. See id. 690-300-0010(58), 690-009-0040(4).
311. Id. 690-300-0010(57) (a).
312. Id. 6 9 0-400-0010(11)(a) (B).
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period when the source is not already over-appropriated or (2) the
applicant can obtain water from an alternate source during overappropriated time periods." ' For example, streams that receive their
base flow from groundwater inflow generally drop during Oregon's dry
summer months. During these months new groundwater uses are likely to be prohibited, whereas they may be allowed during the wetter
winter or spring months.
While the groundwater analysis may seem simple, the technical and
scientific aspects of determining groundwater flow and recharge make
decision making in this area extremely difficult.
3. Implications of the Method for Calculating Availability in Oregon
The way Oregon statutes and administrative regulations calculate
water availability raises several challenges to freshwater conservation
and are particularly interesting in the face of the challenges the state
will face in the energy and climate policy areas. First, the formula and
its implementation do not necessarily account for the daily or instan34
taneous flows in a waterway that are often ecologically significant.
Thus, the Department may grant water rights without consideration, at
least at this early stage of the analysis, of more detailed flow regimes
and their ecological value.1
Second, once the Department establishes a water right, the full
permitted amount is available for use. Even though the right application is evaluated at an 80 percent exceedance rate, once established
the permittee is entitled to the full amount of her right 100 percent of
the time if all senior uses have been satisfied. The use of the 80 percent exceedance rate contributes directly to the problem of overappropriation. In terms of the pure exercise of priorities, this does not
present a problem because the principles of first-in-time, first-in-right
will govern in the event of a shortage between users. For freshwater
conservation, however, this presents a serious problem because conservation envisions that some quantity of water will remain, usually undiverted from the stream, to preserve the natural system. Unless instream rights, or some other mechanisms for maintaining water in the
system, are in place, the water availability calculation using the 80 percent exceedance. rate will exacerbate the problem of overappropriation despite the statutes clear mandate to avoid that situation. While using a lower exceedance rate to establish instream rights
increases the chances of establishing the right, continuing the 80 percent exceedance rate when granting new consumptive rights increases
the number of competing water users on a particular water source and
313.
314.
315.

Id. 690-300-0010(57)(b)(A)-(B).
COOPER, supra note 232, at 17 (explaining how the formula uses averages).
See id.
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questions of enforcement will inevitably arise. In addition, the consumptive use calculation impacts freshwater conservation.' ° As the
Department explains in its water availability report, subtracting only
the consumptive use is valid despite the potential for a user to go from
using less than their paper water right to their full paper water right
without seeking a change of use with the state."' A user may switch to a
more consumptive crop, for example, without notifying the state."'
The only limit on these types of changes is the prohibition against
waste under the water code."9 One of the open questions is the extent
to which the state has the resources to enforce the waste principle.
Third, Oregon's formula does not adequately address several significant dynamics in the actual hydrology. In particular, the current
formula does not address groundwater pumping unless the Department adopts special provisions, reservoir operations or river flow lag
times. Despite advances in hydrologic modeling that integrate ground
and surface water interaction, the Department does not look to
groundwater pumping in determining surface water availability except
in limited circumstances discussed in detail in section 5 on groundwater. In addition, while the Water Availability calculation deducts the
amount of stored water from the natural stream flow, the calculation
does not include the timing and quantity of the releases of that stored
water."' Finally, the Department does not include reservoir operations
because the owner of the reservoir controls those releases most often
through the operation of separate, private contracts."2 ' By excluding
storage releases, the formula results indicate less water than may acIn terms of granting new
tually be physically present in the system.
rights, this may help balance the tendency for over-appropriation. For
instream flow rights, however, it may mean that less water is available in
This results in a dethe system under the availability calculation.
crease in the overall number of established instream rights. While contracts frequently allocate the water stored in reservoirs and render this
water unavailable for conservation purposes, there are situations where
reservoir operations can be modified to address conservation con324
cerns.

316. See id.
317. Id. at 41.
318. See id.
319. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0070 (2008).
320. See id.
321. Id.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 537.346(3) (allowing the state to enter into a contract
to release stored water to satisfy the state's instream water right in the Willamette Basis).
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C. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA: INJURY

The inquiry into whether issuing a new water permit will injure
another water right holder is somewhat limited by the fact that neither
the statutes nor regulations define injury as it pertains to the issuance
of new rights.325 Historically, the Department used the first in time, first
in right principle to protect seniors from injury."6 Currently, the Department does not invoke the concept of injury per se, but uses the
water allocation policy and water availability analysis to get at the injury
analysis for new appropriations. 7 Commentators speculate that the
reason for this omission is that the Department assumes that the prior
appropriation doctrine's call of "first in time is first in right" will automatically protect senior users' water rights.2 The OWRD anticipates
that the injury analysis will see increased attention in the context of
groundwater." In practice, the Department conducts the injury analysis for a new water right on a case-by-case basis, and this analysis may be
somewhat limited or cursory unless another user contests the application.
D. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA: COMMISSION RULES
The Oregon Administrative Rules contain over seventy divisions of
water resources rules,3 potentially making this step in the public interest review quite sweeping in scope. However, out of the seventy divisions, only a few are applicable to protecting the public interest.'
Those few divisions implicate statewide water regulations, statewide
planning goals, local comprehensive plans, and endangered species
protections."2

1. Statewide Water Regulations
The Commission adopted regulations that govern eight "statewide
water resource management" topics: (1) groundwater management;
(2) hydroelectric power development; (3) instream flow protection;

(4) interstate cooperation; (5) water resources protection on public
lands; (6) conservation and efficient water use; (7) water allocation;
325. Oregon Administrative Rules do define injury in the context of water transfers.
For transfers, injury occurs when "a proposed transfer would result in another, existing
water right not receiving previously available water to which it is legally entitled." OR.
ADMIN. R. 690-380-0100(3) (2008).
326. Interview with Or. Water Res. Dep't, supranote 68.
327. Id.
328. BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 90.
329. Interview with Or. Water Res. Dep't, supranote 68.
330. See OR. ADMIN. R. 690-001-0000 to -600-0070 (2008).
331. BASTA ScH, supra note 131, at 85.
332. Id. at 85-87.
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and (8) water storage."' Through statewide regulation, the Commission seeks to establish common governing principles "to guide agency
decisions and activities, including basin planning, permitting, and conservation."3 4 As one example, the statewide policy on groundwater
management sets forth basic principles on conjunctive management,

rules governing well construction, and low-temperature geothermal
waters. 5 The regulations expand upon and put into effect these principles. In issuing a groundwater permit, the Department must now
find that the new right uses comply with these rules in order to satisfy
the public interest review."'
2. Statewide Planning Goals and Local Comprehensive Plans
One of the policies under the "water allocation" section of the
statewide water regulations notes that when allocating water for new
uses (i.e. surface or groundwater permitting), the Commission shall
assure that the new use complies with statewide planning goals and
local comprehensive plans. 7 This policy is expanded upon in an Oregon Administrative Rule that recognizes land use and water manageThe regulation also states that "the
ment are integrally related.3
Commission places a high priority on complying with statewide planning goals" and comprehensive plans.3 Again, in order to find that
the right preserves the public interest, the Department must determine
whether the new right is consistent with these plans. 4 From a practical
perspective, all applications must contain the land use consistency
form signed by the local government.
3. Endangered, Threatened and Sensitive Species ProtectionDivision 33 Rules
The Oregon Administrative Rules establish additional public interest standards for the Department to use when evaluating permit applications in basins that contain threatened, endangered, or sensitive fish
species called the Division 33 rules.34 ' Many consider these provisions
the strongest and most significant tools that the state possesses for li333. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0010 to 0080.
334. BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 86.
335. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0010(2) (a)-(b), (c).
336. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.620(4) (a) (2007).
337. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-410-0070(2) (i) (2008).
338. Id. 690-005-0020(1).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. OR. ADMIN.R. 690-033-0010(8-9) (2008) ("Threatened or endangered" refers to
fish species listed as such by the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife or federal
Endangered Species Act; "sensitive" refers to fish species classified by the Department
as critical, vulnerable, or peripheral).
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miting new stream flow appropriation. The statute and rules break
down into three geographic regions: the Upper Columbia (above the
Bonneville Dam), " ' Lower Columbia (below the Bonneville Dam),

4

statewide.3 "

and
When considering applications that propose to appropriate surface waters and/or hydraulically connected groundwater 3415 with the potential for substantial interference with surface water,

the Department must determine whether the proposed use will be detrimental to listed fish species. 46 If the Department determines that
the proposed use is detrimental to listed species, it will assume that the
application impairs or is detrimental to the public interest and will deny the application 7 With respect to groundwater, this requirement
only applies to applications involving groundwater hydraulically connected to surface water with potential for substantial interference, as
further discussed in section V.D.348
For some high-profile basins, more specific rules have been promulgated. For example, when determining if a proposed use is detrimental to listed species in the Columbia River, the Department consults with the Northwest Power Planning Council, Oregon Department
of Fish and Wildlife, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine
Fisheries Service, Indian tribes, and local governments. 9 Applications
342. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-033-0115(1) (2008) (Upper Columbia Rules apply to applications filed afterJuly 17, 1992, in the following basins: Hood, DeschutesJohn Day, Umatilla, Grande Ronde, Powder, Malheur, Owyhee, Mainstem Snake River, and the Mainstern Columbia River above the Bonneville Dam); see generally id. 690-033-0115 to
0140.
343. Id. 690-033-0210(1-2) (Lower Columbia Rules apply to applications filed after
April 8, 1994, in the portions of the North Coast Basin which drain into the Columbia
River and the Clackamas Subbasin of the Willamette Basin, and applications filed after
June 3, 1994, in the Sandy Basin, Willamette Basin excluding the Clackamas Subbasin,
and the Mainstem Columbia River below Bonneville Dam); see generally id. 690-033-0210
to -0230.
344. Id. 690-033-0310(1-2) (Statewide Rules apply to applications filed afterJune 2,
1994 in waterways of the state where sensitive fish species are located and waterways of
the state, other than the Columbia Basin, where threatened or endangered fish species
are located); see generally id. 690-033-0310 to -0340.
345. Id. 690-033-0000(2)(a)-(b). The standards also apply to applications for permits to appropriate surface water, to appropriate water for groundwater recharge, and
to store water or construct a reservoir. Id. 690-033-0000(2)'(a), (c)-(d). Hydraulic
connectivity refers to water moving between a surface water source and an adjacent
aquifer. Id. 690-009-0020(6). See infta Section V.C. for a full of hydraulic connectivity.
346. Id. 690-033-0000(1).
347. See, e.g., id. 690-033-0120(1) (if a proposed use of water in the Upper Columbia
area is inconsistent with the Northwest Power Planning Council's Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, the Department will presume the application impairs or
is detrimental to the public interest); see also id. 690-033-0220(1) (presumption for the
Lower Columbia Area).
348. Id. 690-033-0000(2)(b). Substantial interference with surface water is determined by standards set in OR. ADMIN. R. 690-009-0040, known as the Division 9 rules.
The Division 33 rules do not list non-hydraulically connected groundwater.
349. Id. 690-033-0120(1).
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for groundwater appropriations along the Columbia River must comply with certain standards that will form the basis for permit conditions:
the proposed use may not withdraw hydraulically connected groundwater that has the potential for substantial interference between April
15 and September 30 of any year; 5 and the proposed use must comply
with state and federal water quality standards and with measurement,
recording, and reporting requirements'
In the Upper Columbia, the Department can except the date restrictions and approve a water right permit for domestic water use;
projects that provide net benefit to native resident and anadromous
fish recovery; emergency public health and safety uses; certain existing
uses; or multipurpose storage projects."'
4. The Significance of the Public Interest Review Throughout the
Western United States
The public interest review process under the water code embodies
many of the key freshwater conservation issues and provides the best
vehicle for consideration of issues related to energy policy and land-use
planning. As discussed above states vary on the approach and application of the public interest review. 53 Despite changes to the public interest review standards in 1995, Oregon continues to evaluate water
right appropriations, at least at the permitting stage, in the context of
public interest criteria.
The public interest review process provides the opportunity for the
Department to evaluate new water rights appropriations for consistency with statewide water management policies. 54 The Department can
also utilize the public interest review to analyze the broad policies in
the administrative process, particularly those policies that relate directly or indirectly to instream flow values, such as Oregon Administrative
Rule 690-410-0030 or Oregon Administrative Rule 690-410-0070.7 In
addition, the public interest review provides a clear opportunity for
other agencies to weigh in on many of these issues. The public interest
review process could also become a tool to coordinate endangered
species recovery planning and the Division 33 administrative rules.

350.

Id. 690-033-0120(2)(b) (Upper Columbia only).

351. Id. 690-033-0120 (2)(d)-(e)
(Lower Columbia).

(Upper Columbia); id. 690-033-0220(2)(b)-(c)

352.

Id. 690-033-0140.

353.

See generally Grant, Supra Note 195.

354.

See id. 690-033-0000.

355. See id. 690-033-0000(1), -410-0030(1), -410-0070(1).
356. See id. 690-033-0000(1) (discussing the public interest review process with regard to sensitive, threatened, or endangered fish species).
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In the context of the public interest review, there may also be room
for the Department to consider the definition of beneficial use or reasonably efficient use. As demand on water supplies increases, agencies
across the West may consider new rules that take into account the most
efficient use of water or the use of the best available technology to determine if a particular use is consistent with the non-waste and beneficial use principles embedded in the water code. Adding these kinds of
inquiries to the pubic interest review and conducting this kind of review when parties seek to transfer water rights would allow the state to
manage future water use in a way that accounts for shortage and increased demand on the resource.
Some very specific areas could benefit from further exploration,
particularly in determining water availability, including: (1) the scientific credibility of using past stream flow data to predict future stream
flow and calculate water availability in the face of climate change; (2)
an analysis of the number of watersheds in the state with established
water availability calculations; (3) whether the water availability calculation addresses variability in daily flows, flood events or evaporation
from storage; (4) whether the reports used to calculate water availability and water use account for changes to irrigation practices over time
or changes to groundwater consumption; and (5) to what extent the
availability calculation accounts for recharge rates, lag times in observable impacts due to pumping, or water table drops that may occur over
time.
I. ENFORCEMENT
Beyond the administrative structure and the substantive contours
of state water law, water users and conservation groups need to understand how the elaborate system is actually administered. After all the
water rights, instream or otherwise, have been established, the Department must manage and enforce the various interests. These enforcement mechanisms make the difference between imagined conservation benefit and the reality of actual on-the-ground impacts. Once a
water right is granted, the Commission and Department have various
enforcement authorities including priority, forfeiture, waste prevention, and regulation of illegal use.
A. ENFORCING PRIORnY

Oregon's legislature, like most western states, based the water code
on common law principles of prior appropriation, which is characterized by the phrase "first in time, first in right."' 7 When the Depart357. OR. REV.STAT. §§ 537.120, .250, .270; Anderson v. Tumalo Irrigation Dist., 667
P.2d 13, 14 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); see also, Krista Koehl, PartialForfeiture of Water Rights:
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ment issues a water right, the right carries with it a priority date."' In
times of water shortage, the right with the earliest priority date receives
water first; the right with the second-earliest .priority date receives water
second, and so on." When comparing two water rights with different
priority dates, the senior right is the older water right, while the more
recent water right is the junior right."
Water rights with the same priority date become subject to a precedence of uses in times of shortage. 6 ' When water rights with the same
priority date are in mutually exclusive conflict, domestic uses have preference over all others, and agricultural uses have preference over
manufacturing uses."' This preference of uses reflects Oregon's water
management prior to the code's passage in 1909.6' If water rights do
not have the same priority date, prior appropriation dictates that the
senior use prevails in times of shortage.
The Department adheres to a similar policy when multiple water
right applications have the same priority date. 4 When the proposed
water uses are mutually exclusive, or the amount of water cannot satisfy
all uses, the Department's policy gives preference to applications requesting water for human consumption purposes over all others, folfinally by other beneficial purlowed by livestock consumption, and
36
5
poses that are in the public interest.
When water runs low, mainly during the summer months, the
priority system is the most important enforcement mechanism. Wa-

Oregon Compromises TraditionalPrinciples to Achieve Flexibility, 28 ENrL. L. 1137, 1141
(1998).

§ 537.150(2) (2007).

358.

OR. REV. STAT.

359.

DAVID GETCHEs, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 75 (3rd ed. 1997).

360. Id.
361. Id.
362. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.140 (2007).
363. Id. This provision, enacted in 1893, predates Oregon's water code. Phillips v.
Gardner, 469 P.2d 42, 43 (1970). Though the text of § 540.140 appears to apply to all
water rights, the enactment of Oregon's water code served to repeal any conflicting or
inconsistent existing provisions. Id. This code provision remains on the books, but is
now limited to water rights with the same priority date. See TOM PAUL, INFORMATIONAL
REPORT ON

2005 FIELD

REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT AcmrTnIES, ATrAcHMENT

3

(2005), availableat
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/staff-reports/2006%2OAugust/Item%
20A%20%2OField%2OActivities/Agenda%20Item%20%20A%20%20sws%20field%20r
egulation%20activities.pdf, at 3 (§ 540.140 is applicable to conflicting uses only when
they have the same priority date).
See OR. REv. STAT. § 537.150(2) (2007) (stating that the Department assigns
364.
priority dates based on the date on which the Department receives the complete application).
365. Id. § 536.310(12); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-300-0010(24) (2008) (defining "human
consumption" as "the use of water for the purposes of drinking, cooking, and sanitation.").
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termasters enforce the priority dates of water rights." The request to
cut off a junior user can originate from a watermaster's own investigation or a complaint from another appropriator, generally a senior right
holder.367 Sometimes, the watermaster will investigate a complaint and
discover that even if she were to cut off the junior user, the water
would still not reach the downstream senior user due to evaporation
rate, soil moisture, and the like." In such a case, the watermaster declares the senior appropriator's complaint a "futile call" and the junior
user may still divert water.
Most junior users comply with watermasters enforcement actions
immediately-in 2005, the Commission reported a 96 percent compliance rate. 370 Yet, if a junior user does not initially comply, the watermaster will issue a notice of violation."' The notice specifies the nature of the violation, the request for compliance, a timeframe to comply, and the consequences for failure to comply.7 2 If the right holder
does not comply even after the notice, the watermaster will then seek
the aid of the Department through the region's enforcement manager
for a formal enforcement.373 The enforcement manager is a part of the
Department and after the formal enforcement, the Department can
assess if there is sufficient evidence to pursue the matter or enforce

civil penalties. 374
Frequently, regulation occurs on water sources each year, and a watermaster can quickly generate a distribution letter to inform the junior user to stop using water.7 5 Priority-date regulation plays a major
role in enforcement; water masters regulate many streams in Oregon
and have done so as far back as the 1800s." 6 The earliest priority date a
watermaster has enforced is 1860Y

366. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.045(1) (a) (2007) (statutory and administrative law does
not specifically lay out the priority enforcement process for watermasters; instead this
statute gives watermaster's the authority to "regulate the distribution of water among
the various users" and the enforcement process is within the Department's discretion).
A field staff comprised of hydrologists, water right specialists, hydrogeologists, well
inspectors, and hydrographic technicians help watermasters decide when priority dates
should take effect. SeePaul, supra note 363, at 1.
367. See Paul, supra note 363, at 2.
368. OR. ADMtN. R. 690-250-0020(1) (2008).
369. Id. 690-250-0020(2).
370. Paul, supra note 370, at 1, 4.
371. Id. at 5.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 3.

376.

Id. at 3-4.

377.

Id. at 4.
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B. ENFORCING FORFEITURE
In addition to the concept of "first in time is first in right," a prior
appropriation right is also conditioned on putting the water to use for
a beneficial purpose, which gives rise to the so-called "use it or lose it"
principle."' Forfeiture is a statutorily created doctrine that relies on a
temporal non-use period. 7 ' Forfeiture involves the "involuntary or
forced loss of the [water] right, caused by the failure of the appropria'
tor or owner to do or perform some act required by the statute."
Oregon's statutory timeframe is five years. 8' Five successive years of
nonuse establishes a rebuttable presumption of forfeiture."'
Water right holders can defend against forfeiture challenges by
raising one of three defenses: (1) establishing a statutory excuse for a
failure to use their water,33 (2) that they had a facility capable of handling the right exists and the user was "ready, willing and able" to do
38 4
so, but for whatever reason did not use the full permitted amount; or
(3) that the non-use resulted from a change in the point of diversion."
The Department3 8 can initiate forfeiture proceedings based upon
87
If
its own determination or upon evidence submitted by any person.
Department personnel submit evidence to initiate the proceeding, the
8
If
Department requires one affidavit setting out the forfeiture claim.
non-Department individuals submit evidence to initiate forfeiture proceedings, the Department must receive two affidavits setting out the
forfeiture claim. "9 The evidence must be enough to prove the forfeiture of the water right to the Department, and the Department must
further find that none of the statutory defenses apply. "' After this ini378. OR. Rrv. STAT. § 540.610(1) (2007); see also, Koehl, supra note 357, at 1143 (Two
doctrines apply to the "use it or lose it" principle: abandonment and forfeiture. Abandonment derives from common law and is characterized as an "intentional relinquishment of a known right").
379. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610(1) (2007); see also Koehl, supra note 357, at 1143.
380. Koehl, supra note 357, at 1143.
381. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.610(1) (2007).
382. Id.
383. Id. §540.610(2)(a)-(n).
384. Id. § 540.610(3).
385. Hannigan v. Hinton, 97 P.3d 1256, 1259-60 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
386. The statutes provide that the Commission shall initiate forfeiture proceedings,
while the administrative rules state that the Department shall initiate the proceedings.
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 540.631 to 670 (2007); OR. ADMrN. R.690-017-0400 to 0700 (2008).
This section addresses forfeiture enforcement as a Departmental action, because the
Department is the enforcing agency within the Commission as noted in section 1.1.
387. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.631 (2007) (while the general public may submit evidence
of forfeiture to the Water Resources Commission, the Commission has discretion to
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to initiate forfeiture proceedings).
388. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-017-0400(4) (2008) (specifying the content requirements for
the affidavit).
389. Id. 690-017-0400(2).
390. OR. REv. STAT.§540.631 (2007);OR. ADMtN. R 690-017-0400(1) (2008).
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tial review, the Department sends written notice to the legal owner of
the lands appurtenant to the water right.39"' The owner then has sixty
days to respond to the notice. "' If the owner fails to protest within
sixty days, the Department may enter an order to cancel the water
right.9 If the owner files a protest, the Department will hold a hearing.394 The Department must provide written notice of the hearing
within ten days prior to the hearing to the owner as well as any other
person who is deemed to be an interested party.99 At the hearing, the
owner can provide a defense, and the Department will make the decision to either cancel the water right, cancel the right in part, modify
the water right, or choose not to cancel the water right.'96
1. Statutorily Excused "Non-uses"
When faced with an assertion of forfeiture, a water right holder
may rebut the assertion with one of several statutorily mandated defenses to forfeiture.'97 The first of the defenses is available to certain
governmental right holders. It provides that if cities or towns hold the
water right for reasonable municipal purposes, and a finding of forfeiture would impair the rights of the cities or towns, the Commission will
not apply forfeiture. 9 ' Beyond this defense, municipalities occupy a
unique position under the water code that allows them to retain water
rights. in preparation for anticipated growth without fear of forfeiture." For example, municipalities may choose not to perfect (develop) a percentage of a water right permit without fear of loss through
non-use."' When this occurs, the Department issues a certificate for
the perfected portion of the water right permit and holds the remainder in reserve for the municipality until the municipality perfects
the remainder of the permit."' Upon perfection of the deferred
amount, the municipality shall request a certificate for the remainder
of the water right as specified in the original water ight application.4"'
Various parties read these particular provisions differently and the provisions may see increasing attention as the demands on water increase.

391. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.631 (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-017-0400(6) (2008).
392. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.631 (2007); OR. ADMIN. R 690-017-0400(6) (c) (2008).
393. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.641 (1) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-017-0500 (2008).
394. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.641(2) (2007).
395. Id.
396. Id.; OR. ADMIN. R. 690-017-0700(4) (2008).
397. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610(2) (2007).
398. Id. §540.610(2)(a)-(b).
399. Id. § 540.610(4).
400. Id. § 537.260(4).
401. Id.
402. Id. In addition to municipalities, if the water is appurtenant to Department of
Veteran's affairs property the holder can defend against non-use. Id. § 540.610(2) (c).
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The appropriator's situation at the time of non-use can provide
further defenses to forfeiture. For instance, the inability to use water
due to economic hardship serves as a defense,"3 as does "using reclaimed water in lieu of using water under an existing right''404 and
"reusing water through land application .... ',05 Likewise, if the nonuse occurred while the water was included in a pending transfer application, the appropriator does not forfeit the water. 4 6 Additionally, if
the nonuse of a supplemental water right occurred during a time when
the primary water right and supplemental water right were leased as an
instream right, the supplemental right is not lost to forfeiture. 407
The water right holder also has defenses against forfeiture due to
If the federal government withdrew land from
governmental action.
an appropriator, and non-use occurred during the time when land was
withdrawn, the holder can defend against forfeiture.4 00 Furthermore, if
the law prohibits the water right holder from using water, that water is
not subject to forfeiture.1 0
Circumstances that are out of the government's and owner's control can also provide defenses to forfeiture. For example, if the owner
could not make full beneficial use because the water was not available.4 1 ' Forfeiture does not apply if a party submits evidence of non-use,
or the Commission initiates forfeiture proceedings, more than fifteen
years after the end of the alleged non-use."2 Finally, if the nonuse occurred during a time when it was not necessary to exercise the full
right due to a climatic condition and the right holder was otherwise
ready, willing, and able to use the full amount, forfeiture will not ap41 3

ply.

2. "Ready, Willing and Able" Defense to Forfeiture
Not only does an appropriator have the many statutory defenses
listed above, but in 1997 the legislature created another defense for
appropriators when it enacted the "ready willing and able" provision of
403. Id. § 540.610(2)(d).
404. Id. § 540.610(2)(h).
405. Id. § 540.610(2) (i); see also id. § 537.141(1)(i) (land application of ground water
does not require a permit if the ground water is reused for irrigation purposes, if statu-

tory requirements are met).
406. Id. § 540.610(2)(m).
407. Id. § 540.610(2)(n).
408. Id. § 540. 6 10(2)(g) (invoking OR. REv. STAT. § 537.775, which allows the Commission to order a discontinuance of a wasteful well).
409.

Id. § 540.610(2) (e) (according to either Acts of Congress of May 28,1956 or the

Federal Conservation Reserve Program).
410. Id. § 540.610(2)(k).
411.
412.
413.

Id. §540.610(2)0(j).
Id. § 540.610(2)(f).
Id. §540.610(2)(1).
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the forfeiture statute.414 The legislature enacted the new provision
largely to address fear among appropriators that they were at risk of
losing their full water right if they did not fully put it to use. 5 Based
on this fear, water right holders diverted the full water right regardless
of whether they needed the full amount to meet beneficial use." ' Under the 1997 provision, water is not subject to forfeiture if the right
holders can prove they have facilities capable of handling the entire
rate and duty1

7

of the water right and that they are otherwise ready,

willing and able to do so."' The provision essentially offered an incentive
to stop the diversion of unneeded water to avoid forfeiture claims." 9
The words "ready, willing and able" leave ample room for interpretation. The legislative history demonstrates that the legislature intended a very broad defense.'
An Attorney General's opinion influenced the legislature's adoption of the defense and offered an insight
to the meaning of the words."' The opinion determined that "[t]he
term 'ready' refers to whether the facility is functioning and the term
'able' refers to the capacity of the facility."4"' The word "willing" has
independent meaning and refers to the owner's willingness to exercise
his full right. "
Arguably, the legislature could have used principles of beneficial
use and waste to address users who divert excess water to prevent
claims of forfeiture. Instead, the legislature chose to enact a statutory
defense that provides an incentive not to over-divert by simply allowing
the user to maintain the ability to put the full water right to beneficial
use without actually diverting the water.2 Ultimately, the ready, willing, and able defense may benefit vested, established water rights more
than it prevents wasteful water use.
In the end, regardless of where
414. Id. § 540.610(3)(b); see also Koehl, supra note 357, at 1137.
415. BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 160-61.
416. Id. at 161.
417. "[R]ate is the maximum instantaneous amount of water that may be diverted or
pumped (normally expressed in cubic feet per second (cfs)." Id.at 101. "[D]uty is the
volume of water that can be applied over the course of the season (expressed in acrefeet)." Id.
418. OR.REv.STAT. § 540.610(3) (2007).

419.

Koehl, supranote 357, at 1139.

420.

Id. at 1148 ("The legislative history demonstrates that, although the primary

purpose was to provide flexibility for crop rotation, the legislature intended the defense to be very broad."); see generally Rencken v. Young, 711 P.2d 954, 956 (Or. 1986)

(forfeiture is an objective question of fact, regardless of whether the user intended to
forfeit his or her water rights); Day v. Hill, 406 P.2d 148, 149 (Or. 1965) ("Whether or

not an owner has failed to use the water appropriated for five or more successive years
is a question of fact.").

421.
422.
423.
424.

Koehl, supra note 357, at 1146.
Id. at 1149-50.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1138.

425.

Id. at 1157-58.
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the true benefits are, the ready, willing, and able defense stands as a
significant exception to enforcing forfeiture claims.
3. Distinguishing Non-Use from Changes in the Point of Diversion
In general, the Department must authorize any change to an existing water right through the transfer process.426 Oregon courts, however, distinguish between an unauthorized use of water for a purpose
other than what is stated in the water right-which constitutes forfeiture-and diverting water from a place other than that authorized in
the water right-which does not amount to forfeiture.427 In Hennings v.
Water Resources Department, the Oregon Court of Appeals explored the
first situation, non-authorized changes in use, and held that such
changes are subject to forfeiture. 2 ' The appropriator in Hennings had
a permit for irrigation but instead used the water to wet the ground for
plowing." The court stated: "[T]he [forfeiture] statute limits the certificate holder's right by authorizing use . . .only for the specific pur1..."'30The court held that the permit
pose set out in the application .
did not specify wetting the ground for plowing as the specific irrigation
purpose. Thus, because the appropriator had not exercised the right
for an authorized beneficial use for five years, the court held that the
non-permitted purpose amounted to non-use, and the appropriator
lost the water right to forfeiture.4 " This case demonstrates that an appropriator's change in use is subject to forfeiture.'
In contrast, the court resolved in Russell-Smith v. Water Resources Department that a change in the point of diversion is not subject to forfeiture. 44 The appropriators in Russell-Smith changed their point of diversion on an unnamed spring without going through the transfer
process. ' However, unlike in Hennings, the appropriators continued
to use the water for the use specified in the permit. ' Because the appropriators also used the designated amount and diverted the water
from the same permitted source, the court found that they satisfactorily used the water right, and this use did not subject the right to forfei-

426. OR. RE,.STAT. § 540.520(1) (2007).
427. See Hennings v. Water Res. Dep't, 622 P.2d 333, 335 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
428. Id. at 334-35.
429. Id. at 335.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 335; see also Hannigan v. Hinton, 97 P.3d 1256, 1258-59 (Or. Ct. App.
2004).
434. Russell-Smith v. Water Res. Dep't., 952 P.2d 104, 108 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Therefore, a change in the point of diversion is not classified as non-use.
435. Id. at 105-08.
436. Id. at 110.
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ture." 7 Hannigan v. Hinton affirmed this finding "based on the recognition that Oregon water rights law treats 'use' and 'point of diversion'
as distinct concepts and the forfeiture statute is addressed only to
'use."'4 8 In summary, Russell-Smith and Hannigan demonstrate that if
an appropriator changes the permitted use of the water, uses a nonpermitted water source, or uses an amount of water other than that
permitted for, then the court can declare any of these changes as nonuse and subject to forfeiture."' However, the courts do not view a
change in point of diversion as non-use and will not rule an appropriator's right is lost to forfeiture. °
C. CONTROLLING ILLEGAL WATER USE

Depending on funding, the Director appoints one watermaster or
assistant watermaster for each water district.'
Watermasters regulate
the distribution of surface and groundwater between water right holders. " ' They do so by regulating, adjusting, and fastening the headgates,
valves, or other means of controlling the local water works as well as
sending out notices if they cannot physically visit each site."4 Watermasters also investigate and respond to complaints of water shortages
or unlawful surface water uses, as well as groundwater complaints such
as wells constructed in a way that wastes water.' 4 If a watermaster believes illegal water use exists, then the watermaster may enter onto private property."
Watermasters regulate illegal water use such as "(a) [i]rrigating
land without a [water] right; (b) [u]sing water for a purpose not authorized in the right; (c) [i]rrigating land or using water for a purpose
with a priority different than the priority under which the water is diverted from the source; or (d) [w]asting water."'
The watermaster
437.
Id.
438.
Hannigan,97 P.3d at 1259.
439.
Russell-Smith, 952 P.2d at 109; Hannigan, 97 P.3d at 1259-60. However, an appropriator using less than the permitted amount can defend the forfeiture claim under
a statutory defense or the "ready, willing and able" defense. See supra sections III.B. 1.
and III.B.2.
440. Hannigan, 97 P.3d at 1259. The court also notes while an appropriator's
change in point of diversion is not subject to forfeiture, it is illegal without Department
approval, and the Department might issue an injunction or civil or criminal penalties
against him.
441.
See OR. REv. STAT. § 540.045(1) (a) (2007) (establishing authority for one watermaster per district).
442. Id.
443. Id. §540.045(1)(c).
444. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-250-0100(1), -0050(3) (2008).
445. Id. 690-250-0090(3) (allowing the watermaster may respond to complaints dealing with surface water and groundwater).
446. Id. 690-250-0050(1)(a)-(d). Oregon Water Law enforces penalties for the following violations: (1) refusing orders from the Commission or decrees of the appellate
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must give oral or written notice to the appropriator to stop the unlawful use.44 ' If the unlawful use continues, the watermaster may take control of the diversion or well and reduce the amount of the water use by
the amount of water being wasted or unlawfully used. 48 If the illegal
use continues, the watermaster can further reduce the amount and
continue to do so until the reductions eliminate the unlawful use.44 9
The state may prosecute anyone who interferes with the watermaster's
regulation. 5'
Watermasters also have control over illegally stored water. 5 ' If necessary, they may release the illegally stored water, but must do so in a
When releasing the water,
manner effective for downstream uses.'
watermasters may consult with the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife to prevent damage to fish and wildlife.
The Department employs twenty watermasters who must regulate
the state's 82,000 regular water rights and 1,500 instream rights.5 An
additional eighteen full-time and part-time assistant watermasters assist
in smaller locales. 5 In 2005, watermasters conducted 218 investigations, took regulatory action of some form 11,451 times, and protected
instream fights 157 of those times. 56
Any person who feels that any watermaster's actions harms or adversely affects her may appeal to the circuit court for an injunction. 7

court; (2) use of water on lands from which the right is transferred and in the new
temporary location during the same irrigation season or calendar year is prohibited;
(3) interference with headgate, or use of water denied by watermaster; (4) unauthorized use or waste of water; or (5) interfere or obstruction with the use or access of the
appropriator who has the lawful right for storage, diversion or carriage of water). See
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 540.370(2), .570(5), .710-.730 (2007).
447. OR. ADMIN. R 690-250-0050(2) (2008).
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.; see OR. REV. STAT. § 540.710 (2007).
451. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-250-0150(1) (2008).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. BASTASCH, supranote 131, at 58, 114; Memorandum from Barry Norris, Technical Servs. Div. Admin., Or. Water Res. Dep't, on an Informational Report on 2004
Field Regulation and Enforcement Activities to the Oregon Water Resources Commission 1 (July 28, 2005), availableat
http://wwwl .Department.state.or.us/files/Publications/staffreports/2005%20July/A
genda%20Item%20J%20-%2OField%2ORegulation%20Activities.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Norris I].
455. Memorandum from Norris I, supra note 454 at 1; see OR. REV. STAT. § 540.080
(Assistant Watermasters are to be paid by either the county court or board of commissioners, otherwise, the users under the assistant's responsibility shall pay the assistant's
compensation.).
456. Paul, supra note 363, at Attachment 3.
457. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.740 (2007).
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A court will grant an injunction if the water right holder can show that
the watermaster failed to carry out his duties properly."'
D. ENFORCING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-WASTE

Beyond priority and the requirement for actual use, the water code
demands that users not waste water; in other words, a user cannot divert water in an amount beyond what the user needs to accomplish a
particular beneficial use. 9 The Commission and Department control
waste in three ways: (1) through the permit process;460 (2) by regulating existing uses;46 ' and (3) through a conserved water program.
1. Preventing Waste through the Permit Process
Preventing waste through the permit process requires the Department to assess how much water a proposed use requires as part of its
ground and surface water application reviews."6 Applicants must describe why they need the requested amount of water and any measures
they are taking to prevent waste."u By rule, the Department should
base its water use requirements on efficient technology and management practices. 5 The Commission created administrative rules to
guide the Department's analysis of (1) whether the technology and
management practices are economically feasible; (2) the environmental impacts of making modifications; (3) what technology is proven and
available; (4) how much time is needed to make modifications; (5)
local variations in soil type and weather; and (6) relevant water management plans and sub-basin conservation plans."' However, some
participants question whether the Department adequately implements
these requirements at the permitting stage.6 7 Contending instead that
the Department is ensuring that new water use complies with "generous customary standards of beneficial use" rather than enforcing effi-

458. Id.
459. Id. § 540.610; OR. ADMIN. R_ 690-400-0010(16) (2008).
460. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.130, .153(3) (c), .621(3) (c) (2007).
461. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-250-0050(1) (d) (2008).
462. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.470(2); see also BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 159-60; Karen
Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of Restoring Streamflows,
27 ENVrL. L. 151, 174 (1997) (discussing the relationship between the regulation of
waste and the protection of instream flow).
463. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.153(3)(c) (2007) (surface water); id. § 537.621(3)(c)
(groundwater).
464. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-310-0040(1) (a) (K).
465. Id. 690-400-0010(16).
466. Id.
467. SeeJanet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVrL. L. 919, 960 (1998) [hereinafter Neuman I].
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cient, waste preventative measures. " Therefore, preventing waste
through the permit process may have limited impact on the ground.
2. Regulating Existing Uses
In addition to regulating waste prospectively through the permit
process, the Commission also regulates waste in existing uses by way of
Department-appointed watermasters4 As discussed in Section III.C.,
watermasters have the power to regulate water rights when users waste
1471
may regulate waste on their own initiative, " ' or
water. 76 Watermasters
may investigate a complaint brought by another appropriator.7 2 One
commentator notes that the Department plays a largely passive role in
regulating existing uses." 3 For the most part, the Department does not
regulate waste by its own investigations, but instead by way of com7

plaint.

E. ADDITIONAL COMMISSION AUTHORITIES
During periods with dramatically less available water than usual,
the Commission can react to fluctuating water availability using four
mechanisms. First, it can withhold unappropriated waters from appropriation.' Second, it can classify and re-classify water sources and
47 6
thus restrict uses and quantities to only those written into policy.
Third, it can enforce laws concerning cancellation of water rights and
discharge any excessive, unused claims to water, including making unused water available for appropriation and beneficial use by the public.4 77 Fourth, the Commission may set preferences in basin programs

for future water uses. 8
The Department and Commission have the authority to measure
water use by conditioning new permits or by requiring measurement
on existing uses.4 79 The Department may impose measurement conditions on a new permit if "an application discloses the probability of
468. Id. at 961.
469. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-250-0050(1)(d) (2008).
470. Id.
471. Id. 690-250-0100(2).
472. Id. at 690-250-0100(1); see also Mark Honhart, Carrotsfor Conservation: Oregon's
Water Conservation Statute Offers Incentives to Invest in Efficiency, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 827,
843 (1995).
473. Neuman I, supra note 467, at 961.
474. Id. (citing Interview with Barry Norris, Or. Water Res. Dep't (Sept. 23, 1997),
discussing examples of the Department's waste enforcement).
475. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 538.110 (2007) (withholding the waters for the Tumalo
Creek in Deschutes County from appropriation).
476. Id. § 536.340(1)(a).
477. Id. § 536.340(1)(b).
478. Id. § 536.340(1)(c).
479.

BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 168.
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wasteful use or undue interference with existing wells or... [interferes
with] existing rights to appropriate surface water. ' The Commission
placed conditions requiring measuring devices on 8,000 water rights.48 '
If the Commission and Department do not include measuring requirements when they issue a permit, they still maintain the authority
to require measurement. 8 For example, the Commission may require
a water ditch or canal owner to place suitable measuring devices along
the ditch or canal and may require the owner to report the measurements according to a Commission-established schedule."' The Commission can also require the owner or manager of a reservoir to place
measuring devices on each natural stream or water source that discharges into the reservoir. Similar to ditches and canals, the Commission can require owners to place devices above and below their reservoirs to help the watermaster determine the entitlement of a particular
water right holder.8
Despite measurement requirements, the Department does not require many users to report their measurements.
The Department estimates there are currently 122,562 existing points
of diversion, including ground water and surface water appropriation.8 Currently, only about eight percent of these water users' permits require them to report.486 The eight percent, however, represent
nearly forty-six percent of the state's water usage. " '
Any government agency that owns a water right must make an annual report to the Department detailing the amount of water, the period of use, and the categories of beneficial use to which the agency
applied the water. " Government agencies include "any state or federal
agency, local government... irrigation district ...water control district ...

and any other special purpose district organized under state

9

Currently, 735 public entities measure and report their current

law."

480. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.629(1) (2007); see also id. § 537.211(1) (noting the Department shall set forth any terms, limitations and conditions as it considers appropriate).
481. Relating to Measurementof Water: Hearingon Oregon H.B. 2564 Before the H. Comm.
Energy andEnv't, 74th Or. Leg. 2 (Or. 2007) (statement provided by Barry Norris, Oregon Water Resources Department), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/listn/archive/archive.2007s/HEE-200702191301 .ram [hereinafter H.B. 2564 Hearings].
482. See OR. REv. STAT §§ 540.310(2),.330(1).
483. Id. § 540.310(2).
484. Id. § 540.330(1).
485. H.B. 2564 Hearings,supra note 481.
486. Karen McCowan, How Much Water Rows? Who Knows?, THE REGISTER-GUARD
(Eugene, Or.) Mar. 1, 2007, at Al.
487. Id. (referencing House Bill 2564 and proposing to require small and medium
water right holders to measure their actual water use; the bill did not pass in the 2007
legislative session).
488.
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.099(1) (2007).
489.
OR. ADMIN. R. 690-085-0008(9) (2008); see also OR. REv. STAT. § 537.099(3)
(2007) (declaring any governmental agency that acquires land through default, such as
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use.49 The Commission must require'reporting from a governmental
agency, but it has the discretion to compel reporting in a few other
instances. 9 ' For example, the Commission can declare an area to have
a serious water management problem and ask for reporting.9 It may
require anyone in a serious water management area to install a measuring device and submit an annual water use report.' As of 2006, however, the Commission had not exercised this authority." ' Additionally,
the Commission has the authority to require measurement and reporting of exempt ground water uses. 95 The Department may also require
measuring and reporting when a water right holder leases all or a portion of the water right for instream flow. '
The Commission recently began a strategy to increase water measurement."7 Under this strategy, the Department is collecting an inventory of significant diversions in high priority flow restoration watersheds. 8 Significant diversions are those with measurement and reporting requirements, and "diversions greater than five cfs or greater than
10 percent of the lowest monthly 50 percent exceedance flow on a
'
stream." 99
The state has over 2,400 significant diversions identified
within 293 priority basins."0 As demands on available freshwater increase, the Commission and Department may need to consider increasing use of their existing authorities to withhold water from appropriadebts owed to the state, is not required to submit an annual report); OR. ADMIN. R. 690085-0010(1) (2008) (same).
490. H.B. 2564 Hearings, supranote 481.
491. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-085-0010 (2008).
492. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.435(1)-(2) (2007) (noting a serious water management
area is created by "ground water decline, unresolved user disputes or frequent water
shortages.").
493. Id. § 540.435(1); see also OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-085-0020(6) (2008).
494. BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 168.
495. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.545(2) (2007) (stating the Commission "may require any
person or public agency using ground water for [the exempt uses] to furnish information with regard to such ground water and the use thereof.").
496. Id. § 537.348(3) (b).
497. See Memorandum from Philip C. Ward, Dir., Or. Water Res. Dep't, to Water
Resources Comm'n, Attachment 3 (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/staff reports/2007%2OFeb/Agenda%
201

tem%20A%20%2OCoast%2OCoho/Coastal%2OCoho%2OStaff%20Report.pdf.
498. OR. WATER RES. DEP'T, FuLL TEXT OF ONGOING OREGON PLAN EFFORTS AND NEW
COMMITMENTS 4 (Feb. 7, 2007) (draft), availableat
http://wwwl .wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/staff reports/2007%2OFeb/Agenda%
20Item%20A%20-%2OCoast%2OCoho/Detail%20Attachment%203.pdf. In 2002, the
Department of Fish and Wildlife teamed up with the Department to identify priority
streamflow restoration areas throughout the state. The main focus of these priority
areas is salmon recovery. Within the Coastal Coho Evolutionarily Significant Units
(ESU) there have been 153 high priority areas identified in the state. Id. at 1.
499. Id. at 4.
500. H.B. 2564 Hearings,supranote 481.
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tion and to gauge and meter water rights. Legislative proposals during
the 2007 legislative session to address measurement did not succeed.'
Despite efforts to amend Oregon water law to require measurement,
other ways may exist for the Commission and the Department to exercise their discretion under existing laws and achieve the same result.
F.

WATER SHALL BE USED BENEFICIALLY WITHOUT WASTE

One additional guiding policy for the appropriation of water in
Oregon is the requirement that all Oregon water users must appropriate the water beneficially without waste. 02 Beneficial use is the amount
of water that is reasonable and appropriate (i.e., not wasting water) to
accomplish the purpose of the appropriation using reasonably efficient
practices." 3 The beneficial use requirement impacts availability by restricting how a user may divert the water and how much water the user
may use once he or she diverts it. °4
Statutory law broadly references beneficial useY. Oregon statutes
explicitly consider municipal, domestic, irrigation, power development, industrial, fish and wildlife, recreation, and pollution abatement
as beneficial uses."0 ' The administrative regulations are similarly broad
and leave room for the Commission or the Department to make individual determinations based on the "economic and general welfare of
the people of the state. '0 7 When an applicant's proposed use does not
clearly fall into one of these enumerated categories, the Commission
decides if the proposed use is beneficial." 8 Other appropriators have
the right to challenge this decision. 9 When faced with a challenge,
the circuit court or court of appeals will determine if the proposed use

501.
See H.B. 2564, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); H.B. 2566, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2007).
502. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.310(1) (2007). For a further discussion on waste see section III.D. on enforcement of waste.
503. See OR.ADMIN. R. 690-400-0010(3) (2008).
504. See id.
505. See, e.g.,
OR. REv. STAT. § 536.300(1) (2007) (illustrating beneficial use as "water
for domestic, municipal, irrigation, power development, industrial mining, recreation,
wildlife and fish life uses and for pollution abatement.").
506. Id.
507. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-400-0010(3) (2008) (defining beneficial use as "an instream

public use or a use of water for the benefit of an appropriator for a purpose concurrent with the laws and the economic and general welfare of the people of the state and
includes but is not limited to, domestic fish life, industrial irrigation, mining municipal
pollution abatement, power development, recreation, stock water and wildlife uses.").

508. See id. (beneficial use includes but is not limited to the listed uses).
509. See e.g. Benz v. Water Res. Comm'n, 764 P.2d 594, 596 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); see
also Neuman I, supra note 467, at 925-26.
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is beneficial." 0 In Benz, senior appropriators sued the Commission because it approved an application giving a new appropriator the right to
use water for boron leaching."' The senior users argued that boron
leaching was not a beneficial use under statutory law. 112 The court
ruled that the Commission properly balanced the boron leaching
against other beneficial uses, conflicting interests, and public concerns."' While the court affirmed the Commission's decision, Benz
serves as an example of the authority the courts possess over the Commission's decisions of beneficial use and a broad view of what uses are
within the concept of beneficial use." 4
A water right entitles the user only to use the water for a beneficial
use; the right does not entitle the user to waste water."' Waste occurs
when a water user continually uses more water than he or she needs to
satisfy the specific beneficial use of their granted right.5 ' For example,
if a user diverts more water than is actually needed to irrigate a crop,
the excessive diversion may constitute waste.'
Statutorily, a right
holder may not willfully waste water to the detriment of another.'
The broad definition of beneficial use gives the state flexibility in
determining whether a particular use meets the definitions of beneficial at the time of reviewing the application. 9 The technical aspects of
beneficial use, however, remain very undefined.2 In particular, waste
is defined based on the amount of water needed for beneficial use.'
The lack of a more precise beneficial use definition can make enforcement of waste extremely difficult. To the extent that the regulation of waste may help to preserve more water instream, the broad definition of beneficial use and its integral relationship to the concept of
waste may be an impediment.
This article identifies several areas where the principles of waste
and the method of enforcing or ensuring that waste does not occur
may benefit freshwater conservation overall. The first opportunity to
address waste occurs at the permitting stage when the Department
makes a determination of beneficial use. At this point, the Department
510. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.075(1)-(2) (2007). If the case is not contested (as defined
by § 537.170), the circuit court will hear the claim; otherwise the Court of Appeals will
hear the claim. See also Neuman I, supra note 467, at 925-26.
511. Benz, 764 P.2d at 596.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 597.
514. Id.
515. See OR. ADMIN. R.690-250-0050(1) (d).
516. Id. 690-400-0010(16).
517. See id.
518. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.720 (2007).
519. See OR. ADMIN. R 690-400-0010(3) (2008) (beneficial use includes but is not
limited to listed uses).
520. Id. (defining beneficial use in broad terms).
521. Id. 690-400-0010(16).
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should conduct a robust analysis of whether a particular proposed use
of water qualifies as wasteful. Additional data on how the Department
currently addresses waste at the permitting stage and some specific
examples of any applications rejected on account of a "wasteful" use
would assist in determining if this is an appropriate policy response.
Furthermore, the state has appropriated most water and therefore it is
important to look at how the transfer process addresses the principles
of waste. Critics of the Department argue that agricultural users may
waste water and the Department only begins to look at the question of
waste when parties seek an instream transfer.
Overall, the water code contains several mechanisms addressing
the misuse of water in the state. Enforcement by watermasters is largely
complaint-driven, which allows action only when water users raise issues to the watermaster regarding other's consumptive use. A complaint driven system may leave instream flow rights at a disadvantage
because the state, already facing a lack of resources, is the entity that
would most often initiate the complaint.5 2 Similar resource limitations
arise with the enforcement of the principles of waste and illegal water
use. The water community should gather further data on the 157 instream water rights previously enforced in the state, as well as general
data on the numbers of enforcement actions due to forfeiture and the
use of the statutory defenses, waste, illegal water use, and the initiating
source of these actions.
The enforcement authorities and principles of non-wasteful and
beneficial use of water bear directly on policy questions about the most
energy efficient uses of water and whether various energy alternatives
use water in a wasteful manner. These enforcement authorities provide an important link in the overall conservation, climate and energy
policy framework because they represent the actual and direct impact
of active water resource management.
IV. INSTREAM WATER RIGHTS
For the freshwater conservation community, the emergence of insteream flow water rights in the western United States marked a milestone in the development of water law. Traditional water rights allowed
appropriators to use water only for out of stream uses. Oregon stepped
forward as an early proponent of instream protection, beginning with
the legislature enacting the minimum perennial stream flow program
in 1955.522

In 1987, the legislature revamped instream protection and

recognized the environmental value of leaving water in a water body by
522.
523.

Id.
Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 707, 1955 Or. Laws 924 (codified as amended at OR.
REv. STAT. § 536.325 (1995)); see also Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands:
Prospectsfor PrivateInstream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENrL. L. 203, 217 (1997).
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enacting the Instream Water Rights Act, which gives instream water
rights equal footing with all other water rights.

24

This section reviews

Oregon's treatment of instream water rights, including how state law
defines them, the different mechanisms for creating instream rights,
and the limitations facing instream water rights.
A. INSTREAM WATER RIGHTS ACT

The 1987 Instream Water Rights Act ("the Act") seeks to protect
and promote instream uses of water.Y Unlike agricultural, municipal,
or industrial uses, which represent private out of stream applications of
water, the Water Resources Department holds instream rights in trust,
and this water remains in its natural stream for public use and benefit.52

The Act fundamentally changed water use in Oregon by recog-

nizing that instream water rights provide a public benefit and therefore
2 7 The Act specifically
satisfy the statutory beneficial use requirement.Y
recognized four public uses: (1) recreation; (2) pollution abatement;
(3) navigation; and (4) "conservation, maintenance, and enhancement
life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and other ecoof aquatic and 2fish
8
logical values.

Prior to the Act, leaving water instream rather than diverting it
would have constituted nonuse subject to forfeiture.2 By acknowledging instream flow as a beneficial use, the Oregon Water Code allows,
and even encourages, users to leave water instream"' Instream water

524. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0000(3) (2008).
525. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.332-.360 (2007).
526. See id. § 537.332(3) (Department holds instream rights in trust for the people of
Oregon); see also id. § 537.341 (stating "[t]he certificate shall be in the name of the
Water Resources Department as trustee for the people of the State of Oregon ... .
527. See, e.g., id. § 537.348(2).
528. Id. § 536.332(5), .350(1); see also OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0000(3) (2007); OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2007) (stating that "'[i]n-stream water right' means a water
right held in trust by the Water Resources Department for the benefit of the people of
the State of Oregon to maintain water in-stream for public use."); id. § 536.310(1) (stating "[e]xisting rights, established duties of water, and relative priorities concerning the
use of the waters of this state and the laws governing the same are to be protected and
preserved subject to the principle that all of the waters within this state belong to the
public for use by the people for beneficial purposes without waste" (emphasis added)); id. §
537.334(1) (2008) (stating "[p]ublic uses are beneficial uses." Instream flow is a public
use.); see also id. §540.610(2) (n) (nonuse during a time when the water right was leased
as an in-stream right does not subject the right to forfeiture); OR. REV. STAT. §
537.332(5) (2007).
529. See id. § 540.610 (defining beneficial as "the basis, the measure and the limit of
all rights to the use of water in this state" and establishing a rebuttable presumption of
forfeiture "[w]henever the owner of a perfected and developed water right ceases or
fails to use all or part of the water appropriated for a period of five successive years ...
.
5).
530.

See id. § 537.348(2).
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rights theoretically have the same legal status as any other water right.5'
As with other water rights, instream water fights receive a priority date
and cannot impair senior water rights. 3 ' In fact, the Department will
modify or reject the conversion of any traditional right into an instream right, as well as any state agency application for an instream
right, if it would otherwise impair existing right holders."'
Despite the notion that instream rights are on par with traditional
rights, the Department manages instream water rights differently than
traditional water rights. First, instream rights must be held by the Department, not individual water users." 4 Instream rights "[do] not require a diversion or any other means of physical control over the water." 5 Therefore, where the Department measures traditional water
rights in cubic feet per second at their point of diversion, it instead
measures instream water fights in cubic feet per second along specified

reaches of a stream or river.5" The typical reach of an instream water
right extends from either the original point of diversion, or agency
designated location, to the mouth of the affected stream, but may extend further where the instream water right is a measurable portion of
the receiving stream. 7 Furthermore, any single instream right may
require multiple reaches in order to account for naturally reduced
flows due to evaporation, transpiration, or tributaries that draw from
the stream.3
The Department does not similarly reduce traditional
water rights for natural losses, and in some circumstances, a court decree may make allowances for seepage. 58 In addition, with traditional
water rights, inefficiencies and losses in the system may benefit other
water users.540
Finally, the statute defines instream flow as the quantity of water
that is necessary to satisfy the applicable public uses as requested by an

531.

Id.§537.500(1).

532. Id. § 537.334(2); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0000(5)-(6) (2008).
533. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0047(2)-(4) (2008).
534. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.341 (providing that the Water Resources Department
holds instream flow rights in trust for the people of Oregon).
535. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2007).
536. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(7)-(8) (2008). While out-of-stream rights only
require measurement at the point of diversion, instream water rights require measurement at several points along the affected stream. Id. Instream flow rights can be
measured by a point or reach, but reach is preferred. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id. 690-077-0075(2) (b) (D), -0075(2) (c) (B).
539. Id. 690-077-0075(2) (b) (D). For example, in the decree for the Deschutes Basin
the percentage of seepage loss is part of the water rights. BRUcE AYLWARD, EcOSYSTEM
ECON. LLC, RESTORING WATER CONSERVATION SAVINGS TO OREGON RIVERS: A REVIEW OF
OREGON'S CONSERVED WATER STATUTE 26 (2008), availableat http://cbwtp.org/jsp/cb

wtp/library/documents/Oregon%27s%2Conserved%2OWater%2OProgram.pdf.
540. SAx, THOMPSON,
(4th ed. 2006).

LESHY AND ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES,

128-9
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agency.5" Because some view instream water rights as defined in terms
of the minimum quantity of water necessary in order to protect a public use, the regulations limit the quantity of legally protectable instream
flow for a given body of water. 42 Generally, the Estimated Average
Natural Flow ("EANF") operates as an upper limit on the quantity of
water that a user may secure under an instream water right."'
In special circumstances, however, a user may reserve a quantity of
water that exceeds the EANF as an instream water right. " The administrative rule governing the quantity of instream flow allows flows to
exceed the EANF when the flows are "significant for the applied public
use. 54 5

"[H]igh flow events that allow for fish passage or migration

over obstacles" are one instance where a larger flow is significant for
the applied public purpose. ' Another example pertains to instream
water rights established through instream transfers, leases, or allocations of conserved water. 547' For these instream water rights, a presump-

tion exists that a flow exceeding the EANF is significant for the applied
public use upon the satisfaction of certain criteria.4 8 First, the flow
must not exceed the maximum amount of any instream water right
applied for by the DEO, the ODFW, or Parks and Recreation for the
same reach of the stream and for the same public use. ' Second, the
ODFW must either determine-the stream is in a "flow restoration prior5 or listed as water quality limited by the DEQ 55 If these
ity watershed,""
can establish an instream water
criteria are satisfied, the Department
5 52
right that exceeds the EANF

541. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(2) (2007).
542. See generally, OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(2) (2008).
543. Id. 690-077-0015(4) (stating "[i]f natural stream flow or lake levels are the
source for meeting instream water rights, the amount allowed during any identified
time period for the water right shall not exceed the estimated average natural flow...
."). The EANF "means average natural flow estimates derived from watermasters distribution records, Department measurement records and the application of appropriate available scientific and hydrologic technology." Id. 690-077-0010(10).
544. Id. 690-077-0015(4).
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. 690-077-0015(5).
548. Id. (stating that the presumption applies "[u]nless the Director determines
otherwise.").
549. Id. 690-077-0015(5) (a).
550. Id. 690-077-0015(5)(b).
551. Id. 690-077-0015(5) (c). The DEQ must also have "provided scientific information that demonstrates that increased flows would improve water quality." Id.
552. Id. 690-077-0015(5).
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B. MECHANISMS FOR CREATING INSTREAM RIGHTS

Since the inception of the Instream Water Rights Act, the Department has issued approximately 1,500 55 instream rights using four me-

chanisms.5 These mechanisms include the conserved water program,
555designated state agency requests, 51 conversion of minimum perennial flows,557 and purchases, leases or gifts.5 Regardless of the mechanism, the Department will issue the right in its own name and hold the
right in trust for the people of Oregon.
1. Conserved Water Program
Section IV.G. discusses the Conserved Water Program more thoroughly. Briefly, the program seeks to enhance water efficiency and
availability for current and future uses by providing an incentive for
water users to reduce waste by discouraging over-diversion and securing a percentage of the conserved water for instream flow.5" The program allows water right holders who invest in more efficient water delivery systems to either leave the conserved water instream indefinitely,
or apply it to another piece of land.56'

The program's purpose is to

incentivize efficiency in water use and encourage the protection of
instream flow.562
2. State Agency Requests for Instream Rights
Only designated state agencies may apply for new instream rights
in Oregon; private and other public entities may not.'
Only three
553. See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry Norris, Administrator, Technical Services
Div., State of Or. Water Res. Dep't, to Water Res. Comm'n 3 (May 21, 2004), available
at
http://wwwl .wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/staff-reports/2004%20May/Agenda%
20Item%20K%20-%20ISWR%20use%20rpt.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Norris II] (In 2001, 1,437 instream rights were issued; 1,447 were issued in 2002; and 1,451
were issued in 2003).
554. The Scenic Waterways Act also protects instream flow. See OR. REV. STAT. §§
390.805-.925 (2007); See also Diack v. City of Portland, 736 P.2d 198, 201 (Or. Ct. App.
1987) (requiring the state to make a finding that a proposed use would not diminish
scenic waterway flows below the level needed to support fish, wildlife, and recreation).
555. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455-.465 (2007).
556. Id. § 537.336.
557.
Id. § 537.346.
558. Id. § 537.348.
559. Id. § 537.341 (requiring that a copy of the certificate must be forwarded to the

requesting state agency and may be requested by an appropriate party).
560. See id. § 537.460-.470.
561. Id. § 537.490(1).
562. See generally id. §537.470; see also id. § 537.465 (explaining the application procedure for conserved water program).
563. Id. § 537.336.
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state agencies may apply for instream water rights: the ODFW, the
DEQ, and the State Parks and Recreation Department. 5 Agencyrequested instream rights receive priority dates just as traditional appropriative rights do. For agency-requested rights, the filing datewith
the Department sets the priority date.
However, applicants for municipal purposes, multipurpose storage projects, and hydroelectric
projects may petition to establish precedence over an instream right,
regardless of their junior priority date."' For the Department to grant
a petition, it must conduct a review of the proposed project in accordance with the contested case hearing proceedings."'
In addition to subordination to particular future uses, agencies that
request instream rights may consent to their injury during the transfer
process of another water right."' The scope of the agencies' ability to
consent to injury is quite narrow. For one, limitations include point of
diversion transfers only. 9 Additionally, an agency can only consent to
the injury of an instream right that it requested. 7 ' The agency may not
consent to injury for instream rights that "any person" acquired by
lease, gift or purchase. 7 ' Also, the agency can only recommend that
the Department allow the proposed transfer if it will result in a net
benefit to the water source, and is consistent with the instream right's
purpose. 7 ' Furthermore, the agency may include necessary conditions
to ensure the transfer is consistent with the recommendation. 7 The

agency's consent must be in writing, available to the public for commenting, and provide an explanation detailing both the extent of the
injury to the instream right and the reasons for finding a net beneficial
gain. 574
Each of the three agencies has developed its own methods and
administrative regulations for determining how much instream flow is
necessary to achieve the agency's goals.
However, because the ad-

564.

Id.

OR. REV. STAT. § 537.341 (2007). Any person purchasing, leasing, or accepting
a gift of an existing water right may apply for conversion to an instream water right and
565.

retain the initial priority date; conversion of minimum perennial stream flows to instream flows also retain the initial priority date. OR. REV.STAT. § 537.352 (2007); see also
id.§§ 537.346, .348.
566. Id. § 537.352; see also OR- ADMIN. R_ 690-077-0100 (2008) (explaining that this
system of precedence is subject to Departmental review).
567. See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§537.170, .352 (2007). See also OR. ADMIN. R. 690077-0100(4) (2008).
568. Id. § 540.530(1)(c); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-5030(2) (2008).
569. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.530(1)(c)-(d) (2007).

570.
571.

Id. § 540.530(1)(c).
See id. §§ 537.348, 540.530(1)(c).

572.
573.
574.
575.

Id. § 540.530(1)(c).
Id. § 540.530(1) (d) (B).
Id. § 540.530(1)(d).
OR. ADMIN. R_ 690-077-0020(3) (2008).
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ministrative rules require the agencies to notify each other of the proposed application, the individual agency requests do not operate in a
vacuum. 78 After the proposing agency has notified the other two agencies that it is submitting an instream application, the non-proposing
agencies (ODFW, DEQ or Parks) have the opportunity to incorporate
the public uses for which they are responsible into the instream application. 7
To fulfill their requests for instream rights, the Department of Fish
and Wildlife and the State Parks and Recreation Department may secure water by purchasing it, leasing it, or receiving it as a gift from an
out of stream right holder."' Only the Water Resources Department
can hold the right in trust after an agency secures that right.179 In addi-

tion to applying directly for a new water right, each of the three agencies may seek water from a reservoir or storage facility to supply its requested instream rights."'0 In order to utilize storage water, the agency
must show in writing that it has entered into an agreement with the
owners of a reservoir and that the reservoir impounds enough water
"'
for the purposes set forth in the request.58
a. Departmentof Fish and Wildlife Requests for Instream Rights
The Department of Fish and Wildlife ("ODFW") may request instream water rights for "conservation, maintenance and enhancement
of aquatic and fish life, wildlife and fish and wildlife habitat. 5

82

The

576. Id. 690-077-0020(2); see also id. 340-056-0300(6)-(7) ("The Department [of Environmental Quality] will submit the draft application to ODFW and Parks for review
and comment" and "ODF&W and Parks may incorporate other public uses into... [an
instream] application and jointly apply .. ");id. 736-060-0030(5)-(6) (noting that
Parks and Recreation Department "shall notify ODF&W and DEQ of the proposed
application" and "DEQ or ODFW, or both, may incorporate the public uses for which
they are responsible .... ); id. 635-400-0030 (requiring the Department of Fish and
Wildlife to send draft instream water right applications to DEQ and Parks for their
review and comment).
577. Id. 690-077-0020(2).
578. Id. 635-400-0035 (Department of Fish and Wildlife); id. 736-060-0040(1) (Parks
and Recreation Department). Administrative rules regulating DEQ requests for instream rights do not contain a provision granting the agency this capacity, whereas
both the DRW and PRD do.
579. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.341,.332(3) (2007).
580. Id. § 537.336(4).
581. Id.
582. Id. § 537.336(1); OR. ADMIN. R. 635-400-0005 (2008) ("It is the policy of the
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission to apply for instream water rights on waterways
of the state to conserve, maintain and enhance aquatic and fish life, wildlife, and fish
and wildlife habitat to provide optimum recreational and aesthetic benefits for present
and future generations of the citizens of this state. The long-tem goal of this policy
shall be to obtain an instream water right on every waterway exhibiting fish and wildlife
values."); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(5)(b) (2007) (explaining that the definition of
"public use" partially mirrored by the ODFW policy for instream requests is the
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ODFW has broad authority to request instream rights for the quantity
of water necessary to support the public uses ODFW recommends including flows for "any other ecological value." ' To date, the ODFW
approximately 950 applications for instream flow water
has filed
84
rights.

The ODFW calculates how much flow is necessary to achieve its
goals using one of the following methodologies: the Forest Service Method, the Instream Flow Incremental Methodology, or the Oregon Method."5 The Forest Service Method determines the flow requirements
of salmonids, while the Instream Flow Incremental Methodology determines the flow requirements for fish and other aquatic life, generally."' The Oregon Method is the oldest method available; the Oregon
State Game Commission developed it to determine the instream flow
requirements for fish. "7
b. Departmentof Environmental Quality Requestsfor Instream Rights
The Department of Environmental Quality may request an instream water right to protect and maintain water quality standards that
8
The amount of
the Environmental Quality Commission establishes."
necessary
for pollution
the request shall be for the quantity of water
8
abatement per the DEQ's recommendation." Similar to ODFW's authority, the DEQ has broad authority to request instream rights within
the agency's goals.
The DEQ may request instream flows for any body of water within
the state.5

8

It determines the necessary amount of instream flow by

analyzing water/water quality correlation, load assimilation, and water
51
quality models, as well as using a non-degradation flow methodology.
To date, the DEQ has filed approximately thirty-five applications for
"[c]onservation, maintenance and enhancement of aquatic and fish life, wildlife, fish
and wildlife habitat and any other ecological values" (emphasis added)). The Department of Fish and Wildlife requests instream rights pursuant to OR. ADMIN. R. 635-400-

0000 to -0040.
583. OR. REV.

STAT. § 537.336(1) (2007).
Interview with Dwight French, supra note 67.
585. OR. ADvNN.R.. 635-400-0010(8), (10), (14) (2008).
586. Id. 635-400-0010(8), (10).
587. Id. 635-400-0010(14); see OR. ADMIN. R § 635-400-0010(15) (explaining that the
Oregon State Game Commission was the predecessor of the Department of Fish and

584.

Wildlife).
588. OR. REV.

STAT. § 537.336(2) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-056-0015(1) (2008)
("It is the policy of the Environmental Quality Commission... [t]o apply for instream

water rights for pollution abatement where such action provides a public benefit...
."). Requests by the Department of Environmental Quality for instream rights are
made pursuant to OR. ADMiN. R. §340-056-0005 to -0400.
589. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(2) (2007).

590.
591.

OR. ADMIN. R. 340-056-0200 (2008).
Id. 340-056-0400.
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instream flow rights for water quality purposes .5" The DEQ filed all of
its instream rights in the early 1990s for locations entirely in the northern Willamette Basin within thirty to forty miles of the City of Portland 9
c. State Parks and Recreation DepartmentRequests for Instream Rights
The State Parks and Recreation Department may request instream
water rights for the purposes of recreation and scenic attraction. 94 The
request shall be for the quantity of water necessary to support the public uses that the State Parks and Recreation Department recommends.95

As with the ODFW and the DEQ the Parks and Recreation

Department has broad authority to request instream rights within the
agency's goals, and it may do so for any body of water within the
state."6 The quantity necessary to accommodate the predominant recreational use or uses of any given month helps determine the quantity
of water to request.9 7 To date, the Parks and Recreation Department
has filed for less than ten instream water rights.9
3. Minimum Perennial Stream Flows Converted into Instream Rights
Oregon adopted the minimum perennial stream flow program in
1955.' The program allowed individual basin programs to reserve a
quantity of water for instream flow by prohibiting future appropriations from designated streams."' Though called minimum perennial
stream flows, the flows do not ensure a minimum quantity of instream
flow but rather secure water instream through administrative rule with
a priority date, just like any other water right."' Oregon established
592.

Interview with Dwight French, supra note 67.

593.

Id.

594. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(3) (2007); OR. ADNIN. R. 736-060-0005 (2008) ("It is
the policy of the Parks and Recreation Department to apply to the Water Resources
Department for instream water rights on the streams, rivers, lakes, and wetlands of the
state to protect scenic attraction and recreational values for the benefit of present and
future generations of citizens of this state."). The Department of State Parks and
Recreation requests instream rights in accordance with OR. ADMIN. R. 736-060-0000 to 0040.
595. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.336(3) (2007).
596. See OR. ADMIN. R. 736-060-0005 (2008).
597. Id. 736-060-0015 (2008).
598. Interview with Dwight French, supra note 67 (stating Parks and Recreation have
filed a small number ofjoint requests with ODFW).
599. Or. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, Instream Water Rights, BACKGROUNDERJan. 22,
1997, at 1, availableat
http://www.dfw.state.or.us/fish/water/docs/BKGWaterRights.pdf"
600. BAsTAscH, supra note 131, at 112 (explaining that whereas water rights issued by
the Department are secure in perpetuity, administrative regulations may be changed).
601. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.346; see also BASTASCH supra note 131, at 112.
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hundreds of minimum perennial stream flows between 1955 and
1988°" The Instream Water Rights Act, which converted the existing
minimum perennial stream flows into instream rights, largely superseded the former program."° Prior to conversion, there were a total of
547 minimum flows."4 To date, twenty-four minimum perennial
stream flows still exist in Oregon, seventeen of which are in the Umatilla Basin."' Converted rights remain subject to priority, and retain the
date the minimum perennial stream flow establishment as their priority dates."° Along with the priority date, converted instream rights also7
retain any conditions placed on the minimum perennial stream flow.1

Unlike some instream rights, converted minimum perennial stream
flows are not subordinate to multipurpose storage, municipal use, and
hydroelectric purposes."' However, when a transfer occurs, an agency
may consent to the injury of converted minimum perennial stream
s
e.
flows in a very narrow set of "c
Stored water is frequently used to meet the twenty-four remaining
minimum perennial stream flows. As a result, there are several special
regulations governing the relationship between stream flow and stored
water. These regulations are typically part of a basin program where
the storage project is located. Some basin programs make the water
released from storage available for appropriation despite the minimum
perennial stream flow."' Another common regulation states that the
Water Policy Review Board may establish additional minimum flows
during its review of application for appropriation of water from storage."' Likewise, these regulations encourage storage projects that are
consistent with the purposes of the minimum perennial stream flows."'
602. BAsTAscH, supra note 131, at 113.
603. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.346(1) (2007); see also BASTACH, supra note 131, at 114-15.
604. BASTASCH supranote 131, at 113.
605. Id. at 114-15 (noting that the seventeen minimum perennial streamflows remaining in the Umatilla Basin were adopted after the Instream Water Rights Act, and
the Act only required the conversion of existing minimum perennial streamflows).
606. OR. REV. STAT. §537.346(1) (2007).
607. Id. § 537.343.
608. Id. § 537.352 ("The precedence given under this section shall not apply if the
instream water rights was established pursuant to [OR. REv. STAT.] §537.346.").
609. Agency consent is limited to point of diversion transfers and only when it will
result in a net benefit to the water source and is consistent with the instream rights
purpose. Id. § 540.530(1)(c) (addressing the conversion of minimum perennial
streamflows and specifically mentioning instream water rights established under OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.346(1)). See also id. § 537.352. For further discussion see infra section

IV.D.
610. See, e.g., id. 690-515-0000(2)-(3) (2008) (Upper Rogue Basin); id. 690-5150030(2)-(3) (Applegate River Basin); id. 690-515-0040(2)-(3) (Middle Rogue Basin).
611. See e.g., id. 690-515-0000(3)(a) (Upper Rogue Basin); id. 690-515-0030(2)(a)
(Applegate River Basin); id. 690-515-0040(2) (a) (Middle Rogue Basin).
612. See e.g., id. 690-515-0000(3)(a) (Upper Rogue Basin); id. 690-515-0030(2)(a)
(Applegate River Basin); id. 690-515-0040(2) (a) (Middle Rogue Basin).
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There are also special statutory provisions that govern the release
of stored water in the Willamette Basin." 3 For one, regardless of priority date, the Department cannot mandate the release of stored water to
satisfy an instream right until the state enters into a contract with either a private or state-run storage center, or reservoir, to satisfy the
instream fight; nor may the Department otherwise regulate the use of
water in order to satisfy an instream right."4 These contracts must include the state and the owner of the storage facility as parties to the
contract, explicit permission allowing the state to use the released storage water to satisfy a minimum perennial stream flow right, and a method for determining the specific quantity of stored water that will be
released to satisfy the minimum perennial stream flow." 5 However,
where a federal storage facility fails to fulfill a valid contract to supply
water for instream rights, the Department may not regulate or impair
other right holders, regardless of a valid contract.6
4. Purchasing, Leasing, and Gifting-Instream Transfers of Existing
Rights
The fourth mechanism for creating instream rights involves purchasing, leasing or gifting the out of stream rights for the transfer of
out of stream use to instream use."' The State authorizes instream
transfers, which convert all or a portion of an existing out of stream
water right into an instream right, without loss of priority."8 While
agency-requested rights lead to relatively new and, therefore, junior
instream water rights, the instream transfer program provides an opportunity to establish more senior instream water rights. By allowing
any current right holder to convert an out of stream right by sale, lease,
or gift, this mechanism can increase the chance that instream flow will
be available even in times of low flow.
Furthermore, instream transfers offer other benefits over other
forms of instream rights. For one, instream transfers are excluded
from the subordination of uses that apply to agency requested instream
613.

OR. REv. STAT. § 537.346(3)-(5) (2007).

614. Id. § 537.346(3) (The Department may not compel the release of stored water
or regulate other users in order to satisfy instream rights based upon converted minimum flows within the Willamette Basin.)
615. Id. § 537.346(4) (2007).
616. Id. § 537.346(5) (2007).
617. Id. § 357.348; Robert David Pilz, Comment, At the Confluence: Oregon's Instream
Water Rights Law in Theory and Practice,36 ENVTL. L. 1383, 1387 (2006); BASTAScH, supra
note 131, at 116 ("Acquisition may hold the greatest promise of any mechanism in
restoring instream flows through the water rights system.").
618. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.348(1) (2007); OR. ADmRN. R. 690-077-0010(15) (2008); see
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.348(2) (2007) (reaffirming the ability of a water rights holder to
split their water right by leasing a portion for instream use while still retaining the right
to use a specified quantity for out-of-stream use).
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transfers and arguably instream rights from the conserved water program."9 Additionally, agency-requested rights and converted minimum
perennial stream flows are subject to provisions that allow the Department to consent to their injury in the transfer process.62

'

However, the

Department is not able to consent to injury
for an instream right estab2
lished through purchase, lease, or gift. '
The Oregon Water Code authorizes state agencies to acquire water
rights through this mechanism. For instance, "[any person may purchase or lease all or a portion of an existing water right or accept a gift
of all or a portion of an existing water right for conversion to an instream water right. ' 22 The applicable definition of "person" includes,
among others, "the state and any agencies thereof.6 2' Though any per-

son may purchase, lease, or accept a gift of a water right for conversion
to instream use, only the
Department of Water Resources may hold the
24
instream water rights.

As previously discussed, the Department of Fish and Wildlife and
the Parks and Recreation Department have promulgated regulations
regarding the purchase, lease, or acceptance of gifts of existing water
rights for the purpose of transfer from out of stream to instream use. 5
Like a privately held right, this type of instream right maintains its original priority date and is not subject to a precedence of uses.6 26 Unlike
the ODFW and Parks and Recreation though, the DEQ has not yet
promulgated regulations regarding this mechanism.
The Oregon Water Trust, founded in 1993, is a 501 (c) (3) nonprofit organization that facilitates instream transfers. 2 ' The Trust con619.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.352 (2007). The statute only explicitly excludes two types
of instream rights from the precedence the Department may give to municipal supply,

multipurpose storage, or hydroelectric generation: (1) minimum perennial streamflows that have been converted to instream flow rights; and (2) rights that have been
purchased, leased, or gifted for conversion to instream rights.
620. Id. § 540.530(1) (c) (stating that the Department may only consent to injury for
a proposed change in the point of diversion, and upon recommendation from the
agency that requested the right); see infra section IV.D. for a detailed discussion of
injury to existing instream rights.

621. See OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-5050(1) (2008) (Department must seek consent from
the agency that requested an instream right; for purchased, gifted, and leased rights,
there are no agencies to give consent).
622. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
623. Id. § 536.007(6).
624. Id. § 537.332(3).
625. OR. ADMIN. R. 635-400-0035 (2008) (Department of Fish and Wildlife); id. 736060-0040(1) (Parks and Recreation Department).
626. OR. REV. STAT. §537.352 (2007) (exempting from precedence of uses all instream rights acquired by purchase, lease, or gifts from out of stream right holders); see

also id. § 537.348 (an in-stream right's certificate shows the original priority date of the
purchased, gifted or leased water right.).
627. Fritz Paulus, Instream Flow Restoration: Cooperative Free Market Solutions in Oregon,
43 THE WATER REPORT, Sept. 2007, at 14.
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structs agreements with willing water rights holders and compensates
them for leaving all or a part of their water right instream. 8 As of 2006,
the Oregon Water Trust had protected 160 cfs of flow in eighty-six
streams through agreements with over 200 landowners.'n Other local
organizations dedicated to stream flow restoration, such as the Deschutes River Conservancy, have also protected significant instream
flows through leases, conservation, and acquisition."'
Since the Instream Water Rights Act passage in 1987, the Trust has facilitated over
1000 instream leases and sixty permanent instream transfers in Oregon."' As a result of these efforts, Oregon has protected 750 cfs of instream flow. 3

2

The Bonneville Power Administration through the Co-

lumbia Basin Water Transactions Program has provided a portion of
the funding for these efforts.
C. WATER RIGHT TRANSFERS

All transfers, including instream transfers, must meet the standard
transfer conditions set forth in the Oregon Revised Statutes sections
540.505 through 540.585.' A water right holder may transfer those
rights that were established by an official adjudication, a water right
certificate, 5 a water use subject to a lien, or a water use for which an
application for transfer 37 has been approved and the transfer com3
pleted."
The Oregon Water Code maintains that all water rights are appurtenant, or attached, to the land upon which the water is used. 9 To
change the place of use, the point of diversion, or the water's use, a
water right holder must file a transfer application with the Depart-

628.

SeeJanet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years of the

Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB L. REv. 432, 437 (2004) [hereinafter Neuman II].
629.
Paulus, supranote 627, at 17.
630.
See DEScHuTEs RIVER CONSERVANCY, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2006), available at
http://www.deschutesriver
.org/CEDocuments/DownloadsGetFile.aspx?id=227777&fd=0.
631.
See Paulus, supra note 627, at 16.

632.

Id.

633.

COLUMBIA BASIN WATER TRANSACTIONS PROGRAM, FINDING BALANCE IN THE BASIN

2007 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2007), availableat
http://www.narrativelab.com/files/CBWTPAnnual07_web.pdf.
634.
See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 540.510(1), 537.348(1) (2007). However, the transfer or
sale of conserved water is subject to the conditions of OR. REv. STAT. § 537.490.
635.
Id. § 537.250.
636.
Id. § 537.252(1).
637.
Id. § 540.530.
638.
Id. § 540.505.
639.
Id. § 540.510(1).
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ment."4' To create an instream right, the original right must be severed
from the land and its place of use changed to its natural streambed. 4 '
1. Transfers May Not Injure Existing Rights
A transfer, for any purpose, may not injure existing rights unless all
affected parties consent to the injury in signed affidavits.' 2 Injury occurs when a proposed transfer would result in an existing water right's
In
loss of previously available water to which it is legally entitled.'
held
of
Appeals
Court
Kusyk v. Water Resources Department, the Oregon
that the Department has an unambiguous, nondiscretionary statutory
duty to make a "no impairment finding."4' ' Following this decision, the
Department will not approve a transfer unless it can make an affirmative finding of no injury to any existing rights. The Department makes
a determination of injury, and upon a protest or at the Director's discretion, the Commission may hold a hearing to determine if the transfer would result in injury." Upon a finding of injury, the Department
may still approve the transfer if the applicant agrees to the inclusion of
any modifications or conditions that the Department concludes are
necessary to resolve any injury issues associated with the transfer."
As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish between water to
which a protestant is legally entitled, such as return flow, and water to
which the protestant is not legally entitled, such as seepage across the
surface to another property or seepage or percolation into the
groundwater system. Ultimately, distinguishing between return flow
and seepage can be a difficult hydrological undertaking, and some
claims of injury likely arise out of this complicated dynamic. 7
Return flow is not currently described by statute or regulation, but
the definition has developed in the common law. The Oregon courts
define "return flow" as "water that returns to the natural course of the
640. Id. § 540.520(1).
641. Recall the special status allotted conserved water: OR. REV. STAT. §540.510(2)
permits severing conserved water from the conserved water program after merely notifying the Department of the transfer or sale according to OR. REV. STAT. § 537.490
(2007); an application need not be filed under OR. REV. STAT. § 540.520. See id. §
540.510(6).
642. Id. § 540.530(1)(b).
OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-0100(3) (2008).
643.
644. Kusyk v. Water Res. Dep't, 994 P.2d 798, 801 (2000); see OR. REV. STAT. §
540.530(1) (a) (2007).
OR. REV. STAT. § 540.520(7) (2007) (noting that hearings shall be held within
645.
the area where the rights are located).
646. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.530(1)(b)-(c); email from Doug Parrow to Adell Amos,
Assistant Professor & Dir., Envtl. & Natural Res. L. Program, Univ. of Or. School of
Law. (on file with author).
For an excellent discussion of the hydrology of return flow see Pilz, supra note
647.
617, at 1392-95; see also Vaughn v. Kolb, 280 P. 518, 521 (Or. 1929) (distinguishing

return flow from seepage).
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stream from which it was taken, after being applied by an appropriator." 8 By contrast, the courts have defined "seepage" as water that
does not return to the original source.6'9 Any claim of injury turns on
whether an existing water right fails to receive previously available water to which it is legally entitled." ° Oregon law entitles water users to
return flow."' Thus, it is critical to determine whether return flow exists, as well as its quantities and timing. At least one commentator asserts that watermasters in Oregon calculate return flow by subtracting
consumptive use from the diverted amount, which assumes that any
unconsumed quantity returns to the original source." A common situation arises when a senior user operates efficiently and does not use
the full duty of his water right. Junior users come to rely on the extra
water that the senior left in the system by not diverting. If the senior
started using the full duty, the junior would have no claim of injury.
But if the senior sought to transfer that full duty instream, the junior
would likely raise a claim of injury if it reduced the amount he was previously relying on.
At first glance, it seems difficult to imagine that the transfer of an
existing diversionary right to an instream use, which by its very nature
is adding water to the stream, could cause injury to a downstream water
user. A few scenarios may help illustrate how these claims of injury
arise. One scenario involves claims of injury by parties who share an
irrigation ditch, and the transfer of one water right to instream flow on
the main water source reduces the total amount of water moving down
the irrigation ditch. Many commentators refer to this as an impact to
"carriage" water, which describes how one water fight might carry or
shape a quantity of water downstream or down "ditch" so that water
physically reaches another point of diversion.
The Department has
taken the position that the loss of carriage water in a shared ditch will
not constitute injury. 54 In this circumstance, the impacts are viewed as
the same as the user voluntarily canceling the right.
Another scenario involves injury claims that may arise if upstream
senior users who try to satisfy the full transfer of water right to instream
flow pass more water downstream than the historical diversion amount
To satisfy the instrean flow, the upstream user may have to let more
water pass by than the downstream diversionary right required. The
Department has taken the position "that there is no injury if the demands on the system of the proposed new use are no greater than
648. Pilz supra note 617, at 1392; see a/soJones v. Warm Springs Irrigation Dist., 91
P.2d 542, 546-48 (Or. 1939).
649. Vaughn, 280 P. at 521; Pilz, supra note 617, at 1393.
650. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-0100(3) (2008).
651. Vaughn, 280 P. at 522.
652. Pilz, supra note 617, at 1394.
653. Id. at 1408.
654. Email from Doug Parrow to Debbie Colbert, October 20, 2008.
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The De-

partment's analysis turns on this inquiry, not whether the impacts are
greater due to the historic use.656
According to the Department, the most common injury issue to
arise in the context of instream flow involves instream rights that extend further downstream than the original point of diversion. This
dynamic occurs when an instream right is used to protect a reach of a
stream and the reach extends further downstream than the point at
which the original right would have re-entered the watercourse as return flow. In this situation, there may be ajunior downstream diverter
that will be regulated off if the Department seeks to enforce this instream right though the entire reach. The possibility of regulating this
junior right that previously relied on return flow would, according to
the Department, likely be viewed as injurious. 5 ' The next paragraphs
describe some specific examples of injury in the context of instream
flow transfers.
A dispute that arose in Little Creek, located in the Grand Ronde
Basin area of Union County, provides an example of injury claims arising from transfer applications. " When the Oregon Water Trust applied to transfer water rights from irrigation to instream use, neighboring water right holders and a ditch improvement district filed a protest
claiming that the transfer would injure existing water rights. 9 The
protestors held junior water rights and were concerned that the transfer to instream use would result in theirjunior uses being regulated off
during irrigation season to protect the senior downstream instream

right." The Department's Hearing Officer Panel held a contested case
hearing in April of 2002, and the panel issued a proposed order in November 2002." ' The proposed order addressed the protestors' concerns and the issue of injury in some detail.62 However, the parties ultimately settled the case, and the Hearing Officer Panel issued a generic final order that left the proposed order's conclusions only illustrative
rather than precedential." Despite the lack of precedent, the proposed order's issues provide insight into how the Department examines the question of injury.
655. Id.; see also, Technical Operations Manual, State of Oregon, Water Resources
Department, Section 11.01-Water Right Transfer Reviews at 3 (August 15, 2008).
656. Parrow, supra note 654; see also, Technical Operations Manual at 1 (discussing
Oregon as a "face value" state, not a state that bases transfer on the amount that has
"historically" been diverted.
657. Id.
658. Pilz, supra note 617, at 1403.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 1403.
661. Id. at 1403 n.119.
662. Id. at 1404-09
663. Id. at 1403 n.123.
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The proposed order found that the following situations did not
constitute injury:
1) A downstream appropriator's risk of being regulated off the
stream, if the risk was present when the upstream right was fully
exercised;
2) A claim that the transfer included more water than had been historically diverted, provided the holder remained ready, willing,
and able to divert the full amount;
3) A claim that previously the full amount was not diverted, provided forfeiture does not apply;
4) Changes to the shape or timing of the water right provided they
are within the scope of the original right;
5) Possibility of continued sub-irrigation through wetlands after the
transfer of the right;
6) Reduction in the efficiency of a shared convergence channel, or
so-called "carriage" water.'
Furthermore, the Proposed Order indicated that the parties must
present evidence of the existence of return flow, not just speculation
that it exists."
Another proposed instream transfer, this one in the Walla Walla
basin of northeastern Oregon, helps illustrate how return flow affects
the injury analysis. In the Walla Walla case, a landowner who irrigated
one hundred acres of land adjacent to the Walla Walla River applied to
transfer the water right for nineteen of those acres to an instream
use.' After receiving the application, the Department consulted with
the local watermaster, who calculated the nineteen acres' consumptive
water use based on the irrigated crop's transpiration rate. 7 That calculation assumed that all water the crops did not directly use made its
way back to the river as return flow and was thus available for downstream users.' The Department subsequently limited the amount of
water available for instream transfer based on those calculations." The
Oregon Water Trust and landowner disagreed with the Department's
calculations, and a dispute arose over how 6to
calculate and measure
70
the amount of water available for return flow.

The Walla Walla dispute illustrates three dynamics regarding calculation of return flow. First, when an instream injury analysis calls for

664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

1405-08.
1412.
1409.

1410.
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determining return flow, the calculation should include the timing of
the return.67 ' Hydrology and topography impact how long it takes for
irrigation water to return to the source. Thus, depending on the hydrology and topography of the area, the irrigation season may end before return flow makes it back to the source, thus impacting the injury
analysis. 72 Second, the return flow may also be related to the length of
the irrigation season."' For example, a claim of injury may not be valid
if the lack of return flow occurs outside the established irrigation season. These examples leave open the question of whether the analysis
of return flow is the same for all water rights or different where an instream right is at stake.
Another dynamic that arises in the transfer process involves challenges to water rights to be transferred to instream flow. Opponents of
the instream transfer may allege partial or complete forfeiture of the
original right. Often such claims focus on whether the permit holder
was ready, willing, and able to put the water to beneficial use. If sucmay reduce the quantity of water available for
cessful, such a challenge
67 4
the instream transfer.

Enlargement is a form of injury resulting from a transfer whereby
the transfer effectively expands the water ight.75 Examples of enlargement include, but are not limited to: using a greater rate or duty
of water per acre than a right currently allows; increasing the acreage
that a user irrigates under a right; failing to keep the original place of
use from receiving water from the same source; diverting more water at
the new point of diversion or appropriation than is legally available to
that right at the original point of diversion or appropriation. 76 In
some situations upstream juniors could suffer reduction in the diversion in order to let water flow to downward instream flow reach.6
In general, enlargement of a water right is not allowed. Issues of
enlargement arise when transferring irrigation rights to instream flow,
specifically in the method of calculations of the rate and duty of the
water right.7 Open questions remain including: (1) whether the presence of a transfer of the same duty will possibly increase the rate if
there is no injury; (2) whether this would constitute enlargement; and
(3) is enlargement a derivative of the no-injury rule? The Oregon sta-

671.
672.
673.
674.

Id. at 1412.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1391.

OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-0100(2) (2008); see OR. Rrv. STAT. § 540.510 (2007).
OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-0100(2) (2008).
See id.
677.
678.
See OR. Rrv. STAT. § 540.510 (2007) (establishing the procedure for determining
the amount of a transfer).
675.

676.
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tutes do not directly address these issues, and the administrative provisions represent the law and policy currently in operation." 9
2. Permanent Instream Water Right Transfers
In addition to the standard transfer requirements, applications for
all instream transfers must include information on the public uses for
the desired instream right; a description of the time periods of the instream use and quantity of water they seek to transfer to instream use;
the location of the proposed instream use, including upstream and
downstream reaches or the appropriate lake level; recommendations
for conditions such as a measuring and monitoring flow and lake level
to ensure no injury to existing rights."'
To support the creation of instream flows, Oregon statutes and
regulations provide for waivers of some of the above requirements.
The Director may assist in describing premises upon the water's use or
proposed use. The Director may also waive the requirement altogether
for an application for an instream transfer under Oregon Revised Statutes section 537.348; for the completion of a watershed enhancement
project under Oregon Revised Statutes section 541.375; or for endorsements by the Department of Fish and Wildlife that create a net
benefit for fish and wildlife habitat.6 Furthermore, the Director can
waive the mapping requirements and reduce application fees by $100
or fifty percent, whichever is greater, when the application seeks to
create instream rights."
Once the instream transfer is complete, the Department cancels
the original certificate and issues a new certificate in the name of the
Department for instream use. " ' At this point the state holds the transferred instream right in trust for the people of Oregon and has the
power to enforce its terms."4
3. Temporary Instream Water Right Transfer-Leasing Instream Water Rights
In addition to permanent transfers, water rights may be leased for
instream use through a temporary transfer or lease. Leases may not
679. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-3400 (2008); OR. Amn. R. 690-380-2250(3) (prohibiting
transfer of a supplemental water right or permit if the transfer would result in injury or
enlargement).
680.

OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0070(2) (a)-(f) (2008).

681. Id.
682. OR. ADMIN. R 690-380-3400 (2008); id. 690-380-3410.
683. OR. REV. STAT. § 539.140 (2007); see Kerivan v. Water Resources Comm'n, 72
P.3d 659, 661 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
684.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2007) or OR. REV. STAT. §537-341 (both provisions
indicate that rights are held in trust; neither mention enforcement).
685. See id. § 540.523.
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last longer than five years, though they are infinitely renewable."O One
of the principal benefits of leasing instream rights is that the user retains the underlying water right, while avoiding any risk of forfeiture
because so long as the right holder maintains the original diverting
facilities, the leasing of instream rights allows the right holder to remain ready, willing, and able to use the water." Moreover, the Department has taken the position that "the lease of a water right instream does constitute the beneficial use of the right.'' "
The application process for temporarily leasing instream rights is
largely the same as for permanently transferring instream rights. The
same waivers apply," 9 as does the requirement for an affirmative finding of no injury." ° However, there are a few additional requirements
an applicant must meet:"'
" Clearly mark the application as a temporary transfer
" Indicate the duration of the lease (no more than five years)
" Include payment of the appropriate fee pursuant to section
536.050 of the Oregon Code (base fee: $175)
" Include a map (however, water right examiner need not certify
it)
" Provide a description of the use
" Provide evidence that an agreement exists between the parties
Additionally, when evaluating temporary transfer applications, the
Department requires a watermaster or other field staff to submit a written assessment affirming that the lease meets all necessary requirements for an instream lease application." In 2007, there were 390 ac-

686. Id. § 540.523(1).
687. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-8002 (4) (2008); see also Pilz, supra note 617, at 1402.
688. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-77-0077(11) and 690-380-8002(4); see also, Parrow, supra note
654; see also, Preliminary Determination, In the Matter of Instram TransferApplication T10544 and Mitigation CreditProject MP=113, Descutes County, Findings 19 and 20 (December 9. 2008), availableat
http://apps2.wrd.state.or.us/apps/misc/vauit/vaut.aspx?Type=TRFolder&foIder-ima
geid=8668.
689. Id. ("A person who transfers a water right by purchase, lease or gift under this
subsection shall comply with the requirement for the transfer of a water right under
OR. REv. STAT. § 540.505-540.585."); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-380-3400(1) (2008); id. at 690380-3410(1) (a).
690. OR. REV. STAT. §540.523(2) (2007).
691. Id. § 540.523 (1)(c); OR. ADMIN. R 690-380-8004(1) (2008). The requirements
for split season leasing are very similar and may be found under OR. ADMIN. R 690-0770079. Note, however, that the split leasing provision is set to expire on January 2, 2008.
692. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0077(2) (2008). Id. 690-077-0076(3) lists the necessary
requirements.
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tive instream leases, protecting a total of 596 cubic feet per second,
statewide."
The Oregon Code also allows for "split-season" leases of instream
flow rights. 4 This allows a water user to lease a portion of a given season's water right to instream flow while still using water for consumptive use for the remainder of the season.' 5 By rule, the Department has
placed several limitations or conditions on split-season leases. First, the
period for the consumptive use and instream use must not be concurrent; second, the number of "splits" per season is limited to one per
year, and the Department allows only two existing use periods and one
instream period."6 Third, the Department requires that individuals
holding a split-season lease must measure and report their noninstream use. 197
D. INJURY TO EXISTING INSTREAM RIGHTS
Once the Department has established an instream flow right, it subjects the right to the same protections against injury as any other
right."8 However, in 2001, the legislature amended the law to allow for
Departmental consent to injury of an instream right in some limited
circumstances.'
To exercise this authority, the Department must receive a recommendation from either the ODFW, the DEO or Parks
and Recreation, and the Water Resources Department may only con693. Email from Bob Rice, Field Services Division, Oregon Water Resources Department to Adell Amos, Assistant Professor & Dir., Envtl. & Natural Res. L. Program,
Univ. of Or. School of Law (March 4, 2008) (on file with author).
694. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.348(3) (2007).
695. Id. § 537.348(3).
696. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-007-0079(2) (2008); see also Pilz, supranote 617, at 1388 n.22.
The user must prove that non-instream flow use did not exceed the full quantity of the
right by measuring and reporting consumptive use. Interview with David Pilz (March
26, 2008). It then becomes the Department's responsibility to measure and enforce
the instream portion of the right. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2007). The Department is mainly concerned that the user does not exceed the full quantity (or duty)
during the non-instream period because the Department wants to avoid enlargement
of the water right. Usually the non-instream use occurs first, and the remaining
amount of water becomes the set quantity for the instream right. Rice, supra note 693.
697. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3)(b) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R_ 690-007-0079(3) (2008);
see also Pilz supra note 617, at 1388 n.22.
698. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.350(1) (2007).
699. S.B. 870, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001) (amending OR. REV. STAT. § 540.530).
One motivation behind the 2001 legislation was to assist ODFW initiatives. ODFW was
working with water users to modify their diversion structures to make them more fish
friendly. During the course of those modifications, ODFW needed to move the points
of diversion upstream. However, the Department's position is that on stream reaches
with instream rights, moving a point of diversion constitutes injury to those instream
rights. Therefore, the Legislature facilitated the ODFW initiatives when it amended
the language to allow for consent to injury, thereby making the point of diversion
changes possible. Parrow, supra note 654.
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sent to injuries for a proposed change in point of diversion to an agency-requested instream right and for rights converted from minimum
perennial stream flows."0 The Department may not consent to injury
for any instream rights established by purchase, lease, or gift.70' Furthermore, the Department acts on a case-by-case basis and will only
grant the transfer if it results in a net benefit to the source. 2 If an
agency consents to a transfer despite injury to existing instream rights,
the consent must be in writing, available to the public, and provide an
explanation detailing the extent of the injury to the instream right and
the reasons for finding a net beneficial gain. 73 The Department may
any type for the instream rights
not consent to injury from transfers of
74
resulting from purchase, lease, or gift.
Where new appropriations threaten to injure existing instream
rights, the Department follows the same process set out for other rights
to determine water availability and injury.0 0 Instream rights are protected and enforced like other water rights in the system,70 and by design
enjoy the same legal protection as any other water right.
E. ENFORCING INSTREAM WATER RIGHTS
Watermasters enforce Oregon's water laws, including the protection of instream rights. 7 7 Watermasters must frequently measure and
monitor flows in order to effectively enforce water rights, both instream and out. To that end, the Department requires all government
entities holding water rights to submit reports detailing the past year's
water use at each point of diversion, within fifteen percent accuracy.711
As the government entity in charge of all 1,500 instream water rights in
Oregon, the Department must report on the monthly volume of instream rights.7 0 However, the Commission waived the fifteen percent
accuracy requirement in 1993 for all instream rights. 710 The Commis-

700. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.530(1)(c) (2007); id. § 537.336 (providing authority to
these agencies to request instream flow rights).
701. Id. § 540.530(1)(c); seealsoOR.ADMIN. R. 690-380-5030(2) (2008).
702. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.530(1) (c) (2007).
703. Id. § 540.530(1)(d)(A)-(C).
704. See id. § 540.530(1)(c).
705.

BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 91.

706. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.350(1) (2007).
707. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.045(1)(a)-(d) (2007). It is especially important they protect instream rights, as there is no private party regularly relying on them.
708. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-085-0010(1), (3) (2008).
709. Memorandum from Norris II, supra note 553, at 2; BASTASCH, supra note 131, at
114. Out of the 1,500 instream water rights, 177 have continuous gaging stations,
showing 113 instream water rights were met 80 percent of the time.
710. Memorandum from Norris II, supra note 553, at 1.
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sion cited practical difficulties, most likely attributable to insufficient
resources. 711
Watermasters frequently regulate water users in reaction to complaints by other users not receiving their water."' This tendency places
instream rights at a disadvantage since the Department itself holds
them in trust, and there is no particular outside party, depending on
the fulfillment of the ight to call and complain."' As a result watermasters have little time or incentive to monitor and enforce instream
rights."' Nonetheless, the Department enforced instream water rights
157 times in 2005.' 5 Moreover, when groups like the Oregon Water
Trust ("OWT") or the Deschutes River Conservancy ("DRC") acquire
water for instream use, especially if there are federal funds involved,
they must ensure enforcement. 16 In these situations, OWT and DRC
regularly call on the Department to enforce instream rights."' The
DRC has even paid for automated gauges in order to monitor and ensure that water stays instream. 8 The Department is working to become
more proactive in its enforcement, largely by fostering better voluntary
regulation among users, which would permit watermasters to better
monitor instream rights. 19 Watermasters also regularly assist in negotiating a distribution of water that will allow junior users to divert at
least some water, where they would otherwise be regulated off but, according to the Department, these negotiations do not include changes
to established instream flow rights.2
In Oregon, only the State can hold and enforce instream flow
rights. In fact, the Oregon Code defines instream flow rights specifically as, "a water right held in trust by the Water Resources Department
for the benefit of the people of the State of Oregon."7 ' Because the
Department holds this right in trust for the public, members of the
public can complain and seek legal action against it to prompt enforcement. There is one situation, however, where non-state entities
may also be able to enforce instream rights. In the context of the instream leasing program, the administrative regulations provide that
711.
Seeid. at4.
712. See Pilz, supra note 617, at 1396.
713. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.341 (2007); Cf.OR. REv. STAT. § 540.100(1).
714. See id. at 1395-96.
715. Paul, supranote 363, at Attachment 3.
716. Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Rights, 28 HARV.
ENvrL.L. REv. 495, 520 (2004).

717.

Id. at 517-18.

718. KAREN LAMSON & JENNIFER SHANNON CIARK, WASCO CouNTY SoIL AND WATER
CONSERVATION DisTRicT,WHTE RIVER WATERSHED ASSESSMENT 33 (2004), available at

http://www.wasco.oacd.org/WRAssessment%20Final%2OVersion.pdf.
719. See Pilz, supra note 617, at 1396.
720. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.100(1) (2007); id. § 540.150; BASTAScH, supra note 131, at
152; see Pilz, supranote 617, at 1396.
721. Id.
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"[a] lessee has the same standing as the lessor for all purposes regarding management and enforcement of the instream water right. ' 72 2 In

theory, the language of the instream lease regulation equates the lessee
to a consumptive water right holder. This appears to be inconsistent
with the regulatory scheme where the OWRD holds other instream
water rights in trust. The unique nature of the right the instream lessee holds may have significant consequences in terms of administrative
and judicial standing as well as in enforcing the right against other water users. Yet, the precise implications remain uncertain.
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND ENFORCING INSTREAM
WATER RIGHTS

In the face of climate change and potentially competing demands
on water resources based on energy and land-use policy, it is more important than ever to maintain and enforce established instream flow
rights. Moreover, protecting freshwater ecosystems, wetlands, floodplains and other water-dependent system may provide some of the best
protection and resiliency in our natural system.
The Oregon Water Code treats instream rights differently than traditional rights in some significant ways. A number of these differences
limit instream water rights despite the legislature's intent to put instream rights on par with traditional consumptive use water rights.
As an initial matter, the Department still needs to convert remaining minimum perennial stream flows to instream flow rights as the
1987 Act provided. In addition, there are a number of outstanding
instream water rights applications by the state agencies, some of which
have protests pending that are in need of resolution.
In addition to these procedural issues, there are numerous substantive issues that arise with regard to the instream flow program in Oregon. To begin, traditional water rights easily satisfy the beneficial use
requirement for all water rights. 7 ' In practice, applicants for tradition-

al water rights must subjectively believe that the stated use is of value
and is satisfiable with reasonable efficiency. While the instream right
program does contain an exclusive list of instream uses that satisfy the
beneficial use requirement, in practice the uses are typically one or
more of four recognized public uses: (1) recreation, (2) pollution abatement, (3) navigation, or (4) "[c]onservation maintenance, and enhancement of aquatic and fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat,
7 25
and any other ecological values.

722. OR. ADMN. R. 690-077-0077 (12) (2008).
723. See Oregon Water Trust, Utilizing Water Law,
http://www.owt.org/water-law.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
724. BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 59.
725. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(5) (a)-(d) (2007).
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During the review process, the Department gives applicants for traditional water rights additional protection, which it does not explicitly
afford to instream applicants." When the Department exceeds 180
days from the initial filing to decide on a traditional right or an instream right, the applicant may seek a court order compelling the Department either to issue a final order or to conduct a contested case
hearing.727 When the application is for an "out-of-stream" right, the
court must compel the Department to issue the permit unless the Department can establish by affidavit that the new use would result in
harm to an existing water right."' The statute does not explicitly mention if the court must compel the Department to issue a permit for
7
instream rights.

1

One limitation on both traditional and instream rights is that transfers may not injure existing water rights.7 11 When preparing its preliminary determination, the Department must evaluate whether the proposed transfer will injure existing water rights.7 1' As part of this determination, the Department must publish notice of the proposed transfer, and any person may file a protest.73 If someone does file a protest,
or if the Director thinks that a hearing is necessary to determine if the
proposal would result in injury, the Department must hold a hearing.7 "
If the Department holds a hearing, the applicant must show that the
proposed transfer will not injure existing water rights, which effectively
places the burden of proof on the transfer applicant.7 This requirement acts as a significant burden to all water right transfers because
applicants must likely devote additional resources to gathering proof
for the hearing, and often, affirmative proof that no injury will occur is
elusive.7

5

Because not-for-profit non-governmental organizations typi-

cally drive instream transfers, rather than the for-profit interests that
typically drive traditional transfers, some have criticized this require726. See, e.g., id. § 537.175(4)
727. Id. (a court order compelling the Department to act is referred to as a writ of
mandamus).
728. Id. The statute reads, "[i]f the application is for out-of-stream use, the writ of
mandamus shall compel the department to issue a water right." The argument could
be made that while the court has the authority to compel the Department to issue an
instream right, it is not bound by statute to do so.
729. Id.
730. See OR. ADMN. R 690-380-4010(2)(d) (2008).
731. Id.
732. OR. REv. STAT. § 540-520(5)-(6) (2007).
733. Id. § 540.520(7).
734. Id. § 540.530(1) (a) ("If, after hearing or examination, the Water Resources
Commission finds that a proposed change can be effected without injury to existing
water rights, the commission shall make an order approving the transfer ... ").
735. See Kusyk v. Water Res. Dep't, 994 P.2d 798 (2000) ("On remand in a contested
case hearing, it is uncertain whether petitioners will be able to provide any additional
information on this matter that would allow the department to make a pre-transfer
determination in petitioners' favor regarding the transfer request.").
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ment as weighing disproportionately on instream transfers. Participants in the process have also asserted that the Department, in practice, presumes injury and requires an affirmative finding of non-injury
in the instream transfer process, but not in the transfer process for
consumptive rights-essentially imposing a stricter injury analysis for
instream rights than out-of-stream transfers of consumptive rights."'
Furthermore, the Department's heavy reliance on formal and informal complaints to local watermasters for enforcement of water
rights may impact instream rights.73 ' In general, the absence of anyone
with an economic interest in seeing the instream right fulfilled, as opposed to individuals or organizations holding water rights, can reduce
the effectiveness of this method of enforcement for instream rights.
While the Department has been working to increase proactive measures on the part of watermasters as an effort to enhance enforcement
of instream rights, it remains underfunded and shorthanded. That
being said, the emergence of organizations like OWT and DRC create
economic interests that seek to enforce instream rights.
Oregon's strict public ownership of instream rights compounds the
Department's enforcement shortcoming as it prohibits private parties
from directly suing for enforcement of instream rights. 7" Therefore,
not only is notice of injury to instream rights relatively rare (157 out of
11,451 total regulatory actions protected instream rights740), but also
when formal notice does occur, the only public recourse may be to sue
the Department as the holder of all instream rights for a court order to
compel Departmental action. 4 One solution to this problem may be
in the ability of the lessee to manage and enforce temporary leases of
instream flow rights but this may be challenging since the state,
through the Department, ultimately manages and regulates the water
rights system.
According to the Department, the State of Oregon places high
priority of regulating uses based on the need to protect instream flow
ights. 7 1' The State of Oregon sets annual targets for instream regula736. WATER REs. DEP'T, WATER RIGHT TRANSFER SUPPLEMENTAL FoRM C (Oct. 13,
2006) availableat http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/SupplementalFormC.pdf. This
assertion is perhaps due in part to the Department's supplemental instream transfer
application, which includes "recommendations for conditions on the instream use to
avoid taking away or impairing existing water rights."
737. OR. REv. STAT. §537.332(3) (2007); BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 149 (about
half of all actions taken by watermasters is a response to a complaint).
738. BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 152.
739. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2007); BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 157.
740. Paul, supra note 363, at Attachment 3. However, the Department indicates that
instream rights represent only 4 percent of the total water rights in the state, thus instream rights may be over-represented in the total number of enforcement actions.
741. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.740 (2007).
742. Email from Debbie Colbert to Leslie Bach, October 21, 2008 (on file with author).
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tion.43 The ratio of streams regulated to protect instream rights to all
streams regulated for 2006 was 56 percent. The target ratio for 2006
was 35 percent and increased to 40 percent for 2008 and 2009."' The
Annual Performance Measures for the Department also lists possibilities for improving regulation of instream rights but does not consider
external enforcement mechanisms.745 This level of instream rights enforcement reflects a commitment to instream flow protection which
makes Oregon a leader among the western states.
One commentator has suggested that the Department "may use
[forfeiture] to limit landowners' ability to permanently transfer rights
'
instream at the conclusion of a five-year [instream] lease period."746
When the landowner applies for a permanent transfer, the Department
may require the landowner to demonstrate that she has used her water
for the last five years. ' The allegation is that the Department seizes on
the likelihood that the right holder would not have maintained her
diversion facilities during the lease, and therefore will have a relatively
weak "ready, willing and able" defense, causing the right holder to lose
part of the water right."' If this is true, traditional right holders effectively face penalization for supporting instream flow. However, instream rights supposedly have the same legal status as other water
rights and fit the definition of beneficial use, although users do not
consume them. "9 Therefore, the counterargument to this allegation is
that the "forfeiture clock" does not run during the instream lease because the water was being put to beneficial use, and only non-use leads
to forfeiture.75 ° While theoretically possible, the Department, has not
taken this position."'
Furthermore, where injury to instream rights results from a change
in point of diversion, the Department can often consent to the injury,
though only in a very narrow set of circumstances. The instream right
must be agency-requested or the result of a converted minimum perennial stream flow. 75 2 Also, the agency that requested the right must

submit a written report to the Department detailing how the injury to
743. WATER REs. DEP'T PERFORMANCE PROGRESs REPORT (APPR) FOR FIsCAL YEAR 200607 at 9, available at
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/OWRDAnnualPM -Report_- 2007.pdf.
744. Id.; Total regulation may decrease in years of high stream flows, which may
account for the large difference between the target and actual ratio of instream regulation in 2006.
745. Id.
746. Pilz, supra note 617, at 1401.
747. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.520(2) (g) (2007).
748. Pilz, supra note 617, at 1401; see OR. REv. STAT. § 540.520(2) (d) (2007); see also
supra section III.B. (discussing forfeiture and the ready, willing, and able defense).
749. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.334,.350(1) (2007).
750. Pilz, supranote 617, at 1401-02.
751. Parrow, supranote 654.
752. Id. § 540.530(1)(c).
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the instream right yields a net benefit. 75 If the agency's report recommends consenting to the injury, the Department must not only find a
net benefit but also provide public notice and allow public commenting on the recommendation. 54 Agency-requested instream rights face
limitations in other respects as well: applications for certain other types
of use can subordinate them. Specifically, these instream water rights
are subject to water permit applications for a multipurpose storage
facility, a municipality, or a hydroelectric project-regardless of greater
relative seniority within the priority system.75 '

For the Department to

allow this subordination, it must conduct a review in accordance with
the contested case hearing process. 757
Finally, the water code limits the quantity of water that the Department may legally protect within any given stream, 5 ' by limiting the
quantity of water that may be dedicated to instream rights at any one
time. 59 The water code restricts the protected quantity of instream
flows to "the minimum quantity necessary to support the public use
requested by an agency," and to the minimum to "maintain water instream for public use., ,7'

Through these definitions, the Department

has essentially equated the amount necessary for instream purposes
with the amount an agency's request of instream rights for a particular
purpose, or what the Department determines is appropriate to maintain public use.76 ' Further, the regulations prohibit the creation of instream rights that would otherwise, "exceed the amount needed to
provide increased public benefits"-commonly referred to as the beneficial use cap. 711
As a result, the Department measures transferred instream flow
rights as a contribution to the level that the agency established, but not
an addition to the established instream flow right." 7 The volume or
number of transferred rights may make this a small distinction currently. But, in the future, transfers may be a more significant avenue for
establishing instream flow rights. For stream segments where no agency has established an instream flow right, the amount of instream flow
753.
Id. § 540.530(1)(c), (d)(B).
754.
Id. § 540.530(1)(d).
755.
Id. § 537.352; id. § 540.530(1)(c)(d)(C) (noting that the net benefit report
must include an analysis of the cumulative impacts to the instream right).
756.
Id. § 537.352; see also id. § 537.282 (defining municipal applicant).
757.
Id. § 537.352; see also id. § 532.170 (stating review procedures).
758.
Id. § 537.332(1)-(2); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(10)-(11) (2008).
759.
OR. REv. STAT. § 537-332(1)-(2) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(4), (10)-

(11) (2008).
760.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332(2)-(3) (2007).
761.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332(2)-(3) (2007); see also OR. ADMIN. R_ 690-0770015(10)-(11) (2008).
762.
OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(11) (2008).
763.
See OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(2) (2007); see also OR. ADMIN. R_ 690-077-0015(10)(11) (2008).
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that the Department can protect is not so limited because the Department uses the estimated average natural flow standard. The Department will issue instream flow rights for up to the estimated average
natural flow of a particular stream segment.
The regulations reflect the statutory limits on the quantity of water
that can be dedicated to instream flow. First, the regulations prohibit
the creation of instream rights that would otherwise "exceed the
amount needed to provide increased public benefits"-referred to
above as the beneficial use cap.7" Again, the Department likely bases
this determination on the quantity of the agency- requested instream
rights. Secondly, the administrative regulations permit reducing the
protected quantity of instream flow to account for natural losses such
as evaporation, seepage, and transpiration. 75 Historically, at least, traditional rights did not experience a similar reduction following a
change in point of diversion.76
Thirdly, the Department may limit the quantity of water protected
by instream rights based on a stream's Estimated Average Natural Flow
("EANF") .' EANF is a calculation of a stream's historic monthly average flow."8 Using EANF, the Department can limit instream rights to
quantities no greater than the established EANF for a particular stream
segment. For example, if a river's EANF is 5 cfs in July, and 2 cfs in
August, then regardless of the combined quantities that the instream
rights list, the maximum protected instream flow for the month of July
is 5 cfs, and 2 cfs in August.7 9 The original reasoning behind this rule
was that flows in excess of the natural average could not provide additional public benefits.770 The Department, however, asserts that for
instream rights that are issued as additive, the Department will protect
the combined quantities of water regardless of whether the quantity is
above or below EANF. 7T
The 2005 amendment to the EANF regulations provide an example
of a right that can be issued as additive. The Amendment declares that
subject to the Director's discretion, "for instream rights established
through instream transfers, leases, or allocations of conserved water, it
is presumed that flows that exceed the estimated average natural flow

764. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0015(11) (2008).
765. Id. 690-077-0075(2) (c) (B).
766. Id. 690-380-2110.
767. See Pilz, supra note 617, at 1399.
768. Id. 690-077-0010(10) ("'Estimated Average Natural Flow' means average natural
flow estimates derived from watermaster distribution records, Department measurement records and application of appropriate available scientific and hydrologic technology.").
769. Pilz, supranote 617, at 1397-98.
770. Id. at 1399.
771. Parrow, supra note 654.
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or natural lake levels are significant for the applied
public use," pro772
vided the circumstances satisfy two of three criteria.
The first requisite criterion is that "the flow does not exceed the
maximum of any instream rights applied for [by the state agencies] for
the same reach or portion thereof and for the same public use."7 3 The
second criterion requires either: (1) "[f]or the specified time period
that flows are requested to exceed the estimated average natural flow
or lake level, the stream is in an ODFW flow restoration priority watershed"; or (2) " [t]he steam is listed as water quality limited and DEQ
has provided information that demonstrates that increased flows would
improve water quality."7 4 The first criterion holds the quantity of protected instream flow to the amount the agency-requested instream
rights protect for the same public use. " Therefore, if the public use
listed on the other instream rights differs from that of the agencyrequested instream right, the amount could theoretically exceed the
maximum quantity that the agency-requested rights allow. The other
criteria each function as absolute barriers-either the stream is located
in a priority restoration watershed/water quality limited or it is not."'
Nonetheless, this amendment renders the FANF limitation inoperative
for all applicable streams, leaving the beneficial public use cap as the
primary limitation on instream rights. This amendment allows for
groups or private individuals to pursue instream transfers above EANF
levels if two conditions exist. First, there is no agency instream right
already established. And, second, either ODFW has listed the stream
in a priority watershed or DEQ has listed the stream as water quality
limited.7
G. CONSERVED WATER PROGRAM: COMBINING WASTE PREVENTION AND
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION

The state not only has authority to establish instream rights
through agency requests and transfers, but also through the Conserved
Water Program."' Like the transfer mechanism, the conserved water
program creates an opportunity to establish instream water rights from
pre-existing rights with no loss of priority.7 The stated goal of the
772. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(5) (a)-(c) (2008).
773. Id. 690-077-0015(5) (a).
774. Id. 690-077-0015(b)-(c).
775. Id. 690-077-0015(5) (a).
776. Id. 690-077-0015(5)(b)-(c).
777. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015(5)(b)-(c).
778. The program is codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455-.500 (2007). See OR. REV.
STAT. §537.463 (2008). Statutorily, conservation occurs when users reduce the amount
of water they are using by improving the technology or method of diversion or transportation. See id. § 537.455(1). For a detailed analysis of Oregon's conserved water
statute, see generally AYLWARD, supra note 539.
779. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.470(3), (6) (2007)
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Conserved Water Program is to enhance efficiency and water availability by providing users an incentive to reduce waste.8
If users participate in the conserved water program, they get to use, as part of a permitted water right, some of the conserved water while the other portion of conserved water is designated as instream flow. The program
aims to meet this goal by encouraging and incentivizing more efficient
78

water use, which makes water available to enhance instream flows. '

When water right holders undertake conservation measures and apply
to the program, they must convert a portion of the conserved water
into an instream right. 8' In exchange, the Department grants the right
holders greater latitude in how they use the remaining conserved water." Since the 1993 amendment to the statute for the Conserved Water Program through 2007, the Department has received fifty-three
applications to allocate conserved water and approved thirty-four; the
Department directly denied only one application.
After the user files an application for allocation of conserved water,
the state determines the quantity of water conserved and may reduce
that quantity to "mitigate the effect of other water rights." The state
then allocates 75 percent to the user and converts the remaining twenty-five percent into an instream right that the state administers.8
However, if the state or federal government provides more than 25
percent of the financing for the conservation project and that money is
not subject to repayment, the state will convert the same percentage
into an instream right.786 The applicant may also choose to turn over
the entire amount of conserved water to the state as an instream
right.7 17 Furthermore, the Department may determine additional instream flow is not necessary to support established instream purposes,
in which case that portion will revert to the public and be made available for future appropriation.7 8 A user must file an application for conserved water within five years of the date from which the conservation
measures were implemented.8

780.

Id. § 537.460(2).

781.

Id.

782.

Id. § 537.470(3).

783.

See id.

supra note 539, at 11-12. The amendment of this statute in 1993
made it clear that reducing diversions could conserve water and that water conserva784.

AYLWARD,

tion was not limited to reductions in consumptive use only. These numbers reflect
statistics between 1993 and 2007. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.455 (2007); Honhart, supra note
472, at 845-46; see BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 163.
785. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.470(3) (2007).
786. Id. § 537.470(3).

787.

Id.

788.

Id.; see supra Section IV.F. (discussing agency-requested rights' impact on the

establishment of additional instream rights).
789.

OR. REV. STAT. § 537.465(1) (b) (2007).
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The water right holder may choose the priority date to use the conserved water, which can be either the same as or one minute after the
priority date of the original water right."' The chosen priority date will
apply both7 to the state's 25 percent allotment and the user's 75 percent
allotment.

1

The Conserved Water Program in Oregon has received considerable attention and well-deserved praise for its innovative and incentiveIssues and questions
based approach to freshwater conservation.
about effectiveness from 1993 to 2007 have been systematically examined for the first time in a recent report to the National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation.7

3

This conserved water program report finds that

the most water has been conserved by piping ditches and other measures to improve the efficiency of irrigation systems, reviews how return
flows and injury to other water rights have been addressed in such cases, and frames a host of issues about the Conserved Water Program for
further exploration.
H.

SCENIC WATERWAYS

The Oregon Department of State Parks and Recreation administers
the scenic waterways program created by the legislature through the
Scenic Waterways Act of 1970 to protect free-flowing rivers and lakes.9
The program protects designated free-flowing waterways that "possess
outstanding scenic, fish, wildlife, geological, botanical, historic, archaeologic, and outdoor recreation values of present and future benefit
to the public. 7 '

A scenic waterway designation prohibits construction

of dams, reservoirs, or other water impoundment facilities on scenic
waterways. 97 The program also prohibits construction of new water
diversion facilities unless the Commission finds that the proposed diversion would be consistent with the policies of the scenic waterways
program.7" The program also protects "[r]elated adjacent land,"
which extends the borders of a protected waterway for a quarter mile

790. Id.§537.485(1).
791. Id. § 537.485(2).
792. See, e.g., Or. Water Res. Dep't, Stewardship and Conservation Awards, State of
Oregon, www.wrd.state.or.us/OWRD/mgmt.awards.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
793. Bruce Aylward, Restoring Seepage Loss to Oregon Rivers: A Review of Oregon's Conserved Water Statute - A Report to the NationalFish and Wildlife Foundation,July 2008.
794.

See generally AYLWARD, supra note 539 (detailing an analysis of the conserved

water program).
795. OR. REV. STAT. § 390.845(1) (2007); OR. ADMIN. R_ 736-040-0400(2) (b) (2008)
(stating that scenic waterways are individually managed).

796.
797.

OR. REv. STAT. § 390.815 (2007).
Id. § 390.835(1).

798. Id. See infra section VIII. for a discussion of federal law, particularly that the
Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is a separate mechanism that operates differently.
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along the banks.' Related adjacent lands may not be altered, filled, or
have material removed."' The scenic waterway program does not affect
existing appropriations and uses.80 '
A scenic waterway may achieve its designation through any one of
three mechanisms: (1) adoption by the governor, (2) by vote in the
legislature, or (3) by public vote through a ballot initiative.

802

Most of

Oregon's scenic waterways were created by ballot initiative.0 Currently, the scenic waterway program protects nineteen river segments and
one lake (Waldo Lake), for an approximate total of 1,100 miles. 4
I. OTHER MECHANISMS FOR ENHANCING INSTREAM FLOW

In recent years various entities have explored alternatives to instream rights for enhancing instream flows, including forbearance
agreements, changes to points of diversion, source switching, and voluntary cancellation or diminishment.'00 The Oregon Water Trust has
recently used voluntary, short-term agreements to limit legally permit0
ted uses of water that have significant impact."
For example, an
agreement may compensate a landowner who stops diverting when
water levels drop below a certain point. In the Lostine River Basin,
near Enterprise, the Oregon Water Trust has used forbearance agreements to keep a target of fifteen cfs instream during Chinook salmon
spawning up to the Wallowa Mountains. 7 Because these agreements
are informal, there is no need for approval by the Department."
Frequently changing a point of diversion from a tributary to the
mainstream of a water source will help protect critical habitat for at-risk
species.Y Provided the mainstream has sufficient flow, encouraging a
water user to change his point of diversion can have a significant impact."' Similarly, switching from a surface water source to a groundwater source may help enhance surface stream flows, but the risks are
high since the relationship between surface and groundwater may be
less obvious.' Decisions regarding these source switches should consider a "thorough knowledge of the hydrology of the system."'
799.

OR. REV. STAT. § 390.805(1) (2007); see id.§ 390.845(3).

800.

Id. § 390.835(2).

801.
802.
803.
804.

Id. § 390.835(6) (b).
BAsTAscii, supranote 131, at 237.
Id.
Id.; see also OR. REv. STAT. § 390.826.

805.

Paulus, supra note 627, at 16-17.

806.

Id. at 16, 18.

807.
808.
809.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.

810.
811.
812.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the Oregon Water Trust has entered into agreements with
water users to voluntarily cancel all or a portion of their water rights."'
Pursuant to section 540.621 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, a permit
holder may cancel an existing right, and the water reverts to public
ownership and is subject to appropriation again. Because this mechanism does not establish an instream flow right, its effectiveness in enhancing stream flows lies in basins that have been closed to further
appropriation or where downstream landowners are not likely to seek
new appropriations in the targeted reach.1 4
V. GROUNDWATER
A. THE GROUNDWATER RESOURCE
Groundwater provides a valuable water source for many Oregonians and in the face of competing demands for water and largely overappropriated surface water sources the importance of groundwater to
the policy debates is clear. It is the primary source of drinking water in
Oregon, with approximately 70 percent of all residents state-wide relying on it for their drinking water.81 That percentage jumps to 90 per1
cent in rural Oregon."
Additionally, 90 percent of Oregon public water supply
systems draw their water exclusively from groundwater
817
sources. While groundwater provides its most well-known use as
drinking water from wells, it also provides essential water supplies for
irrigation, industry, and base flows for most of the state's rivers, lakes,
and streams."
Certain regions of the state depend more heavily on groundwater
than others. In the Willamette Valley, groundwater accounts for 30
percent of all water withdrawals, while the Columbia Plateau depends
on groundwater for 18 percent of its water withdrawals.'
In the remaining regions of the state, groundwater constitutes approximately 5
percent of total withdrawals." Because the majority of Oregon's rivers
are over-appropriated, groundwater satisfies many new water rights. 2'

813.
814.

Id.
Paulus, supra note 627, at 14.

815. OR. DEP'T OF ENvrL. QUALrr, GROUNDWATER QUALITY IN OREGON: DEQ REPORT
TO THE LEGISLATURE 3 (2007), available at
http://www.deq.state.or.us/pubs/legislativepubs/GroundwaterQualityLegReport2007.
pdf.

816.
817.
818.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.

819.

OR. PROGRESS BOARD, OR. STATE OF THE ENV'T REPORT

ch. 3, at 14 (2000), availa-

ble at http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/docs/SOER2OO/Ch3_la.pdf.
820. Id.
821. See id. at 2.
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The Groundwater Act of 1955822 ("Act") defines groundwater as any
water, other than capillary moisture, which lies "beneath the surface of
the land or beneath the bed of a stream, lake, reservoir, or other body
of surface water" within the state boundaries.82 Groundwater may be
present in any geologic formation or structure in which the water
"stands, flows, percolates, or otherwise moves. 12 4 The Act declares that

the public (by way of state control) has the right to control all sources
of water supply within the state, including groundwater, and sets forth
the following policies to preserve public welfare, safety, and health:
" Permit System: A permit and registration system governs groundwater appropriation within the state.2
" Priority: The state will acknowledge and protect appropriative
groundwater rights and their priority dates, except
when "public
8 2' 6
welfare, safety, and health require otherwise.

"

"

"

•

"
"

Beneficial Use- Beneficial use, without waste, is the "basis, meas-

2' 7
ure, and extent of the right to appropriate groundwater."

Public Records: All appropriative groundwater claims will be a
matter of public record.
Conservation: Permitting must assure adequate and safe supplies
of groundwater for human consumption, and must conserve
maximum supplies of groundwater for beneficial uses such as
"agricultural, commercial, industrial, thermal, recreational, and
other beneficial uses."8
Sources: The state is to determine the "location, extent, capacity,
quality, and other characteristics of particular sources of
groundwater."°
Stability: The state is to determine and maintain reasonably stable groundwater levels.2 1
Prevent Depletion: The state is to prevent or control, within practicable limits, the "depletion of groundwater supplies below economic levels," pollution that impairs the natural2 quality of
groundwater, and practices that waste groundwater.

822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.

The Groundwater Act is codified at OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.505-.795, .992 (2007).
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.515(5) (2007).
Id.
Id. § 537.525(1).
Id. § 537.525(2).
Id. § 537.525(3).
Id. § 537.525(4).

829.

Id. § 537.525(5).

830.
831.
832.

Id. § 537.525(6).
Id. § 537.525(7).
Id. § 537.525(8).
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The Water Resources Commission may, under the state police
power, control the use of groundwater resources within the
state."'
" State Control Over Wells: The state controls the "location, construction, depth, capacity, yield and other characteristics of
groundwater wells." '
* Prevent Contamination: All activities in the state that affect
groundwater quality or quantity must be consistent with the
State's goal of preventing groundwater contamination.83'
"

B. EXEMPTIONS
The Groundwater Act sets forth fairly stringent criteria for acquiring groundwater rights, but exempts broad categories of uses from
permitting.38 There are no permit or registration requirements for the
following uses, which leads to the term "exempt wells:"
(1) Stockwatering; 3
(2) Watering a lawn or noncommercial garden less than one-half
acre,

if the school is lo(3) Watering school grounds less than ten acres
31
area;1
groundwater
cated within a critical
(4) Single or group domestic wells pumping less than 15,000 gallons per day;8"
4
(5) Down-hole heat exchange purposes; '
(6) A single industrial or commercial purpose requiring less than
5,000 gallons per day;842 or

(7) Re-using certain groundwater for land application.'
The exemption for domestic wells that pump less than 15,000 gallons per day, "exempt wells," is a particularly controversial exemption.
Critics say it provides a loophole that encourages rural development
and allows individuals to draw down groundwater supplies without any
833.

Id. § 537.525(9).

834. Id. § 537.525(10).
835. Id. § 537.525(11).
836. See generally id. § 537.525. As discussed in more detail in section 5.4, the Commission has the statutory authority to classify or withdraw groundwater to preclude
future exempt uses, see, OR. REv. STAT. § 536.340(3). Attempts to use this authority
have been extremely controversial as discussed below.
837. Id. § 537.545(1)(a).
838. Id. § 537.545(1)(b).
839. Id. § 537.545(1)(c).
840. Id. § 537.545(1)(d).
841. Id. § 537.545(1)(e).
842. Id. § 537.545(1)(f).
843. Id. § 5 3 7 .5 45 (1)(g).
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checks. " Exempt domestic wells are located mostly in rural housing
developments, which municipal water suppliers do not serve. "5 Local
government controls rural housing development,"6 but due to limited
groundwater data and staff expertise, local government usually assumes
groundwater is available if the Water Resources Department fails to
formally restrict water development. 7 This assumption worries some
commentators who observe the disconnect between land use planning
and water resources management in the state.'
When county planners review proposed land use permits, they tend to address water
availability concerns by deferring to the Water Resources Department. 9 In turn, the Department's limited resources restrict its review
to determining whether or not a legal right to use water exists.8 58 This
bifurcation creates the possibility that the basin's long-term water
supply and the new use's net effect on water supply will fall through
the cracks. 5 These concerns create a particular tension for proposed
land uses that rely on exempt wells. Because county planning commissions defer to the Department and the Department does not have authority to restrict exempt wells, there is a concern that neither the
land-use planning nor water resources-management side of the equation adequately addresses groundwater availability.'
The exemption for industrial and commercial use is equally controversial for many of the same reasons. As demand for water outstrips
844.

See, e.g., Russell Sadler, Oregon's FutureDependent on Water, Op.-Ed., MAIL
(Medford, Or.), Mar. 18, 2007, availableat
http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070318/OPINION/7040
5007; see also Robert Glennon, High and Dry in the West: The Failureto Integrate Management of Ground- and Surface-Water Resources, Sw. HYDROLOGY, July-Aug. 2003, at 12, 13,
availableat http://www.swhydro.arizona.edu/archive/V2-N4/feature1.pdf.
845. See also Glennon, supranote 844, at 13.
846. See OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-005-0010 (2008) (setting forth regulations for compliance with Statewide Planning Goals and compatibility with Comprehensive Plans).
847. Memorandum from Barry Norris, Administrator, Water Res. Dep't to Water
Res. Comm'n 1 (Oct. 22, 2004), availableat
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/staff reports (Click "2004 Oct", then
click "Agenda Item F") [hereinafter Memorandum from Norris III].
848. See Gail Achterman, Oregon State University, Water Regulation vs. Land Use
Planning, Presentation at the Northwest Water Policy & Law Symposium (Sept. 19,
2006), available at http://inr.oregonstate.edu/download/N'W..Aater-Conference.pdf.
("The bottom line is that in Oregon we have two separate planning systems that relate
to one another on paper, but often fail to connect in practice .. ").
TIBUNE

849.

TAMRA MABBOTT, WATER, UMATILLA COUNTY PLANNING DIR., PAPER OR PLANNING?

1 (2006), available at
http://wwv.co.benton.or.us/boc/water/documents/mabbott-water-planning.pdf;
Letter from Michael F. Ladd, Reg'l Manager, Or. Water Res. Dep't, to Tamra Mabbott,
Umatilla County Planning Dir. (Dec. 1, 2006), availableat
http://centralpt.com/upload/301/ 1996_hsb82waterresourcesletter.pdf.at 2.
850. Id. at 3.
851. Id.
852. See id.
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availability, these types of exempt uses will likely receive increased scrutiny and attention.
Many western states have similar exemptions, which are rooted in
the historical policy judgment that it is cumbersome to require small
groundwater users to obtain a water right and permit.85' State legislatures hold the view that exempt domestic uses are minor compared
with the large amounts of water irrigation uses and that the overall
domestic consumption is relatively small; in fact, exempt wells can have
a profound impact in the aggregate and in specific, concentrated locations.85' The Water Resources Department estimates that there are approximately 230,000 exempt wells throughout Oregon."' If each well
withdraws its full 15,000 gallons per day, the exempt wells alone have
the potential to withdraw approximately 3.5 billion gallons of groundwater per day.
Exempt wells affect both ground and surface water resources.
There are no restrictions on exempt wells that are hydraulically connected to surface water, so exempt wells can and do directly affect surface water flows."' Additionally, the Department allows exempt wells in
groundwater restricted areas, which the Department creates in reaction to groundwater shortages. Oregon recognizes two types of
Critical Groundwater Areas and
groundwater restricted areas:
Groundwater Limited Areas. Critical Groundwater Areas may restrict
current and future water permits, while Groundwater Limited Areas
limit future permits to certain specified uses.8 '7 Exempt wells are restricted in only one of Oregon's seven Critical Groundwater Areas, and
in none of the state's Groundwater Limited Areas. 58 In these restricted
areas, as in all other areas of the state, exempt wells essentially enjoy an
enforceable priority date relating back to when the well began pumping water.5 If it becomes necessary for the Department to regulate
groundwater use, it can use that priority date to regulate and protect
exempt uses along with permitted uses.88

853.
854.
855.

See Glennon, supra note 844, at 13.
See id.
Sadler, supranote 844.

856. See TROUT UNLIMITED'S WESTERN WATER PROJECT, GONE TO THE WELL ONcE Too
OFTEN: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUNDWATER RIVERS IN THE WEST 14 (2007), available at
http://www.tu.org/atf/cf/%7BOD 18ECB7-7347-445B-A38E65B282BBBD8A%7D/ground%20water%202ed-lores.pdf.
857. Id.; see also infra section V.E. for further discussion of groundwater restricted
areas.

858.
859.
860.

See Memorandum from Norris III, supra note 844, at 2.
§ 537.545(3) (2007).
Id.
OR. REv. STAT.
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1. Legislative Attempts to Reduce Exemption
Throughout the years, there have been various legislative attempts
to reduce the exemption. House Bill 2566, which the Committee on
Energy and the Environment introduced before the 2007 House, is the
most recent." ' The bill attempted to close some of the perceived loopholes by lowering the volume allowance for single domestic purposes
from 15,000 gallons per day to 5,000 gallons per day, and authorizing
the Commission to pass rules requiring permits for exempt groundwater uses in Groundwater Limited Areas and Critical Groundwater
Areas.862
The bill failed, as did several previous bills attempting to limit well
withdrawals to 5,000,863 and even 500, " ' gallons per day. Other failed
bills proposed eliminating exemptions altogether and requiring all
groundwater users to file for a permit."6 '
C. CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT

One of the Department's guiding groundwater principles states
that it shall conjunctively manage ground and surface water where conjunctive management will protect "water resources, existing water
ights, and the public interest.''8 The Water Resources Department
determines whether wells have the potential to cause substantial interference with surface water supplies and, if so, will conjunctively manage the ground and surface water to control the interference." ' The
potential for substantial interference occurs when groundwater pumping lowers surface water flows and thus impairs surface appropriation."
Oregon Administrative Rule 690, Division 9 establishes the criteria for
861. In its final version, the bill proposed to: (1) lower the volume allowance for
single domestic purposes from 15,000 gpd to 5,000 gpd; (2) establish a $250 fee recording fee for certain exempt uses and directed that state earmark revenues for
groundwater studies and monitoring; (3) authorize the Commission to pass rules requiring permits for exempt groundwater uses in Groundwater Limited Areas and
Groundwater Critical Areas; and (4) create a Task Force on Exempt Uses to identify
basins and sub-basins where groundwater management problems exist, study whether
restrictions on exempt wells or additional groundwater measurements would improve
identified groundwater management problems, identify financial resources to study
groundwater resources, and review laws that regulate Oregon water use. H.B. 2566,
74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
862. See id.
863. H.B. 3481, 69th Legis., 69th Sess. (Or. 1997).
864. H.B. 2395, 68th Legis., 68th Sess. (Or. 1995).
865. H.B. 3421, 70th Legis., 70th Sess. (Or. 1999); H.B. 3622, 71st Legis., 71st Sess.
(Or. 2001).
866. OR. ADMIN. R.690-410-0010(2) (a) (2008).
867. Id. 690-009-0050. For a detailed look at the issue of conjunctive management in
Oregon the Deschutes Groundwater Mitigation Program is a fascinating and informative case study.
868. See id.
690-009-0040.
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determining connectivity between all groundwater appropriations (except the exempt uses discussed above) and surface water sources."9
These criteria are often referred to as "Division 9 Rules," for their place
in the Oregon Administrative Rules."'
Determining whether the groundwater source-usually a well-is
hydraulically connected 7' to the surface water source provides the
baseline trigger for conjunctive management."' The particular well's
Water Well Report serves as the basis for the determination8 7 exceptin
situations where no report is available or if the well is located within
one-fourth of a mile of an unconfined aquifer."' If no report is available, the Department will use the "best information available" to determine hydraulic connectivityY" If the well is located within one-fourth

of a horizontal mile of "a surface water source that produce[s] water
from an unconfined aquifer," the Department will assume that the well
and surface water source are hydraulically connected "unless the applicant or appropriator provides satisfactory information or demonstration to the contrary." 7
If the ground and surface water are not connected, then the Department manages groundwater and surface water separately and, as a
result, does not evaluate impacts to surface water when granting
If, however, the Department determines that
groundwater permits.'
the ground and surface water are hydraulically connected, the Department assumes that the wells that pump water from that aquifer
have the potential to substantially interfere with the surface water
source if the appropriation meets any one of the following four conditions:
(1) The well is horizontally less than one quarter mile from the surface water source;8 7 8 or

(2) The well's appropriation/pumping rate is more than five cubic
feet per second and the well or other point of appropriation is

869. See id. 690-009-0010 to -0050.
870. See generally id.
871. Id. 690-009-0020(6) ("'Hydraulic connection' means that water can move between a surface water source and an adjacent aquifer.").
872. Id. 690-009-0040(1).
873. Id.
874. Id. 690-009-0040(1)-(2).
875. Id. 690-009-0040(1) (The best information available "may include other Water
Well Reports, topographic maps, hydrogeologic maps or reports, water levels and other
pertinent data collected during a field inspection, or any other available, date or information that is appropriate . .
876. Id. 690-009-0040(2).
877. Id. 690-009-0040(6).
878. Id. 690-009-0040(4) (a).
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horizontally less than one mile from the surface water source;"
or
(3) "The rate of appropriation is greater than one-percent of the
minimum perennial stream flow or instream water right with a
senior priority date," or greater than one percent of the discharge that is equaled or exceeded eighty percent of the time,
and the well is less than one mile from the surface water
source;... or
(4) The appropriation, if continued for thirty days, would deplete
the stream by more than twenty-five percent of the rate of appropriation, and the well is less than one mile from the surface
water source.""
Because the regulations set out specific conditions to determine
the potential for substantial interference, Oregon's rule is sometimes
referred to as a "bright-line" test.8" The advantage of a bright-line test
is that it is "relatively easy to administer," it "reduces transaction costs,"
and in the opinion of some, succeeds in covering "most groundwater
that is hydrologically connected to surface flows." ' Other parties disagree with this last assertion and argue that the bright-line test fails to
cover an increasingly substantial portion of actual groundwater use.
The disadvantage is that it does not account for individual hydrologic
variations.884
If the above conditions are met and there is a presumption of interference, the Department will conjunctively manage ground and surface waters.8 As such, the regulations charge the Department with
processing groundwater applications according to rules "similar to or
compatible with, but not more restrictive than" surface water rules.88
In theory, this means that the Department will not grant a new
groundwater permit if surface water is unavailable. This has resulted in
restricting groundwater development in many parts of the state.
The Department must also review existing appropriations on a
case-by-case basis if it suspects that the appropriation substantially interferes with a surface water source.887 If the Department asserts con879. Id. 690-009-0040(4)(b).
880. Id. 690-009-0040(4) (c).
881. Id. 690-009-0040(4)(d).
882. See Glennon, supra note 844, at 12.
883. Id. However, some disagree with the assertion that the test succeeds in covering
most hydraulically connected waters. See id. at 13 (acknowledging that in Colorado, a
similar system's exceptions are a response to "the political clout of Denver's fastest
growing suburbs").
884. See id. at 13.
885. OR. ADMIN. R.690-009-0050 (2008).
886. Id. 690-009-0050(2).
887. OR. ADMIN. R.690-009-0050(1).
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trol over the existing appropriation, the imposed controls must be
"similar to or compatible with, but not more restrictive than controls
on the affected surface water source," and be in accordance with the
relative ground and surface water priority dates.88
D. GROUNDWATER RESTRICTED AREAS
The Commission employs various tools to protect groundwater. If
there is an imminent need to act, the Commission may designate a
Critical Groundwater Area in order to reduce current groundwater
withdrawals.889 Alternatively, it may designate a Groundwater Limited
Area in order to limit future groundwater uses. "9 ' The Commission
designates critical and limited areas by rule; it then incorporates the
rules into basin programs." '
1. Critical Groundwater Areas
A Critical Groundwater Area designation connotes that an area's
groundwater is already at risk or is likely to be at risk shortly.9 In essence, it is the Commission's reaction to falling groundwater levels and
noticeable interference with other water uses. The Commission may
designate an area as a critical groundwater area if:
" The water table is declining or has declined excessively;
" There is a pattern of substantial interference between wells in
the area or interference between wells and geothermal resources;
" The wells in the area are interfering with an earlier-priority surface water right or minimum perennial stream flow;
* The available groundwater supply is or will be overdrawn;
" The groundwater is or may reasonably become polluted; or
" Groundwater temperatures are or will be substantially altered. 3
Establishing a Critical Groundwater Area is an arduous, contentious, and expensive undertaking.8 "4 The Commission must hold a
hearing before designating a Critical Groundwater Area, and water
users who resist the designation often attend the hearings. Bastasch
has explained that, "when data are sufficient to trigger groundwater
888. Id. 690-009-0050(2).
889. SeeOR. REv. STAT. § 537.730 (2007).
890. Or. Water Res. Dep't, Water Protections and Restrictions, State of Oregon,
available at http://www.oregon.gov/OWARD/PUBS/aquabook-protections.shtml.
891. SeeOR. REv. STAT. § 537.735 (2007).
892. Id. § 537.730(1).
893. Id. § 537.730(1)(a)-(g).
894. BAS-rAscoi, supra note 131, at 124.
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controls, the damage has usually already been done and communities
are heavily invested in the customary level of (over-) use .... the controls are ...unpopular and fiercely resisted .... ,8

The Butter Creek

Critical Groundwater Area provides one example of the fierce resistance. The Department designated the area in 1976, but it was not
until fourteen years-and a trip to the Oregon Supreme Court-later
that controls went into effect.896 Perhaps for these reasons the Commission has only designated seven Critical Groundwater Areas in the
state.897
Of the state's seven Critical Groundwater Areas, the Umatilla Basin
contains four-the Stage Gulch, Butter Creek, Ella, and Ordnance (divided into Ordnance Basalt and Ordnance Gravel) Critical Groundwater Areas. " The remaining three Critical Groundwater Areas are Cow
Valley near Vale; The Dalles in Wasco County; and Cooper MountainBull Mountain southwest of Beaverton and Tigard. "
In a Critical Groundwater Area, the Commission will adopt administrative rules designating the critical groundwater area's boundaries
and indicating which reservoirs are included, in whole or in part, in
the designation. °' The rules set forth corrective actions, and may close
the area to any new appropriations (i.e. prohibit any new permits),
limit the total amount of groundwater that may be withdrawn from a
particular groundwater source, and/or may enact any other provision
as is necessary to protect the public welfare, health, and safety.' After
the Commission has held a contested case hearing, it may restrict current groundwater rights. "2 It may do so by apportioning out the total

895.
896.

Id. at 127.
Id. at 124.

897. Water Protections and Restrictions, supra note 890 (listing Oregon's critical
groundwater as Cow Valley near Vale; The Dalles in Wasco County; Cooper MountainBull Mountain southwest of Beaverton and Tigard; and the Butter Creek, Ordnance
and Stage Gulch areas in Morrow and Umatilla Counties).
898. OR. WATER REsOURcEs DEP'T, GROUND WATER SUPPLIES IN THE UMATILLA BASIN 2
(2003), availableat
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/UmatillaGWWkshpRptApril2003.pdf. In reaction to
the Umatilla Basin's declining groundwater, the area's diverse interests (agriculture,
business, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation and local governments) have taken the somewhat unusual step of banding together and cooperatively promoting legislation. Dennis Doherty, Letter, CooperationKey for Getting Water to
Umatilla Basin,E. OREGONIAN (Feb. 13, 2008) (Dennis Doherty was a Umatilla County
Board Commissioner); see also S.B. 1069, 74th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2008) (directing
the Water Resources Department to conduct a regional aquifer recovery assessment for
the Umatilla Basin.) (Governor Kulongoski signed SB 1069 on March 3, 2008).
899. Water Protections and Restrictions, supranote 890.
900. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.735(1)(a) (2007).

901.

Id. § 537.735(3).

902.

See id. § 537.742.
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allowable withdrawal amount among existing appropriators;... prioritizing certain uses regardless of priority date;..4 reducing the amount a
right holder is allowed to withdraw; forbidding a right holder with
more than one well from using all of the wells, requiring an owner to
seal a well that admits pollutants into the groundwater supply; and/or
setting a rotation schedule for groundwater use."'
2. Groundwater Limited Areas
While both Critical Groundwater Areas and Groundwater Limited
Areas are reactionary, Groundwater Limited Areas focus on preventative measures and in these areas, no existing rights are curtailed. The
Department classifies Groundwater Limited Areas in basin programs
and, through changes in the basin program, limit future permits to a
few designated uses."°' There are twelve Groundwater Limited Areas in
the northern Willamette Valley,"7 and two outside of the Willamette
Valley."'
E. TRANSFERRING GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

The regulations and administrative processes governing groundwater right transfers are largely the same as those governing surface water
transfers."u The same criteria govern permanent changes to the use;
place of use; point of diversion (surface), or point of appropriation
(groundwater); and temporary changes to the place of use for surface
and ground waters. 10 The regulations set forth additional criteria
when a proposal seeks to transfer the point of diversion for a surface
water right to a groundwater fight point of diversion."'
When a surface water fight holder proposes to transfer the point of
diversion from a surface water source to a groundwater source, the
proposal must meet the following criteria in order for the Department
903. Id. § 537.742(2) (a) (the apportionment will be based on the groundwater
right's priority date).
904. Id. § 537.742(2) (b) (residential and livestock watering receive first priority).
905. Id. § 537.742(2)(a), (c)-(f).
906. Water Protections and Restrictions, supra note 899.
907. Id. The Willamette Valley limited areas are located in the following approximate areas: Sandy-Boring, Damascus, Gladtidings, Kingston, Mt. Angel, SherwoodDammasch-Wilsonville, Stayton-Sublimity, Parrett Mountain, Chehalem Mountain,
Eola Hills, South Salem Hills, and Amity Hills-Walnut Hill. The Willamette and Sandy
Basin programs list the limitations.
908.
Id. The two limited areas outside of the Willamette Valley are located in Fort
Rock and Ella Butte.
909.
See generally OR. REv. STAT. § 540.505-.587 (2007) (change in use and transfer of
water rights); OR. ADMEN. R 690-077-0000 to -0100 (2008) (instream water rights); id.
690-380-0010 to -9000 (water right transfers).
910.
OR.ADMriN.R. 690-380-0010(1).
911.
See id. 690-380-2130 (2008).
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to approve the transfer request: (1) the groundwater source must be
an unconfined aquifer hydraulically connected to the authorized surface source, (2) the new groundwater withdrawal must affect the surface water source similarly to the original authorized point of diversion, and (3) the new groundwater withdrawal must be within 500 feet
of the surface water source.9 2 If the surface water source is a stream,
the new groundwater withdrawal must be within 1,000 feet of the original point of diversion, unless the applicant provides evidence from a
licensed geologist that: (1) the groundwater withdrawal will be from an
unconfined aquifer that is hydraulically connected to the surface water,
(2) the original water right will not be enlarged and the transfer will
not injure other water right holders, and (3) the new withdrawal will
similarly affect the surface water.9
F. THE FUTURE OF GROUNDWATER POLICY

Three major areas of concern emerge when reviewing Oregon's
groundwater law, or any western states' groundwater law. Because
concern over groundwater depletions is a relatively new phenomenon
in western water law, many state codes need updating to address contemporary issues. First, with increased demand on water supplies, the
continued reliance on exempt wells seems misplaced. As with any expansion in permit programs, efforts to eliminate exempt wells will be
costly, but increased pressure on freshwater supplies may council in
favor of an investment of resources. In Oregon, particularly as rural
development increases and residential communities are developed, the
impact of the exempt well provisions will be greater. This dynamic reemphasizes the importance of connecting land use planning with water
resource planning generally, but particularly groundwater because
many see it as the most available new source of water.
Second, although the freshwater conservation community should
commend Oregon as one of the first western states to recognize a relationship between ground and surface water, the conjunctive management system is reactive rather than predictive or proactive. Currently,
the state will conjunctively manage surface and groundwater rights
once interference has been shown, unless special groundwater districts
have been designated. As a result, conjunctive management reacts to
existing interference and may emerge relatively late in the process as a
management tool. Further studies could gather more information on
the Department's use of its authority to review existing appropriations
of groundwater when there is demonstrated surface water interference.
912.
913.

Id. 690-380-2130(2)(a)-(d).
Id. 690-380-2130(2); see OR.

TRANSFER

APPLICATIONS,

(last visited Oct. 11, 2008).

WATER

REs.

DEP'T, CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING

http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/transfercriteriareview.pdf
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This information would help policymakers better understand the dynamics of conjunctive management in Oregon. Finally, any policy
analysis should account for the fact that often groundwater pumping
impacts on surface water supplies are delayed. Thus, by the time users
detect impacts to one source, the cessation of pumping may not immediately solve the problem. A lag time between withdraw and affect
make effective conjunctive management extremely challenging.
Third, Oregon does have significant tools for dealing with critical
groundwater areas. The only impediment is the lengthy administrative
process needed to take advantage of their provisions. In the areas
where the Department has employed these designations, the process
has been controversial and time-consuming.
Finally, on a broader note, the role of scientific data, or the lack of
it, in the area of groundwater management is an important consideration. Currently, scientific data on groundwater availability is limited.
In light of the 1955 Groundwater Act's call to prevent depletion, this
lack of data makes the question of whether there is water available to
appropriate quite challenging. Given the lack of data, there is concern
that insufficient analysis goes into groundwater appropriation decisions.
VI. WATER MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING MECHANISMS
One of the most significant challenges for any state government in
the face of policy choices regarding climate and/or energy policy is the
lack of overall comprehensive planning with regard to water resources.
Focusing on planning and freshwater conservation will provide some of
the greatest opportunities to address water supply and demand issues.
In Oregon, the Commission and Department generate and enforce the
laws and administrative rules governing water,"' yet their authority
interacts with other organizations and management boards. In terms of
water management and planning within the state, three primary mechanisms exist: (1) Commission-established basin management programs;" ' (2) a Watershed Enhancement Board that provides money to
improve state watersheds;" 6 and (3) water user organizations. " The
interrelationship between these programs dictates how agencies physically manage water within the state and provides opportunities for
comprehensive watershed planning.
914. See Or. State Archives, Water Res. Dep't Records Guide: Agency HistoryCurrent Organizations,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/archives/state/waterlhist/histcurr.htm (last visited Oct. 12,

2008).
915.

OR. REV. STAT.

§§ 536.300(2)-(3) (2007); OR.

0600 (2008).
916.
917.

OR. REv. STAT. §§ 541.351-.420 (2007).
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 545.001-554.590 (2007).

ADMIN. R. 690-500-0010 to -521-
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A. BASIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Basin management programs are administrative rules establishing
water management policies and objectives for individual basins.9 Each
program's rules govern the appropriation and use of the surface and
groundwater within the state's major river basins.'
These programs
supplement the statewide rules governing water use and allocation by
determining and controlling what uses can be made of water in a particular basin."' The administrative rules classify water use into eleven
categories; the individual basin programs specify which categories the
Department may issue new water rights for in each basin. 2 ' The basin
programs may also withdraw surface and groundwater from further
appropriation, reserve waters for specified future uses, and establish
minimum perennial stream flows."' The Commission must adopt or
amend basin programs through a public process.
Basin programs are based on hydrogeography. For purposes of the
programs, a basin includes "all the land area, surface water bodies,
aquifers, and tributary streams that drain into the major namesake river." 4 Out of the twenty basins in Oregon, the Commission has
enacted management programs for eighteen. 2 Most recently, the
Commission amended the Mid-Coast Basin Plan and the amended ver918. OR. ADMIN. R 690-500-0010(2) (2008). Statutory law divides the twenty drainage basins in the state into five regional river management basins. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 536.022(3) (2007). These basins represent the area over which an individual Commissioner has responsibility. See id. § 536.022(1).
919. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-500-0010(2) (2008).
920. See id.
921. Id. 690-500-0200 (The eleven categories of water use are domestic, fish culture
or fish life, industrial, irrigation, livestock, mining, municipal, pollution abatement,
power or power development, recreation, or wildlife use.).
922. Id. 690-500-0010(2).
923. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.300(3) (2007) ("The commission may adopt or amend a
basin program only after holding at least one public hearing in the affected river basin."); id. § 536.025 (the Commission may delegate the authority to conduct a public
hearing to the Director, but the Director may not actually adopt or amend a basin
program, the Commission must take this action).
924. Water Protections and Restrictions, supranote 890.
925. OR. ADMIN. R- 690-500-0010(3) (2008); see id. 690-501-0005 to -0040 (North
Coast Basin Program); id. 690-502-0010 to -0260 (Willamette Basin Program); id. 690503-0010 to -0060 (Sandy Basin Program); id. 690-504-0000 to -0160 (Hood Basin Program); id. 690-505-0000 to -0630 (Deschutes Basin Program); id. 690-506-0010 to -0080
(John Day Basin Program); id. 690-507-0010 to -0840 (Umatilla Basin Program); id.
690-508-0000 to -0120 (Grande Ronde Basin Program); id. 690-509-0000 to -0160
(Powder Basin Program); id. 690-510-0000 to -0110 (Malheur Basin Program); id. 690511-0010 to -0110 (Owyhee Basin Program); id. 690-513-0010 to -0060 (Goose and
Summer Lakes Basin Program); id. 690-515-0000 to -0060 (Rogue Basin Program); id.
690-516-0005 to -0040 (Umpqua Basin Program); id. 690-517-0000 to -0050 (South
Coast Basin Program); id. 690-518-0010 to -0060 (Mid Coast Basin Program); id. 690519-0000 to -0050 (Columbia River Basin Program); id. 690-520-0000 (Middle Snake
River Basin Program).
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sion took effect on January 5, 2007.6 Outside of this amendment,
there has been no comprehensive, wholesale planning in Oregon for
well over a decade. The two basins for which the Commission has not
adopted basin programs are the Klamath and Malheur Lake basins.
In the Klamath basin, the general state water code and Klamath Compact, an interstate compact between Oregon and California, govern
water allocation. 2

'

The Klamath Basin is currently undergoing a gen-

eral stream adjudication to determine water rights in the Basin.9 In
the Malheur Lake basin, waters are likewise subject to statewide policy,
with the exception of specific streams in the basin for which the Commission has adopted minimum perennial stream flows outside of the
basin program process."'
If a water right applicant wishes to appropriate water for a use that
the basin program does not recognize, the applicant may submit a petition for an exception."' The Department, and then the Commission,
will review petitions and consider possible exceptions on a case-by-case
basis.32
To request an exception, the applicant must first file an application
with the Director.9 The application must include a letter to the Director showing (1) the water will only be appropriated for a short duration each year, or will not be appropriated continuously for more than
five years; and (2) that the use is unusual, not likely to recur in the basin, and that the Commission likely did not consider the use when setting the basin program. 34 After receiving this information, the Director notifies the Commission if the Department proposes to accept the
application. 9

When considering the application, the Department will evaluate
seven criteria to determine if the proposed use: (1) is for a short duration; (2) is for a continuous period no longer than five years; (3) is
926. Id. 690-518-0010 to -0060 (2008).
927. Water Protections and Restrictions, supranote 890.
928. OR. ADMIN. R. 690-500-0010(5) (2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 542.610-.620 (2007).
929. Or. Water Res. Dep't, Klamath Basin Adjudication/ADR,
http://wvw.wrd.state.or.us/OWRD/ADJ/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2008); see also
OR. REV. STAT. § 539.005 (2007) (providing process for general stream adjudications in

Oregon).
930. OR.

ADMIN.

R. 690-500-0010(4) (2008); see also OR. REV.

STAT.

§ 536.235 (2007)

(designating priority of minimum perennial streamflows); OR. ADMIN. R_
690.500.0010(2) (2008) (describing the administrative nature of basin programs);
BASTACH, supra note 131, at 112 (While the Department still has the authority to create
minimum instream flows, their status as regulations makes them susceptible to exceptions and amendments, whereas instream water rights are permanent and of equal
status as regular water rights.).
931. See OR. REv. STAT. § 536.295(1) (2007).

932.
933.
934.
935.

See id. § 536.295(5).
See OR. ArnMIN. R. 690-082-0030(1) (2008).
Id. 690-082-0030(1).
Id. 690-082-0040.

Issue 1

IMPORTANCE OFFRESHWA TER CONSERVATION

largely non-consumptive in nature; (4) is necessary to ensure public
health; (5) is necessary to avoid extreme hardship; (6) will provide a
public benefit such as a riparian or watershed improvement; or (7) is
of an unusual nature not likely to recur in the basin, or unlikely to
have been considered by the commission when it decided the previous
uses." 6 If the use meets one or more of these criteria, the Commission
must also evaluate whether the use is consistent with the general policies of the applicable basin program."7 The Commission must affirmatively grant the exception and then the applicant must go through the
regular permitting process.9
This includes determining if the proposed use would result in an injury to an existing right.9
The basin management process occurs outside of the state land use
planning system. Oregon's land use and water management system,
like many in the United States, are not integrated.'
While the basin
management programs derive from administrative rules establishing
water management policies in individual basins, there are no overarching administrative rules that consider statewide water management in
conjunction with land use planning. This dynamic raises concern that
no state agency analyzes particular land use permit applications for
cumulative impacts on the water resources of the state. 4 ' These cumulative impacts have the potential to affect a basin's sustainability and
undermine the basin water management programs.
B. OREGON WATERSHED ENHANCEMENT BOARD

The Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board ("OWEB"), an interagency and citizen group created by the legislature in 1999, provides
grants to restore and enhance Oregon's watersheds. 43 The group
meets four times a year, and provides grant funding for watershed restoration projects, assessments, monitoring efforts, watershed councils,
936. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.295(1)(a)-(g) (2007); see also id. § 536.295(l)(g)(A)-(D)
(unusual water uses include, but are not limited to, exploratory thermal drilling, heat

exchange, maintaining water levels in a sewage lagoon, or facilitating the watering of
livestock away from a river or stream).
937. See id. § 536.295(4).
938. Id. § 536.295(5) (2007).

939.

Id.

940.

See MABBOTr, supra note 849, at 2.; see generally North Coast IRWCMP, North
Coast Integrated Regional Water Management Plan,
http://www.northcoastirwmp.net/Content/10318/preview.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2008); Integrated Management Plan for the Platte River Basin (Draft),
http://tribasinnrd.org/documents/imp.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008); GA. WATER
COUNCIL, GEORGIA COMPREHENSIVE STATE-WIDE WATER PLAN (2008), available at

http://www.georgiawatercouncil.org/FilesPDF/water-plan_20080109.pdf.
941. MABBOTT, supra note 849, at 3.
942. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 541.360, .375 (2007); Or. State Archives, Or. Blue Book: Or.
Watershed Enhancement Board: Present Duties (2008),
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/executive/watershed/watershedduties.htm.
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and education and outreach activities."' Common projects include
reseeding, planting, fence construction, and wetland restoration, as
well as purchasing conservation easements and instream water rights.""
OWEB receives funding from the federal government, as well as local
funding from the state lottery and salmon license plates.945
OWEB collaborates with local, regional, state, tribal, and federal
governments. It establishes frameworks for locally based, integrated
watershed planning and management processes."' OWEB encourages
more efficient use of planning resources by local watershed councils
and soil and water conservation districts."7 To this end, OWEB has
established guidance for watershed assessments that both encourages
consistent assessment methods and requires public availability of information, resulting in reduced duplicative efforts. 8 This guidance
requires that a watershed assessment incorporate various components,
such as conditions that promote watershed restoration. 49
Though OWEB is not directly involved in managing water resources, because it provides funding, it has a role to play and influence
on the water planning process. In particular, OWEB has adopted
statewide and regional goals and priorities that form the basis of its
funding decisions. 9 For example, OWEB prefers projects that focus
on upslope or upstream treatments instead of projects that focus on
downslope or downstream treatments.9 OWEB also has the authority
to designate high priority watersheds.9 Such a designation serves as a
management tool for state agencies when allocating resources to sup-

943. OR. REV. STAT. § 541.370 (2007); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 541.360, .375 (2007); OREGON
STATE ARcHiVES, OREGON BLUE BOOK: OREGON WATERSHED ENHANCEMENT BOARD:
PRESENT DUTIES (2008),
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/executive/watershed/watershedduties.htm.
944.
BASTAScH, supra note 131, at 270.

945. Or. Watershed Enhancement Board, About Us,
http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/about-us.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2008). The
Board's total budget for 2005 to 2007 was approximately $39,000.00. OR. SENATE
SPECIAL COMM. ON BUDGET, BUDGET REPORT AND MEASURE SUMMARY, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/comm/lfo/2005budgetreports/HB5172.PDF; Telephone Interview with Cindy Silbernagel, Fiscal Manager, Watershed Enhancement Bd.,
(Oct. 10, 2007) (revenue from salmon plates averaged approximately $25,000 per
month between January and October as of this 2007; however, the amount has increased steadily throughout the year).
946. Id. § 541.371 (1) (a).
947. See id.
948. Id.; see also, OR. WATERSHED ENHANCEMENT BOARD, OREGON WATERSHED
ENHANCEENT MANUAL 3 (1999),
http://www.oregon.gov/OWEB/docs/pubs/wa manual99/ajintro-print.pdf (providing an OWEB assessment manual).
949. OR. REv. STAT. § 541.371(1) (a) (A) (2007).
950. Id. § 541.371(c).
951. OR. ADMIN. R. § 695-010-0030(5) (2008).
952. OR. REv. STAT. § 541.384(2) (2007).

Issue I

IMPORTANCE OFFRESHWA TER CONSERVATION

port coordinated watershed management activities.9
OWEB may
place conditions in its grant agreements that are necessary to carry out
the purpose of the watershed enhancement program."' However,
OWEB expressly lacks regulatory or enforcement authority.
C. WATER USER ORGANIZATIONS

The legislature has created a statutory framework for the types of
water user organizations allowed in the state: (1) irrigation districts; 56
(2) drainage districts;5 7 (3) diking districts;... (4) water improvement
districts; 59 (5) water control districts;9" and (6) corporations for irrigation, drainage, water supply or flood control. 6 ' Each district works to
maintain its interests in the water planning process.
While the
Commission and Department manage the overall water allocation system, districts are independent local governmental entities with their
own sets of statutes and procedures.9 These water organizations often
control much of the water in a particular basin due to their prevalence
and the large number of water rights they hold.
Groups of land irrigators who join together to irrigate their lands
can create irrigation districts." Districts may then acquire water rights
like any other party.6 5 They have express authority to purchase, lease,
and condemn water and water rights." Any rights obtained immediately vest in the district and the district holds those rights in trust for
the uses and purposes set forth in the "Irrigation District Law.

'

67

Title

to these rights must be in fee simple or whatever lesser estate the appropriation designates. After formation of the district, it holds water
rights for the land within it and follows administrative guidelines to
change boundaries, create subdistricts, and merge with other dis953.
954.
955.
956.

Id.
OR. ADMIN. R. § 695-005-0050(10) (2008).
OR. REV. STAT. § 541.371(1) (f)
(2007).
See id. § 545.001-.685.

957.
See OR. REV.STAT. §§ 547.005 -. 990 (2007) (relating to drainage); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 548.005- .995 (2007) (relating to irrigation and drainage).
958.
See id. §§ 551.
959.
See id. §§ 552.
960.
See id. §§ 553.
961.
See id. §§ 554.
962.
See id. §§ 552.108(1); 553.020(1) (2007).
963.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 536.037(1) (c) (2007). Compare to the individual chapters
the Oregon legislature provided to water user organizations within the Oregon Revised
Statutes. Supra notes 957 to 961.
964.
OR. REv. STAT. § 545.025(1) (2007) (describing the petition process required for
formation of irrigation districts).
965.
OR. REV. STAT. § 545.239(1) (2007).
966. Id.; see also id. § 545.249.
967. Id. § 545.253.
968. Id.
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tricts. 9 Irrigation districts may distribute water to lands not included
within their district,97 and may require their water users to have water
measuring devices and water control devices.9 ' Irrigation districts can
temporarily transfer water rights to other land within the legal boundaries of the district without going through a formal process, allowing
for easier reallocation of water rights inside a district than outside a
district."' The transfer, however, may not injure any existing water
rights or result in enlargement.9
Landowners, with acreage that border on swamps, wetlands, irrigated lands, or waters that contribute to a swamp, can petition to form
drainage districts."' The Oregon Revised Statutes provide for drainage
in order to protect lands, for sanitary or agricultural purposes, or if
Similar to irrigation districts, unique
conducive to public health.7
rules and procedures govern drainage districts.7 ' Additionally, the
legislature has enacted a set of laws pertaining to both drainage and
irrigation districts.9 These laws mainly relate to insurance for district
employees, 8 the legal status of board members, 79 government loans,"9
dissolution of a district,' and other monetary issues. 9'
Landowners representing at least one half of land subject to tidewaters or floods may petition to form a diking district.9 " After the petition, the court will apportion the cost to build the dam or dike among
the landowners. 4 A compilation of statutes guides the process of
building and maintaining the dams.9 Diking district dams differ from
hydroelectric and storage. The diking district's purpose is to build
dams to prevent flooding. 9" Hydroelectric dams generate electricity
969. See id. §§ 545.051-.131. The question of whether the individual irrigators or the
organized irrigation district owns the water rights can be a controversial one. In the
Klamath Basin considerable time and energy have been spent on this question in the
5h Amendment Takings litigation that was recently filed. In the end, the takings question was resolved without definitively answering the ownership question. Klamath
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
970.

OR. REV. STAT. § 545.271 (2007).

971.
972.
section
973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.
986.

Id.§545.279(1)(b).
See id. § 540.570(1). For a further discussion of water right transfer, see supra
I.D.
Id. § 540.570(1).
Id. § 547.005.
Id.
See id. §§ 547.005-990.
See id. §§ 548.005-995.
Id. § 548.050.
Id. § 548.105.
Id. § 548.305.
Id. § 548.905.
Id. § 548.715.
Id. § 551.020.
Id. § 551.060.
See id. §§ 551.070 -. 180.
Id.§ 551.020.
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and water storage facilities (or storage dams) maintain future water
resources."7 Other districts have the power under statute to create hydroelectric capabilities; however diking districts do not possess this
authority."
Water improvement districts exist for many purposes: to prevent
damage or destruction of life and property due to floods; to improve
the agricultural and other uses of lands and waters; to improve public
health, welfare and safety; to provide domestic and municipal water
supply; to provide water-related recreation; and to enhance water pollution control and fish and wildlife resources. 8 While improvement
districts have separate laws, these laws may not interfere with any other
water laws or rights."9 The district's board may work with the Commission to formulate a watershed improvement plan, but for the most
part, it is its own separate entity."
Water control districts are very similar to water improvement districts and have overlap with the purposes of other districts. Landowners form control districts to prevent damage or destruction of life and
property due to floods, to improve agricultural and other uses of land,
and to improve public health and safety." The main difference between water control districts and improvement districts is that the state
creates control districts to provide water for domestic and municipal
supply, recreational purposes, or to enhance pollution control or fish
and wildlife resources. "' A control district must obtain a city or district's consent to include lands that are a part of an irrigation district,
drainage district, or city.9
Recognizing the many demands on Oregon's natural resources, the
state legislature authorized Soil and Water Conservation Districts
("SWCDs") in part to conserve and develop natural resources, control
and prevent soil erosion, control floods, conserve and develop water
resources and water quality, and prevent dam and reservoir impairment . 5 Subject to the Water Resources Commission's authority, the
districts may play a role in flood prevention by planning, constructing,
maintaining, managing, or administering flood prevention projects
within their district. 6 In addition, many of the districts are active participants in watershed improvement efforts.7
The Oregon DepartM

987.
988.

See id. § 543.650 (hydroelectric projects); id. § 537.238 (storage facilities).
See id. § 543.650 (listing all other districts, specifically, except diking districts).

989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.
996.
997.

Id. § 552.108(1).
Id. § 552.113(1).
See id. § 552.403(1)-(4).
Id. § 553.020(1).
Id.
Id. § 553.110(2).
Id. § 568.225(1).
Id. § 568.552.
BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 268.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 12

ment of Agriculture administers the forty-five current SWCDs, which
008
cover much of the state.
Watershed Councils are voluntary local organizations that "address
the goal of sustaining natural resource and watershed protection, restoration, and enhancement" within Oregon's watersheds.' Local governments, such as counties, cities, or water supply districts, convene the
councils." °° Diverse interests within a watershed make up the councils,
which work towards articulating and achieving common goals of ecological and economic sustainability within a watershed."0
Municipal water suppliers are "publicly or privately owned water
distribution system[s] that deliver[] potable water for community
needs, either to individual customers or another distribution system, 002
or
uses."'
industrial
or
commercial
for
primarily
that deliver[] water
Municipal suppliers hold water rights, which the Water Resources Department has the authority to, and often does, condition on the municipal suppliers preparing water conservation plans.'0 3 Oregon requires
municipalities to develop these plans in order to receive permit extensions.'0 4 Thus, municipal water suppliers are integral players in the
water conservation arena.
Any of the above districts can turn into a corporation through a legal filing process. 0" When they incorporate, 0 0their
name changes from
6°
"district" to "district improvement company.'

1. The Value of Comprehensive Planning
One of the most significant improvements in freshwater conservation would be for the state to devote resources and time to further efforts in water resource planning. To the extent that this planning
process involved the stakeholders concerned with freshwater conservation, it would be valuable as well. As currently written, the best mechanism provided by the water code is the basin programs. It would be
useful to gather further data on the status of planning under the basin
programs and to understand how often exceptions to the basin programs are granted and under what circumstances. In addition, OWEB
may have unexplored authorities to integrate the plans and programs
998. Or. Dep't of Agriculture, Or. Soil and Water Conservation District Guidebook:
A Guide to Operations and Management Ch. 1, at 3 (2002) available at
http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/SWCD/swcd-guidebook.shtml
(follow hyperlink to
History -ch. 1).
999. OR. REv. STAT. § 541.351(15) (2007).
1000. Id.
1001. BAsTAscH, supra note 131, at 269.
1002. OR. ADMrN. R. 690-086-0030(6) (2008).
1003. See OR. ADMiN. R_ 690-086-0100(1) (2008).

1004. OR. ADNIN. R. 690-086-0100(1) (2008).
1005.
1006.

OR. REv. STAT. § 554.005-.590 (2007).
Id. § 554.040(2) (b).
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of the various agencies engaged in water resource issues particularly in
terms of data integration and funding prioritization.
Perhaps more important or more urgent, is the need to develop
and enhance water management and planning mechanisms in light of
climate change. For example, many policymakers are poised to move
forward on new storage projects to meet increased energy demand in
basins that may not have comprehensive water management plans in
place. Before moving forward, it is critical that policymakers fully understand the current and future demand on the system and the tools
may be available to better manage and reallocate water resources.
In 2007 the Oregon legislature provided funds to the Department
for the Oregon Water Supply and Conservation Initiative (OWSCI). °07

In 2008, HDR, Inc, a private consulting firm hired by the Department,
conducted a conservation inventory and water demand assessment of
the State of Oregon as part of the OWSCI. As part of that process
HDR developed a forecasting tool to evaluate demand under various
scenarios across the state of Oregon.10" 8 While there may be some critiques of the details of this process, these kinds of efforts represent important steps as states try to be proactive in water resource management. In particular, this model developed by HDR accounted for the
impact that conservation initiatives can have on reducing the overall
demand on the water resources of the state.
Too often, policy makers, governments, citizens and agencies assume that population growth and increased economic activity means
municipal and agricultural demand for water will increase. Certainly,
one can point to local examples where there is real demand for new
supply. But, there may also be instances where the notion of "increased demand" may not be consistent with the reality on the ground
and may rather be a justification for new water supply projects, increased public funding for infrastructure or the preservation competing water institutions.'
In the face of climate change and pressure for
alternative energy sources, including hydropower, the pressure to have
accurate demand information is even more important. Before proceeding on any project premised on increased demand numbers, policymakers should carefully examine the underlying data regarding increased pressure on existing water sources and consider the role that
conservation initiatives may play in reducing overall demand. Water
1007. See OR. WATER SUPPLY AND CONSERVATION INITIATrVE DECEMBER 2007 UPDATE,
available at
http://wwwl .wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/OWSCI%20Update%2ODec%202007.pdf.
1008. HDR Presentation available at
http://aquadoc.typepad.com/waterwired/2008/09/oregon-water-supply-conservationinitiative-inventory-and-demand-forecasts.html
1009. See generally, Achterman, et al, Oregon Coastal Community Water Supply Assessment,
INST. FOR NAT. RESOURCES., OR. ST. U. (June 2005) (discussion the dynamics ofjurisdictional fragmentation and competition among water resource institutions).
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conservation initiatives should be weighed against new supply projects
in terms of overall cost effectiveness, carbon impact and energy efficiency, adopting a "least cost planning" approach to water resource
management and investment.""
VII. HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS
Hydroelectric projects are important to freshwater conservation
due to their profound environmental impact on Oregon's rivers and
freshwater ecosystems. " 1
The detrimental impacts of hydropower,
including habitat inundation and blockage, on river ecosystems
throughout the West, have been well documented. 2 In addition, hydropower projects play a major role in freshwater conservation because
releases from reservoirs can be timed to enhance or harm downstream
environmental needs. And finally, hydropower projects emerge as
popular "green" energy solutions in the face of climate change and
energy policy debates. The governor of California, for example, has
proposed a series of new hydropower projects to replace carbon-based
electricity production. 1 For all of these reasons, hydropower is at the
front of any agenda dealing with the interface of water, energy and
climate policy. This section provides a brief overview of the state and
federal hydropower licensing processes.
Hydroelectric projects fall into two primary categories-those authorized or permitted by the state government and those authorized or
permitted by the federal government. Federal projects include those
1 4 and
authorized through particular federal legislation,""
private
projects in navigable water that require a license from the Federal
1010. See generally, S. Fane, A. Turner, and C. Mitchell, The Secret Life of Water Systems:
Least Cost Planning Beyond Demand Management, Institute for Sustainable Futures in
Conference Proceedings for 2"d IWA Leading Edge Conference on Sustainability In
Water Limited Environments, Sydney, Australia, November 8-10, 2004.
1011. See, e.g., G.P. Harrison et al., Climate Change Impacts on HydroelectricPower, 18
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 1324, 1324 (2003), available at
http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/-gph/publications/GPH-Upec98.pdf.
1012. Michael C. Blumm, et. al, Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously, 28
EN-VrL. L. 997, 999-1000 (1998); Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 653-654
(1997); Philip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon and Rogue Rivers: A Comparison of Dam Removal Proposals in the Pacific Northwest, 17 J. LAND RESOURcEs & ENrm. L.
189,192 (1997); see generally, A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The
Revival of Watershed Management in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1059 (2008).
1013. See generally Press Release, Governor of California, California Governor Signs
Ten Energy Bills, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/node/5313 (last visited Oct.
10, 2008).
1014. See, e.g., Interior Department Appropriations Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 83-465,
68 Stat. 361, 365 (1954) (authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation to construct and
rehabilitate the Crescent Lake Dam project).
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Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). °'1 State projects fall into
similar categories-those authorized by the state legislature,'1° 6 and
those private projects that require a state license."17 Complicating matters, some state authorized projects may also require a FERC license.'1°8
Parties must determine if the hydroelectric project will be located on a
navigable waterway, as defined in the Federal Power Act, to determine
whether the government requires a FERC license." 9

A. AUTHORIZATION PROCESS FOR STATE PROJECTS
Three categories of applicants apply for state hydroelectric projects
in Oregon: (1) private citizens, groups of citizens, or a private corporation;' ... (2) public applicants, including cities, towns or other municipal
corporations; "'° and (3) private individuals or corporations that jointly
develop a hydroelectric project with a municipality."" Oregon treats
joint municipal-private projects the same as a public project, provided
that the municipality retains sufficient benefit and control in the
project in order for the Commission to consider it a municipal
project."" The state or municipality has the right to take over a pri0 24
vately run project at any time, as long asjust compensation is paid.
All applicants applying for a state hydroelectric project, including
potential public parties, must comply with public interest and envi-

1015. See 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 543.050(2) (2007); id. § 543.260.
1016. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 12934(d) (2008) (describing the state water facilities of California). The authority for a state legislature to authorize hydroelectric
projects derives from its general police power and its ability to provide for the public
health and welfare.
1017. See OR. REv. STAT. § 543.050(2) (2007) (authorizing the Water Resources Commission to issue licenses to construct, operate and maintain dams).
1018. Seeid. § 543.260(1).
1019. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2008); see also id. § 796(8) (defining "navigable
waters" as "those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has
jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States, and which either in their natural or improved condition notwithstanding interruptions between the navigable parts of such streams or waters by falls,
shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage, are used or suitable for use for the transportation of persons or property in interstate or foreign commerce, including therein
all such interrupting falls, shallows, or rapids, together with such other parts of streams
as shall have been authorized by Congress for improvement by the United States or
shall have been recommended to Congress for such improvement after investigation
under its authority.").
1020. OR. REv. STAT. § 543.050(2) (2007).
1021. See id. § 543.150; see also id. §§ 537.282-.299.
1022. Id. § 537.285.
1023. Id.; OR. ADMtN. R. 690-051-0410 (2008). The municipal applicant must retain a
minimum percentage of the project's annual income, must retain proprietary in'terest
in the project lands, and must assure payment of annual fees, compliance with stateimposed restrictions, and maintenance of state-required facilities.
1024. Id. § 543.610(1).
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ronmental standards.1 2 ' The process begins with a Water Resources
Commission initial review of the public interest and environmental
impact. 1021 Municipal project applicants then apply for a water right
similar to how any appropriator would, and subsequently apply for a
license to operate the hydroelectric project.1 127 Private project applifrom the Commission, and then
cants apply for a preliminary permit
012
for a license to gain the water right. 1
1. Public Interest Standards
The Commission considers public interest factors in determining
whether to allocate water for hydroelectric development, including
present and future power needs. ' The Commission must also consider any recommendation from the Energy Facility Siting Council in order to uphold the public interest.0 " When determining whether the
public interest is impaired, the Commission will have due regard for:
conserving water for all purposes; maximizing economic development;
controlling the water for beneficial purposes; the amount of available
protecting vested water rights; and the state
water; preventing waste;
1 031
policy.
resources
water
2. Protecting Natural Resources
In addition to the general public interest factors, the Commission
must also consider the protection of Oregon's natural resources with
any action it takes toward hydroelectric development. 1032 All projects,
02
municipal or private, must adhere to strict environmental standards.
The standards are consistent with Oregon's general policy to ensure
that hydroelectric projects protect natural resources from possible adverse effects of power production."" The Commission, Energy Facility
1025. BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 107-08.
1026. OR. REV. STAT. § 543.017 (2007).
1027. See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.282-.299 (2007); see e-mail from Mary Grainey, Or. Water Res. Dep't to Adell Amos, Assistant Professor & Dir., Envtl. & Natural Res. L. Program, Univ. of Or. School of Law. (April 21, 2008) (on file with author) At one time,
the Energy Siting Council and the Department had joint licensing authority over hydroelectric projects. In 1995, however, the state legislature redefined the Council's
jurisdiction over energy facilities and removed hydroelectric projects from the list.
Therefore, an applicant need not go through the Energy Siting Council.
1028.

See OR. REv. STAT. § 543.210-.260 (2007) (describing the procedure to gain a

permit and a license).
1029. Id. § 543.017(1) (e).
1030.

Id. (This requirement is for projects over 25 megawatts.).

1031.

Id. § 543.225(3)(a)-(g).

There is no reported case law on the public interest

factors.
1032. Id.§543.017(1)(d).
1033. BAsTAscH, supra note 131, at 107.
1034. Id. at 108; see OR. REV. STAT. § 543.015(1)-(2) (2007).

Issue I

IMPORTANCE OFFRESHWATER CONSERVATION

Siting Council, Department of Environmental Quality, and other affected state agencies
participate to "the fullest extent" to protect the
3
natural resources.

5

Several "minimum standards" apply to any Commission action relating to hydroelectric projects." 6 The Commission shall not approve
any activity that will cause habitat loss, kill, or injure anadromous salmon or steelhead, and any activity must be consistent with the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program.' 7 Additionally, the Department shall impose conditions on any permits or licenses requiring
the operator of the facility to perform, or allowing the Department of
Fish and Wildlife to perform, tests to measure fish protection."" The
Commission shall not approve a project that results in a net loss of wild
game fish or recreational opportunities, unless the applicant proposes
a mitigation strategy that the Commission finds acceptable. 3"
3. Water Rights and Hydroelectric Licenses
After completing the review discussed above, the processes applicable to private projects versus public projects diverge. The state issues
time-limited water rights to private projects in the form of a "license"
from the Department.' "" The water rights granted to a private hydroelectric project are vested in the licensee.' 4 ' This means that as long as
the license, or any lawful extension of it, is in force, the appropriator
has a valid state-issued water right just like any other water user in the
state.'"" Upon the license's termination, the water right reverts back to
the public as an instream right."
During the license's lifetime, the
state conditions the water use so that it is "inferior in right and subse044
quent in time to any future appropriation of water upstream.'

1035.

OR. REV. STAT. § 543.015(3) (2007).

1036. Id. § 543.017(1).
1037. Id. For a copy of the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, see
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE
PROGRAM
(2000),
available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/LIBRARY/2000/2000-

19/FullReport.pdf.
1038. OR. REv.STAT. § 543.265 (2007).
1039. Id. §543.017(1)(c).
1040. Id. § 543.050(2); Id. § 543.260(1).
1041. OR. ADMN.R.690-051-0380 (2008).
1042. Id.
1043. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 543A.305(3) (2007) ("upon expiration of a hydroelectric water right not otherwise extended or reauthorized.... up to the full amount of
the water right associated with the hydroelectric project shall be converted to an instream water right.").
1044. OR. ADMIN. R.690-051-0380 (2008) (so long as the upstream appropriation is a
consumptive beneficial use); see also OR. REv. STAT. § 543.050(2) (2007) (stating that
the Commission will grant power to citizens, an association of citizens and private cor-
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In contrast, public projects, which are usually run by municipalities, do not need a preliminary permit and do not go through a separate water right application process. '"' The public project applicants
acquire a water right through the traditional process and receive nonexpiring water rights in the form of a permit to appropriate water for
hydroelectric power generation.""4 For joint projects between private
parties and municipalities, the municipality must remain qualified as a
municipality in order to maintain the non-expiring water right.01 47 If

the Commission believes that the holder is no longer municipal, it may
cancel the permit.""
In the 2007 session, the Oregon Legislature adopted a new, expedited procedure for existing water right holders to obtain a hydroelectric certificate.14 9 The expedited application process is only available to
hydroelectric projects that are exempt from FERC's jurisdiction.050
The expedited application process requires a thirty-day comment period.0

5

'

The application must demonstrate that the proposed hydroe-

lectric use does not impair and is not detrimental to the public interest.'

52

After the Department issues a final order approving the applica-

tion, the water right holder receives a 50-year license for hydroelectric
use with the priority date of the underlying water right."'°
4. State Preliminary Hydroelectric Permit Process for Private Applicants
As mentioned above, while public applicants go through the standard water right application process,"° private applicants must apply
1 0 55
for a preliminary permit prior to submitting the license application.
Private applicants apply to the Commission for the preliminary
permit, and after processing the application, the Commission provides
porations to appropriate, perfect, acquire and hold rights to use water, "including
waters over which the state has concurrentjurisdiction.").

1045.

OR. REV. STAT. §

543.150 (2007).

1046. Id. (exempts municipalities from the application of, among others, section
537.260, which limits the duration of license to fifty years); see also BASTASCH, supra note

131, at 106.
1047. OR. REV. STAT. §537.295 (2007); see also id. § 537.292(1) (b).
1048. Id. § 537.295; see also id. § 537.292(1)(b) (2007). However, if the Commission
believes that canceling the permit will hurt the public interest, it may delay the cancellation until the Commission authorizes another entity to take over the facility. Id. §
537.299(2) (a).
1049. H.R 2785, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (enacted).
1050. Id. § 2(1).

1051. Id. § 2(3)(a).
1052. Id. § 2(4).
1053. Id. §§ 2(6), (9).
1054. BASTASCH, supra note 131, at 106. The standard water right application process

is discussed further in suprasection I.G.
1055. OR. REV. STAT. § 543.210(1) (2007).

Issue I

IMPORTANCE OFFRESHWA TER CONSERVATION

notice to anyone likely to be interested in the project." 6 If the Commission believes it to be necessary, it holds a public hearing on the application. 57 When the Commission is through with these proceedings,
it sends the application to the Department for further proceedings
consistent with the Commission's order.0 58
In considering the application, the Director determines the cumulative impact of the hydroelectric project along with the impacts of
other proposed and existing projects in the same river basin.05 9 In
making this determination, the Director essentially conducts another
public interest review." If granted, the preliminary permit is valid for
a period not exceeding three years.0 "' The preliminary permit also
establishes a priority date for the project.""
5. State Licensing Process (maximum of 50 years)
After receiving a preliminary permit, the applicant must file for a
license from the Commission. "3 If both municipal and private applicants request to appropriate the same water for separate projects, the
Commission will give the municipal applicant preference."°0 '
When the Commission grants licenses to private projects, it includes time-limited water rights.'
The licenses do not last more than
fifty years.0 6" Also, when the Commission grants a license, it does so on
the following conditions: (1) that the potential project must adapt well
to the water power involved; (2) that the licensee will develop and
build the project according to the maps approved previously by the
Commission; (3) that the licensee control of storage and the release of
storage shall be reasonable; (4) that the licensee will maintain the facilities; (5) that the licensee will pay the state not more than one dollar
per each horsepower generated by the license; and (6) other conditions the Commission deems necessary in the public interest.'6 7 If the
Commission revokes a license, the circuit court may sell all or part of
1056. Id. § 543.220(1)-(2), The Commission shall give notice to a municipality or any
person likely to be interested in the project, and landowners that are adjacent to the
proposed site and adjacent to any portion of the stream that will decrease because of
the project. The Commission shall also publish notice of the application once a week
newspaper of general circulation in the affected area for at least four consecutive
weeks.
1057. Id. § 543.230.
1058. Id. § 543.225(4).
1059. Id. § 543.225(1).
1060. Id.
1061. Id. § 543.250.
1062. Id.
1063. Id. § 543.260(1).
1064. Id. § 543.260(3).
1065. Id. § 543.260(1).
1066. Id.
1067. Id. §543.300(1)-(6).
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the license. ' However, the purchaser must perform all the duties as
The Commission may waive or modify any
stated under the license.'
liof the above requirements of the preliminary permit process and
070
censing process for a minor project of less than 100 horsepower.
B. AUTHORIZING FEDERAL PROJECTS

The law requires federal hydropower permits when the project
would affect foreign or interstate commerce, be on navigable waters of
the United States, use water from a federal dam, or occupy any public
lands or reservations of the United States.0 7' There are two categories
of federal projects: (1) projects that are under operation by the federal government, and (2) projects that are under license by the federal
government but under operation by private entities. Federally licensed
projects must still apply for a state water right. '112 Private applicants that
apply for Oregon water rights, but will operate under a federal license,
are not subject to the same procedure as state-based projects."' 3
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has the authority to issue licenses to private hydropower projects for a period up
to fifty years.' 4 The federal project must be licensed by FERC, and it
must apply for a state water right through the Commission and Department.'" Any project that applies for a preliminary permit from
FERC must, at the same time, apply for a state preliminary permit in
order to acquire a water right.0 7 " The fifty-year state license term (the
water right) is concurrent with the federal license and expires when
the federal license expires. "

1068. Id. § 543.430.
1069. Id.
1070. Id. § 543.300(7).
1071. 16 U.S.C. 797(e) (2006); BAsTAscH, supra note 131, at 107.
1072. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 543.050(1)-(2), .210 (2007); see also id. § 543A.071 (discussing
the reauthorization process, but mentions that state water rights are issued to federally

licensed projects).
1073. OR. REv. STAT. § 543.140 (2007) ("The provisions of [OR. REv. STAT. § 543.010.610] shall not apply to any water power project or development constructed by the
United States.").
1074. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2008).
1075. Id. § 797(e); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 543.050(1)-(2), .210 (2007).
1076. OR. REv. STAT. §543.210(1) (2007); see also id. § 543.210(2) (a)-(e) ("The application must include: (a) the name and post-office address of the applicant; (b) the approximate site of any proposed dam or diversion; (c) the amount of water in cubic feet
per second; (d) the theoretical horsepower; and (e) any other data the commission

may by rule require.").
1077.

OR. REv. STAT. §§ 543.050(2), .260 (2007).
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C. HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT REAUTHORIZATION PROCESS

Oregon reauthorizes water rights for state and federal hydroelec0 78 Similar to the authornzation
tric projects.'
process, the reauthorization process focuses on public interest and environmental standards,
but it also focuses on boosting the benefits of the project while shrinking the costs.' 79 As of 2002, under the state project and federal project
reauthorization process (which was implemented in 1995), the state
conducted Hydroelectric Application Review Team ("HART") review
for twenty state jurisdictional projects, but had not yet reauthorized
any of the forty-seven federal projects."
1. Reauthorizing State-Licensed Projects
When a private operator's license comes within three years of expiration, the Department is to give notice of the expiration and ask for a
notice of intent."8 ' The notice shall include whether the operator intends to reauthorize or end the project. 0" If the operator intends to
0 3 The Departreauthorize, the Department will call upon the HART.""
ment sits as the lead agency on the team, with Department of Environmental Quality and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife
joining as well.'8 4 Other state agencies with specific interest in the
project, such as the Parks and Recreation Department or Division of
State Lands, may also join the review team.' 89
Before the application goes to HART, the Director must find that
the project will not be detrimental to the public interest. 0 0 When determining whether the project impairs public interest, the Director will
consider the same public interest factors as the Commission did for the
authorization. '7 The public interest consideration also requires that
the state permittee mitigate any adverse impacts on fish and wildlife

1078. Id. §543A.010.
1079. Id. § 543A.020.
1080. Memorandum from Dick Bailey, Administrator, Water Rights/Adjudication
Div. on Hydroelectric Program to Water Res. Comm'n 3 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/staff reports (follow hyperlink for
2002 August, then the hyperlink for Work Session Item 1).
1081. OR. REv. STAT. § 543A.030(1) (2007).
1082. Id. § 543A.030(2)-(3).
1083. Id. § 543A.035 (3).
1084. Id.; see also, Memorandum from Bailey, supra note 10801080, at 2.
1085. Memorandum from Bailey, supra note 1080, at 2.
1086. OR. REv. STAT. § 543A.025(1) (2007).
1087. Id. § 543A.025(1) The factors considered are: (1) conserving water for all purposes; (2) maximizing economic development; (3) controlling the water for beneficial
purposes; (4) the amount of available water; (5) preventing waste; (6) protecting

vested water rights; and (7) the state water resources policy.
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that result from the project. 88 The mitigation requirement prioritizes
mitigation actions in the following order:
(1) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain development action or parts of that action;
(2) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the
development action and its implementation;
(3) Rectifying the impact by repairing or rehabilitating the affected
environment;
(4) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation
or maintenance operations during the life of the development
action by monitoring and taking appropriate corrective measures; and
(5) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing comparable substitute resources or environments.01 89
The Director must also consider recreational uses, scenic and aesthetic values, historical, cultural and archeological sites, and botanical
resources."'

Additionally, the project must also comply with Pacific

Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Council plans, Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality standards, and it must protect
wetland 9resources and provide for the proper protection from seismic
activity.1 1
HART collects public comments on the project and prepares a
draft of the proposed order. ' The proposed order must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. 9° 3 The Department receives the
proposed order and either rejects or approves the application.'"
When the Department approves applications, it then holds a contested
case hearing."'O The hearing is open to the applicant, anyone that filed
a timely protest, and anyone that filed a request for standing." 6 Fol-

1088. Id. § 543A.025(2) (a).
1089. Id. § 543A.025(5).
1090. Id. §543A.025(2)(f).
1091. Id. § 543A.025(2) (b)-(e).
1092. Id. § 543A.040(1)-(2).
1093. Id. § 543A.120(2)(a)-(g). The order shall include but not be limited to: (1)
confirmation or any modification of the preliminary determinations made in the initial
review; (2) brief statement that includes the criteria relevant to the decision; (3) an
assessment of the water availability; (4) an assessment of whether the project would
cause injury to existing water rights; (5) an assessment of whether the project would be
detrimental to the public interest; (6) a draft certificate, including any proposed conditions; and (7) the date by which protests to the proposed final order must be received by the Department.
1094. Id. § 543A.125(1)-(2).
1095. Id. § 543A.130.
1096. Id. § 543A.130(2)(a)-(c).
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lowing the hearing, if the Director does not find any reason to reject
the project, he or she issues a final order." 7
2. Reauthorizing Federally Licensed Projects
Federally licensed projects must go through a FERC relicensing
process. As part of that process, the state is asked to re-issue the underlying state water right.' When a federally licensed project is reauthorized, HART and the Director conduct the state reauthorization review
in a way that is consistent with, but does not duplicate, the federal review process." In conducting the reauthorization renewal for a federally-licensed project, the Department and HART""° focus on: (1) fish
passage (namely the Endangered Species Act); (2) water quality
(namely the Clean Water Act); (3) mitigation factors; (4) terms of the
water right; (5) public interest factors; (6) recreation factors; and (7)
other issues such as ramping rates, cultural and historic issues, and
similar issues." 1
D. DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS

If the state does not reauthorize a project or if the owners choose
not to reauthorize, the project will be decommissioned. ' 2 Upon the
decommissioning of a federally licensed or state run project, a hydroelectric facility's water right converts to an instream right, held in trust
by the Department."'" Up to the full amount of the water right associated with the project converts to an instream right." 4 If hydroelectric
production is not the sole beneficial use of the water right, only that
portion used exclusively for production will convert into an instream
right."'5 The Department will not convert the hydroelectric water right
1097. Id. § 543A.130(5).
1098. Id. § 543A.071; see Memorandum from Bailey, supra note 1080, at 1 ("The state

issues water rights for a term of up to 50 years for new privately-owned projects.").
1099. OR. REv. STAT. § 543A.060(1) (2007).
1100. See id. § 543A.120 (describing the standards for a proposed final order from the
Department and HART team).
1101. Memorandum from Bailey, supranote 1080, at 4-5.
1102. OR. REV. STAT. § 543A.300(1) (2007).
1103. Id. § 543A.305(3) ("Five years after the use of water under a hydroelectric water
right ceases, or upon expiration of a-hydroelectric water right not otherwise extended

or reauthorized, or at any time earlier with the written consent of the holder of the
hydroelectric water right, up to the full amount of the water right associated with the
hydroelectric project shall be converted to an in-stream water right, upon a finding by

the Water Resources Director that the conversion will not result in injury to other existing water rights."); see also Memorandum from Bailey, supra note 1080, at 3. For further information on instream water rights, see supra section IV.
1104. OR. REV. STAT. § 543A.305(3) (2007) (conversion into an in-stream right will
occur, so long as the Director finds that there is not injury to existing water rights).

1105. Id.§543A.305(6).
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if the project is on boundary waters of the state and has water rights
issued by Oregon and any other state.""6
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, governmental leaders are recognizing that climate
change is not only an environmental issue, but a risk management
problem for many communities." °7 As a result, governments at every
level from the Congress and the U.S. Department of Energy to state
water agencies and local land use boards are beginning to grapple with
difficult questions about water availability and precipitation patterns." 8
In many areas of the western United States the availability of freshwater
is the primary constraint of future development. Pat Mulroy, head of
the Southern Nevada Water Authority, has indicated that one of the
primary limiting factors for the continued growth of Las Vegas and the
southern Nevada is the availability of water."'
While scientists have done a relatively complete job in modeling
temperature changes that we are likely to see as a result of climate
change, data that extrapolates precipitation predictions from the temperature models is still being developed." To the extent that precipitation data has been generated and modeled, the changes in hydrology
due to a warming atmosphere are quite variable.."" Some areas will see
increases in the precipitation; some areas will see decreases; some annual precipitation amount will remain the same, but the water will
come in differing patterns."' 2 Many predict increases in major storm
events that may overwhelm reservoir capacity, increased evaporation
due to higher temperatures, and early snow pack melt in mountainous
states. Some models predict that the greatest impact will be at the
4000-foot elevation and above watersheds and the lower elevation
communities that rely on those watersheds to supply their drinking
and agricultural water. Many of the impacts will be felt first on those

1106. Id. § 543A.305(5). In this situation, the water right holder can submit a written
request to have the rights converted.
1107. See GENERAL GORDON SULLIVAN (RET.), On Risk, in NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE
THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 10, 10 (2007), available at

http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/.
1108.

U.

See Sarah Klahn, The Blind Man and the Elephant: DescribingDrought in Colorado, 6

DENV. WATER

L. REv. 519, 529 (2003).

1109. Felicity Barringer, Lake Mead Could Be Within a Few Years of Going Dry, Study
Finds, N.Y. TIMEs, February 13, 2008, at A18; -Joe Gertner, The Future is Dhying Up, N.Y.
TIMEs, October 21, 2007, §6 (N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE).
1110. See Brian E. Gray, Global Climate Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management
Opportunities, 14 HASTINGS W.-NwJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1453, 1454-55 (2008).

1111. Id.
1112.

Kathleen A. Miller, Climate Change and Water in the West: Complexities, Uncertain-

ties, and StrategiesforAdaptation, 27J. LAND

RESOURCES

&ENvL. L. 87, 91 (2007).
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entities that manage reservoirs, hydropower producers, and irrigation
and drinking water suppliers.
A recent study of water and energy use in California provides a powerful example of the connections between water, climate, and energy
policy."' 3 In response to the need to reduce carbon releases into the
atmosphere, California's Assembly Bill 32 set ambitious carbon reduction targets for the state."" The California Energy Commission conducted a study looking at energy use throughout the state and discovered that nearly 20 percent of the energy consumed in the state is used
to treat, transport and deliver water..'.. Peter Gleick from the Pacific
Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security testified before the California Water Resource Agencies that "according the
California Energy Commission, reductions in energy consumption by
water programs would result in almost identical energy savings as the
energy efficiency programs identified by the Public Utilities Commission, but at about half the cost.""..' 6 With the energy cost associated with
water usage reaching nearly 20 percent, the question is whether California can hope to meet its ambitious carbon targets without addressing the use of energy to transport, treat and deliver water. In fact, Senate Bill 820 adopted in both Houses of the California legislature in
2005, but ultimately vetoed, "would have required urban water management plans to include information about the amount of energy
produced and consumed by current and future water
sources and ...
' 7
an analysis of energy-related costs and benefits.'

1

Policy makers need to take energy considerations into account in
order to make sound water policy decisions, and vice versa. Fortunately, western water law in particular may offer some tools for addressing
energy and efficiency issues in the context of existing water law. Prior
appropriation, the common structure of water codes in the seventeen
western states, has long been criticized as being an antiquated system
that protects older and often inefficient uses of water. The first-in-time,
first-in-right principle in prior appropriation ensures that older uses,
that may not be the best use of water in current times, must be fully
satisfied before newer uses can be met. The prior appropriation system has been described as rigid and lacking the necessary flexibility to
respond to current water management needs because the priority sys-

1113. SeeJ. Harder, California Water Agencies Solicit Input from Experts and Public on Responding to Climate Change, 11 W. Water L. & Pol'y Rep., 11 307 (2007); see also CAL.
ENERGY COMM'N, INTEGRATED ENERGY POUCY REPORT (Carolyn Walker et al. eds., 2005),
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-100-2005-007/CEC-1002005-007-CMF.PDF.
1114. Id. at 306.
1115. Id.at307
1116. Id. at 307.
1117. Id.
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tern essentially locks in time and place the use of water."1 8 Transfers of
water rights are allowed but the process allows existing users to protest
the transfer of water and claim harm. The burden of providing that a
transferred use does not harm other existing users usually falls on the
party requesting the transfer."" Prior appropriation is also criticized as
creating incentives to waste water as a use-or-lose system. If a user fails to
use water, she risks losing her right under principles of abandonment
and forfeiture. Thus, regardless of whether a permitted water user
needs all the water secured by her water rights, she is likely to divert
the full amount to protect against claims that she has not fully used her
right. Moreover, prior appropriation law, in most states, lacks a mechanism for re-evaluating water uses outside the formal water transfer
process. Thus, the state water agency usually has very limited, or nonexistent, authority to reconsider water use. Water dedicated to particular use in 1910, even though that use may not be of high public value
in 2008, is protected under prior appropriation because water rights
are permitted in perpetuity. Provided a water right holder continues
to use the water for the established purpose, the state has little authority to shift water use. The appropriative system contrasts with the timelimited permits common in regulated riparian jurisdictions in the eastern United States. As a result, prior appropriation affords little opportunity for the state water agency to reevaluate decisions about the appropriate use of water and often creates expectations of private property interests in water among users.
All that said, the western system of prior appropriation may inherently embody concepts that would allow state and local governments
to address energy and efficiency issues within the context of the existing legal structure. First, prior appropriation is built on the principles
of shortage as expressed in the priority system. Thus, water users in
western states are more accustomed to the idea that there may not be
enough water to satisfy all uses in a given year. Prior appropriation
may use the wrong factors - first in time and use or lose - to determine
which uses are satisfied, but at least the notion of limited water supply
is embedded in the foundation of the doctrine.
Second, water use in prior appropriation states is premised on
putting water to "beneficial use." Each western state defines what uses
constitute a beneficial use of water. Over the years, states have made
modifications to the definition of beneficial use and as a result, there
may be some inherent flexibility, given the necessary political will, to
make modifications to the definition of beneficial use to address the
efficiency or amount of energy consumption associated with particular
uses. The broad definition of beneficial use gives the state flexibility in
1118. Christopher L. Len, Synthesis - A Brand New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 55,87 (2004).
1119. See e.g., Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 782-83 (Colo. 1962).
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determining whether a particular use meets the definitions of beneficial at the time when the application is presented. The technical aspects of beneficial use, however, remain undefined. In particular,
waste is defined based on the amount of water needed for beneficial
use. The lack of a more precise beneficial use definition can make
enforcement of waste extremely difficult. In Oregon, the first opportunity to address waste occurs at the permitting stage when the Department makes a determination of beneficial use. At this point the
Department could conduct a robust analysis of whether a particular
proposed use of water qualifies as wasteful. Furthermore, because
much of the water of the state has already been appropriated, it is important to look at how the principles of waste are addressed during the
process for transferring water rights. For example, a state could evaluate a proposed water use based on the amount of energy required to
put the water to the proposed use. The concept of beneficial use without waste could be expanded to address the energy consumption associated with various water uses and state water agencies could use this
evaluation when making decisions to grant new water rights or transfer
existing rights.
Third, nearly every western state requires a public interest review as
part of approving new water rights. The public interest review process,
both when granting new water rights and when consider applications
for transfers of water rights, may be a place in the existing water code
to address questions of energy consumption and efficiency of water
use.
Fourth, jurisdictions may want to more fully explore their planning
and water management authorities. The provisions of existing water
codes that provide for comprehensive water availability studies and
basin management plans may be important tools in the future as governments face pressure to respond to climate change. Recently, in
Oregon and elsewhere, two trends have emerged to increase supply in
response to increased demand - accessing groundwater supplies and
increasing storage capacity. Both of these have important implications
on energy consumption. Groundwater takes a significant amount of
energy to pump to the surface and distribute and building increased
storage capacity also requires significant energy both at the construction and operational stage. Many policymakers are poised to move
forward on new storage projects in basins that may not have comprehensive water management plans in place. Before moving forward, it is
critical to fully understand the current and future demand on the system and the tools may be available to better manage and reallocate
water resources. While the energy consumption associated with these
water supplies may ultimately be worthwhile, it is important for any
decision to pursue these sources also take into account and evaluate
the energy that will be used.
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Fifth, policynakers need to carefully consider the importance and
overall value of existing freshwater conservation strategies. This article
spends considerable pages looking at the challenges posed in the law
for conservation efforts, but in the end, despite these challenges,
freshwater protection may be one of the strongest tools for adapting to
changing climate conditions and ensuring the resiliency of our natural
systems.
The available tools for improving freshwater conservation in Oregon have yielded noteworthy successes: the Department takes into account instream flow requirements to determine availability, the Department currently holds more than 1,500 instream rights; conjunctive
management is evolving and providing better protection for surface
water from excessive groundwater appropriation; and basin management programs combined with assistance from the Oregon Watershed
Enhancement Board have enhanced larger scale improvements in conservation. In the coming decades freshwater conservation must be evaluated and advanced in the context of energy and climate policy.
In particular, the tools available under the existing water code from the definitions of beneficial use and waste to the comprehensive
planning mechanisms to the connections between land use energy and
water planning - should be explored. In addition to an exploration of
existing water law tools for addressing climate change, freshwater conservation advocates may also want to consider changes to law and policy to address the impacts to water resources. Considering new and
innovative mechanisms may be particularly beneficial as we face a time
when policymakers may be ready and willing to consider more farreaching changes to a water allocation system that has often been criticized as out-dated. Moreover, as new proposals to the water code are
inevitable whether from the water user or conservation community, it
will be increasingly important for freshwater advocates to ensure that
these new proposals account for ecosystem and conservation needs.
Western water law has been criticized as addressing conservation needs
as an after thought. The next decade may provide the opportunity to
proactively consider conservation and ecosystem protection at the
same time that we are considering reform to the overall management
and allocation system.
Given that much of the water in the state of Oregon, like most
western states, is already subject to water rights permits under the prior
appropriation system, the transfer process is the primary mechanism
for re-allocating water to new and emerging needs. Thus, a thorough
analysis of the transfer process will serve conservation groups well-not
just transfer to instream flow but transfer more generally. In particular, conservation groups could devote attention to looking at the role
of the public interest review when water rights are transferred. The
public interest review is the primary mechanism for considering conservation and freshwater ecosystem goals in the new water rights per-
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mitting process. While most western states conduct this review for new
water rights, very few, including Oregon, conduct the public interest
review for transferred water fights. Because of the importance of the
transfer process, conservation advocates may want to explore some
mechanism for addressing freshwater ecosystem issues when application to transfer water rights are processed.
Additional data and analysis is needed on enforcement issues in
general. During the last few decades considerable progress has been
made on securing and establishing instream flows. The real challenge
in the next decade is ensuring that these instream flow rights are held
properly and enforced, particularly in times of shortage. It would be
extremely valuable to gather comparative enforcement data from various states to get a sense, across the western United States, of the effectiveness of the current mechanisms for instream flow protection.
As the perception or reality of increasing demand takes hold, more
and more states will look to new sources of water.""0 Particular focus
has emerged on accessing groundwater supplies and developing aquifer storage capacity. As a result, the conservation community may want
to consider further investigation in both of these areas. In most western states, including Oregon, groundwater law is a relatively new development and the notion of securing non-consumptive, in-situ rights
to groundwater is novel. However, from a freshwater ecosystem perspective, groundwater is integrally connected to the dynamics on the
surface and may support groundwater dependent ecosystems. As policymakers turn to groundwater as a source of increased supply, they
need to consider the value of groundwater conservation. In addition
to tapping groundwater for increased supply, there are proposals to
use groundwater aquifers to increase storage capacity.""' The freshwater conservation community may want to consider further investigation
and research on issues such as aquifer storage and recovery as well as
proposals for increased surface storage reservoirs.
Ultimately, water resource agencies may need to shift their central
goals away from water allocation and toward water management. Traditionally water resource agencies in the western United States have
seen their mission as focused on the allocation of water rights and not
necessarily on the overall management and conservation of water and
energy resources. As we face challenges with regard to water and
energy policy, it will be vital for these agencies to begin to see themselves as water managers with the goal of efficient water use.

1120. See Robert Glennon & Michael J. Pearce, TransferringMainstream ColoradoRiver
Water Rights: The Arizona Experience,49 ARIz. L. R. 235, 255 (2007).
1121. See Gray, supra note 1110, at 1458.

LESS IS MORE: A LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTISTATE MANAGEMENT OF INTERSTATE
GROUNDWATER BASINS
JAMES H. DAVENPORT
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 139
I. THE INTERESTS OF FOVEREIGN STATES ............................ 142
II.EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT ............................................ 146
I. STATE AREA-OF-ORIGIN STATUTES (INTERSTATE WATER
TRANSFER EMBARGOES) ...................................................... 149
IV. IINTERSTATE GROUND WATER: A COMPLEX RESOURCE 154
V. ATTRIBUTES OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS UNIDER
VARIOUS STATE'S LAWS: CONFLICT OR INTEGRATION?. 158
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF SHARED GROUNDWATER BASINS:
LESS IS M O RE ......................................................................... 172
CON CLU SIO N .............................................................................. 178

INTRODUCTION
Whenever a legal system has to consider natural resources for human use, it needs to consider carefully all the physical, chemical, hydrogeological, environmental interconnections. Groundwater can be
no exception. Political, social, and economic "interconnections" are of
equal importance with the physical ones. The need for simultaneous
emphasis on all of them has been known for a long time, at least academically, but institutional accommodation has been lacking for too
long.'
At the opening of the twenty-first century, hydrogeology and law
still are not wholly integrated ....

The intertwined relationship be-

tween law and hydrogeology, that has had a long-established history,
will become even more intimate in the future.!
Beginning with the first compact between Maryland and Virginia in
1785 designating the waters in the Potomac River as a "common highway,"' American states have sought means to settle, quantify and allo1. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.06 (1991 ed. repl.
vol. 2003) [hereinafter DELLAPENNA].
2. Id. §18.02.
3. DAN SELIGMAN, COLO. RIVER COMM'N OF NEV., "LAws OF THE RIVERS:" THE LEGAL
REGIMES OF MAJOR INTERSTATE RIVER SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES 225-26 (Oct. 2006).
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cate rights to the nation's interstate waters.' In the American West, at
least since 1922, when Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, California, and Nevada adopted the Colorado River Compact,' followed in
1928 by the Congress,' states have again sought means to settle, quantify, and allocate their competing rights to interstate surface water systems. In recent decades, as hydrologists have more accurately estimated the hydrologic volume of surface water supplies, where demands for supply have become greater, where entities have imposed
environmental servitudes upon the supplies' natural flow, underground7 water is becoming an ever more important resource.
In 1995, Professor Abrams analyzed the problem of the security of
water rights in interstate water systems before and after the allocation
of the volume of those systems between the involved states.' Acknowledging the three established methods of equitable apportionment,
congressional allocation, and interstate compact, he posited that individual rights are more secure once conferred under the "umbrella" of
a state's apportionment.9 However, Abrams observed that water users
have traditionally made use of interstate waters without awaiting legal
pronouncements of interstate allocation:"0
[The] rights to interstate water exercised in advance of interstate allocations are not secure.

The hard cases, and the interesting cases, are the ones that seek security in advance of allocation. Here the pathways to security are less
clear. Real-world self help (going out and making use of the water
4. Id. at 26, 28 (with respect to these waters, this paper uses the words "interstate"
and "shared" interchangeably).
5. Id. at 71, 73 (Arizona did not adopt the 1922 Compact until 1944).
6. Id. at 73.
7. The proper form of reference to underground water seems to differ depending
upon the writer. Here, the convention used is that "ground" is an adjective when used
to modify the noun "water" (as with "surface water"), but a noun when used as one,
e.g., "buried in the ground." The two words "ground" and "water" are therefore not
merged. "Groundwater" is an adjective but not a noun. Thus the two words "ground"
and "water" are merged when the adjective is used to modify a different noun, e.g.,
"groundwater supply." (Compare Slater's style that hyphenates such merged adjectives.
See infra note 125.)
8. Robert H. Abrams, Secure Water Rights in Interstate Waters, in WATER LAw: TRENDS,
POLICIES, AND PRAcTncE, 332 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James Crammond eds., A.B.A_
SEC. OF NAT RESOURCES, ENERGY, ENVTL. L. 1995). Professor Abrams presumes that the
equitable apportionment rationale of the U.S. Supreme Court is essentially that of the
international law concepts upon which cross-border water bodies are shared. See also
Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A HydrogeologicalApproach to Transboundary Ground
Water Resources and InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 201, 205 (2003).
9. Abrams, supra note 8, at 331.
10. Id.
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before anyone else does) can succeed because priority of use enjoys a
measure of protection in subsequent allocation litigation. Still, the
advantage of priority is not absolute and those seeking greater security will have to be inventive or find a less risk-averse banker."

Security of the water right is, of course, not the only concern. Sustainability of the resource, environmental service, and efficiency of
regulatory management must also be considered. In 2001, Professor
Sax urged the importance of reconciling "hydrologic reality (or rationality)" with "managerial practicability" when considering watershed
management:
One profoundly important question as one ponders watershed management is to what extent we may have to break problems down into
artificial units simply to be able to cope with them at all. The watershed, or whatever the hydrologically-rational unit may be, usually
bears little if any relationship whatever to governmental units at any
level-from the county to the country. Nor is there any hydrological or
ecological measure of managerial capacity. 2

Western American states' water law is part of the law of conquest 3
or capture: 4 superlative ("I killed it, it's mine to eat."); declarative ("it's
mine, I used it first." (albeit after many others)); and diminutive
("can't you see, I've marked all the corners."). Likewise, the sovereignty America's western states assert with respect to water within their
boundaries is assertive and protective, reflecting the dog-in-the-manger
attitude of their respective citizens ("It's mine even if I'm not using it. I
might get thirsty.") .,

Notwithstanding that assertiveness, the role of comity between the
states, the mandates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 16 and the overarching cloud of the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution' necessarily constrain the states' claims to inter-

11.
Id. at 334-35.
12. Joseph L. Sax, Boalt Hall Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, Keynote Address at the 19th
Annual Water Law Conference, Watershed Management: A New Governance Trend:
Issues in the Watershed Management Movement (Feb. 15, 2001) (transcript available
at A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources).
13.
See ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERIcAN EXPANSION AND THE
EMPIRE OF RIGHT 14, 54 (1995).
14. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Priority Water Use: Adding Flexibility to the Water
AppropriationSystem, 83 NEB. L. REv. 485 (2004).
15.
Id. at 488, 490.
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
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state water, be it surface or ground water. As the U.S. Supreme Court
has stated in the equitable apportionment context, no state can impose
its law on another, and no state must yield to another's law.'" The
rights and responsibilities of U.S. states to control natural resources
and the limitations of their claims to those natural resources under the
jurisprudence of equitable apportionment, the Commerce Clause,'9
and the Compact Clause2 ' deserve some thought. Is there a fourth approach to interstate water management, perhaps a hybrid or a variant,
which is especially suited to interstate ground water? That complex
resource may indeed require a unique approach adapted to the unique
attributes of individual aquifers.
I. THE INTERESTS OF SOVEREIGN STATES
The right and responsibility of U.S. states to control the natural resources within each state's boundaries arises from the American colonies' inheritance of England's common law. Under the common law,
the King and derivative owners of land with chain of title to royal control, owned all the natural waters, forests, game, minerals, and profits
upon or under the land.2 ' When the thirteen American colonies released English royal claims by Declaration of Independence, each state
asserted the same governmental ownership or control of the waters,
forests, games, minerals and profits within their boundaries." That
claimed jurisdiction was not surrendered by the Articles of Confederation in 1787 or transferred to the United States government by the U.S.
Constitution.2" As new states entered the union, each entered on
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
18. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,.
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.").
21. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) ("[I]t came to be recognized as the
'settled law of this country' that the lands under navigable freshwater lakes and rivers
were within the public trust given the new States upon their entry into the Union,
subject to the federal navigation easement and the power of Congress to control navigation on those streams under the Commerce Clause") (citation omitted); Montana v.
Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 545 (1981); Ill.
(1892); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (states as sovereigns "hold
the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the
general government."); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 462
(3d ed. 2000).
22. SAX ETAL., supra note 21, at 462.
23. Id. Compare Katie O'Bryan, Issues inNatural Resource Management - Inland Water
Resources - Implicationsof Native Title and the Future of Indigenous Control and Management
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"equal footing" with those original thirteen. 4 That is, each new state
was presumed to be endowed with all the same governmental rights
and privileges as the original thirteen, including sovereignty with respect to all natural resources within the particular territory. 5 One such
presumed right is a state's right of ownership, or at the minimum management, of natural resources, including water, within the limits of its
political jurisdiction.
Various western state enabling acts or constitutions address jurisdiction over natural resources, generally, and water in particular. Wyoming's Constitution declares, for example, that "[t]he water of all the
natural streams, springs, lakes or collections of still water, within the
boundaries of the state are . . .the property of the state."2'6 Likewise,

Colorado's Constitution states that "[t] he water of every natural stream,
not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided." 7 Montana's Constitution provides that all the water
within the state, including underground water, is the property of the
state, and that all uses of that water are "public use [s]," notwithstanding the user or the purpose. 8 New Mexico's Constitution declares that
all the "water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within
the state" unappropriated at the time of statehood, "belong[s] to the
public."' California's Constitution provides that "the use of all water"
by appropriation is a "public use, and subject to the regulation and
control of the state."30
While Nevada's Constitution does not specifically address the public's ownership of water, Nevada's legislature stated clearly in 1913 that
"the water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the
state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to
of Inland Waters, 14 Murdoch U. E-LawJ. 280, 281-82 (Oct. 2007) (discussing Australian
constitutional law), availableat https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/index.html.
24. SAXETAL., supranote 21, at 462.
25. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221, 222-23 (1845); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 202
(1987). Before statehood, the U.S. may reserve the lands underlying navigable waters
for federal purposes if it clearly expressed the intent to do so.

26.

Wyo. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.

27.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI,

§ 5.

28. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 ("(2) The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rent, distribution, or other beneficial use, the right of way
over the lands of others for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connection therewith, and the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting
and storing water shall be held to be a public use. (3) All surface, underground, flood,
and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state
for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.").
29. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
30.

CAL. CONST. art. 10,

§ 5.
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the public."'" North Dakota's legislature declared both surface and
ground water to "belong to the public,""' as did Utah's," Oregon's, 4 and
Nebraska's" legislatures. Washington's legislature declared that "all
waters within the state belong to the public," again subject to rights
existing prior to that declaration. Idaho's legislature declares that all
its waters belong to the state. 7 California's statute declares only that
surface waters are "public water of the State." 8 Likewise, Texas law also
declares that surface water is the "property of the state." 9 Private rights
to use water in these states are thus encumbered with the constitu-

31.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2007).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (2008).
33.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2008) ("All waters in this state, whether above or
under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all
existing rights to the use thereof.").
34.
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110 (2007) ("All water within the state from all sources of
water supply belongs to the public.").
35.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-202(1) (2007) ("The water of every natural stream not
heretofore appropriated within the State of Nebraska, including the Missouri River, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public and is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation."); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702
(2007) ("All water within the state of Kansas is hereby dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to the control and regulation of the state in the manner herein
prescribed.").
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2008) ("The power of the state to regulate and
control the waters within the state shall be exercised as hereinafter in this chapter
provided. Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the public, and
any right thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and in the manner provided and not otherwise; and, as between appropriations, the first in time shall be the first in right. Nothing contained in
this chapter shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or modify the existing rights of any
riparian owner, or any existing right acquired by appropriation, or otherwise.").
37.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (2008) ("All the waters of the state, when flowing in
their natural channels, including the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the
boundaries of the state are declared to be the property of the state, whose duty it shall
be to supervise their appropriation and allotment to those diverting the same therefrom for any beneficial purpose, and the right to the use of any of the waters of the
state for useful or beneficial purposes is recognized and confirmed; and the right to
the use of any of the public waters which have heretofore been or may hereafter be
allotted or beneficially applied, shall not be considered as being a property right in
itself, but such right shall become the complement of, or one of the appurtenances of,
the land or other thing to which, through necessity, said water is being applied .
.
38.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2008).
39. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (2007) ("(a) The water of the ordinary flow,
underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay
or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every
river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the
property of the state. (b) Water imported from any source outside the boundaries of
the state for use in the state and which is transported through the beds and banks of
any navigable stream within the state or by utilizing any facilities owned or operated by
the state is the property of the state.").
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tional or statutory reservation of states' sovereign powers" Professor
Tarlock remarked "[s]tates, especially in the West, have traditionally
asserted not only the power to set the ground rules for the recognition
of private rights, but also the power to deny or to constrain private use
choices to further broad community interests in water allocation.""
In 2003, Professor Leshy declared state administration of water
rights "lax" - exacerbating almost every water rights dispute in the West
through uncertainty about water measurement, management, and administration.2 Moreover, he declared the lax, status quo management
was preferable to states and water rights holders because of the greater
cost associated with "tighter management. ' "" According to Leshy, "[i] t
requires outlays for devices to measure and keep track of water use, for
courts to adjudicate rights, and for bureaucracies to administer the
system.... It is politically costly to change to tighter control.""

40. There is, of course, disagreement on this issue. See Conference Materials, Alf
W. Brandt, Cal. Assembly Comm. on Water, Parks & Wildlife, An HistoricalPerspective on
Water Ownership in Bureau of Reclamation Projects, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment,
Energy, and Resources 24th Annual Water Law Conference (Feb. 23-24, 2006) [hereinafter 24th Annual Water Law Conference] (on file with American Bar Association);
Steven L. Hernandez, Hubert & Hernandez, P.A., Las Cruces, New Mexico, Ownership
of Water Rights in Reclamation Projects:A Lesson from New Mexico, at 24th Annual Water Law
Conference, Clifford T. Lee, Deputy Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, A California
Perspective on the Water Right Ownership Issue, at 24th Annual Water Law Conference,Nancie
G. Marzulla, Marzulla & Marzulla, Washington, D.C., Water, Property Rights, and Endangered Species, at 24th Annual Water Law Conference Christopher B. Rich, Senior Attorney,
Intermountain Reg'I Solicitor's Office, Dep't of Interior, Can You Own a Usufruct? Or
Why the Concept of Ownership May Not Be the Most Apt Description of a Water Right, at 24th
Annual Water Law Conference. See also James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental
Interference with the Use of Water: When Do Unconstitutional 'Takings' Occur?, 9 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 25, 33 (2005); Alf W. Brandt, U.S. Dep't of Interior, 21st Water Law
Conference, Water Project Deliveries = Property?, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment,
Energy, and Resources. 21st Annual Water Law Conference (Feb. 20-21, 2003) (on file
with American Bar Association).
41. A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated,56 U. COLO. L. REv. 381, 389-90 (1985).
42. John D. Leshy, Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Hastings School of
Law, The Federal Role in Water Management in the West: Time for New Thinking?, at A.B.A.
Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 21st Annual Water Law Conference
(Feb. 20-21, 2003).
43. Id.
44. Id. Professor Leshy also attributed preference for lax administration to the
"rugged individualism" of those dependent on government-sponsored water projects,
"the lingering Reagan-era legacy that government tends to be incompetent and foul
things up whenever it gets involved," the temporary duration of shortages and genuine
constraints on water use, the arrival of public money for more water projects to provide
more storage and new supplies when shortages occur, and scapegoats such as Indians,
federal agencies, environmentalists, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water
Act. Id.
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Generally speaking, states sharing interstate surface water systems
respect each other's laws regarding the creation of water rights. A California statute is a good example:
Upon any stream flowing across the State boundary, an appropriation

of water in this State for beneficial use in another State may be made
only when, under the laws of the latter, water may be lawfully diverted
therein for beneficial use in this State.
Upon any stream flowing across the state boundary a right of appropriation having the point of diversion and the place of use in another
state and recognized by the laws of that state shall have the same force
and effect as if the point of diversion and the place of use were in this
State if the laws of that state give like force and effect to similar rights
acquired in this State ......
Notwithstanding its movement, all water "resides" somewhere. Its
residence within any state makes that water an intrastateresource. But,
as a portion of a resource that resides in more than one state, it is also
an interstateresource.

H.

EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

The Supreme Court exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction
over suits between states.46 Only that Court, finding facts through a
special master, may entertain equitable apportionment litigation between states.47 In order to secure the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over interstate equitable apportionment cases, the plaintiff state
must prove injury." Sometimes state ownership of the resource or a
state's parens patriae responsibility for the protection of the private interests of its citizens is the premise for standing.49
Each state is entitled, of course, to some reasonable share of the
common resource. States' sovereign rights under the American federal
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1230, 1231 (West 2008).
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power of the United States
"to Controversies between two or more States"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (stating
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction "in all Cases... in which a State shall
be Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (providing the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over a suit is "between two or more States.").
47. See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows ofJudicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's OriginalJurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REv. 625, 653, 655
(2002).
48. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 386-87, 392 n.2 (1943); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S 517 (1936); Tarlock, supra note 41, at 394 (" ... if all claims, perfected or
not, on a stream exceed the dependable flow, then a conflict exists and injury should
be presumed.") (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945)). See also Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 463 (1931).
49. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 389-91 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,
610 (1945)).

45.
46.
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system stand on equal footing. The Supreme Court views states' competing claims to natural resources on the same premise. No state can
impose its law on another, and no state must yield to another's law.50
The objective of fair allocation guides the substantive law of equitable
apportionment." The Court applies federal common law to determine
each state's share." The Court's primary objective is to make an "equitable apportionment ''of benefits between the ... States resulting from
the flow of the river. 5
Fair allocation rather than consistency with locally generated expectations became the touchstone of equitable apportionment. Local law
remains, however, central to an equitable apportionment inquiry. Although the Court has never been very precise about the source of the
law of equitable apportionment, its early decision makes it clear that
the grant of original jurisdiction requires a federal law and a federal
law that will not allow one state to use its law to gain an unfair advantage over another.54
But local law may serve as a source of principles to apply since a federal common law must of necessity examine the most relevant sources
of substantive law. 55

As local law is not determinative, the idea of superiority of rights,
whether by prior appropriation 6 or otherwise, is not controlling upon
the Supreme Court. Nor is the Court bound by the variance between
two states' riparian or appropriative water law origins. 7 "[A]ll the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other must be
weighed.... ,,""
According to Abrams, "[t] he concept of entitlement to
50. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
51. See id. at 98.
52. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (citing Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907) (characterizing the body of law as "interstate common law")).
53. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907). See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945).
54. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 394 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)).
55. Id. at 395 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972)).
56. MacDonnell, supra note 14, at 486 ("Priority is, however, a purely temporal basis
for establishing rights. It says nothing about the nature of the use, its economic or
social value, its importance in relation to other existing or potential uses of the water
source, or its effects on the ability of subsequent appropriators to use that source.").
57. For example, Kansas v. Colorado involved a riparian-doctrine state and an appropriation-doctrine state. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). Kansas recognizes both riparian and appropriation doctrine rights, but it relied mainly on a riparian doctrine claim to the undiminished flow of the Arkansas River. See also Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (discussing Kansas v. Colorado). See generally,
Douglas L. Grant, InterstateAllocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court: The
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 401 (2004).
58. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943).
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'a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of
an international drainage basin' is reinforced by the concept of the
inherent equality of each of the several states. Indeed, equitable ap'
portionment cases often sound like odes to sharing.""
After Colorado v. New Mexico, the court is likely consider factors including a harm-benefit comparison,' the feasibility of means to improve water use efficiency and enhance water supplies,6' and protection
of existing economies dependent on water. The Court may consider
a state's commitment to water conservation and avoidance of waste
relevant, because protection of existing, prior wasteful uses at the expense of newer, more conservation-oriented uses would not be equitable. The court will also consider population and economic demand
relevant. As Tarlock points out:
Recognition of prior uses need not freeze all existing uses. It operates
more to place the burden of water conservation on new users. This is
a difficult but not impossible burden to discharge as the Court's most
recent equitable apportionment case, Colorado v. New Mexico, illus-

trates. And... the burden may be a positive one to society because it
encourages greater state planning and regulatory responsibilities to

promote the efficient use of water.63
Justice Marshall's request of the special master in Colorado v. New
Mexico to make specific findings on remand illustrates the potentially
more expansive concerns of a modern Supreme Court in an equitable
apportionment case." Marshall requested findings regarding:
(1) the existing uses of water [sic] from the Vermejo River, and the
extent to which present levels of use reflect current or historical water
shortages or the failure of existing users to develop their uses diligently; (2) the available supply of water from the Vermejo River, ac-

counting for factors such as variations in streamflow, the needs of cur-

59. Abrams, supra note 8, at 332-33 (citation omitted). The Vermejo River litigation
[Colorado v. New Mexico] suggests that the sharing principle is not prevailing, but that
"reasonable conservation efforts are relevant in calculating a state's entitlement and
that 'the equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually be compelling,' but that apportionments for wholly future uses, nevertheless, could be obtained." Id. at 334. (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982)).
60. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1995); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507
U.S. 584, 593 (1993); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1931); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114 (1907).
61. Grant, supra note 57, at 417-18.
62. Colorado, 459 U.S. at 187.
63. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 396. "Although Colorado v. New Mexico is, in terms of
result, a replay of Wyoming v. Colorado, the two opinions suggest that the Court is tightening the standards that a state must meet to retain waters put to historic beneficial
use." Id. at 408.
64. Colorado, 459 U.S. at 189.
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rent users for a continuous supply, the possibilities of equalizing and
enhancing the water supply through water storage and conservation,
and the availability of substitute sources of water to relieve the demand for water from the Vermejo River; (3) the extent to which reasonable conservation measures in both States might eliminate waste
and inefficiency in the use of water from the Vermejo River; (4) the
precise nature of the proposed interim and ultimate use in Colorado
of water from the Vermejo River, and the benefits that would result
from a diversion to Colorado; and (5) the injury, if any, that New
Mexico would likely suffer as a result of any such diversion, taking
into account the extent to which reasonable conservation measures
could offset the diversion. 6
It is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court sitting today
would perpetuate the tradition of recognizing socially important resource issues when considering equitable apportionment of interstate
waters. Demographics matter. After Colorado v. New Mexico, it is also
reasonable to assume that, balancing the equities and applying the
harm-benefit comparison, the Court may be disposed to reallocate interstate water to achieve a more equitable apportionment of benefits.
III. STATE AREA-OF-ORIGIN STATUTES
(INTERSTATE WATER TRANSFER EMBARGOES)
States may declare a defensive posture with respect to their water
supplies (both intrastate and interstate) through the adoption of a
statute precluding the movement of water from within the state to
serve uses outside the state. Such statutes are typically called "area-oforigin" statutes. Such states seek to place embargoes on interstate water transfers. The primary question that arises with respect to such
statutes is whether the negative implication of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution precludes such embargoes, taking into account the state's objectives premised upon its police power.'
Essential to that question is whether water is a natural resource or a
commodity, an economic or a social good. As Douglas Grant said,
The critical question that arises under the negative commerce clause
is how much state interference with the free flow of commerce between the states is too much. The Supreme Court has used different
approaches over the years in dealing with that question. Generally,
however, the Court in its modern cases has weighed the national in-

65.

Id. at 189-90.

66.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
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terest in the free flow of interstate commerce against whatever inter67
est a state might advance to justify the interference.
8

Douglas."
The primary case in this area is Sporhase v. Nebraska ex ret.
Mr. Sporhase maintained a large, interstate farm with 140 acres in the
State of Colorado and 500 acres in the State of Nebraska.' Sporhase
maintained a groundwater well in Nebraska, along the Colorado/Nebraska state line." Sporhase built a sprinkler system in Colorado and sought a Colorado permit to drill a Colorado well." Colorado turned down Sporhase's application because the aquifer, which
the states share, was already overused." Sporhase thereafter delivered
water from his Nebraska well to the Colorado sprinkler system without
The Neseeking a permit to transfer groundwater from Nebraska.
braska statute prohibited transfer of groundwater to any state that did
not permit transfer to Nebraska.74 The Colorado statute prohibited all
out-of-state groundwater transfers.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, approached the fundamental
question, whether water is a natural resource within the total control of
the state where the water resides, or whether it is an article in commerce." He divided his analysis into three other questions: whether
ground water is an article of commerce; whether the Nebraska statute
imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce; and
whether Congress had granted the states permission to engage in
groundwater regulation that otherwise would be impermissible under
the Commerce Clause. He answered the first question in the affirmative, finding that the state does not own the ground water, notwithstanding its significant regulatory interest, and that there is a federal
interest in water commerce.8 He also answered the second question in
the affirmative, based on the conclusion that the reciprocity clause in
the Nebraska statute failed the Bruce Church balancing test.79 He then
67.

Douglas L. Grant, Commerce ClauseLimits on State Regulation of Interstate Water

Export, 105 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 10 (Autumn 1996), available at

http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/V105_A3.pdf.
68. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
69. Id. at 944.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Colorado et al. at 3, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sporhase
608568.
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (No. 81613), 1982 W.VL
72. Id.
73. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
74.

Id. (citing NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)).

75. See id. at 944 n.2.
76. Id. at 943.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 953-54.
79. Id. at 954, 958; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
The Supreme Court established a new balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of
state legislation affecting interstate commerce:
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answered the third question in the negative, finding that Congress had
not permitted the states to engage in groundwater regulation that otherwise would be impermissible under the Commerce Clause (the negative implications of the Commerce Clause remain in effect unless Congress expressly states an "intent and policy" that state legislation should
be free from attack under the Commerce Clause)." In dissent, Justices
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. (citation omitted).
Several cases leading to Sporhase establish the basis for the Supreme Court's
ruling. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529, 535 (1896) (The Court
upheld the constitutionality of a state law that prohibited the interstate transfer of game birds killed within Connecticut. The Court held that wildlife is
the common property of all citizens of a state and, therefore Connecticut
owned game birds "as a trust for the benefit of the people." As owner of the
birds, Connecticut could validly prohibit or condition their capture.); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908) (The Court
specifically addressed the power of a state to prevent interstate water transfers. NewJersey had enacted a statute forbidding water transfers out of state
- stating the need to preserve fresh water for the health and prosperity of its
citizens. A water company contracted to divert water from Passaic River in
New Jersey and deliver it to New York City. New Jersey obtained an injunction against the transfer, which was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Holmes held that: "[T]he constitutional power of the State to insist that
its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use ... and what it has it
may keep and give no one a reason for its will."); West v. Kan. Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 258 (1911) (Oklahoma adopted a law prohibiting the interstate sale of gas produced within Oklahoma. The Court limited its decision in Hudson County Water Co., holding that only the initial possession of
natural resources may be restricted for conservation purposes under a state's
police power. Once the resource is in private hands, prohibitions on transfer
must be evaluated under the Commerce Clause. The Court must decide
whether the law constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce.);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (State regulation of natural
resources is not exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Oklahoma required licenses for commercial enterprises that seine, transport or sell minnows, and by another statute precluded shipment of minnows for sale in another state. The Supreme Court (Brennan) repudiated Geer v. Connecticut, rejecting the theory of state ownership of natural resources, finding "[t]he fiction of state ownership may no longer be used to force those outside the State
to bear the full costs of 'conserving' . . . when equally effective nondiscriminatory conservation measures are available.").
80.
See A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law's PotentialBut Limited Impact on Urban Growth Management, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL
LAND USE? 92 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005) ("A few states with serious overdrafts
have imposed substantial limitations on new groundwater use, but the dormant Commerce Clause may prevent the use of these regimes to limit urban growth. Sporhase v.
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Rehnquist and O'Connor argued that water is not an article in corn81

merce.

In 1982, when the Supreme Court heard the Sporhase case, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had statutes limiting out-ofstate transfers of water, either partially or completely: (1) absolute
prohibition - Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico; (2) discretionary
approval power in state legislature or administrative officer - Arizona,
Montana, Wyoming, Oregon, Oklahoma, Nebraska; (3) reciprocity Kansas, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Nebraska; and (4) no prohibition - California, North Dakota, Texas. 2 At present, most western
states have export statutes, fashioned primarily to satisfy the Sporhase
test.8 ' Each statute contains means by which the exporting state can
determine, as a prerequisite to permitting the interstate transfer,
whether a state can serve its intrastate water needs while making the
transfer. 4
The Sporhasecase raises the fundamental question of whether water
is an economic good, 5 the value of which should be given freedom to
Nebraska ex rel Douglas holds that state water laws are subject to the dormant Commerce
Clause because water is an article of commerce. Sporhase constrains state restrictions
on interstate transfers and its impact on intrastate transfers is largely untested.") (citations omitted). See also Richard S. Harnsberger, Josephine R. Potuto & Norman W.
Thorson, Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options after Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REv. 754, 759
(1991), characterizing the Supreme Court's opinion in Sporhase as an "overview of governing federal constitutional constraints on state water law and policy." The article
explores ways that a state may act consistent with those federal constraints and describes the potential benefits and burdens of particular policy options. The article
contends that the holding in Sporhase is narrow - addressing only reciprocity, that the
holding applies both to ground water and surface water, that no constitutional obstacles prevent Congress from exercising exclusive control over ground water management, and that the Bruce Church test allows a state to prefer its own citizens in times of
severe water shortage, assuming that the state establishes a close ends-means relationship.
81. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 961 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
82. Harnsberger,supra note 80, at 817.
83. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-291 to 45-294 (2008); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-81101 to 37-81-104 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-401 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a726, 82a-1502 to 82a-1504 (2006); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 85-2-311, 85-2-316 (2008); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.515 to 533.524 (LexisNexis
2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 82-LB (2008); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 537.810 to 537.870 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-13 (2008); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3a-108 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.300 (LexisNexis 2008);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-115 (2008).
84. In addition to the statutes listed supra note 83, for a general discussion, see City
of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D. N.M. 1984); City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
563 F. Supp. 379 (D. N.M. 1983).
85. See CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR
INTERNATIONAL REFORM 10 (Resources for the Future, 2004). The Dublin Principles,
adopted by the International Conference on Water and Environment, Dublin, 1992 - a
precursor event to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 - recognized among
other things that "[wlater has an economic value in all its competing uses and should
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find its greatest utility." Water is essential to human sustenance, public
health, and food production. It works and produces energy. Its aesthetic and recreational value is now more greatly recognized. Water's
role in society was not, obviously, a matter upon which the Supreme
Court's members could agree in 198287 and probably is not a matter
upon which its current members could now agree.
The question whether states technically "own" water resources or
merely have constitutionally reserved rights to regulate them is essentially academic. There is a clear state interest in ground water preservation and use-an interest that states will need to utilize collectively in
the case of interstate groundwater bodies. In Sporhase, the Court could
not use its equitable apportionment thinking, balancing harms and
benefits so as to apportion the resource, because the parties were not
states.88 Reliance on the Commerce Clause rationale was therefore required."9 But, in the future, were state export statutes evaluated on the
equitable apportionment rationale - that is, considering equity of
benefit from the interstate water system, rather than the balance of
commercial integration versus protection of a state's protection of the
welfare of its citizens - those statutes might not stand.

be recognized as an economic good." Bauer observes: "The strongest market advocates
argue that managing water as an economic good means treating water as a fully private
and tradable commodity, subject to the rules and forces of the free market; from this
perspective, the economic value of water is the same as its market price." Id. Bauer also
notes:
"[t]
he extreme opposing viewpoint considers access to water as a basic human
right and sees market forces and prices as unacceptable or irrelevant. An intermediate position is that water should be recognized as a scarce resource,
which means that the available supplies are insufficient to satisfy all demands
and that trade-offs are therefore necessary in allocating water to different
uses. These trade-offs, however, need not be made via private or unregulated
markets."
86. Bauer explores the value of water as an "economic good" in an excellent comparative study of the several water codes adopted in Chile during the Twentieth Century. Bauer compares three generations of Chilean water law: Chile's first water code
(1951); Chile's 1967 Amendment to its 1925 Constitution and consequent Agrarian
and Water Reform laws; and Chile's third Water Code (1981). The three laws illustrate the normal Western U.S. states' type regulated-resource approach, a revolutionary
distribution-of-wealth type approach, and a pure economic-good approach to water
rights ownership and management. Bauer concludes that the first is best, albeit constantly in tension between social and economic objectives. See BAUER, supra note 85.
See also, Matt Berkowitz, Bottling the Water Bottlers: A Critique of Pennsylvania Groundwater
Law, 22 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 235 (2004) (discussing the special problem of exportation of groundwater as an economic good).
87. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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IV. INTERSTATE GROUND WATER: A COMPLEX RESOURCE
The geologic history of the present North American continent includes an era of the presence of great surface water bodies which are
now overlain by newer geologic materials. These geologic materials sediments" or volcanic basalts, tuffs or ice- and water-relocated granitics9' - have captured now-deep water bodies that are large in area and
extend under modern U.S. political boundaries." Likewise, more surfacial, alluvial ground water, resulting from the contribution of modernera (even current annual) precipitation through rain and snow, lies
and moves in the porous and transmissive sands, gravels, tills and loams
of the modern geologic surface, often under the hydrologic influence
of surface water rivers. Like the larger deep connate or fossil aquifers,
these higher elevation aquifers also do not respect U.S. political
boundaries. Unlike interstate surface water systems, there has been
little to no effort in defining a legal approach to the problem of apportioning underground hydrologic systems between the political subdivisions of the American political system - namely, the states." According
to the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Earth Sciences:
The world water cycle constitutes a transfer of water between reservoirs. The largest store of water is the oceans which contain 97.6 per
cent of all water. Of the remainder, the atmosphere contains, at any
one time, around 0.035 percent as vapor. On the land at the present
day three-quarters of all non-ocean water occurs as ice in glaciers and
ice caps, and almost a quarter consists of groundwater, stored in the
voids of rocks beneath the surface. Moisture in the soil accounts for
0.06 percent while lakes and rivers contain only 0.33 percent of all
non-ocean water. Nevertheless it is in the lakes and rivers that water is
actually moving fastest, for it is through them that almost the entire
terrestrial water cycle is funneled back to the sea. The relative rapidity of flow processes in the various stores may be seen by comparing
their mean residence times, found by dividing their volume by their
net throughput. The water cycle is the most vigorous at the Earth's
surface, with residence times all much less than one year, whereas

90. "Connate water" is water that was entrapped within sediments when they were
deposited. Such water typically does not ultimately supply surface flow. Connate water
is usually very deep and has not traditionally been considered as available as a contribution to available groundwater supply.
91. "Fossil water" is water that is very deep, often found in aquifers within bedrock
material.
92. See Figure 1, Principle Aquifers of the United States
93. In 1995, "nearly 60 percent of all groundwater used in the United States is
pumped in just eight states - in the order of volume pumped within the state, California, Texas, Nebraska, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Arizona and Idaho." DELLAPENNA,
supra note 1, at 18-2 (citing U.S.GS. Circular no. 1200 (1998)). Groundwater withdrawal then was just under 20 percent of the total amount of water withdrawn in the
United States. Id.
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residence times in groundwaters are from a few years to thousands of
years, averaging at a few hundred. The oceans and glaciers have residence times of thousands of years.9 4
Generally speaking, groundwater bodies are heterogeneous. 9' They
may be composed of varying or intersticed geologic matter." Waters
within those geologic masses move pursuant to hydraulic principles,
albeit slowly compared to surface waters. 7
The movement of water within an aquifer is downhill hydraulically
from where the water level in the aquifer is high to where the level is
lower, but pressure and friction cause it to move slowly, without the
turbulence marking surface flows.
...The velocity with which groundwater moves in any given direction
will be determined by permeability, hydraulic conductivity, porosity,
and the hydraulic gradient. 8
One aquifer may be hydraulically connected to another, either vertically or horizontally, with the pace of ground water affected by the
geologic composition of intervening masses.
[F] ormations with the greatest head potential will lose water to those
with lesser head potential. Natural gradients also may allow water to
migrate from one formation to another in inter-aquifer exchange.
Intervening aquitards slow the movement relative to some direct exchanges, but they do not stop it. 9
In some instances, there is a hydrologic connection between
ground water and surface water, 00 one being "tributary''' to the other.
94.

THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH SCIENCES 291 (David G. Smith ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1981).
95. "While the movement of water through homogeneous aquifers is understood,
movement through non-homogeneous aquifers is not understood. The precise constitution, location, and extent of non-homogeneous aquifers are expensive and timeconsuming to determine, if they can be determined at all." DELLAPENNA, supra note 1,
at 18-13.
96. Id. at 18-9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 18-8. Note that the "downhill" to which Dellapenna refers may be up, i.e.,
toward the earth's surface. Ground water flows from areas of high pressure to areas of
low pressure. This is called the "hydraulic gradient." The terms "permeability" and
"hydraulic conductivity" are sometimes used interchangeably.
99. Id. at 18-11. "Porosity is the fraction of a rock's bulk volume which is made up
of voids. In general, clastic rocks are porous, especially if poorly cemented, while crystalline rocks have low porosity. Porosity is usually greatly decreased by diagenesis of
sedimentary rocks but is increased by weathering." Smith, supra note 94, at 293.
100. See, e.g., D.E. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2001);
In re General Adjudication of All Rights To Use Water In Gila River System And
Source, 9 P.3d 1069, 1073-74, 1083 (Ariz. 2000) (holding "subflow" can be regulated as
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The hydraulic gradient or slope of the water in confined or unconfined aquifers slowly but massively provides volume to surface streams,
in some seasons all of a stream's flow. Permeability as well as hydraulic gradient plays a significant role in this process. All groundwater in
motion, and other than connate water "entrapped within sediments
12

when they are deposited," ultimately will supply some stream.

0

Where ground waters supply streams, they are sometimes called

"gaining streams." ' 3 Streams that supply ground waters are called "losing streams" or "losing reaches."'' 4 Ground water can be recharged
from the unsaturated zone from precipitation, from losing streams or
other surface waters, or from other ground water in adjacent aquifers.
When the upper boundary of the groundwater body in an aquifer is
the water table, the aquifer is said to be unconfined. The ground water is fed by recharge from the unsaturated zone. In some cases an
aquifer is overlain by an aquiclude and the water in it is under greater
than atmospheric pressure. The aquifer is then confined. Water will
rise up a borehole drilled into it until it reaches a level that defines
the hydraulic head in the aquifer."°
During floods or other occasions of supersaturation, surface water can
have a higher potential than groundwater, thus reversing the normal

relationship and directly charging the aquifer, wiping out the baffling
power of the unsaturated zone. "6

surface water although it is not flowing at the surface and no unconstitutional taking
occurs from its regulation); Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Prop. Owners Ass'n,
956 P.2d 1260, 1267-68 (Colo. 1998); Baumler v. Town of Newstead, 668 N.Y.S.2d 814
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Wash.
1993).
101. SeeJ. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Groundwater:Implications
for Nebraska, 83 NEB. L. REv. 541, 542 (2004); RobertJerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interaction, 43
RocI MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-8 (1997); Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona's Futile Effort to Separate Groundwaterfrom Surface
Water, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 567 (1994).
102.

DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 18-11 (citation omitted).

103. See Groundwater Glossary: The Groundwater Foundation,
http://www.groundwater.org/gi/gwglossary.html#G ("Gaining stream: A stream in
which groundwater discharges contribute significantly to the streamflow volume. The
same stream could be both a gaining stream and a losing stream, depending on the
conditions.").
104. Id. Losing reaches sometimes occur as a result of significant groundwater
pumping in the vicinity of an otherwise gaining stream.
105. Smith, supra note 94, at 293.
106.

DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 18-12.
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ttes Geological Survey has mapped principal aquifers
:es (Figure 1). 07' The map reveals that the nation's
do not respect state boundaries.

ipal Aquifers of the United States
posited four case models to illustrate the transarising from shared groundwater resources' interacwater.' 8 Although the four cases anticipate applicattional boundary context, they are no less relevant in
nestic interstate groundwater basins. Eckstein refined
I Barberis' models when describing his six model

Lquifers of the 48 Conterminous United States, Hawaii, Puerto
irgin Islands, http://nationalatlas.gov/mld/aquifrp.html (last
is, The Development of InternationalLaw of Transboundary Groundwa-
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V. ATTRIBUTES OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS UNDER VARIOUS
STATES' LAWS: CONFLICT OR INTEGRATION?
Constructive conversation about apportionment or management of
interstate groundwater resources will be more difficult where conflict
exists between the governmental or proprietary law related to ground
water of two or more states. Which state's law should apply? With surface water, the general appropriative/riparian distinction, applicable
generally on a west/east axis, suggests that at least the same general
jurisprudence will prevail throughout a region of states where an interstate water body may lie or flow. However, with ground water, adjacent
states' law is more likely to vary.
Dellapenna notes "the states have not opted for a single legal rule
to regulate groundwater." ' Glennon posits that "groundwater law has
more variety between and among western states than does surface water law."' Although this is perhaps an apt generalization, an analysis
of western states' laws regarding shared groundwater bodies suggests
that those laws may, in fact, be more similar than different in particular
cases.
Definition of the attributes of a water right, whether a right to surface or ground water, depends upon the origin of the right, whether
from state statute or common law, federal statute, or contract. Dellapenna describes five potential legal doctrines for ground water in the
sected by an international border and hydraulically linked to a river that is also intersected by the same international border; (3) an unconfined aquifer that flows across an
international border and that is linked hydraulically to a river flowing completely
within one state's territory; (4) an unconfined aquifer that is completely within the
territory of one state but that is linked hydraulically to a river that flows across an international border (the aquifer is always located in the downstream state.); (5) a confined aquifer, unconnected hydraulically with any surface water body, with a zone of
recharge (perhaps in an unconfined portion of the aquifer) that traverses an international border or that is located completely in another state; and (6) an aquifer unrelated to any other body of water (e.g., a stream or lake) that is disconnected from the
hydrologic cycle.
In the last model case, the aquifer does not recharge, contains non-renewable ground
water, and a state could never sustainably utilize it. Such aquifers contain ancient waters and may be confined or unconfined as well as fossil or connate. If the aquifer is
unconfined, a lack of recharge generally implies that it is located in an arid zone where
annual precipitation is inconsequentially small. Moreover, as there is neither a distinct
recharge or discharge zone, the ground water table in this type of aquifer is horizontal
and the water is stagnant with little or no perceptible flow. The transboundary consequences associated with aquifers that do not recharge are almost exclusively a function
of pumping the aquifer in one or more of the riparian states. When a state commences production of ground water from a water well penetrating such an aquifer, the
state will generate an ever-expanding cone of depression that will eventually encroach
in the subsurface across the international border.
110. DELLAPENNA, supranote 1, at §18.06.
111. Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U.
MIcH.J.L. REroRM 1021, 1027 (2006) (citation omitted).
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United States, with variations and modifications, excluding rights
based on prescriptive use and the federally-created rights: (1) the absolute dominion rule; (2) the reasonable use rule; (3) the correlative
rights rule; (4)2 the regulated riparian system; and (5) the appropriative
rights system."

Under the absolute dominion rule, a landowner may withdraw
ground water from an aquifer under his land for any purpose and use,
be it on or off the land. "3 Under the reasonable use rule, one may use
ground water reasonably upon the land from beneath which it was
withdrawn, but cannot be spread to use on other land, thus limiting
the property rights in the aquifer to the overlying owners. 4 The reasonable use rule does not require the institution of an administrative
process."' Under the correlative rights rule, landowners hold proportionate proprietary shares in the aquifer, depending upon their proportionate share of the overlying property."6 Like the reasonable use
rule, the correlative rights rule does not require the institution of an
administrative process. Under a regulated riparian system, permits to
withdraw water for reasonable use must be obtained from a state permitting entity."7 Under an appropriative rights system, rights may have
been established prior to enactment of permitting statutes, by acclaim
and diversion." 8 Modernly, anyone can establish appropriative rights

112. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 19-18.
113. Id. at 19-20. The absolute dominion rule is also referred to as the "English
Rule," as that is its origin. First stated in Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.
Cham. 1843), the rules provides that, absent malice or willful waste, a landowner has
the right to take all the groundwater he can capture from under his land, and do with
it as he pleases, and will not be liable to neighboring landowners even if in doing so he
deprives his neighbor of the use of the water. The English Rule is actually a rule of tort
law, rather than a rule of property law. The absolute dominion rule is also called the
"rule of capture" as it permits a landowner to capture the ground water beneath the
land without limitation other than through the protection of other landowners
through tort law.
114. Id. at 22-19 to 22-21. The reasonable use rule is also sometimes referred to as
the "American Rule," distinguishing it from the "English Rule." Id. at 22-12. Originally
applicable to surface water, eastern American states adopting the reasonable use rule
have extended it to ground water. With respect to surface water, the reasonable use
rule provides that a landowner is "entitled to take only [those actions] as are reasonable, in light of all the circumstances of relative advantage to the actor and the disadvantage to the adjoining land6wners, as well as social utility." Ridge Line, Inc. v.
United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Page Motor Co. v. Baker,
438 A.2d 739, 741 (Conn. 1980). See also Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577
(N.H. 1862).
115. See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIZ. L. REv. 445, 472-74 (2008).
116. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 21-12 to 21-3.
117. Id. at 23-23.
118. Smith, supra note 94, at 467.
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to withdraw water, notwithstanding their ownership of land, so long as
they obtain a state permit."9
A survey of state statutes regulating groundwater rights reveals that
there is a relatively consistent body of law throughout the states regarding groundwater rights, notwithstanding the commonly held view that
the states' laws are diverse (Table 1).
Table 1120
State

Groundwater Legal

Statutory References

System

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Statutory
References

System

Regulated
Riparian

ALA. CODE §§ 9-

Regulated
Riparian

ALA. CODE §§

10B-1 to -30

Appropriat-

ALASKA STAT. §

Appropri-

ALASKA STAT.

ive Rights

46.15.040

ative
Rights

§§ 46.15.010
to- .270

Absolute
Dominion

ARiz. REV. STAT.
§ 45-103121

Appropriative

ARIZ. REv.
STAT. § 45-

Rights
System

103

Rule generally; Regulated Reasonable Use
System in
Active Management
Areas

119.
120.

Surface
Water

9-1OB-I to -30

DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 19-4.
ALYSON GouLD, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FIFTY STATE

(2009), http://www.ncsl.org/.
121.
Willardson, Tony, "Ground Water Management in the West," Western States'
Water Council (2004), unpublished manuscript, in possession of author. Brewer, et
al., supra note 111.
COMPARISON OF WATER WrHDRAWAL REGULATIONS
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State

Arkansas

California"'
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Groundwater Legal
System
Regulated
Riparian

Reasonable
123
use.
"Overlying
Rights"correlative.
124

Nonoverlying users
("appropriators")
can pump
surplus
water for
export from
the basin or
for nonoverlying uses.
Where no
surplus,
right of the
appropriator must
yield to
overlying
owner.

Statutory References
ARK. CODE §§ 1522-201 to 1313

No state ground
water management in Califor• 125
nia.

Surface
Water
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory
References

Regulated
Riparian
paramount.
Appropriative
Rights
System
(includes
surface
water and
"subterra-

CAL. CONST.

ARK. CODE §§
15-22-205 to 223

ART. 10, §2;
CAL. WATER
CODE, § 1200

nean
streams
flowing
through
known
and definite channels")

122. See David RE. Aladjem, California's Other "DualSystem:" CoordinatedManagement
of Groundwater and Surface Water, 49 RoCmY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 7C.01-7 7C.03
(2003).
123. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
124. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 740 (1998)
(stating that each owner "has a common right to take all that he can beneficially use
on his land if the quantity is sufficient; if the quantity is insufficient, each is limited to
his proportionate fair share of the total amount available based on his reasonable
need."). See also Anne J. Schneider, Evolving Federalism in Water Law and Policy, at the
A.B.A. Section of Environmental, Energy, and Resources 17th Annual Water Law Conference (1999).
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State

Groundwater Legal
System

Statutory References

Surface
Water
System

Statutory
References

Colorado 126

Appropriat-

COLO. REV. STAT.

Appropri-

ive Rights
System
(ground
water not
tributary to
surface

§ 37-82-101

ative

CoLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-82-

Rights
System
(includes
tributary
ground

1

water)
Regulated
Riparian

101

Connecticut

water). 2
Regulated
Riparian

Delaware

Regulated

DEL. CODE ANN

Regulated

DEL. CODE

Riparian

tit. 7, § 60, Environmental Control (scattered

Riparian

ANN. tit. 7, §§
6003 to 6013

FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§

CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 22a-365

365 to -380

to -378

Florida

CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 22a-

Regulated

sections)
FLA. STAT. ANN.

Regulated

Riparian

§§ 373.013 -. 71

Riparian

Regulated

GA. CODE ANN.

Regulated

Riparian

§§ 12-5-1 to -193

Riparian

373.403 -. 468
Georgia

GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-5-

20 to -53
Hawaii

Regulated

Riparian
Idaho

Appropriative Rights
System 12 8

HAw. REv. STAT.
§§ 174C-1 to -68

Regulated
Riparian

IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-202

Appropriative
Rights

HAw. REv.
STAT. §§
174C-1 to -95
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-202

System

125.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (2008).

See also SCOTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA

(2007) (discussing state groundwater issues in California).
126. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6. See also D. Monte Pascoe, Plans and Studies:
The Recent Quest for Utopia in the Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources, 55 U. COLO. L.
REV. 391, 395-5, 414 (1984); James J. Petrock, Use of Colorado Water Rights In Secured
Transactions 18 COLO. LAW. 2307, 2309 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property
Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268 (1990); Note, Nontributary, Nondesignated Ground Water: The Huston Decision, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 135, 136
(1984); Note, Principles & Law of Colorado's Nontributary Ground Water, 62 DEN. U. L.
REv. 809, 811 (1985).
127. See Ramsey L. Kropf, Colorado Groundwater Law: Colorado's System-Integration (or
Not?) of Groundwater and Surface Water, 49 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 7B.01, 7B.02
(2003); Hal D. Simpson, Conjunctive Use of Surface and Ground Water in the Arkansas River
Basin, Colorado, at the A.B.A. Section of Environmental, Energy, and Resources 15th
Annual Water Law Conference (1997).
128. See Karl J.Dreher, Groundwater and Conjunctive Use in Drought Management, the
Crisis on the Eastern Snake River Plain, at the A.B.A. Section of Environmental, Energy,
and Resources 23rd Annual Water Law Conference (2005).
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State

Illinois

Indiana

Groundwater Legal
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory References
525 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/1 45/7

Surface
Water
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory
References
615 ILL.
COMP. STAT.

50/1
§§
14-25-1 to -2, -

Regulated

IND. CODE §§ 14-

Regulated

Riparian

25-1-1 to 15-13

Riparian

Regulated

IOWA CODE §

Regulated

IOWA CODE

Riparian

455B.261 - .281

Riparian

455B.261 279

Appropriative Rights
System

KAN. STAT. ANN.

Appropri-

§§ 82a-705, 82a 1021 to -1039

ative
Rights
System
Regulated

KAN. STAT.
ANN. §82a-

IND. Code

5
Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Regulated

Ky.

Riparian

ANN. §§ 151.100

Regulated
Riparian

Maine

Regulated
Riparian

REV. STAT.

Regulated
Riparian

Michigan

Regulated
Riparian

Riparian

151.100 to .990
None

ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38 §§

Regulated
Riparian

ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit.

MD. CODE ANN.,
EMNVR. §§ 5-201

MASS. GEN. LAws

Regulated

ch. 21 §§ 8 to
25A
MICH. COMP.

Riparian

LAWS §§

5, §3331-8
Regulated
Riparian

MINN. STAT. §§
103A.001 -

Regulated
Riparian

Regulated

MISS. CODE ANN.

Riparian

§§ 51-3-1 to -55

1302
MASS. GEN.

Regulated

LAws ch. 21G,
§§ 1-19
MICH. COMP.

Riparian

LAWS §§

324.32101Regulated
Riparian

1031.715
Mississippi

MD. CODE
ANN., ENVIR.

§§ 5-201 to-

.30113
Regulated
Riparian

REV. STAT.

to -.210;
§151.990
LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30:2072
to -2089

324.30101Minnesota

KY.

ANN. §§

to -1302
Massachusetts

705

Riparian

401 to - 404
Maryland

§§

3420
MINN. STAT.
§§ 103A.001 -

103G.801
Regulated

Riparian
1_

_1

MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 51-3to-55
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Surface
Water
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory
References

Groundwater Legal
System
Regulated
Riparian

Statutory References

Montana

Appropriative Rights
System' 9

MONT. CODE
ANN. §§85-2-101
to -907

Appropriative
Rights
System

Nebraska

Correlative
Rights' 0
Reasonable
Use, managed by
Natural
Resource
Districts
Appropriative Rights
System

NEB. REV. STAT.
§§46-635 to -642
NEB. REV. STAT.
§§46-700 to -740
No state management of
ground water

Appropriative
Rights
System

NEB. REV.
STAT. §46226

Appropriative
Rights
System

NEv. REv.
STAT.
§§532.010
534.360

Riparian

None
N.J. STAT.ANN. §§
58:1A-1 to-17
N.M. STAT. §§
72-5-1 to -39

State

Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT. §
640.400 to -.435

New Hampshire

Regulated
Riparian

NEv. REv. STAT.
§§532.010 534.360. State
management of
ground and
surface water is
integrated.
N.H. REv. STAT.
§ 482:1 to -:93

NewJersey

Regulated
Riparian

N.J. STAT.- ANN. §
58:1A-1 to -58:26

Regulated
Riparian

New Mexico

Appropriative Rights
System

N.M. STAT. §§ 7212-1 to -28

Appropriative
Rights
System

New York

Regulated
Riparian

N.Y. ENvTL.
CONSERV. LAW

Regulated
Riparian

Nevada

§15-0101 to -

Regulated
Riparian

N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 143215.11 to-.22B

-

N.Y. ENVrL.
CONSERV. LAW
§15-0101 to 2901

3111

North Carolina

Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§
640.400 to .435
MONT. CODE
ANN. §§85-2101 to -907

Regulated
Riparian

N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§
143-215.11 to
-.22L

129. See Laura S. Ziemer, Eloise Kendy & John Wilson, Ground Water Management in
Montana: On the Road from Beleaguered Law to Science-Based Policy, 27 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 75, 79 (2006).

130.

Willardson, supra note 121.
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State

Groundwater Legal
System
Appropriative Rights
System

Statutory References

Ohio

Regulated
Riparian

Oklahoma

Surface
Water
System
Appropriative
Rights
System

Statutory
References

OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §1521.16

Regulated
Riparian

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§
1521.01 to .99

Appropriative Rights
System

OKLA. STAT. tit.
82 § 1020.7

OKLA. STAT.
tit. 82 § 105.9

Oregon

Appropriative Rights
System

OR. REV. STAT. §
537.120

Appropriative
Rights
System
Appropriative
Rights

Pennsylvania

Regulated
Riparian

Regulated
Riparian

Rhode Island

Regulated
Riparian

62 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 631
to 641
R.I. GEN. LAws §
46.15.7-1

South Carolina

Regulated
Riparian

Regulated
Riparian

South Dakota

Appropriative Rights
System 3'

S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-1-10 to 495-150
S.D. CODIFIED §
46-6-3

Tennessee

Regulated
Riparian

Texas

Absolute
Dominion

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-02

N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-0402

OR. REv.
STAT.§
537.120

System

Regulated
Riparian

27 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§
3101-3136
R.I. GEN.
LAws §§
46.15.7-1 to-3

TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 69-1-101 to 117
TEXAS WATER
CODE ANN. § 36002

Rule 132
Utah

Appropriative Rights
System

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 73-3-1

Vermont

Regulated
Riparian

VT. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 10 § 1410

I-_

Appropriative
Rights
System
Regulated
Riparian

I

Appropriative
Rights
System
Appropriative
Rights
System
Riparian
I

S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-410-80
S.D. CODIFIED
§ 46-5-10

TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 69-7301to-309
TEXAS WATER
CODE ANN. §
22.022
UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-3-1

VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10 §
, 1031

131.
"South Dakota water law is a mix of Prior Appropriation and Riparian Doctrines running from the West to East." Willardson, supra note 121, (quoting Garland
Erbele, South Dakota State Engineer).
132.
See Dylan 0. Drummond, Lynn Ray Sherman & Edmond R. McCarthy Jr., The
Rule of Capture in Texas-Still So Misunderstood After All These Years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV.

1,13-15 (2004).
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Virginia

Washington

Groundwa-

Statutory Refer-

Surface

Statutory

ter Legal
System

ences

Water
System

References

Regulated

VA. CODE ANN. §

Regulated

VA.

Riparian

62.1-263

Riparian

Appropriative Rights

WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.03.010

Appropriative

90.03.010

CODE

ANN. § 62.11 44.2 to -.34:28
WASH. REV.
CODE §

West Virginia

Regulated
Riparian

W. VA. CODE ANN
§ 22-12-1 to -14

Rights
System
(Regulated Riparian are
also recognized)
Regulated
Riparian

Wisconsin

Regulated
Riparian

Wisc. STAT. ANN.
§281.11 to .37

Regulated
Riparian

Wis. STAT. §
30.18

Wyoming

Appropriative Rights

Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§41-3-905, 906

Appropriative

WYO. STAT.
ANN. §41-3-

System

Rights

System
_____________
_________

_____________

System

W. VA. CODE
ANN § 22-26-1
to -9

101
_______

With respect to governmental law, i.e., the extent, nature and
means of governmental involvement in water rights, adjacent states
may differ constitutionally concerning the public/private character of
the ground water resource. One state's statutes may provide for more,
or less, regulative involvement in the management of the resource than
others. Comparing Figure 1 (USGS's map of principal aquifers) with
Table 1, it appears that most adjacent states sharing principal aquifers
have relatively similar groundwater legal regimes. There are exceptions, for example:
California/Nevada, Arizona/New Mexico,
and
possibly
OreTexas/New
Mexico,
Texas/Oklahoma
gon/Washington. Where states authorize groundwater use permitting,
the extent, nature, and even the process of regulation may differ. The
concept of comity, which is the deference and respect states show for
each other's laws, generally resolves conflicts in the exercise of sovereignty, particularly if being applied within the geographic limits of that
state's jurisdiction. " In natural resource matters, comity is the frequent and common basis under which adjacent states assist each other
with fighting forest fires, protecting or managing migrating game, or
addressing water pollution in interstate streams.'

133.
Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 486 (1911).
134. The latter, of course, is more modernly actuated by federal statutory requirements under the Clean Water Act, rather than through simple comity. Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1981).

Issue I

LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

With respect to the proprietary law of water, conflict is not between
sovereign rights, but rather between private rights, i.e., a dispute between competing claimants premising their claims on adjacent states'
differing legal principles of ownership. In the case of interstate surface
water, the U.S. Supreme Court's historic decision in Wyoming v. Colorado suggests that where the legal regimes for development of the water
right are the same, the legal principles of both are applicable, i.e., defWhere true conflict is
erence to prior rights in the adjacent state.
joined, for example, in a conflict between a permitted ground water
retrieval state and an Absolute Dominion Rule state,' 6 some principles
of conflict of law resolution may need to be applied.'37
Whether the guiding paradigm of a state's groundwater law differs
from its neighbors' is only part of the context within which interstate
ground water apportionments may be accomplished. Their respective
laws may differ as it relates to various particular issues. For example,
there is potential for a conflict of law where there is a hydrologic connection between ground and surface water."3' The case law in western
states has not developed to the same extent regarding how the laws of
those waters interact. Where ground-surface water connectivity exists,
surface water law may control all or some of the groundwater rights,

defining their attributes differently than if there was no hydrologic
connection. 9 Holders of ground or surface water rights may have
rights vis-;I-vis each other, notwithstanding state regulatory interests

135. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 471 (1922).
136. For example, New Mexico and Texas.
137. Conflict of law resolution principles include: (1) a provision in the law of the
choice of law state that permits the court to use the lexfori, i.e. law of the forum state;
(2) the "significant contacts test," which evaluates the contacts between the states and
each party to the case, and applies the law of the state that has the most significant
contacts with the litigation as a whole; (3) the "seat of the relationship test," which
examines the relationship between the parties to the lawsuit, and applies the law of the
state in which the relationship between the parties was most significant; (4) the
"balance of interests test," which examines the interests of the states themselves, and
the original purpose for the laws in question. Other alternatives include the
"comparative impairment test," which examines which state's policies would suffer
more if their law was not applied, or the "better rule test," which seeks to apply the
empirically-better law, as between the competing states. However, state judicial
application of choice of law rules is subject to the limitations of the U.S. Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause and Fourteenth Amendment. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment are satisfied so long as there are sufficient aggregate contacts between the
forum and the event giving rise to the cause of action).
138. See supratext accompanying note 100.
139. DELLAPENNA, supra note 139, at 18-4. "[In the early twentieth century, t]he idea
that all water was tributary to some stream (or that streams were tributary to groundwater), if followed rigorously to its logical conclusion, would have made chaos of existing
legal regimes."
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over either. "' Some recent decisions from western states have begun to
recognize the legal implications of interconnected surface and
groundwater systems.' Storage of surface water underground in some
states also raises additional questions.'42 Various states' recognition of
the significance of hydrologic connectivity makes it likely that there
will be differing outcomes on this matter in adjacent states.
Conflict of law may exist regarding the degree to which a public interest encumbers a state-based water right. Depending on the state, a
water right may be regarded as a pure property interest. More commonly, however, the right is regarded as infused with some sort of reserved public aspect. The declaration by some states that water is always ultimately owned by the state or "the public" infuses the right with
an encumbrance of responsibility to use water wisely even after a citizen establishes a valid right to use the water. A constitutional declaration of public or state ownership limits the legislative or administrative
transfer of public rights to individual property owners.' 0 A judiciallydeveloped "public trust doctrine"'4 or a "public interest" component
lodged within a state's permitting statute' 5 may do the same. Where a
140. See David J. Aiken, Hydrologically-Connected Ground Water, Section 858, and the
Spear T. Ranch Decision, 84 NEB. L. REV. 962, 964 (2006) (discussing the Nebraska Supreme Court's adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 858 (2005), to resolve
conflicts between surface water and groundwater rights).
141. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 18-29 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1
(2001); City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); State ex rel
Johnny Appleseed Metro. Park Dist. v. City of Delphos, 750 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2000);
Hubbard v. State, 936 P.2d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)). See also Robert Glennon, Pinching Straws: Reforming Groundwater and Surface Water Law to Protect the Environment, 49
ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 7A-1, 7A-4 (2003).

142.

PeterJ. Kiel & Gregory A. Thomas Banking Groundwaterin California:Who Owns

the Aquifer Storage Space?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2003, at 25.

143. See supra text accompanying notes 26-41.
144. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446-47 (Cal. 1983). See
also ScoTr S. SLATER, 1 CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY §§ 12.02, 13.11 (2007). Slater contends that California's judicially-declared public trust doctrine does not pertain
to California's percolating ground water, premised on the observation that such water
"does not constitute a navigable waterway under any stretch of the imagination." Id. §
13.11. This conclusion seems inconsistent with Slater's reading of California Constitution, Art. X, Section 2, extending that article's reasonable use requirement to ground
water. Id. § 12.02.
145. See, e.g. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a) (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 45-153
(2008); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 105, 1253, 1255, 1257 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN §§ 42202B, 42-203A, 42-222 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §
85-2-311(3); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-204, 46-234, 46-289 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
533.370 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6, -7, 72-12-3(E) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6104-06(4) (2008); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 536.410, 537.153, 537.170 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 46-2A-9 (2008); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134(b) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-3-8(4) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290 (2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931
(2008). Colorado does not have a public interest review requirement, and Oklahoma
had one, but eliminated it in 1963. But see OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 82 §1085.2 (discussing

Issue I

LIMITED APPROACH TO MULTI-STATE MANAGEMENT

water right is regarded as a pure real property interest with no public
encumbrance, the outcome could differ.'46
While it is common that state statutes pertaining to intrastate, interbasin transfers of water rights, or petitions to change the nature or
place of use of existing water rights, apply essentially similar substantive
standards to such transfers or changes, such statutory provisions are by
no means uniform. Conflict of law problems may therefore exist in
this area as well.
States' laws may differ as to the salvaged water doctrine. In California, for example, where a water user uses water more efficiently, the
water user may market the salvaged water.'47 If state law does not protect salvaged water, in a prior appropriation state the water is typically
regarded as abandoned and available for subordinate appropriators to
use. 148
State laws may also differ with respect to the limitation of the
amount of ground water that the state will permit or allow one to withdraw, based on an estimate of the water available for withdrawal.
These protections are normally stated in terms of "safe"'' 41 or "sustained" yield.' The Oklahoma groundwater statute, for example, prothat the Water Resource Board shall develop plans to meet the needs of the people of
Oklahoma).
146. But seeJoseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) ("[W]ater rights have less protection than most
other property rights for several reasons... (a) because their existence may intrude on
a public common, they are subject to several original public prior claims, such as the
navigational servitude and the public trust, and to laws protecting commons, such as
water pollution laws; (b) their original definition, limited to beneficial and nonwasteful uses, imposes limits beyond those that constrain most property rights; (c)
insofar as water rights (unlike most other property rights) are granted by permit, they
are subject to constraints articulated in the permits.").
147. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201, 1244 (2008).
148. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325,
1327 (Colo. 1974). See also JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER

RESOURCES 182-89 (4th ed. 2006) (examining salvage issues in prior appropriation
cases).
149.

See, e.g., UTrON TRANSBOUNDARY RES. CTR. MODEL INTERSTATE WATER

COMPACT, art. III § K (Jerome Muys, George W. Sherk & Marilyn C. O'Leary 2006),
("Safe Annual Yield: The amount of water that can be withdrawn annually from a
surface or sub-surface water resource without serious water quality, net storage, environmental or social consequences.").
150. Marcus Moench, Groundwater: The Challenge of Monitoring and Management, in
THE

WNORLD'S

WATER

2004-2005,

THE

BIENNIAL

REPORT

ON

FRESHWATER

RESOURCE 79, 80 (Island Press 2004). ("Aquifer 'sustained yield' is defined as the
amount of water than can be pumped from a given hydrological unit without depleting
the stock of water in storage. When extraction exceeds recharge aquifers are generally
described as suffering from overdraft or overextraction, the primary warning sign that
management may be required."). Predictions regarding the amount of ground water
that can be reproduced in annual cycles, which predictions are typically based on "recharge," precipitation, evapotranspiration, previous withdrawal, etc., are most appropriate where disconnected, unconfined, alluvial aquifers are involved. Where connate
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vides for the determination of maximum annual yield of groundwater
basins."'
A simple, purely hydrological definition of safe yield would allow the
extraction of no more water annually than is recharged-naturally or
artificially-annually.... If we are to allow the meaningful exploitation of water at all in arid regions, however, the concept of safe yield
must allow for a greater rate of annual withdrawal than annual recharge.
South Dakota's water code prohibits use of ground water in
North Dakota'54 and Monamounts above average annual recharge.'
55
tana statutes authorize public officers to reserve water supplies for
future use, thereby encumbering the current grant of permits for appropriation of ground or surface waters. In Kansas, the state legislature reserves to itself the right to establish a "minimum desirable
streamflow for any watercourse" in the state, thereby limiting the chief
engineer's approval of proposals to appropriate water from that watercourse.'
Instream flow statutes have become more common, as in
Oregon... and Nebraska.'
In recent years, political subdivisions, frequently known as management districts, increasingly manage ground water, particularly
where there has been legislative or administrative concern that ground
water supplies may be insufficient for current and future needs or
there is a threat of overuse. Arizona's groundwater code created "Active Management Areas" in the Santa Cruz, Prescott, Pinal, and Tucson
regions, for the purpose of establishing safe-yield goals. 9 In Kansas,
"Ground Water Management Districts" recommend rules for state implementation and have created "intensive ground water use control

or fossil aquifers are at issue, predicting the amount of water in storage is more difficult.
151. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1020.5 (2008), (In determining maximum yield of
groundwater, the Water Resource Board shall consider "(1) ... the total land area
overlying the basin or subbasin; (2) the amount of water in storage in the basin or
subbasin; (3) the rate of recharge to the basin or subbasin and total discharge from the
basin or subbasin; (4) the transmissibility of the basin or subbasin; and (5) the possibility of pollution of the basin or subbasin from natural sources.").
152. DELLAPENNA, supranote 1, at 18-47.
153. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-6-3.1 (2008).
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-31 (2007).
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (2007).
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a (2006).
157. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.334 (2008). See also Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail
Achterman, Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENvTL. L.
1125, 1129-130 (2006).
158. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,107 to -2,119 (2008).
159. Jack A. Vincent, What Lies Beneath: The Inherent Dangers of the Central Arizona
GroundwaterReplenishment District, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 857, 862-63 (2006).
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t*160,,161

areas."" Montana utilizes "controlled ground water areas.
In Nevada, the state integrates ground and surface water management by
basin, typically defined by topographic contours.'62 The state has designated 111 of these 256 basins and sub-basins for special management, with another ten basins having partial designation.'
Texas utilizes local "ground water management areas" with limited powers to
regulate ground water pumping.'" Where such management districts
are adjacent to state lines and overlapping common ground water bodies, conflict may exist between these organizations' objectives.
Conflict of law issues may also arise between the application of state
and federal law, giving due respect for the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Although neither the Articles of Confederation of
the original thirteen states nor the Constitution transfer the states'
right and responsibility to control and manage natural resources to the
federal government, Congress has more recently enacted statutes,
premised primarily on the Interstate Commerce Clause, that affect
both intrastate and interstate natural resources. With respect to interstate surface water bodies, those relating to waterborne commerce are
generally consolidated under the rubric of "navigational servitude."'6 "
"Reserved" rights to natural resources, including ground water,"' are
implied from congressional action reserving federal land for specific
uses from the more general multiple-use characteristics with which the
federally-owned lands are endowed. More modern national environmental legislation, also apparently premised on the Commerce Clause,
imposes an as yet ill-defined "environmental servitude" upon natural
resources. According to Dellapenna:

160. SeeJohn C. Peck, GroundwaterManagement in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 445, 455 (2006) (examining several types of
Groundwater Management District regulations, including the creation of "intensive
ground water use control areas").
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 (2007).
162. Department of Conservation & Natural Resources: Division of Water Resources,
Nevada State Water Plan, S. 4-1, -22, available at

http://water.nv.gov/WaterPlanning/wat-plan/ptl-cont.cfm.
163. E-mail from Robert H. Zeisloft, P.E., Section Chief, Surface Water and Adjudication Sections, Nevada Division of Water Resources (October 14, 2008) (on file with
The University of Denver Water Law Review). See generally http://water.nv.gov/ (under
"Mapping/GIS" tab, follow "Basin Boundary Map" hyperlink) (map lists Nevada's basins and subbasins and the designation of each).
164. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 35.004 (2007).
165. Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property:Judicial Theories and
the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REv. 627, 628 (1988).
166. See Robert T. Anderson, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. School of Law, Indian
Reserved Water Rights - Legal Overview, at A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and
Resources 20th Annual Water Law Conference, (Feb. 21-22, 2002) (citing cases where
federal reserved rights apply to groundwater).
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Congress has not adopted a preemptive federal statute, although
Congress has acted to deal with saltwater intrusion, public drinking
water sources, and certain groundwater polluting sources. [citing e.g.,
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452,1454(h);
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 43 U.S.C. § 3 0 0 .g-l; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6987; and
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.] Congress, however, has left allocating water quantitatively generally to the states.
Notwithstanding these federal legal overlays, which are not insignificant, modern state legislatures and administrations continue to
assume their right and responsibility to manage and control natural
resources, including water. Federal assertion of the "navigational servitude" to ground water seems inappropriate, as ground water does not
support waterborne commerce. It is generally agreed that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in 1976, found that federal reserved rights apply to
ground water in Cappaert v. United States.'6' The implication of the
more general "environmental servitude" resulting from national environmental legislation affecting ground water is less clear. The basis
and effect of that legislation, combined with the quantification and
state-recognition of the water right thereby created, make the implication less precise, particularly given the reservation of state regulatory
authority also contained in numerous federal water (i.e., Reclamation)
statutes. The result is a cloudier, and often contentious, definition of
the particular effect of the federal statutory overlay.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF SHARED GROUNDWATER BASINS:

LESS IS MORE
Divided administration is the status quo with respect to state ad-

ministration of shared groundwater basins. And, so long as claims for
167. DELLAPENNA, supra note 1, at 19-18.
168. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976). See also In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila III), 989
P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000). But see Debbie Shosteck,
Beyond Reserved Rights: Tribal Control over GroundwaterResources in a Cold Winters Climate,
28 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 325, 331, 338, 344, 361 (2003) ("Gingerly evading the issue of
whether the Winters doctrine holds true for groundwater, the [U.S. Supreme] Court
concluded that the water in Devil's Hole was actually surface water.") ("The Court's
emphasis on state sovereignty, disinclination towards creating federal common law,
and tendency to narrow the federal reserved rights doctrine, indicate that the groundwater issue would not fare well if the Court ultimately encounters it. Despite the strong
reasoning enunciated by the Arizona Supreme Court and favorable precedent espoused in Winters and Cappaert, the Court will likely reject the idea of a reserved right

to groundwater.") ("Assuming a court determines that tribes indeed maintain a preemptive right to oversee their own groundwater resources, it remains unclear how an
aquifer underlying both reservation and state land would be managed according to a
dual legal regime.").
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the use of water do not approach total water available to be administered, divided administration works. When claims do exceed supply,
however, two outcomes are predictable: a race to the finish or an
agreement, either one potentially leading to equitable apportionment.
Professor Abrams ultimately concluded, in 2002, that the security of a
state's "umbrella" may not be all that good; rather that "secure" water
rights may be later made less secure if equitable apportionment reallocates interstate water due to inefficient use." Again, security isn't everything. The watershed management approach has somewhat revised
the positive view of multi-state division (apportionment) of interstate
surface water systems.'7" Another alternative is to approach the shared
resource from the perspective of agreeing upon the management tasks
accomplishable without dividing the resource. These lesser tasks, if
accomplished, may in fact produce more results in terms of managing
interstate groundwater resources than would reaching an agreement
splitting those resources.
Marcus Moench recommended an approach exemplifying "less is
more." His suggestion is to utilize "simple data" and "direct measures
of groundwater conditions as a basis for groundwater systems management, particularly including data regarding groundwater levels and
water quality, rather than mass balance recharge-extraction equations. 7 ' Indeed these are the equations upon which water resource
Moench recommends simplicity in the
managers more typically rely.'
face of hydrogeologic complexity:
Quantifying the water balance within aquifers, for example, requires
quantitative estimates of deep groundwater inflow from other aquifers, groundwater discharge to streams, evapotranspiration by plants,
and a wide variety of other factors. These factors often vary from year
to year and require extensive recording periods (and assumptions of
stable climatic conditions) to develop stable quantitative estimates. In
addition, evaluation is complicated where boundaries of aquifers
cannot be clearly identified-a common situation. Without clear
boundaries, it is often difficult to accurately evaluate either recharge
or extraction.]7

169. Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primerfor Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK L. REV. 155, 168-69 (2002).
170. See Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprintfor Twenty
First Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLT' REV. 113, 145
(2000).
171. Moench, supra note 150, at 97.
172. Id.("In the groundwater case, managers often cannot develop effective management and allocation systems because they rely on concepts of sustained yield but
cannot generate the basic scientific and monitoring data required to translate such
concepts into practical tools for management.").
173. Id. at 80.
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Moench also suggests:
Managers should also use some other simple indicators. These can
include key groundwater quality parameters and operational well
characteristics. When combined with existing hydro-geological information, they can provide a foundation for monitoring groundwater conditions at all levels from local regions or aquifers to global assessments. Furthermore, because each of these indicators is a direct
neasure, the level of uncertainty inherent in the measure itself is
much lower than with extraction and recharge estimates. 7'
Moench's proposal, which is applicable to the basis for the approval
of groundwater withdrawals, suggests an approach for interstate managerial structure as well: states should develop limited agreements between themselves premised on the known characteristics of groundwater systems, rather than on their unbounded unknowns.
Professor Leshy's suggestion that federal support for state managerial programs "earmarked solely to improve state water management measurement, adjudication and administration of water rights ''175 is also
helpful, as such support would facilitate development of the more precise data necessary to understand and manage interstate groundwater
resources, supporting the development of limited managerial agreements. Professor Sax' suggestion of contractually created regulatory
structures is also apt:
[B]etween pure localism and total centralization of authority there is
a wide range of intermediate choices. Recent efforts to deal with regional water problems, as on the Platte River, the Rio Grande, the
Colorado, and the Sacramento/San Joaquin, have spawned some
rather novel sorts of collaborative entities, borne out of negotiation
(and sometimes litigation). They bring local stakeholders together
with state and federal officials, generating new forms of governance
that are essentially created contractually, rather than through the political process. One interesting question ... is whether we are seeing
viable new institutional arrangements being fitted to the hydrological

174. Id. at 97-98.
175. John D. Leshy, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law, The FederalRole in Water Management in the West: Time for New Thinking?, at A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 21st Annual Water Law
Conference (Feb. 20-21, 2003) ("The withdrawal of federal dollars for water infrastruc-

ture has itself placed more financial demands on the states. Federal environmental
laws have made the state's management job more difficult. And the general stream

adjudications have proved more difficult, lengthy and expensive to litigate than anyone
thought possible.").
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away of some of the old boundaries
realities, and a genuine
76 withering
and the old politics."
Where interstate water supplies are involved, states must decide
how they will live with their neighbors: through agreement and compromise, or through disagreement and litigation. Under the race paradigm, each state presumes that it can administer the entire resource,
notwithstanding its neighbor. Under the agreement paradigm, the
several states agree as to the maximum available extent of water in the
groundwater resource, apportion that total between themselves, and
thereafter agree (or disagree) how to administer the shared resource
within those limits.'" The first problem is, given the complexity of aquifers and that they cannot be observed, it is not easy to determine the
amount of available ground water. The second problem is the difficulty for a state to acquiesce that its neighbor should have as large an
apportionment as the neighboring state will want. Negotiation over
these issues may deter a successful outcome, perhaps interminably,
causing the agreement paradigm to revert to the race paradigm, and
thus to equitable apportionment.
The course through agreement and compromise has traditionally
been thought to be implemented exclusively through compact thus
avoiding equitable apportionment and congressional intervention.
Interstate compacts, authorized and entered pursuant to the Compact
Clause," are unfortunately difficult to put in place, as they require the
approval of state political bodies (legislatures) and become frozen instruments difficult to modify with changing circumstances once the
states obtain Congressional imprimatur."'°
176. Joseph L. Sax, Issues in the Watershed Management Movement, Keynote Address at the A.B.A. Section on Environment, Energy and Resources 19' Annual Water
Law Conference, (Feb 15, 2001).
177. See, e.g., Susan J. Buck, Gregory W. Gleason & Mitchel S. Jofuku, "The Institutional Imperative": Resolving TransboundaryWater Conflicts in Arid Agricultural Regions of the
United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 595, 620-21

(1993).
178. See Muys et al., supra note 149, at art. III § M ("Subsurface water: All waters
below the surface of the ground whether or not hydrologically connected to surface
waters."). See generally Jerome C. Muys, Muys & Associates, P.C., Washington, D.C.,
Beyond Allocation: Equitable Apportionment and Interstate Watershed Protection and Management, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 19th Annual Water
Law Conference (Feb. 15-16, 2001) (explaining that equitable apportionment byjudi-

cial decision accomplishes the same thing as interstate compacts); Charles T. DuMars,
Professor of Law, Univ, of N.M. School of Law, InterjurisdictionalCompacts as Tools for
Watershed Management, at the A.B.A. Section of Environment, Energy and Resources

19th Annual Water Law Conference (Feb. 15-16, 2001) (discussing cases where compacts were useful).
179.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

180.

Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: Mien the Virtue of Perma-

nence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 150 (2003).
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Negotiation compromise among states is still the best apportionment
vehicle, but in many cases the product of negotiation - interstate
compacts - merely postpones the exercise of original jurisdiction. A
compact is usually negotiated as a substitute for a Supreme Court equitable apportionment. But, when it becomes necessary to litigate the
meaning of a compact term or concept, a court will turn to the law of
equitable apportionment to ascertain the intent of the drafters.'
Agreements between agencies or political subdivisions of states'2
may be more flexible and more particularly designed to the situation
presented by different reservoirs and different state-law conflict problems. The advantages of such an approach are clear, even though
agreement may be difficult to reach. A primary advantage is that it
permits leaving unresolved, for the time being or for some extended
period, the thorny issue of allocation of the resource. Allocation of the
resource is, of course, the primary political concern, but may not be
the primary resource management concern. States could pursue management of the shared resource in both states' common interest without first accomplishing strict allocation. The problem, however, is to
find a means to manage the resource while allowing a state to grant
new authority to withdraw water from the shared resource, without
encouraging another involved state to veto that grant.
181. A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 410-11 (1985).
182. The question whether an association of governments in different states, be they
the sovereign states themselves, or another entity like an agency or a political subdivision, constitutes a "compact" is not a question of who the parties are, but what the
effect of the association is on the political power of Congress. The U.S. Supreme
Court has pointed out that not all "compacts" or "agreements" invoke the Compact
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, article I, section 10, clause 3. See New Hampshire v.
Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (boundary first established by King George II; court explained that "[t] he application of the Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are
directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of
the United States") (quoting from and relying upon Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503
(1893) (boundary established by charters of English sovereigns (James I, Charles II) by
whom colonies of Virginia and North Carolina were formed)); ; North Carolina v.
Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914) (boundary established by cession act of North Carolina
Legislature and later marked out by Commissioners appointed by North and Carolina
and Tennessee); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1977)
(creation of interstate agency (Multistate Tax Commission) by seven states, laterjoined
by 14 other states, did not violate Compact Clause). See alsoJennifer Evans, Transboundary Groundwater in New Mexico, Texas and Mexico: State and Local Legal Remedies to a
Challenge Between Cities, States, and Nations, 30 WM. & MARY ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 471,

488-89, 503 (2006) ("A regional groundwater agreement can also survive an application of the foreign affairs exclusivity or dormant foreign affairs cases."). Thus, the
modern attitude about multi-state (some say "regional") government is to permit its
enhancement, not judicially preclude it. Only in those cases where states are trying to
politically aggrandize themselves, at the expense of Congress, is judicial intervention
against multi-state agreements likely to occur.
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The best approach is one which is built upon the specific situation
in which it finds itself."' The specific hydrologic characteristics of the
groundwater resource may well dictate the better form of management
structure, the relevant stakeholders, and the appropriate relationship
between the states possessing sovereign interests in the resource.
What might more limited agreements address? Two Colorado
River agreements suggest some possibilities. In 1973, the United States
and Mexico executed Minute 242184 to the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water
Treaty.'8 5 Minute 242 established a salinity standard comparing water
quality at Morelos Dam with water quality at Imperial Dam, authorized
the Wellton-Mohawk Bypass Drain, and limited groundwater pumping
within 5 miles of the international boundary.'8 The agreement's limited scope permitted its accomplishment. States might fashion a similar agreement establishing ground water chemistry characteristics at
specific monitoring wells and prescribing changed use behaviors that
might be required in the event of change of those characteristics.
The Secretary of the Interior has now adopted Interim Guidelines
for the Operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead.' 7 The guidelines are
premised on an agreement and proposal between Colorado River BaOne of the reasons
sin states that share the river's resource values.'
for success of that interstate agreement was a willingness on the part of
the participants to limit the scope, both in breadth and time, of the
matters necessary to be agreed upon. The states set aside other matters, for the time being, , including differences in interpretation of
Consistent with this limitation approach,
seminal legal questions.'
states might strike agreements regarding solution of conflict of law
problems; agreements regarding the collection of data and well monitoring; agreements limiting extraction to given volumes in respective
183. See Evans, supra note 182, at 479 ("A case-by-case approach that entails basinoriented agreements is often advocated by scholars." (citation omitted)).
184. Agreement confirming Minute no. 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.- Mex., Aug. 30, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1968 (setting forth a permanent
and definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the Colorado
River) (recognized and implemented by the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act,
June 24, 1974, 88 Stat. 266).
185. U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (respecting utilization of
waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio Grande).
186. International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 242: Permanent and
Definitive Solution to the InternationalProblem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30,
1973, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/min242.pdf.
187. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages
and Coordinated Operations for Lakes Powell and Mead, (2005), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies.html.
188. SeeJames H. Davenport, Softening the Divides: The Seven ColoradoRiver Basin States'
Recommendation to the Secretary of the InteriorRegardingLower Basin Shortage Guidelines and
the Operation of Lakes Mead and Powell in Low Reservoir Conditions, 10 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 287, 290, 292-93 (2007).
189. Id. at 293-94.
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states; agreements establishing recognized monitoring wells and management choices given preset water level elevations; agreements requiring conservation activity of existing or future water users; agreements
requiring groundwater extraction or use measurement systems; agreements establishing ground water chemistry characterization and monitoring for change; or other less encompassing details.
States may also consider shared administration of interstate
groundwater basins. 9 ° First, shared administration addresses the principal shared water problem - race to consumption. Second, shared
administration comports with developing concerns regarding sustainability, regional formats of growth management, and wet growth philosophy. 9 ' Shared management is more likely sized to the regional
scale of potential drought. It establishes a better framework upon
which to organize data from a region regarding an underground
source's geology, hydrologic characteristics, and water level. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized interstate organizations designed to
address regional problems since 1977.9
States should exercise caution to not to bite off more than they can
chew. States should limit agreements regulating resources in their duration, so that the agreements can accommodate new politics, new science, or new knowledge about the resource. It is better to tackle reasonably-sized problems, although in the context of groundwater resources this may be difficult given their size and relatively unknown
characteristics. States should fashion agreement documents so that
they are capable of alteration when consensus dictates. Agreement
regarding smaller or component differences may lead to agreement
regarding larger, overarching differences.
CONCLUSION
Interstate groundwater bodies are large and complex. They do not
respect state boundaries. The law with respect to intrastate ground
water is somewhat uniform but also somewhat in conflict, which sug190.

See MODEL

WATER SHARING AGREEMENTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

4 (Stephen E. Draper ed., 2002).
191.
CRAIG ANTHONY (TONY) ARNOLD ET AL., WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER
LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 8 (2005).
192.
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 456, 479 (1977)

(holding that an interstate tax organization does not violate Compact Clause of U.S.
constitution). State planning and management of natural resources is premised on
the state's police power and its purpose of protecting the public health and safety.
Local land use planning is premised on municipal power, arising from State constitutional or statutory origins, or the State's statutorily conferred "police power." Interjurisdictional planning organizations accomplish regional planning by borrowing these
municipal or police power authorities through inter- or multi-jurisdictional agree-

ments. Interstate compacts or lesser agreements can aid in the accomplishment of
multi-state regional planning.
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gests potential dissention among water rights owners and states when it
comes to interstate resources. Generalization regarding uniformity or
disparity of the law between the states is probably not very useful, as
one must first examine the particular case to evaluate the difficulty of
resolving potentially inconsistent state groundwater law.
The traditional view has been that there are only three ways to resolve interstate competition: equitable apportionment, congressional
intervention, or interstate compact. But a fourth alternative exists. Do
less and thus do more. Act in the present. Be mindful of the future.
Let perpetuity take care of itself. Appraise the shared resource with all
the precision currently available, but leave room for surprise. Share
management where possible, so as to contemplate a common good, if
in fact individual opportunity can also be accommodated. Eschew centralization. Let the variety and heterogeneity of groundwater resources
suggest the best course, treating them individually. Permit each set of
states, as appropriate to the specific aquifer, to ascertain the best approach for that aquifer. Accept the federal interest in both intrastate
and interstate groundwater systems and coordinate it with the states'
managerial responsibilities. Balance the economic, social, health, aesthetic, and recreational values of water, in the face of growing demand,
shortening supply, and now climate change. Such an approach sounds
challenging, but less is more.
ARTICLE UPDATE
The following is a brief update on the issues presented in James
Davenport's prior work in the University of Denver Water Law Review,
"Softening the Divides: The Seven Colorado River Basin States' Recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior Regarding Lower Basin
Shortage Guidelines and the Operate of Lakes Mead and Powell in
Law Reservoir Conditions," found at 10 University of Denver Water
Law Review 287 (2007).
- The Editors

In December 2007, the Secretary of the Interior signed the Record of Decision regarding the Final Environmental Impact Statement
for the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages
and Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead.'93 The
Guidelines, based upon the Preferred Alternative and public input, will

193. Record of Decision - Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin
Shortages and Coordinated Operation for Lake Powell and Lake Mead 1 (December
at
available
2007),
http ://www.usbr.gov/lc/region /programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf
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remain in effect through 2025.' The Secretary will use the Guidelines
to: 1) determine the circumstances under which the Secretary would
reduce the annual amount of water available for consumptive use from
Lake Mead to the Colorado River Lower Division; 2) define the coordinated operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead to improve the operation of both reservoirs, especially under low reservoir conditions; 3)
allow for storage and delivery of conserved Colorado River system and
non-system in Lake Mead particularly under drought conditions; and
4) determine those conditions under which the Secretary may declare
the availability of surplus water for use within the Lower Division
states.9

194.
195.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 7-8.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the "priority doctrine" of water law embedded in the constitutions of many western states, each water right has a priority date attached to it.' In Colorado, the rights with earlier priority dates ("senior
rights") have seniority in the allocation and usage of surface and
groundwater.! State law considers water rights property that the right
owner can lease or sell; further, the priority attaches to the right when
it is traded
In the South Platte Basin of Colorado, many surface diversions allocated for irrigation use date back to the mid-19th century.4 They are,
thus, quite senior. If low stream flows prevent senior fights from diverting the water to which they are entitled, the seniors can put a "call"

* Professor Emeritus of Economics and Senior Scholar, Environment & Society
Program, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado-Boulder. The author
wishes to thank Lawrence (Larry) J. MacDonnell for many insights into water law and
the nature of water rights.
1. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §5 (declaring all water in the streams of the
state of Colorado as property of the state).
2. Coffin, et al v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (recognizing prior
appropriation system in Colorado instead of common law riparian system); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-101, et seq. (incorporating groundwater withdrawals into prior appropriation system).
3. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 1939).
4.

NEIL S. GRIGG,

PoLITcs, 58 (2003).

COLORADO'S WATER: SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT, HIsTORY AND
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on the river, requiring all upstream rights 'Junior" to the caller to stop
diverting water until adequate streamflow is restored.'
Following World War II, well drilling exploded in the alluvial valleys of the West, based on improved pump technology, cheap energy
and the absence of regulatory frameworks over wells.6 In the South
Platte River Basin of Colorado, irrigators tapped into the huge aquifer
tributary to the South Platte River with thousands of wells that provided a reliable and handy source of water.' During the same period,
developments in hydrologic science made clear the connections between river flows and tributary aquifers.8 For example, hydrologists
demonstrated that well pumping could deplete streamflows.9
With this new knowledge of river-aquifer linkage, Colorado's 1969
General Assembly decided the priority system should incorporate wells
tapping the tributary aquifer, awarding priorities according to the date
of first use.'" This statute, the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, attached priority dates to the tributary wells, making the wells very junior in priority in their respective basins." It thus
appeared that the state would prohibit use of tributary wells during
periods of low stream flow, for example during prolonged droughts,
just when the huge store of groundwater would be most valuable.
To avoid this clearly uneconomic result, the 1969 Act allowed the
State Engineer to approve temporary "substitute water supply plans,"
or augmentation plans, that would allow junior wells to continue
pumping when there was a call on the river as long as the well owners
could augment surface flows to make up for current shortages attributable to their current and past pumping - a calculation requiring detailed models." The augmentation must make up for any potential
injury to seniors." The Act cited numerous ways to augment the injury
that would be caused by their pumping, including "pooling.. .water
resources or water exchange projects...."'

Under these arrangements,

Water Court Division One permanently approved 2,800 South Platte
wells that continued to operate; Division One also permitted several
5. See Colorado Division of Water Resources, "Water Rights Terminology" available
at http://water.state.co.us/wateradmin/terms.asp.
6. See, e.g. Colorado Division of Water Resources, Republican River Compact Administration Ground Water Model, available at
http://water.state.co.us/wateradmin/republicanriver/rrca-model.pdf (noting the
increase in groundwater pumping in the Republican River basin after World War II).
7. LawrenceJ. MacDonnell, Colorado's Law of Underground Water: A Look at the South
Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. L.REV. 579, 604 (1988).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 588; see also C.R.S. § 37-92-101 (2008).
MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 588.
Id. at 589; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2008).
MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 589.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2008).
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hundred wells to operate temporarily while applications to the Water
Court for permanent plans were pending."
During the 197 0's, 1980's and early 1990's, generous stream-flows
meant that calls on the river were generally confined to July and August, requiring only limited well augmentation.'" As the drought of the
early 2000's became increasingly severe, surface water shortages led to
increasingly frequent calls on the river, with almost continuous calls
from 2002 to 2006. 7 This meant that the wells that had been operating
under "substitute water supply plans" had to provide much larger volumes of augmentation water if they were to continue pumping and
had to scramble for increasingly costly surface rights or leases.'" Most
were unsuccessful. The State Engineer shut down more than 400 major
wells in the early summer of 2006 through 2007, drying up 30,000 acres
of cropland with immediate, severe impacts on the farms and associated rural communities. 9 A second effect of the frequent calls on the
river was that many water users in addition to the wells in question had
to stop diverting water from the South Platte system.2 ' A later section
assesses those impacts.
I. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE WELL SHUT-DOWN
The 1969 Act provided for out-of-priority well pumping because of
the value of groundwater during droughts. 2' The requirement for
substitute water supply plans protected downstream water uses. 22
Therefore, it makes sense to compare the economic losses related to
the shut-down with the consequential benefits to parties downstream of
the wells. For this assessment, one needs to ask the following questions: (a) how much of the surface shortage that led to the calls was
15. See Hal Simpson, Address at the State Engineer's Office Forum, "History of Well
Regulation, South Platte Basin" (Sept. 6, 2006), outline available at
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/presentations.asp.

16.

Id.

17. SouTH PLATTE RIVER TASK FORCE BRIEFING DOCUMENT, WELL REGULATION
SouTH PLATrE RIVER BAsIN OF COLORADO 5 (June 2007) available at
http://www.colorado.gov (search "South Platte Briefing Document").

18.

IN THE

Simpson, supranote 15.

19. Press Release,.City of Boulder, City Responds to South Platte Well Shutdowns
(May 19, 2006), availableat

http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=5179&Ite
mid=2526.
20. Id.
21. See generally Kathleen A. Miller, Lawrence J. McDonnell, Steven L. Rhodes,
GroundwaterRights in an Uncertain Environment: Theoretical Perspectives on the San Luis
Valley, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 727, 748 (1993) (explaining that valuable groundwater is
pumped after droughts and that Colorado did not regulate such pumping until the

passage of the 1969 Act).
22.

See generally COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 37-92-308 (2008) (clarifying State Engineer's

authority to approve substitute water supply plans).
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actually attributable to the wells' current and past pumping and, thus,
how much augmentation should the substitute water supply plans require?; (b) what would be the time profile of increased flows downstream resulting from the cessation of pumping?; (c) how does the
present value of future income losses incurred by well owners and linked
activities compare with the present value of future downstream benefits
that would be gradually generated by the increased stream-flows?
Regarding the 2006 surface shortages that occasioned the continuing calls, some estimated that past pumping of the 445 wells caused
out-of-priority depletions of 15,000 to 16,000 acre-feet.2 3' However, other causes of the surface shortage were also at work including the lingering effects of drought, upstream cities increasing water reuse, and water users changing irrigation practices from flooding to sprinklers.
Thus, even had the wells been able to meet their augmentation requirements on a continuing basis, calls would still have occurred, but
less frequently. In a similar situation on the East Snake Plain Aquifer
in Idaho, the Idaho State Engineer commissioned a study that found
that well pumping, drought and changes in irrigation techniques contributed equally to the surface shortages.25
When the wells were shut down, seasonal farm incomes were immediately lost because crops had been planted but had not matured. 6
Direct farm income losses were estimated to be $390 per acre, while
total direct and indirect income losses were estimated at $690 per
acre.2 ' These losses will continue into the future until the state permits
the wells to operate. In contrast, downstream benefits from the increased water supplies would occur only gradually over several years as
the water table recovered and stream-flows increased.28 In addition,
downstream gains would be only marginal additions to farm income
since downstream agriculture was not totally dependent on South

23. City of Boulder, Issue Points on South Platte Wells (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/files/Utilities/Projects/s-platte-factsheet.pdf.
24. SOUTH PLATE RIVER TASK FORCE BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supranote 17, at 11.
25. DONALD L. SNYDER AND ROGER H. COUPAL, ASSESSMENT OF RELATVE ECONONC
CONSEQUENCES OF CURTAILMENT OF EASTERN SNAKE PLAIN AQUIFER GROUND WATER

IRRIGATION RIGHTS at vii (February 2005), available at

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/Committee/ESPA%20Economic%2Study%2OFeb%2020

05.pdf.
26. Jerd Smith, 'Tough News' Dooms Crops, Rejected Proposal Would Have Let Farmers
Start Wells, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 3, 2006, at 4A.
27. JENNIFER THORVALDSON AND JAMES PRITCHETT, COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY,
COLORADO WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
REDUCED IRRIGATED ACREAGE IN FOUR RIVER BASINS IN COLORADO 34 (December 2006),

availableat http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/cr/207.pdf.
28.
See, e.g. SNYDER AND COUPAL, supra note 25, at xviii (noting gradual increase in
downstream benefits on Eastern Snake River).
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Platte flows.' The cropping patterns in the well areas and the benefiting downstream areas are roughly similar."
For these reasons, the present value of losses of income due to the
well shut-down logically must exceed the present value of direct downstream gains from eventual increases in flows. In the similar Idaho situation referenced above, the present value of losses to well owners
called out by surface users was vastly greater than the present value of
the gradual gains to the surface and spring water users, even though
the latter included the largest trout farms in the United States.'
H. THE EFFECTS OF THE RIVER CALL
The calling rights on the South Platte were very senior and located
far downstream on the Platte in the northeastern part of the State."' As
a result, the 2006 call included many upstream juniors in addition to
the wells, resulting in substantial additional losses to those water users." The call included the cities of Greeley, Boulder, Englewood,
Westminster and Highlands Ranch, along with several irrigation
ditches and water districts. 4
The City of Boulder (upstream of the wells) estimated the value of
its foregone diversions in 2006 to be at least $100,000 depending on
how Boulder would have used the water, either by leasing it to farmers
at $25 per acre-foot if the water was in surplus or by having to pay for
make-up water to be imported from the Colorado Basin at a cost of
about $100 per acre-foot.3 5 The losses of other towns involved would
have similar values per acre-foot.
Therefore, the aggregate losses
from the call were substantial. 7
29. SOUTH PLArTE RIVER TASK FORCE BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 17, at 10 (noting that only 1.4 million of the annual 4 million acre-feet surface water diversions come
from the native flow of the South Platte river).
30. At least one study is underway to determine the validity of this assumption, at
least in terms of changes in cropping patterns when irrigated land is fallowed. See
JENNY THORVALDSON AND JAMES PRITCHETT, ECONONUC IMPACTS OF REDUCED IRRIGATED

AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN COLORADO: A SUMMARY OF THREE STUDIES 2,

available at

http://water.usgs.gov/wrri/O5grants/progress.completion-reports/CO/2005CO 115B.
pdf.
31. SNYDER AND COUPAL, supra note 25, at 51-52.
32. See Dick Wolfe, Asst. State Engineer, Regulation of Well Pumping in the South
Platte River (Oct. 7, 2005) availableat
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/presentations/dwolfeOO7705-b.pdf (noting that rights
in the northeastern part of the state have priority dates in the 1880s and 1890s).
33. Colorado Supreme Court, Notice of Appeal by Harmony Ditch et al, May 3,
2006
34. Id.
35. Carol Ellinghouse, Boulder Water Utility, personal email regarding the South
Platte wells, Oct. 26, 2006.

36.
37.

Id.
Id.
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The remaining question is, "How will the well shutdown affect the
frequency and/or duration of future river calls?" Answering that question would require complicated hydrological and climatological analysis and the effects would spread over several years as the aquifer
reached a higher level. The resultant reduction in the frequency and
duration of calls would, to some degree, result in lower losses to the
other junior water users - a benefit of the shut-down. However, because factors other than the wells reduce river flows, the shutdown will
not avoid calls altogether - therefore, one must judge the net effect of
the shutdown as a substantial economic loss.
III. ARE RIVER CALLS UNECONOMIC?
Calling parties are unlikely to take into account the losses to affected juniors. Indeed, it is difficult for a calling senior to identify the
juniors the call will affect.38 The famous "Coase Theorem" suggests
that upstream losers could organize to pay the downstream calling party to "subordinate" their priority if upstream losses exceed those of the
downstream caller. 9 Such organization seems unlikely at a large basin
level."° Thus, there is a presumption that river calls will result in economic losses.
The underlying priority-efficiency conflict occurs because there is a
low correlation between water right priorities and the values (net incomes) those rights generate." Agriculture controlled most early uses
of water, and many of the senior rights remain in agriculture in spite of
a century of water market activity.4" Senior right holders are still applying water to low marginal value uses in agriculture while urban, industrial and environmental rights typically have lower priorities because of
their recent establishment." However, if there were a stronger correla38. It is the responsibility of each right holder to monitor the status of the river
with respect to river calls.
39. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-44
(1960) (describing how effective allocation of property rights can improve efficiency of
transactions). In short, if the costs of bargaining and enforcement of agreements are
low, resources will be efficiently allocated even in the absence of competitive markets
and regardless of the initial distribution of rights or bargaining power. See PAUL
MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 300-301

(1992).
40. Id. Coase's examples of his theorem depend on the effective interrelation of
the economic actors involved. It is unlikely that the economic actors in a market as
large as the South Platte River could achieve this level of organization through market
forces alone.
41. See THORVALDSON AND PRTCHETr, supra note 27, at 14 (noting agricultural production represents 0.84% of the total economic activity in the South Platte basin).
42. Kristin Choo, Litigation Won't End the Battles Over Depleted Water Resources
in Several Regions of the United States (2008), A.B.A.J.,
http://abajournal.com/magazine/gulp
43. Id.
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tion between seniority and economic value ("seniority-value correlation"), then the high-value holders would make fewer calls, perhaps
none at all.
The challenge is to find ways within existing water laws to increase
the seniority-value correlation. This should be the mission of our water
markets: to shift higher priorities towards higher value uses.
IV. IMPROVING WATER MARKETS TO MATCH PRIORITIES AND
VALUES
Making the water transfer process less costly and time-consuming
(i.e., reducing transaction costs4 ) would reduce the frequency of economically inefficient calls because there would be greater motivation to
move lower-value-producing rights to higher-value-producing uses. 45
Sellers could get higher returns and buyers would have to pay less. The
western states, especially Colorado, have had active water markets for
over a century. 6 It should be the goal to make these markets as efficient as possible.
In Colorado, transfers of water rights and plans for augmentation
go through water court review and approval in which the court certifies
various dimensions of the right (e.g. historic consumptive use, timing
of use) so that the water court can condition the transfer on no injury
to other water users." Court review frequently requires costly legal and
engineering studies by buyer and seller.4 In Idaho, Wyoming, and New
Mexico, the Director of Water Resources, the Water Board, or the State
Engineer carries out this review. 9 These agencies have the needed
expertise in-house, thereby reducing the costs of legal representation
and expert witnesses.5' The Supreme Court of Idaho recently ruled
that the Idaho State Engineer has broad authority to approve plans for
well augmentation and can exercise flexibility in designing those arrangements in keeping with consideration of the general public welfare: "Somewhere between the absolute right to use a decreed water
right and an obligation not to waste it and to protect the public's inter-

44. Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs and Peter Butler, Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 393 (1990).
45.
Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 71 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1661, 1664 (2004).
46. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Changing Uses of Water in Colorado: Law and Policy, 31
Ariz. L. Rev. 783 (1989)
47. COLO. REV.STAT. § 37-92-302 (2008).
48. LAWRENCE J. MAcDONNELL, ET AL., WATER BANKS IN THE WEST, 4-2 (Natural Resources Law Center 1994).
49.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1411 (2008); Peggy Sue Kirk, Cowboys, Indians and Reserved Water Rights: May a State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use Their Water?, 28 Land &
Water L. Rev. 467, 488 (1993); Howe, supra note 44, at 400.
50.
Id.
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est in this valuable commodity, lies an area for the exercise of discretion by the Director."5'
In Idaho, a factor facilitating water transfers and augmentation
plans is that the Department of Water Resources, in cooperation with
the University of Idaho, has created a surface water-groundwater computer model that all stakeholders have broadly accepted for use in analyzing alternative plans and policies." Broad authority for the State
Engineer Office and broad acceptance of the standard model combine
to reduce transaction costs and facilitate trades.
"Water banks" are arrangements through which buyers, sellers, and
leasers can quickly execute short-term leases and permanent transfers. 3
Water banks have a long history in Idaho, California, Arizona and Colorado. 4 In Colorado, the General Assembly has authorized water
banks for all major basins. 5 A pilot water bank Colorado authorized in
2002 for the Arkansas River failed to generate transactions partly because of long delays in the review process that ruled out useful shortterm reallocations. Quick agriculture-to-agriculture, agriculture-tourban, and urban-to-agriculture leases can be highly beneficial. Again,
Idaho utilizes a variety of types of water banks and rental pools that
facilitate quick water transfers. 57
There are other steps that would reduce transactions costs of transfers. More complete public records of ownership of rights and the
prices at which transfers occur would help in increasing the efficiency
of water markets. 8 Potential market participants have difficulty in
identifying each other and in knowing what "the going price" should

51.

American Falls Reservoir District v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 154 P.3d 433, 451

(Idaho 2007).

52.

Donna M. Cosgrove, & Gary S. Johnson, Aquifer Management Zones Based on Simu-

lated Surface Water Response Functions, 131J. of Water Resources Planning and Mgmt. 89,

99 (2005).
53. Kathleen A. Miller, Managing Supply Variability: The Use of Water Banks in the
Western United States, in DROUGHT: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT VOLUME III 70-86 (D.A. Wilhite
ed., 2000), availableat http://www.isse.ucar.edu/water-climate/banking.html.
54. Charles W. Howe, Water Markets in Colorado:Past Performanceand Needed Changes,
in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANcE 65, 66 (K. William Easter, Mark
W. Rosegrant and Ariel Dinar ed., 1998).
55.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5 (2008).
56. JOHN D. WIENER, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY PROGRAM, INSTITUTE OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE, UNrERSITY OF COLORADO-BOULDER, PROBLEMS WITH THE ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN
WATER BANK PILOT PROGRAM, 1 (2008),

http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/eb/wiener/papers/One-pagersJulyO8_5.pdf
57. Idaho Water Supply Bank,
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/waterboard/water%20bank?waterbank.htm (last visited

Oct. 10, 2008).
58.

Hennessy, supra note 45, at 1664.
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be in a particular area ("price discovery") .5 The Arkansas River water
bank experience indicated that market participants had little idea of a
reasonable price. ' Various market forms are available to establish
market-clearing prices, e.g. the sealed bid-double auction procedure
that maximizes benefits from transfers, but even simple "bulletin
board" markets have also proved effective.'
These ideas received recognition in the report of the South Platte
Task Force ("SPTF"). The Colorado Governor appointed the SPTF in
2007 and charged them with finding efficient and equitable ways of
resolving the South Platte conflicts.' Their recommendations recognized that streamlining water court procedures would facilitate transfers and plans of augmentation." They further emphasized the potential for water banks, along with other transfer mechanisms that could
substitute for traditional "buy and dry" permanent transfers.
Eventually, the correlation between water right priorities and values generated will continue to increase through the functioning of our
water markets, but the South Platte basin is losing large possible benefits-especially in drought years-by failing to facilitate both temporary
and permanent transfers. Water transfer reform remains a priority issue.

59. Charles W. Howe, Innovations in Water Management: lessonsfrom the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, in ScARCE WATER AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 171, 191 (Kenneth D. Frederick ed., 1987).
60. Wiener, supra note 56.
61. MacDonnell, supra note 48, at 4-16; Howe, supranote 59, at 187, 191.
62. Letter from the Colorado Department of Natural Resources to Gov. Bill Ritter
4 56 7
.
(Sept. 30, 2007). http://www.dnr.state.co.us/newsapp/press.asp?PressId=
63. Id.
64. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1944, Mexico and the United States of America ("United
States") entered into a treaty ("1944 Waters Treaty") to resolve competing claims to the surface waters of the Colorado River.' At the time the
parties signed the 1944 Waters Treaty, the unpaved All-American Canal
in the United States (located just north of and paralleling the MexicoUnited States border) already transported Colorado River water to
farms and cities in Southern California. Although seepage from the
earthen All-American Canal percolated down to replenish the Mexicali
Valley-Imperial Valley Aquifer ("Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer") that
straddles the Mexico-United States border near the cities of Mexicali
(in Northern Baja Mexico) and Calexico (in California), 3 the 1944 Waters Treaty did not directly address the allocation or management of
cross-border groundwater resources.
In 2005, the United States Bureau of Reclamation obtained the final approvals for a project to line the All-American Canal ("AAC") to
prevent seepage and thereby increase the amount of Colorado River
water the canal diverts and delivers to the City of San Diego, farmers in
Imperial Valley, and other Southern California water users.' Some predict, however, that the prevention of this seepage will reduce the water
table in the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer with adverse impacts on farmers,
cities and hydrologically-connected wetlands in Northern Mexico that
rely on the groundwater.3
Mexican and American non-profit organizations challenged the
United States' approval of the lining project in United States federal
district court. This litigation in turn prompted the United States Con1. Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter 1944 Waters
Treaty].
2.

See Maria Rosa Garcia Acevedo, Looking Across the Canal:Reflections on Visions and

Policies on Water Issues in the United States, in

LINING THE

ALL-AMERICAN

CANAL:

129, 133-134
(Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., Sw. Consortium for Envtl. Research and Policy
(SCERP), The U.S.-Mexican Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006).
3. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.
3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Consejo I1]; see also Introduction to LINING THE
COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MExicAN BORDER?

ALL-AMERIcAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MEXICAN
BORDER? xix, xxi (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican Border

Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Introduction].

4.

See U.S.

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,

ALL-AMERIcAN

CANAL

LINING PROJECT

1-2 to -3 (2006); see generally Consejo II, 482 F.3d at
1162-1166 (discussing the history of the All-American Canal).
5. Garcia Acevedo, supra note 2, at 130.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REPORT
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gress to adopt a legislative rider in December 2006 to exempt the project from compliance with United States environmental laws. '
This article examines the conservation of the bi-national MexicaliImperial Aquifer and the litigation and Congressional response to the
proposed lining of the All-American Canal from cross-border natural
resource and international law vantage points.
I. MEXICALI-IMPERIAL AQUIFER AND ALL-AMERICAN CANAL
A. MEXICALI-IMPERLAL AQUIFER
The Southwest Consortium for Environmental Research and Policy
("SCERP") is composed of five universities in Mexico and five universities in the United States, and focuses on cross-border environmental
issues.! In 2006, SCERP published a monograph entitled LINING THE
ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN

THE U.S.-MEXIcAN BORDER?' This 2006 SCERP monograph noted the

following regarding the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer.
First, the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer is a significant source of drinking water for the city of Mexicali in Mexico. Jose Luis Castro Ruiz of El
Colegio de la Frontera Norte reported:
Official estimates for Mexicali foresee a population of 1.1 million inhabitants by 2020, an increase of approximately 100% of the population reported in the 2000 census. With a conservative assumption
that the current allocation of 117 gallons of water per day per inhabitant reported by the city is maintained, the population growth will
generate an approximate annual demand of 143,500 AF [acre feet].
This requires, independent of the needs of other cities in the state, an
annual increase in the urban water supply of 77,000 AF....

[A] reduction in the recharge volumes as a result of lining the
AAC in the area immediately north of the Mesa Arenosa (Sandy

6. Consijo II, 482 F.3d at 1167 (citingTax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub.
Law No 109-432, 120 Stat. 3046-47).
7. The ten participating SCERP universities are Arizona State University, El Colegio del Frontera Norte, Instituto Tecnologico de CiudadJuarez, Instituto Tecnologico
y de Estudious Superiores de Monterrey, New Mexico State University, San Diego State
University, Universidad Automoma de Baja California, Universidad Autonoma de CiudadJuarez, University of Texas at El Paso, and University of Utah. SCERP Homepage,
http://www.scerp.org/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
8. LINING THE A1L-AMERIcAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WA'ATER IN
THE U.S.-MExIcAN BORDER? (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican

Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006).
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Mesa) could accelerate conflict between urban and agricultural uses
in the valley.9
Second, the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer is a significant source of irrigation water for farms and farmers in Northern Baja Mexico. The
SCERP monograph, in its chapter titled Lining the All-American Canal:
Its Impact on Aquifer Water Quality and Crop Yield in Mexicali Valley, anticipates that the proposed canal lining will result in "[a] 14% reduction of the total available water in the Mexicali Valley.""0 It further
notes that "98% of the water used in crop irrigation in the area comes
from the aquifer[, a]nd in this area, seepage from the AAC is the most
important contribution to the recharge of the aquifer."'"
Third, the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer is hydrologically connected to
the Andrade Mesa Wetlands in Northern Mexico.'2 "The Andrade
Mesa wetland area consists of approximately 1,921 hectares of wetland
habitat and 1,453.2 hectares of terrestrial habitat[.]"''
According to
recent surveys, these wetlands serve as migratory habitat for about
10,000 birds annually, comprising more than 100 different species.'4
The 2006 SCERP monograph explains that "the physical proximity of
the wetlands to the AAC, the relative elevation of the AAC in relation
to the wetlands, [and] anecdotal evidence derived from the construction of the Mesa Drain in the 1960s strongly suggests [sic] that the AAC
[seepage] is a major source of water for these wetlands[,]"'" and finds
"if the AAC lining is implemented, these wetlands will likely disappear
absent a significant engineering project to artificially recreate the
seepage flow into the area.,16

9.

Jose Louis Castro Ruiz, Beyond the All-American Canal: Future Scenarios of Water

Availability in the Mexicali Valley, in LINING THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR
COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MExicAN BORDER? 155, 165-67 (Vicente Sanchez

Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13,
2006).
10. Gerardo Garcia Saille, Angel Lopez Lopez &J.A. Navarro Urbina, Lining the All
American Canal: Its Impact on Aquifer Water Quality and Crop Yield in Mexicali Valley, in
LINING THE ALL-AMERIcAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-

MEXIcAN BORDER? 77, 78 (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican

Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006).

11.

Garcia Saille et al., supra note 10, at 82.

12. See Francisco Zamora Arroyo, Peter Culp & Osvel Hinojosa Huerta, Looking
Beyond the Border: Environmental Consequences of the All-American Canal Project in Mexico

and PotentialBinational Solutions, in LINING THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR
21, 28 (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006).
13. Id.at 29.
14. Id. at 32, 35.
COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MEXIcAN BORDER?

15.
16.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 35.
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B. ALL-AMERICAN CANAL

The All-American Canal is located entirely in the United States,
and delivers water from the Colorado River to Imperial Valley and
Coachella Valleys, where its primary use is for agriculture. 7 The
United States Congress approved the Canal in 1928 as part of the legislation authorizing construction of Hoover Dam.'8 Construction of the
All-American Canal took place in the 1930s and early 1940s, and the
Canal became operational in 1940.'"
Most of the All-American Canal is now earthen, and water moving
through the canal percolates through its bed to recharge and replenish
the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer."0 The 2006 SCERP estimates that recharge along the All-American Canal presently accounts for approximately 12% of the aquifer's total recharge.'
In 1988, the United States Congress authorized the United States
Bureau of Reclamation (a sub-agency of the United States Department
of the Interior) to line a significant portion of the All-American Canal
with concrete." The purpose of this lining project was presented as a
water conservation effort: that is, to prevent water traveling through
the Canal from seeping down into the ground and thus being lost.
Although the United States Congress approved the project in
1988,4 the agency did not issue its formal "Record of Decision," setting
forth the details of the canal-lining project, until 1994. Funding for
the project took several years to pull together and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service did not issue final regulatory approval until
late 2004.6 One of the reasons the agency finally secured project funding was to help facilitate a water transfer deal between the Imperial
Irrigation District ("liD") and the San Diego County Water Authority. 7

17. Introduction, supranote 3, at xxi; Zamora Arroyo et al., supra note 12, at 23.
18. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 617 (2000)); see also Fernando A. Medina Robles, The Colorado River and the
All-American Canal: The Historicaland CulturalPerspective of Water in the U.S. Southwest, in
LINING THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETrION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-

MExIcAN BORDER? 101, 121 (Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican
Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006).
19. See Eric A. Stene, Boulder Canyon Project - All-American Canal System (Second Draft),
http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/allamerl.d2.html#Construction (last visited Oct.
18, 2008).
20. Introduction, supra note 3, at xxi.
21. Zamora Arroyo et al., supranote 12, at 28.
22. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 1207, 1217 (D. Nev. 2006) [hereinafter Consejo ].
23. Garcia Acevedo, supra note 2, at 137.
24. Consejo II, supra note 3, 482 F.3d at 1164.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1165.
27. See Garcia Acevedo, supra note 2, at 139-40.
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Under this deal, IID was to convey water it previously used for agriculture to the San Diego area for urban use. 8
As noted above, because the United States' lining of the AllAmerican Canal would reduce recharge of the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer,' it is anticipated that this lining would have adverse impacts on
urban drinking supplies in the City of Mexicali,"0 irrigation supply in
Northern Baja Mexico,' and the Andrade Mesa Wetlands."
H.

LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUTING AQUIFER
RECHARGE AND CANAL LINING

In considering the legal framework for the dispute over the lining
of the All-American Canal and its impact on cross-border groundwater
resources, there are in fact at least three different potential frameworks
at play: (1) United States environmental impact assessment law; (2) the
1944 Waters Treaty and International Boundary Waters Commission
regime; and (3) international law on transboundary watercourses.
A. AQU1FER RECHARGE AND CANAL LINING UNDER UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT LAW
When the United States made the final decision to proceed with

the lining project, plaintiff Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali ("Consejo"), representing the business and farming interests in
Northern Mexico, sued the United States Bureau of Reclamation in
federal district court in July, 2005." The City of Calexico (in California) and two United States-based environmental groups, Citizens
United for Resources and the Environment ("CURE") and Desert Citizens Against Pollution ("DCAP") were also plaintiffs in that action."
Among other things, the plaintiffs in the lawsuit alleged that the
Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") that the United States Department of Reclamation prepared for the project did not comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") because it did not assess
the adverse cross-border environmental impacts of the project.'5 As the
plaintiffs stated in their briefing:
This is a "transborder" case as every significant impact is felt simultaneously on both sides of the border. The impacts from the project on

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 136, 142.
See Garcia Saille, et al. supra note 10, at 79.
See generally Garcia Acevedo, supra note 2, at 130.
See Garcia Saille et al., supra note 10, at 79, 82.
See Consejo I, supra note 22, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1235-36.
See Consejo II, supra note 3, 482 F.3d at 1165-66.
Id. at 1165..
See Consejo I, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
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U.S. soil literally cross the border and revert back given the interrelated watershed, ecosystem and air-basin.
All the so-called Mexican impacts have a U.S. analog with respect to
this project. Drying up the wetlands deprives American Yuma clapper
rails of a winter habitat and breeding ground; allowing selenium deposits to accumulate threatens birds on both sides of the border. Less
water for irrigation in Mexico means fewer vegetables for U.S. consumers, less profits for U.S. farmers in Mexico, fewer Mexican shoppers at the "Big Box" stores in Calexico, more illegal immigration
from displaced farm workers, and less run-off to the New River and
thence to the Salton Sea.
Every Mexico impact has a reciprocal and related impact because the
air, water and ecological setting does not respect the artificial border.
Appellants are not asking for "extra-territorial" application of NEPA
to a foreign project, and BOR [Bureau of Reclamation] has not and
cannot cite to a single case excusing NEPA compliance
6 in circumstances where the project is taking place in this country.1
For purposes of the NEPA EIR, the United States Bureau of Reclamation took the position that NEPA only required assessment of "domestic" environmental impacts and not cross-border or transnational
impacts. 7 The United States District Court rejected the plaintiffs'
NEPA argument in aJuly 2006 decision that held:
Based on the facts here and absent a clear statutory intent to the contrary, NEPA does not apply to the All-American Canal lining project's
environmental impacts in Mexico. Although the agency action of
constructing and lining a new section of the All-American Canal will
occur within the United States, the projects' effects on the Andrade
Mesa Wetlands, the Mexican Yuma Clapper Rail population, the
socio-economic situation in Mexico, groundwater in the Mexicali Valley, seepage flow to the New River in Mexico, and air quality in Mexico will occur outside United States territory ....

Accordingly, NEPA

does not require [the Bureau of] Reclamation to issue a SEIS [Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement] examining the AllAmerican Canal project's impacts in Mexico.38
The plaintiffs then appealed the District Court's decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; 9 the Ninth Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction to halt work on the project while the appeal was

36.

Consolidated Reply Brief of All Appellants at 18-19, Consejo de Desarrollo

Economico de Mexicali v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007).
37.
38.
39.

Consejo I, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
Id. at 1235-36.
Consejo II, 482 F.3d at 1162.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 12

pending." By issuing this preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit
Court suggested that it might be prepared to reverse the District
Court's ruling and require cross-border environmental impact assessment.
While the appeal before the Ninth Circuit was pending, however,
in December 2006, the United States Congress enacted a section to an
omnibus appropriations bill that provided in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall, without delay, carry out the AllAmerican Canal Lining Project identified.., as the preferred alternative in the record of decision for that project, dated July 29, 1994 ....
The 2006 legislation also provided:
The Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating
to the utilization of the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, and supplementary protocol signed November 14,
1944. . . is the exclusive authority for identifying, considering, analyzing, or addressing impacts occurring outside the boundary of the
United States of works constructed, acquired, or used within the territorial limits of the United States.42
Following the enactment of this December 2006 legislative rider,
the Ninth Circuit requested additional briefing and oral argument on
the question of the extent to which the rider affected the viability of
the appeal."
After the briefing and oral argument, in April 2007, the Ninth Circuit lifted its injunction and ruled that the plaintiffs' appeal could not
proceed.44 In its decision doing so, the Ninth Circuit held: "[W]e conclude that, in light of the 2006 Act, we cannot fashion effective relief
and the challenges... based on alleged past violations of NEPA... are
45
moot.'
The end result of this litigation, in which the court exempted the
federal government from the obligation to consider the impacts of the
AAC lining project on the Andrada Mesa wetlands in Northern Mexico, was particularly striking in light of the outcome in another somewhat similar domestic environmental case. In Sierra Club v. Glickman,
environmental groups sued the United States Department of Agriculture in connection with agency programs that increased pumping from

40.
41.
2922,
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, §395, 120 Stat.
3046 (2006).
Id. § 397.
See Consejo II, 482 F.3d at 1162.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1172.
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the Edwards Aquifer in the State of Texas. 6 Unless pumping impact
the Aquifer, water in the Edwards Aquifer flows to the Northeast where
it eventually discharges into San Marcos Springs and Comal Springs.47
The court noted that the San Marcos Springs and Comal Springs are
the only remaining habitat for four species of fish protected under the
federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 48
In Sierra Club v. Glickman, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that pumping from the Edward Aquifer can "have significant
ecological consequences to the Edwards-dependent species. In times
of even mild drought, the springflow at both the San Marcos and Comal Springs can decrease enough to threaten the survival of the Edwards-dependent species."" The court's determination led the Fifth
Circuit to conclude that the United States Department of Agriculture
had violated section seven of the ESA in failing to consult with the
United States Fish & Wildlife service concerning the impacts of the
anticipated aquifer depletion on listed species. 5°
As in the AAC lining litigation, Sierra Club v. Glickman addressed the
specific question of the legal obligation of federal agencies to evaluate
their actions that impact wildlife-dependent surface waters when the
actions reduce the amount of water in a hydrologically-connected aquifer. The answer therefore appears to be "yes" if federal agency actions
deplete groundwater hydrologically connected to wildlife-dependent
surface waters in the United States but "no" if federal agency actions
deplete groundwater hydrologically connected to wildlife-dependent
surface waters across the border in Mexico.
B.

AQUIFER RECHARGE AND CANAL LINING UNDER

WATERS TREATY AND

1944

IBWC MINUTE No. 242

The second legal framework for considering how the project raises
issues of aquifer recharge and canal lining is the 1944 Waters Treaty
between Mexico and the United States, which the Congress referenced
in the December 2006 legislation concerning the All-American Canal
lining project.5 '
Among other things, the 1944 Waters Treaty allocated the surface
waters of the Colorado River between the United States and Mexico.2
The Treaty allocated the United States 14 million annual acre feet of
Colorado River water and allocated Mexico 1.5 million annual acre
46.
47.
48.

Sierra Club v. Glickman, 153 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. (referring to the species as the "Edwards-dependant" species).

49.

Id.

50. Id. at 621.
51. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 397, 120 Stat.
2922, 3047 (2006).
52. 1944 Waters Treaty, supra note 1.
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feet of Colorado River water." On the subject of allocation of crossborder groundwater resources, however, the 1944 Waters Treaty is silent.
The 1944 Waters Treaty designated the International Boundary
and Water Commission ("IBWC") as the binational forum for Mexico
and the United States to resolve disputes over shared water resources.5'
In 1973, the IBWC adopted Minute No. 242, which provided in pertinent part:
With the objective of avoiding future problems, the United States and
Mexico shall consult with each other prior to undertaking any new
development of either the surface or the groundwater resources, or
undertaking substantial modifications of present developments, in its
own territory in the border area that might adversely affect the other
country."

Although Mexico has lodged protests with the IBWC over the proposed lining," the United States' position is that, under the 1944 Waters Treaty, any waters it diverts from the Colorado River into the AllAmerican Canal are part of the 14 million annual acre feet the treaty
allocates to the United States; therefore, Mexico has no claim to any of
the Canal's groundwater seepage and no basis to object to the Canal's
paving. 7 The United States reasserted this position in its September
53. Id. at art. 10. The 1922 Colorado River Compact equally divided the 15 million
acre feet of water in the Colorado River between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin
of the river. The 1944 Waters Treaty allocated 1.5 million acre feet of the Colorado
River to Mexico. Thus, the 1944 Waters Treaty allocated approximately 14 million acre
feet to the United States. See 1922 Colorado River Compact, art. III, a, available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/gl000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf.
54. 1944 Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2.
55. International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mex., Minute 242, Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the
Colorado River, August 30, 1973, available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
56. Stephen P. Mumme & Donna Lybecker, The All-American Canal: Perspectives on
the Possibility of Reaching a Bilateral Agreement, in LINING THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL:
COMPETITION OR COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MEXIcAN BORDER? 175, 177
(Vicente Sanchez Munguia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican Border Env't Monograph
Series No. 13, 2006).
57. Id. (stating "[s]hortly after the initial 1988 decision to line the AAC, Mexico
informally lodged a protest with the United States through the Comision Internacional
de Limities y Aguas (CILA), its section of the IBWC, alleging potential injury due to
existing uses in the Mexicali-Valley and pointing to the U.S. obligation arising from
Minute 242 to consult with Mexico on any changes affecting groundwater use along
the international boundary. Mexico's case centers on the issue of so-called acquired
rights. The United States, in turn, denied any intent to alter the groundwater regime,

claiming AAC seepage water was, in fact, previously allocated to the United States and
its status remained unaffected by any conservation measures the United States should
take.") (citation omitted). See also Larry Rohter, Canal Project Sets Off U.S.-Mexico Clash
Over Waterfor Border Regions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, at Al.
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2005 briefing to the United States District Court in the NEPA litigation
over the All-American Canal lining project, arguing:
The Complaint's central claim[,] that Mexican users of the Mexicali
aquifer have established a water right to seepage from the AllAmerican Canal[,] is entirely inconsistent with the position taken by
the United States government on the application of the 1944 Treaty
to conveyance of the Colorado River waters that seep from the AllAmerican Canal. The United States maintains that the Colorado
River waters that seep from the All-American Canal are waters reserved to the United States under the 1944 Treaty, and on this basis
the United States asserts the sovereign right to recover or conserve
Colorado River water flowing through the All-American Canal.

The plaintiffs called this reasoning into question in their briefing
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
The drafters of the 1944 Treaty could have addressed groundwater,
and in particular the seepage from the AAC (which had then already
in operation), but they chose not to do so. This Court should hesitate
to impose a gloss on this Treaty that neither side intended, and that
no responsible legal scholar has ever accepted.5 9

Similarly, the 2006 SCERP monograph observed:
[T] he fact that the treaty negotiators were cognizant that groundwater in Baja California was hydrologically connected to the Colorado
River but silent as to the potential effects of Mexican use of those
groundwaters on the hydrological system constitutes a major ambiguity that the treaty does not resolve in a mutually satisfactory manner.60

In terms of IBWC Minute No. 242, the United States' position is
that the duty to "consult" with Mexico about the proposed lining of the
All-American Canal is simply the duty to provide notice to Mexico of
the project.6' The United States has not interpreted the consultation
requirement in IBWC Minute No. 242 to mean that the consultation
must result in any type of consensus between the United States and
Mexico, or to mean that the United States must obtain Mexico's consent before proceeding."

58. Memorandum in Support of United States' Motion to Dismiss Counts 1-4 and 78 at 15, Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. et al. v. United States, 438
F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Nev. 2006) (No. CV-S-05-0870-KJD-GWF).
59. Consolidated Reply Brief, supra note 36, at 7.
60. Mumme & Lybecker, supranote 56, at 181 (citation omitted).
61. Id; Garcia Acevedo, supra note 2, at 143.
62. Mumme & Lybecker, supranote 56, at 181; Garcia Acevedo, supranote 2, at 143.
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As Professor Albert Utton (for whom the Utton Transboundary Resources Center at the University of New Mexico School of Law is
named) noted back in 1991:
The groundwaters in the Mexicali Valley are return flows or seepage
water from the Colorado River. Accordingly, the United States is correct in its assertion that the Colorado River waters have already been
allocated by mutual agreement under the 1944 Treaty. Nevertheless,
one question remains: even if the source of the groundwater is the
surface flow from the Colorado River, and even if this surface flow has
been allocated, does the United States have the right to interrupt return flows by lining the canal, thus enabling it to recapture seepage
waters upon which Mexican farmers have developed a dependency
and corresponding expectancy over the course of several decades?"'
To answer the question posed by Professor Utton, we must consider sources of international water law outside the 1944 Waters Treaty.
C. AQUIFER RECHARGE AND CANAL LINING UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW ON TRANSNATIONAL WATERCOURSES

This leads to the third legal framework for considering the United
States' proposed All-American Canal lining project: the international

law on transnational watercourses. Within this international law
framework, there are in fact three sub-frameworks: the equitable apportionment doctrine; transboundary environmental impact assessment; and recharge zone protection.
1. Equitable Apportionment/Prescription
A fundamental concept in international law on the topic of shared
watercourses, whether they be surface-waters or groundwaters, is that
of "equitable apportionment." Many treaties and international documents set forth and recognize this concept, including the 1997 United
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourse 4 and the 2004 InternationalLaw Association Berlin Rules on
Water Resources Law.65
Article 6 of the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses articulates that equitable
apportionment of shared water resource should take account of "[t] he

63. Albert Utton, The Transfer of Water From an InternationalBorder Region: A Tale of
Six Cities and the All-American Canal, 16 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 477, 483 (1991).
64. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, art. 5, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter United Nations
Convention].
65. Fourth Report of the Water Resources Law Committee, International Law Association, Berlin Conference, art. 12, 2004 [hereinafter Berlin Conference].
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population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State,"
and "[t]he effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other watercourse States."
Article 12 of the 2004 InternationalLaw Association Berlin Rules on
Water Resources Law includes an articulation of the equitable utilization
principles that provides: "Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due regard
67 for the obligation not to
cause significant harm to other basin States.
The international law doctrine of "prescription" is relevant in the
application of the concept of "equitable utilization" to the All American Canal situation. As Professor Utton observed back in 1991: "Prescription under international law has strong echos [sic] of abandonment. Perhaps the long usage by Mexico of the seepage waters of the
All-American Canal might arguably create a prescriptive right to the
continued flow of these groundwaters."68 Professor Utton added:
The U.S. would surely counter that it had not intentionally aban-

doned the water, but at all times had intended to recapture the water
when it was needed ....
But the fact that the United States has not
put the water to beneficial use for forty eight years would cast doubt
on the robustness of U.S. intent.0
The forty-eight year delay Utton mentioned back in 1991 is now a sixtyfive year delay, which only lends additional weight to Mexico's potential prescription-based claim.'
2. Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment
As explained above, in preparing its environmental impact assessment for the lining of the All-American Canal, the United States Bureau of Reclamation took the position that, under the National Environmental Policy Act, it had no obligation to assess the cross-border
environmental effects of the project. 7' That is to say, for environmental
impact assessment purposes, the United States took the position that it
could draw a line in the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer at the border.
Many international water law experts, such as Professor Owen

McIntyre in his 2007 book, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under InternationalLaw, suggest that the Bureau of Reclama-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

United Nations Convention, supra note 64, at art. 6, 1, §§ c-d.
Berlin Conference, supranote 65, at art. 12, 1.
Utton, supra note 63, at 490.
Id. at 488.
Id. (citing a 48-year delay in an article 17 years ago).
Consejo I, supra note 22, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
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tion's position does not square with current international law principles." Professor McIntyre states:
The requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment of
any development or activity likely to cause harm to the environment

of an international watercourse or of another watercourse State plays
a very important role in ensuring that environmental concerns are
likely to figure prominently in determining an equitable regime for
the utilization of an international watercourse. 7
For instance, Article 29(1) of the 2004 InternationalLaw Association
Berlin Rules on Water Resources Law provides: "[s] tates shall undertake
prior and continuing assessment of the impact of programs, projects,
or activities that may have a significant effect on the aquatic environment or the sustainable development of waters."75 As Professor McIntrye explains in his 2007 book:
[I]n 2004 the members of the Water Resource Committee of the [International Law Association] clearly regarded the requirement to
conduct transboundary [Environmental Impact Assessment] as a rule
of customary international law and, as if to dispel any lingering
doubts, the commentary to Article 29 of the Berlin Rules expressly
notes that "[T]he International Law Association recognized that the
practice has crystallized into a rule of customary international
law, at
76
least insofar as transboundary effects are concerned.
This was also the conclusion of a September 2007 article in the
journal Water Resources Development, titled Assessing the Assessments: Improving Methodologies for Impact Assessment in Transboundary Watercourses. The article's authors stated: "[o]ver the past
decade and more, a variety of international, bilateral and national laws,
guidelines and institutions have adopted requirements that a TIA
[transboundary impact assessment] be conducted prior to making
de77
cisions on projects or activities with transboundary implications.

73. See OWEN McINTYRE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 367 (2007); Carl Bruch et al., Assessing the

Assessments: Improving Methodologies for Impact Assessment in Transboundary Watercourses,
WATER RESOURCES DEvELOPMENT, Sept. 2007, at 391.
74. MCINTYRE, supra note 73, at 367.
75. Berlin Conference, supra note 65, at art. 29, 1.
76.
77.

MCINTYRE, supra note 73, at 235.

Bruch, supra note 73, at 391.
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3. Recharge Zone Protection
a. 2006 Draft Articles on Law of TransboundaryAquifers
Although there is not currently a comprehensive international
convention or treaty dealing exclusively with the issue of transnational
groundwater resources, in 2006 the Drafting Committee of the United
Nations International Law Commission finalized its Draft Articles on
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers.'
Articles 2(f) and 10(1) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers focus on the All-American Canal controversy.' Article 2(f)
provides that the term "recharge zone" means "the zone which contributes water to an aquifer, consisting of the catchment area of rainfall
water and the area where such water flows to an aquifer by runoff on
the ground and infiltration through soil."8
Article 10, "Recharge and Discharge Zones," provides: "Aquifer
States shall identify recharge and discharge zones of their transboundary aquifer or aquifer system and, within these zones, shall take special
measures to minimize detrimental impacts on the recharge and discharge processes.""

In his 2007 article on the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundaly
Aquifers, Professor Gabriel Eckstein offered the following commentary
on Article 10:
In order to ensure the viability and normal functioning of an aquifer,
the integrity of related recharge and discharge zones must be maintained and protected. In the case of recharge zones, this consists of
ensuring both the quantity and quality of water flowing through the
recharge zone and entering the aquifer. Thus, protection of the recharge zone might include limitations on industrial and municipal
development projects in the recharge area that potentially could diminish the amount of water percolating through the zone into the
aquifer.... Draft Article 10(1) obligates aquifer States to identify the
recharge and discharge zones of transboundary aquifers. Once identified, they are then bound "to take special measures to minimize" any

78. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1 15, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10 (May 1-June 9 andJuly 3-August 11, 2006), availableat
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2006/2006report.htm (adopting draft articles); see
also Gabriel E. Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. InternationalLaw Commission'sDraft
Articles on the Law of Transbounday Aquifers, 18 COLO.J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 537, 538
(2007).
79. Eckstein, supra note 78, at 547, 584.
80. Id. at 547.
81. Id. at 584.
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negative consequences to the processes of recharge and discharge in
82
these zones.
The bed of the canal would likely qualify as a recharge zone given
the significant contribution to the cross-border Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer resulting from seepage from the presently earthen All-American
Canal." It seems highly questionable whether the United States' current unilateral paving plans for the canal would comply with Article 10
of the Draft Articles on the Law of TransboundaryAquifers.
b. 1988 BellagioDraft Treaty on TransboundaryGroundwaters
A precursor to the 2007 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundaly
Aquifers was the 1988 Bellagio Draft Treaty on Transbounday Groundwaters
("Bellagio Draft').8 The origins of this effort go back to 1977 when Professor Albert Utton and Ambassador Cesar Sepulveda helped form the
United States-Mexico Transboundary Resources Study Group."
A
working group under this broader study group undertook the task of
examining binational aquifers and this resulted in the 1985 "Ixtapa
Draft" of a Mexico-United States agreement on the subject.
In 1987, following up on the release of the 1985 Ixtapa Draft focusing on Mexico-United States binational groundwaters, 7 a global conference on transboundary aquifers convened at the Rockefeller Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy. The proceedings of the 1987 conference resulted in the Bellagio Draft, which the group presented in
1988 at a Panel Session of the Sixth Congress of the International Water Resources Association.
Article 1(19) of the Bellagio Draft defines "recharge" as "the addition
of water to an aquifer by infiltration of precipitation through the soil
or of water from surface streams, lakes, or reservoirs, by discharges of
water to the land surface, or by injection of water into the aquifer
through wells.""
Article VII of the Bellagio Draft calls for appropriate binational
commissions (such as perhaps the IBWC in the case of Mexico and the
United States) to identify and delineate "Transboundary Groundwater

82.
83.

Id. at 585.
See id.

84. See, e.g., Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The
Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 663, 666, 676 (1989) [hereinafter Bellagio Draft
Treaty].

85.
86.

Id.at 665.
Id.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 666.
BellagioDraft Treaty, art. I, 1 19, supra note 84, at 679.
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Conservation Areas."9' One of the considerations in identifying and
delineating a "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Area" is
whether "recharge has been or may become impaired."92
Article VIII of the Bellagio Draft provides that appropriate binational commissions shall develop "Comprehensive Management Plans"
for each designated "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation
Area."
These "Comprehensive Management Plans" may "provide for
the establishment where required of protective zones in which land use
must be regulated" and "arrange, where conditions are favorable, programs for transboundary aquifer recharge. 94
The primary objective of the Bellagio Draft was institutional in nature: to create a workable binational structure allowing for improved
management of crossborder aquifers. 5 The elements of this proposed
institutional arrangement include the binational designation of areas
where groundwater recharge may become impaired, and the binational development of management plans concerning land use regulation to help ensure adequate aquifer recharge. 6 As such, the United
States' approach regarding the proposed AAC lining is difficult to reconcile with the more cooperative and collaborative decision-making
structure the Bellagio Draft proposes."
IV. CONCLUSION
The governance structure for determining whether the lining project will proceed and the project's impacts on binational groundwaters
is essentially unilateral in the case of the All-American Canal and its
impacts on the Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer.
The United States Congress intervened to ensure that the courts do
not interpret NEPA to require assessment of the project's cross-border
impacts. To date, the United States treats the consultation provisions
of IBWC Minute No. 242 as a mere notification requirement; moreover, international law concepts of equitable apportionment, prescription, and recharge zone do not play a role in the outcome.
As Professor Helen Ingram of the University of California observed
in her preface to the 2006 SCERP monograph: "[e]mbedded in the
very name "All-American Canal" is a clue to the basic issue at stake.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Bellagio Draft Treaty, art. VII, I1 1-2, supranote 84, at 692.
Bellagio Draft Treaty, art. VII, 5(b), supra note 84, at 693.
Bellagio Draft Treaty, art. VIII, 1, supranote 84, at 695.
Bellagio Draft Treaty, art. VIII, 1 2 (a) (5), (d), supra note 84, at 696.
Hayton, supra note 84, at 668.
Bellagio Draft Treaty, art. VII, 2, art. VIII, 1 1, supra note 84, at 692, 695.
See Bellagio Draft Treaty, art. VII, 11 1-2, supranote 84, at 692.
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Unilateralism is at odds with geographical and hydrological reality in
the river basins and aquifers that straddle international boundaries.""8
In sum, the experience to date with the All-American Canal reveals
that while the United States and Mexico may share a common aquifer,
there is presently little common ground as to the appropriate legal
framework for managing this groundwater in an equitable and ecologically sound manner.

98.

Helen Ingram, Preface to LINING THE ALL-AMERICAN CANAL: COMPETITION OR

COOPERATION FOR WATER IN THE U.S.-MEXIcAN BORDER?, at xv

(Vicente Sanchez Mun-

guia ed., SCERP, The U.S.-Mexican Border Env't Monograph Series No. 13, 2006).
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INTRODUCTION
Kazakhstan is one of a significant number of countries that have
recently re-formulated its policy and legal frameworks relating to water.' The country suffers from serious water problems mainly due to
the costly legacy of the extensive industrial and agricultural works undertaken during the Soviet era. Although water resources are not
scarce,3 Kazakhstan has generally not used them efficiently,' and the
country is now on the cusp of a major water crisis.5 The United Nations Development Programme identified Kazakhstan as a country facing severe water management problems, which may be detrimental to
its long-term economic growth.6
This paper concerns the Nura River basin in central Kazakhstan,
which terminates in the Kurgaldzhino wetlands west of Astana.7 The

1.

Other countries include South Africa, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan.

See Sarah L. O'Hara, Lessons from the Past: Water Management in Central Asia, 2
365, 370 (2000).
3. Kazakhstan has an estimated population ofjust over 15 million. See CIA, THE
WORLD FACT BOOK (2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/kz.html (suggesting a population of 15.28 million in July 2007); see also
The World Bank, Data and Statisticsfor Kazakhstan (2005),
http://www.worldbank.org.kz (follow "Data & Statistics hyperlink) (suggesting a population of 15.1 million in 2005). Per capita water use varies between 1,700-2,800m 3 per
year. LEONID DMrrRIEv, GLOBAL WATER P'SHIP CENT. ASIA AND CAUCASUS, IWRM
PRINCIPLES IMPLEMENTATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND CAUCASUS 57
(2004), http://www.cawater-info.net/library/eng/gwp/iwrm2004_e.pdf.
4. See, eg., TIM HANNAN, UNDP WATER GOVERNANCE FAciLrrY AT SIWI, THE PROCESS
OF PREPARING A NATIONAL LWR.M AND WATER EFFICIENCY PLAN FOR KAZAKHSTAN 2
(2006),
http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/4/41/IWRMPlanProcessKazakhst
an.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Tatyana A. Saiko & Igor S. Zonn, Irrigated Expansion and Dynamics of
Desertificationin the Circum-Aral Region of CentralAsia, 20 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 349, 353-55
(2000).
6. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEv. PROGRAMME, NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT KAZAKHSTAN 2003: WATER AS A KEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FACTOR 7-8 (2004),
(discussing
http://www.undp.kz/library-ofpublications/centerview.html?id=1484
water problems as a key factor in human development, and reviewing water resources
from an economic, environmental, and social perspective).
7. The Nura River is a closed system with the exception of the Irtysh-Karaganda
2.
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Canal. See infra Part II.B. For a useful detailed description of the Nura River, see T.W.
Tanton, M.A. Ilyushchenko & S. Heaven, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Some Water Resources Issues of CentralKazakhstan, 148 WATER & MAR. ENGINEERING
227, 228-32 (2001).
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Nura's particular difficulties are peculiar to it alone,8 but the broader
aspects of stakeholder participation that this paper seeks to address
apply equally to the Nura and to other rivers in Kazakhstan. Stakeholder participation is a novel concept in the country, and water users
are more accustomed to centralized decision-making and the paternalism of the Soviet system.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the steps Kazakhstan has taken to ensure effective stakeholder participation within
the water policy framework, focusing in particular on the establishment of representative River Basin Councils and on the availability of
information. Stakeholders repeatedly raised these two issues as outstanding areas of concern while interviewing with the authors. The
paper will suggest ways of improving these measures in the light of international practice in the fields of governance and integrated water
resources management. The paper will also assess the governance arrangements to determine whether the objectives of the water policy
can be successfully achieved by the legal and institutional frameworks
that exist to implement them.
Before setting out the measures taken to establish representative
basin organizations, we will, as an instructive purpose, provide a brief
hydro-political history of the Nura River. We will then detail some of
the current legislative context governing water use, and identify ambiguities and gaps in the legislative and institutional environments. We
will also highlight areas of specific concern to stakeholders before examining the problems associated with information availability. One
cannot view the River Basin Councils in isolation from the broader
regulatory framework; inadequacies and problems with the institutions
it is intended to "shadow" will have an impact on the way the representative body functions, and this may have corresponding effects on
the success of efforts to encourage stakeholder involvement. In part
four, we will briefly outline examples from other nations' experiences
with representative stakeholder bodies in order to assess whether Kazakhstan can learn lessons from these models.
I. HISTORICAL AND PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
A. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN

Russia annexed vast areas of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan,
during the second half of the nineteenth century.9 During this time,
engineers and agricultural specialists assessed the agricultural potential

8. For a more detailed discussion of the Nura's problems, see discussion throughout this article and discussion in Tanton et al., supra note 7.
9. SeeGEOFFREYHOSKING, RussIA: PEOPLE AND EMiRE 1552-1917 38-39 (1997).
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of these newly acquired lands.'" Remains of ancient irrigation canals
clearly showed the feasibility of irrigation in the central Asian region."
Russia intensified its expansion of irrigated territories after the 1890s.2
During the period from 1908 to 1915, Russia established a number of
water transfer and irrigation schemes in the region, mainly with a view
to support cotton production in an attempt to end its dependence on
American cotton." However, because the Tsarist government could
not afford to fund these vast projects, the actual expansion in the area
for irrigation was fairly modest.'4
In the 1920s, the Soviet Union took control of the Central Asian
countries" and, using central funds to cover costs, constructed large
irrigation schemes. 0 As a result, water demand increased dramatically,
especially following the advent of Krushchev's Virgin Lands scheme in
1954.'" This plan intended to plough up several million hectares of
fallow land in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals and in the northern Caucasus.'" This resulted in the over-exploitaton of the region's water re19
sources.
The Soviet era completely centralized water management, and centrally determined production targets dictated regional water management strategies. 2' The break-up of the Soviet Union severed the link
between the centrally located managing authority in Moscow and the
vast network of irrigation schemes providing the basis for agricultural
production and funding.' Although the physical structures still existed, many of the region's rivers became international watercourses
overnight, and the five newly independent states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - each became responsible for the maintenance of water infrastructure in their own territo10.

O'Hara, supranote 2, at 369.

11.

Id.

12. See, e.g., Saiko & Zonn., supranote 5, at 351.
13. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 374; see also HOSING, supra note 9, at 38, 389 (discussing the impact of the American Civil War on cotton production plans and Stolypin's
promotion of moves towards greater irrigation of the region).
14. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 369, 370, 374.
15. See id. at 375.
16. Id. at 370.
17. Charles E. Ziegler, Soviet Images of the Environment, 15 BRT.J. POL. Sci. 365, 373
n.23 (1985).
18. Frank A. Durgin, Jr., The Virgin Lands Programme 1954-1960, 13 SOVIET STUD.
255, 255 (1962). Many have documented the devastating environmental, social and
economic repercussions of this program. See, e.g., O'Hara, supra note 2; CENTRAL
EURASIAN WATER CRISIS: CASPIAN, ARAL AND DEAD SEAS 25 (Michael H. Glantz & Iwao
Kobori eds., 1998); Philip P. Mickin, Desiccation of the Aral Sea: A Water Management
Disasterin the Soviet Union, 241 SCIENCE 1170, 1170-76 (1988).
19. See Ziegler, supra note 17, at 373.
20. O'Hara, supra note 2, at 375 (discussing the workings of the centrally managed
irrigation system during the Soviet era).
21. Seeid. at 367.
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ries.' Unfortunately, the cost of maintaining these systems is immensely expensive and the governments have markedly reduced the number
of people working within the water management sector." The institutions that currently manage water at the national level are largely relics
of the Soviet past and share a focus on agriculture with associated assumptions regarding the role of the state in funding irrigation
projects. 4

B. THE NURA RIVER
The Nura River is a highly regulated closed system in central Kazakhstan. 5 The river is unusual in Kazakhstan insofar as it is not a
transboundary water: its only connection with international waters is
the Irtysh-Karaganda canal 6 that connects its upstream reaches with
the Irtysh River before the latter flows into Russia. 7 It is characterized
by generally low flow levels and flooding in the early spring." At 978
km in length, the Nura rises in the Karkaralinsk mountains, flows west
through the Karaganda region and past the new capital city Astana,
and finally discharges into the Kurgaldzhino wetlands and Lake Tengiz, one of the most important wetland sites in Central Asia. 9

22. Id.
23. Id. The United Nations Development Programme suggests that staffing levels
should be around ten times higher than they currently are, having fallen from these
levels since independence. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, KAZAKHSTAN
NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER EFFICIENCY PLAN,

DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005,

http://rbec.undp.org/waterwiki/images/l/16/first-draft of national_lWRM%26wat
erefficiency-plan.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Fritz Schwaiger et al., Asian Dev. Bank, InstitutionalStrengthening of the
Committee for Water Resources (forthcoming) (outlining historical development of water
management agencies) (on file with author). For press release announcing commencement of the study, see Press Release, Government Steps up Efforts to Strengthen
Implementation of State Water Sector Programs,
http://209.225.62. 100/documents/reports/
japan.special-fund/2005/chap2.pdf.
25. Tanton et al., supra note 7, at 228.
26. Also known as the Satpaev Canal. See POSCH &PARTNERS, IDENTIFICATION OF
PRIORITY ISSUES IN SEVEN MAJOR RIVER BASINS IN KAZAKHSTAN 4 (2002),

http://www.worldbank.org/eca/kazakhstan/water/Ishim-eng.pdf.
27. See infra Figure 1 p. 6 .
28.

COMM. ON ENVTL. PoLIcY, UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM'N FOR EUROPE

(UNECE), ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF KAZAKHSTAN

97 (2000),

http://wivw.unece.org/env/epr/studies/kazakhstan/contents.html.

29.

Tanton et al., supranote 7, at 228.
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are 1: Nura river basin in northern Kazakhstan

As a result of significant pollution discharges from the highly industrialized city of Temirtau, the river downstream from this point is
heavily contaminated with mercury." The Samarkand Reservoir at
Temirtau (with an approximate capacity of 254 million M 3)3 1 is the
main reservoir in the catchment and connects to the 458 km long Irtysh-Karaganda canal that stretches from the Pavlodar area to Karaganda.31 Although the canal originally intended to satisfy demand
from irrigators, the general absence of significant agricultural activity
on the Nura River now means that the canal's largest water users are

30. See id. (stating that 240 tons of mercury lie in the riverbed and the plain of the
river in the 75 kilometers below the source at the AO Karbide plant in Temirtau). The
earlier work of the UNECE suggested that this figure was nearer to 50 tons. The World
Bank is currently engaged in a project to clean up this pollution. See Press Release,
The World Bank Group, World Bank Supports Cleanup of Kazakhstan's Nura River
(May 9, 2003),
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/General/14A8FC1 C8FB9F6D485256D2 10
0529BA5?OpenDocument. The presence of mercury in the water is one of the main
reasons why the government has not used the Nura-Ishim canal to transfer drinking
water to the burgeoning new city of Atsana. The ironic result of this is that the Kurgaldzhino wetlands and the Lake Tengiz currently receive adequate water, but this
supply would be threatened in the event that the water becomes sufficiently safe to be
used for human consumption. See COMM. ON ENrrL. PoLicY, supranote 28, at 103.
31. Tanton et al., supra note 7, at 228.
32. Id. at 229.
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industrial concerns." Four such concerns link directly to the Samarkand reservoir."
The two largest industrial plants utilizing most of the water from
the Samarkand reservoir are a vast steel plant and a thermoelectric
plant. 5 The power plant apparently owns the infrastructure of the reservoir, which is therefore responsible for the maintenance of the reservoir." However, this company is bankrupt and has no significant
assets." As a result of the consequent failure to maintain the infrastructure, the State proposed that it take over ownership of the reservoir, and therefore responsibility for maintenance of the infrastructure; a suggestion that users have broadly welcomed."
The other potentially major consumer of water from the Nura is
the new capital city of Kazakhstan, Astana. Although Astana lies on the
Ishim River rather than the Nura, the two rivers share a flood plain,
and a canal exists between them. 9 Astana's population is growing very
rapidly" and pressure not only to use the water from the Nura, but to
protect the city from flooding, will grow commensurately.4' However,
major withdrawals of water at this point in the river may have devastating effects on the wetlands downstream. Thus, the government must
manage the Nura River carefully in order to balance its three major
sectoral users in a sustainable way.

33. See, e.g., Eric W. Sievers, TransboundaryJurisdiction and Watercourse Law: China,
Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2002) (discussing the role, or lack of
one, of the Irtysh-Karaganda canal on the management of the Nura River and the
potential for it to play a crucial role in the provision of water to Atsana).
34. See K KUDAIBERGENULY, WATER RES. WORKING GROUP, ACTION PLAN FOR
PROTECTION AND RATIONAL UTILIZATION OFWATER RESOURCES 11 (1997),

77
.pdf.
http://www.atasu.org/eng/projects/docs/water%20action%20plan-19
35. Interviews by the authors and others with users of the Samarkand Reservoir,
Temirtau (Oct. 2005) (on file with author). See also, TwINBAS FINAL WORK PACKAGE

REPORT, TWINNI NING EUROPEAN AND THIRD COUNTRIES' RIVER BASINS DEVELOPMENT OF
INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT METHODS 25-26 (2007),

http://ivl.dataphone.se/twinbas/AP3%2Final%20Report%20A.pdf.
36.
Id.
See generally id. (stating that ownership and control of the dam has subsequently
37.
changed hands twice).
38. Id.
39. Id; see also supra Figure 1.
40. David Holley, BuildingKazakhstan'sBridge to the 21st Century, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2005, at A8 (suggesting that the population of Astana will rise from around 600,000

currently to 1.2 million by 2030).
41. See Tanton et al, supra note 7, at 232.
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II. EXISTING WATER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN
KAZAKHSTAN
The Kazakh government regards its future success as bound to improvements in its water management system and has therefore taken a
number of steps aimed at implementing Integrated Water Resources
Management ("IWRM")." In addition to committing itself to a number of international conventions and obligations," this process resulted
in the recent formulation of a new comprehensive Water Code," which
is intended to form the foundation of these efforts. In addition, a new
Environment Code was scheduled to be introduced at the end of 2006,
to replace the existing Law on the Protection of the Environment of
1997." The Government is cognizant of the importance of the role
stakeholders play in improving water management" and the Code includes attracting community interest and open availability of information amongst its guiding principles.
The institutional context that the Water Code must operate within,
however, inherited much of the Soviet legacy, and this has been less
than helpful to the overall pursuit of IWRM and to the open availability
and accessibility of accurate information."
A. WATER USE LICENSING

A number of different pieces of legislation and a variety of regulatory bodies govern water management in Kazakhstan. The principal
law on the issue is the 2003 Water Code, 5° and a plethora of regulations
sit beneath this.5' The code seeks to set up a water management re42.
See A.K. Kenshimov, Address to the 2006 Stockholm World Water Week, National Plan for Integrated Water Resource Management and Water Efficiency in Kazakhstan (2006),
http://cawater-info.net/4wwf/pdf/kenshimov-e.pdf.
43.
Id.
44. KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 1.7 (providing a comprehensive list of the the Kazakh government's commitments, including signing up to the
Johannesburg plan of implementation).
45.
Vodn'I Kodfks Rfspuieiki Kazakhstan [WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz.]
No. 481-11 (July 2003) (further modifications have been made to the Water Code
three times since its promulgation).
46.
See KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 1.7.
47.
See A.D. Ryabtsev, On Public Participationin Water Resources Management, in 77

NATO

SCIENCE SERIES, IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN

CENTRAL ASIA 89, 89-94 (Patricia Wouters, Victor Dukhovny & Andrew Allan eds.,
2007). Mr. Ryabtsev is the incumbent Chair of the Committee for Water Resources.
48. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11 art. 9.

49.
50.

HANNAN, supra note 4, at 1-2.
Id. at 3.

51.

See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11.
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gime that will "achieve and maintain environmentally friendly and
economically optimal levels of use and protection of the water fund for
conservation and improvement of living conditions for population
and environment"5' through implementation of the following principles:
53
" state regulation of water use and protection;
" sustainable water use through rational use and water resource
protection;
" establishing optimal conditions for water use, environmental sustainability, and the sanitary and epidemiological protection of
the population;
* basin-based administration; and
* combining decision-making regarding the use and control of water resources with economic considerations. 4

The Kazakh water use regime takes as its basic premise the idea
that the population may use all waters may be used by the population,
but it places restrictions on the uses of certain water bodies, and on the
types of use to which water may be put. Fundamentally, the law splits
uses into those that are allowed through the exercise of inalienable
rights and those that require authorization through licences or permits, so-called special uses." The Kazakh water regime broadly categorizes water bodies 6 according to the uses that may be made of them. 7
Water users may not undertake "special uses" without some form of
administrative approval from the licensing bodies in the form of a licence or permit. 8 Generally, only the abstraction of more than 50m 3
52. Id. art. 3(1).
53. Id. art. 8(1)-(2) (stating that the State owns all water). See also CONST. OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KAz. art. 6(3) ("The land and underground resources, waters, flora and
fauna, other natural resources shall be owned by the state. The land may also be privately owned on terms, conditions and within the limits established by legislation.").
54. WATER CODE OFTHE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11, art. 34.
55. See infra pp. 10-11.
56. The definition of "water bodies" does not appear to specifically include irrigation canals. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 5. This is consistent
with the distinction between primary and secondary users, but may be seen as not being conducive to effective IWRM.
57. There are five types - common, joint, isolated, wildlife sanctuaries, and bodies
of special state importance. WNATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art.
11 (3). The code divides them into four further varieties, based on their physical characteristics: surface; sub-surface; sea; transboundary, id. art. 11(2), and see arts. 12-15
for detailed definitions.
58. Broadly, these uses include abstraction of water from water bodies for the purposes of irrigation; Ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Litsenzirobaniia Deiatel'nosti Po Spetsialnomu Vodopoleovaniiu, 1 1(2) (2004) [herinafter Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use]; WATATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art.
95(4); industry and energy, id. art. 03; domestic supply, id. art. 66(5); fisheries (only in
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per day from surface waters for the purposes of agriculture, industry,
energy production, fish-breeding and transport require a license." In
practice, a further distinction exists between surface and ground water
use approval: the authors encountered stakeholders who had obtained
permits for the use of groundwater from the Committee for Geology
and Use of Underground Resources.'
Water officials cannot authorize licences and permits, however, unless the licensee has obtained the approval of the relevant local executive agencies responsible for the environment and for the sanitary and
epidemiological welfare of the local populations."1 Prospective licensees must also demonstrate that they have the use of the engineering
or infrastructure equipment necessary for carrying out the licensable
activity, and that they have suitably qualified responsible personnel. 2
The documentary requirements for the licensing of activities involving
abstraction of water and use in relation to hydropower are more onerous,"3 although the regulations do nothing more than demand "information" regarding, for example, fish protection.64 The actual information requirements are not set out in greater depth. Beyond this, the
criteria for the allocation of licences are vague, and the principles that
underlie the legislation therefore appear to govern allocation. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the authors were told by all
stakeholders interviewed that they had their surface water use licence
issued to them by the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment.
The water regime allows uses indefinitely or for limited periods,
but not lasting more than forty-nine years.6 Water officials can suspend licences in the event of the licensee breaching the provisions of
relevant, though unspecified, legislation,67 but officials may suspend
permits if the water user does not comply with the legislative provisions
limited circumstances), id. art. 66; waste discharge, id. art. 66(4); impoundment for
irrigation, id. art. 95(3); and in some cases navigation, id. art. 105(1).
59. Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use, 1(2). Note that
there is some confusion in the Regulations and Water Code regarding the use of permits or licences, and a lack of clarity over the distinction between the two.
60. See infra p. 11.
61. Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use, 1 2(5) (1)-(2).
Where the use demands it, licensees must also obtain the approval of veterinary bodies
and fish protection bodies. Id. at 1 2(5) (3)-(4); see also id. 1 4 (detailing the documentation required for the approval of licences).
62. Id. at 113(6), 3(7), 4(8)(7).
63. See id. at 4(10).
64. Id. at 14(10)(3).
65. For example, general uses are permanent. See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KAz. No. 481-11 art. 70(6).
66. Id. art. 22. The Ministry issues short term rights for periods of less than five
years, long term rights last between five and forty nine years. Id. art. 22(3).
67. Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use, 1 5(13).
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relating to water and to the environment." Water users may exercise of
both types of uses only in the light of available resources and the ecological condition of the water body,' although it is unclear if this
means that officials can suspend or revoke authorizations if ecological
quality or availability diminishes.
Additionally, if the relevant water body simply dries up, whether
through natural or artificial means, the government may terminate any
special use rights." If the holder of the special use rights does not adhere to the terms of use or does not use the rights for three years, the
issuing body can actively terminate use rights.71 If the state determines
that the resources are necessary for its own use, the state may administratively terminate the special rights." The issuing body may impose
other restrictions over water uses in certain circumstances, but the methodology detailing the application of these3 criteria, and the factors
involved in such procedures, is non-existent.
Finally, the issuing body makes a distinction between primary users
of water and secondary users. 4 Primary users are those that use water
for their own purposes directly from the water body, 5 and secondary
users receive their water from primary users under contractual arrangements. 6 This distinction between primary and secondary users is
important, as it effectively governs the River Basin Organziations'
("RBOs") licensing of water uses.7 For example, in a major irrigation
project the irrigation infrastructure manager/owner takes water from
the natural water body. This is the primary user, and it is this organization that the RBO licenses. The irrigation provider then supplies water
to farmers, the secondary users. The RBO does not license them, but
contracts in place with the irrigation provider (or water user cooperative, if one exists) govern their water use."
68.

Id. at

69.

WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11 art. 70.

11.

70. Id. art. 75(1)(5). The code does note elaborate on the difference between
"natural" and "artificial." Under art. 75(1), the automatic termination of rights may
also occur where the term of the authorization has expired, or the holder of the right
expires (whether by death of a natural person or the liquidation of other legal entities).
71. Id. art. 75(2). Under art. 75(2)(1), if a rights-holder does not use drinking
water resources used for one year, this will trigger termination. Given the RBO's need
for user self-monitoring, it seems improbable that many rights atrophy in this way.
72. See id. art. 75(4). Users can appeal such a decision, though the code does not
contain details relating to compensation payable and the circumstances justifying such
an action.
73. See id. arts. 74-75.
74. Id. art. 69.
75. Id. art. 69(1).
76. Id. art. 69(2).
77. See id. art. 69.
78. Id. Individual farmers can possibly be primary users, and therefore licensable,
if they take water from the body directly, but farmers are normally secondary. Indus-
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B. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The Kazakh institutional structure for the management of water
operates at a number of geographic and political levels: the national,
oblast, basin, and rayon.79 The national executive agencies, including
the RBOs, are also represented at the oblast and rayon levels, and it
would normally be these local level bodies that were involved in the
day-to-day management of waters. "°
The body responsible for authorizing special uses varies depending
to some degree on the nature of both the use and the prospective user,
but the primary licensing body is the River Basin Organization.8' Article 49 of the Water Code identifies the following additional bodies
that are involved in water management (aside from irrigation management bodies):
* central executive body for environment protection;
* authorized body for subsoil use and protection (the Committee
for Geology and Use of Underground Resources, Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources);
* authorized state body for sanitary and epidemiological safety of
population (in the Ministry of Health);
* authorized state veterinary body;
* state body in charge of phytosanitary supervision; and
* local executive bodies - the Akimats. 2
In addition to this list, the following are also involved:
* Ministry of Agriculture;
" Kazgidromet (reporting to the Ministry of Environment Protection) ;83
trial concerns would normally be primary water users, though this may depend upon
the source of the water - a factory, such as the steel mill at Temirtau that withdraws
water from the Irtysh-Karaganda canal, would be bound by a contract with the canal

operator rather than by a licence from the river basin authority. The variety of sources
used by the mill means that it is bound both by contract and by licences relating to
each source.
79.

KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER

EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFr NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, §§ 9-1, 13-5.

80. Id. §§ 9-1, 10-1.
81. See Regulations for Licensing the Activities for Special Water Use,
3-5. In
addition, the Committee for Water Resources, the national water administration body,
is solely responsible for issuing licences and permits relating to the use of water from
those water bodies of special state importance, and it is also the only body that may
authorize foreign entity water use.
82.
83.

See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 49.
See MIMSTRY OF ENV'T PROT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. & ORG. FOR SEC. AND

COOPERATION IN EUR., GUIDELINES ON HANDLING PUBLIC REQUESTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
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Agency for Land Resources Management;
Ministry of Industry and Trade;
Ministry of Emergency Planning;
Ministry of Economics and Budget Planning and Ministry of
Finance;
Ministry ofJustice;84 and
Local representative bodies - the Maslikhats.

Aside from their licensing functions, the Committee for Water Resources ("CWR") and the RBOs principally have a coordinating role
only, rather than having active management responsibilities. To some
degree, the RBOs view their role as being the administration of water
use limits set by the CWR.8 The CWR, however, is a department of the
Ministry of Agriculture, which results in an almost automatic conflict of
interest if the CWR desires to appear as an impartial coordinator of all
water uses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is often friction
between basin organizations and the local Akims, the heads of the local
executive bodies, who report directly to the President's office. 6 The
functions of the RBOs and the Akims relate closely with respect to the
administration of waters, but the Akims have the advantage in terms of
sheer power, and the latter has more direct power over watercourse
The United Nations Development Programme
management."
("UNDP") believes that the RBOs are under-funded and suffer greatly
from the fact that the CWR does not have ministerial status." Internationally, it is not unusual to have a number of bodies making decisions
that impact water resource management, but the crucial requirement
in such contexts is the quality of the coordination. Anecdotal evidence
presented to the authors suggests that coordination is neither extensive nor formalized. In addition, a lack of both financial and human
resources largely cripple the RBOs. This renders enforcement of decisions difficult and compounds the views of some industrial concerns
that the RBO is toothlessly impotent.

INFORMATION 25, availableat
http://www.osce.org/documents/cia/2004/11/3787_en.pdf.
84. See KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFr NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, §§ 6-4, 6-5.
85. Id. § 1-7.
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., WATER CODE OF THE REPUBUC OF KAz. No. 481-11 art. 39(112)-(20).
88. KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER
EmcFNCY PLAN, DRAFr NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 6 (outlining suggested improvements to the status of the CWR).
89. Id. § 6-2.
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C. RIVER BASIN COUNCIL

Among the functions of the RBOs are the preparation of basin
agreements for the rehabilitation and protection of water bodies."
These agreements, which the relevant RBOs, local executive bodies,
and "other subjects" within the basin must conclude, seek to aid in the
coordination of the water management roles played by the signatories,9' and, according to Article 43(1) of the Water Code, also create
River Basin Councils ("RBCs"). The RBOs draw plans on the basis of
existing strategies and data outlining water use capacities, but the expected effects of the agreement are not set out, and preparation of
these agreements appears to lie with RBCs9 The RBCs have principally an advisory function 4 with respect to the parties to the agreement,
and have the power to make suggestions and recommendations
alone. They are essentially intended to develop cooperation between
members 7 and to advise on issues concerning the use and protection
of water resources.98

Membership consists of the head of the RBO (chair)," local executive and representative bodies,' 9 along with local users including representatives of other oblast-level executive agencies responsible for water
There is no inmanagement,' NGOs, and water user associations.'

90. Order from A. Ryabtsev, Chairman, Committee for Water Resources of the
Ministry of Agriculture, ORDER # 71-11 OF THE COMMITTEE FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN DATED 21 APRIL 2004, reprinted in
U.N. Development Program in Kaz., Committee for Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Kaz., METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE: ESTABLISHMENT OF RIVER BASIN
COUNCILS IN KAZAKHSTAN 27 (2005), (outlining suggested improvements to the status of
the CWR) available at

http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/7/73/MethodologicalGuidelines_
Estd of RiverBasinCouncils.pdf.
91. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 42(1).

92. Id. art. 43(1). But see Order from A. Ryabtsev, supra note 90, at 27, which obliges the RBOs to create the RBCs and to arrange for the preparation of the basin agreements.
93. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 43(3).
94. Id. art. 43(1).
95. Id. art. 43(3).
96. See id.
97. STANDARD REGULATION OF RIVER BASIN COUNCIL, reprinted in U.N. Development
Program in Kaz., Committee for Water Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of
Kaz., METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE: ESTABLISHMENT OF RIVER BASIN COUNCILS IN
KAZAKHSTAN 28 (2005), available at
http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/7/73/MethodologicaGuidelines_
Estd-of RiverBasinCouncils.pdf.
98. Id. at 28-29.
99. Id. at 30.
100. Id. at 29 (making up no more than 20% of the total).
101. This section of the water code does not specify the exact composition of this
group, but it may be that it links directly back to those organizations referred to in
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dication as to how voting rights, if any, are split in the inevitable instances where basins overlap oblast boundaries, and the maximum
number of members is not set. It is worth noting, however, that the
director of the relevant RBO determines the initial composition of the
RBC."' Other individuals and representatives of other bodies may participate in meetings of the RBC, but only if the RBC specifically invites
them. °4
The RBCs must consider and advise upon the following documents:
"
*
*
*

river basin scheme proposals, with respect to the comprehensive use and protection of water resource;
local executive bodies' plans for the rational use of basin water
bodies;
draft agreements on the rehabilitation and protection of the
basin water bodies; and
other relevant documents requiring integrated decisionmaking.'

While the RBC has the power to advise and produce recommendations, the corresponding obligation on the part of the RBO or local
executive bodies to take the views of the RBC into account is very limited.' 6 The RBC may make its views known, but there is largely no
obligation on the part of the receiving authorities to listen. The exception to this appears to be with respect to the Basin Schemes of "waters'
complex use and protection."'' 7

481-11 art. 49; See STANDARD REGULATION OF
RIVER BASIN COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 28 (making up no more than 20% of the total).
102. WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC or KAz. No. 481-11 art. 43(2); STANDARD
REGULATION OF RIVER BASIN COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 29 (determining that users,

WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No.

including non-governmental organizations and water user associations can make up no
more than 20% of the total membership). It is not clear which groups should make up
the remaining 40% of the composition of the Council.
103. STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR RIVER BASIN COUNCILS, supra note 97, at 29. The
RBO is also responsible for covering the costs of running the respective RBC, but only
from funds allocated to it from central government. Id. at 31.
104. Id. at 29. The Nura-Sarysu Basin Council has twenty nine members, drawn
from local Akimats (ten members in total, including only one from any of the maslikhats, thereby comprising more than 30% of Council membership), local executive
bodies (eight members), industry (eight members), the Korgalzhyn reserve body, and
an NGO (one member each). NGO membership therefore falls far short of the 20%
maximum. Full details of all members can be found at
http://ww.caresd.net/iwrm/new/en/doc/NS_ BQmembersilist.pdf.
105.

STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR RIVER BASIN COUNCILS, supra note 97, at 29.

106.

See Order from A. Ryabtsev, supra note 90, at 27.

107.

WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 art. 46.
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Article 46 of the Water Code requires these schemes and develops
the obligation in greater detail for the development and approval of
general and basin schemes for comprehensive use and protection of
water resources and water balances of 2004. 08' Article 17 provides that
the basin scheme that the RBO submits to the CWR "reflect[s] the recommendation of the participants of the" RBC and "people."' ' "Reflect" is potentially a very strong word, and the intention is unclear as
to if the RBOs are bound by the views of the RBCs, or if they merely
ensure that the scheme is broadly reflective of the RBC's views. Either
way however, "reflect" provides a potentially potent means of imposing
the views of users and those bodies involved in management of waters
at the basin level on the basin scheme, although there is unfortunately
no mechanism for the communication of the draft scheme to the RBC
in the first place."'
This omission is especially noteworthy given the other detailed
procedures outlined in the regulations for the development of the
scheme and its passage through other relevant organizations."' It is
also important to recognize that it is the basin agreement, rather than
the basin scheme, that coordinates the work of all agencies that are
involved with managing water resources at the basin, oblast and rayon
levels."' The RBC therefore has some power in relation to one management document, but not with respect to the one instrument that is
intended to reflect the integrative character of the RBC's own composition. Moreover, a UNDP document suggests that it may be possible
to have more than one basin agreement in place, as they need not be
multilateral."3
In October 2005, the authors attended a meeting of many of the
prospective members of the Nura-Sarysu RBC in Karaganda."' The aim
of the meeting was primarily to identify any incentives that might make
key stakeholders choose to participate in the river management
process. " ' Missing from that meeting, however, were a number of major industrial users, who had also been absent from a preliminary meeting of the RBC members earlier in the year. Following the October
108. Id.
109. See id. art. 17.
110. Id.
111. See Regulations for Development and Approval of General and Basin Schemes
for Comprehensive Use and Protection of Water Resources,
14-19.
112. MINISTRY OF ENV'T PROT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. & ORG. FOR SEC. AND
COOPERATION IN EUR., supra note 83, at 4.
113.

See U.N. Development Program in Kaz., Committee for Water Resources, Minis-

try of Agriculture, Republic of Kaz., METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINE: ESTABLISHMENT OF
RAVER BASIN COUNCILS IN KAZAKHSTAN 8 (2005), available at

http://europeandcis.undp.org/WaterWiki/images/7/73/MethodologicaGuidelines_
Estd of RiverBasinCouncils.pdf.
114.

TwINBAs FINAL WORK PACKAGE REPORT, supa note 35, at 29.

115.

Id.
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meeting, the authors visited these industries to gauge their views on
the RBC. While the information that the industries provided occasionally conflicted with what was heard at the main meeting, their reasons
for doubting the usefulness of the RBC were illuminating. Both parties
were broadly of the view that, without proper powers, the RBC would
be little more than a discussion forum and that there was, therefore,
little point in being involved. There was also a feeling from one of the
parties that, even if the RBC were able to materially influence the decisions of the RBO, this would be of little consequence because parties
perceive the RBO as unable to exert control over the water use of industry in any case.' 6 This is important, as it provides a concrete example of one of the reasons why stakeholder participation fails to work in
some cases; when stakeholders lack rights that they can effectively enforce and because the law appears to be applied inconsistently."'
D. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Along with a number of other provisions within the Criminal and
Civil Codes,"8 the Water Code sets out a number of provisions designed
to fulfill open information goals."9 Firstly, the Water Code explicitly
states that one of the functions of the RBO is the dissemination of information on measures taken to protect waters and improve their condition, ° and they must provide public access to the state water cadastre. 1 ' Secondly, water users have the right to obtain information regarding the conditions of water bodies with respect to using them for
economic activity.'2 2 In addition, one of the principles underlying the
Water Code is the availability of information on the status of waters in
Kazakhstan. 3 On the broader matter of availability of information, the
Law on Environmental Protection of 1997124 provides a general right to

116. See id. at 31-33. For example, the requirement that users monitor their own
water use means that there is little incentive for them to provide accurate data and the
RBOs currently lack the capacity to enforce use limits effectively.
117. See, e.g., European Comm'n, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive GuidanceDocument No. 8 Public Participationin Relation to the Water Framework Directive, at 186, EC 2000/60 (2003) (discussing stakeholder cooperation on the
catchment level in the Eman River Basin, Sweeden), available at http://www.wrrlinfo.de/docs/Guidance doc_8Public-participaklein.pdf.
See MINISTRY OF ENV'T PROT. OF THE REPUBIC OF KAz. & ORG. FOR SEC. AND
118.
COOPERATION IN EUR., supra note 83, at 19-21.
119. WATERCODEOFTHEREPUBCcOFEKAz. No. 481-11 arts. 40(2)(19), 59(6), 71(5).
120.
Id. art. 40(2) (19).
Id. art. 59(6).
121.
122. Id. art. 71(5).
123. Id. art. 9(10), 71(5).
124. Eakon Respubliki Kazakhstan [LAwOF REPUBLIC KAZAKHSTAN] No. 160-1
(1997). An unofficial Russian version is available at
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/kaz25276.doc.
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2
reliable information with regard to the health of the environment. 5
The terms of the Arhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters further obligate Kazakhstan to uphold certain standard of
transparency.2 6 Article 4 of the Convention obliges parties to ensure
that:

... in response to a request for environmental information, [to] make
such information available to the public, within the framework of national legislation, including, where requested and subject to subparagraph (b) below, copies of the actual documentation containing or
comprising such information:
(a) Without an interest having to be stated;
(b) In the form requested.... 27
The Kazakh Constitution supports this, to some extent, in Article 18,
"[s] tate bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must
provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents,
decisions and
other sources of information concerning his rights and
2
interests."

The RBOs rely on the quality of the information the monitoring
agencies provide them. In addition to receiving information from water users themselves under their obligations for self-monitoring," the
principal source of this data is Kazhydromet,' 30 the main monitoring
organization of the Ministry of Environmental Protection.

Unfortu-

nately, this body relies on being able to sell its recent data in order to
continue surviving. 1' During the meetings the authors attended in
Karaganda, it became clear that Kazhydromet's reputation was low, the
quality of the data it provided was not highly regarded,'32 and the prices
demanded for such information were so exorbitant that even the RBO
125. Id. art. 5.
126. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to justice in Environmental Matters ("Arhus Convention"), art. 3, 17,june
25, 1998, UN-ECE-CEP-43, adopted October 30, 2001, availableat
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm.
127. Id. art. 4(1).
128. CONST. OF THE REPUBUC OF KAZ. art. 18, availableat
http://www.kazakhembus.com/Constitution.html.
129. See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. No. 481-11 arts. 61(5), 72(9), 72(16).
130. Kazhydromet is the principal data source with respect to surface waters only.
Information on groundwater is the responsibility of the Committee for Geology and
Underground Resources. See MINIsTRY OF ENv'T PROT. OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAz. & ORG.
FOR SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUR., supra note 83, at 22.
131. Id. at 26. Older data is freely available, but current information is provided
only in the context of a contract.
132. See id. (detailing Kazgidromet's managing of the monitoring infrastructure).
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did not wish to purchase it. The role of Kazhydromet therefore produces some problems in relation to the provisions set out above on the
availability of monitoring data and environmental information. Furthermore, the state water cadastre (established by and referred to
throughout the Water Code,)'.. has little additional legislative support,
so the mechanisms for generating and maintaining such a database are
sparse.
The Kazakh government has encountered further problems in relation to the implementation of the Arhus Convention; the Convention's Compliance Committee found Kazakhstan to be in breach of its
obligations. 11 The Committee's last recommendations on the issue,
which the Parties to the Convention approved in June 2005, specifically
requested that the Kazakh government produce a strategy for implementing the Convention by the end of that year.'36 While Guidelines
on the implementation exist, the parties did not regard these as sufficient.'37 Today, Kazakhstan still has not transposed the terms of the
Convention into Kazakh law.
II. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
International practice varies with respect to representative basin
The European Union Water Framework Directive
committees.
("WFD")' 3 for example, contains no specific provision on their establishment, but demands that "member states encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation of this Directive, in particular in the production, review and updating of the river
basin management plans.' 39 Member states may implement this as
they wish, within the overall framework of River Basin Districts.
France, for example, has an established system of sophisticated Basin
133.

See WATER CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZ. No. 481-11 arts. 58-61.

134.

See KAZKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER

EFFICIENCYPLAN, DRAFT NOVEMBER 2005, supra note 23, § 13.7.

135. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. Economic Commission for
Europe, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties,1 1, ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.7, Decision II/5a, (June 13, 2005) availableat
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm.
136. Id. 1 5. Such a strategy was submitted by Kazakhstan in time for the Eleventh
Meeting of the Compliance Committee at the end of March 2006 and negotiations
appear to be ongoing. See U.N Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. Economic Commission for Europe, Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Compliance Committee,
1 9, ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add/7 Decision II/5a, (May 10, 2006), available at
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm.
137. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. Economic Commission for
Europe, supra note 135, 1 1, 2.
138. Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the Community action in the field of water policy, art. 24, 2000
O.J. (L 327) 1 (EC), availableat http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html.
139. Id. art. 14(1).
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Committees. 40 England will have advisory liaison panels.'4 ' Scotland
will have River Basin District Advisory Groups. "' Poland, which recentlyjoined the European Union, created a system of Regional Boards of
Water Management.' 2
Outside the EU, South Africa has set up Catchment Management
Agencies ("CMAs"), which are statutory bodies with jurisdiction over
defined Water Management Areas.'44 These CMAs have the duty, under the National Water Act, to promote community participation in
4 1 5 Stakeholders participate through exwater resource management.'
tensive involvement in the water management process,' 6 and through
strict governance controls over the activities of management agencies
and their directors.' 7 In Brazil, new water legislation enacted in 1997
allows the National Council on Water Resources to establish River Basin Committees.'
These committees act as the instrument through
which stakeholders within
the basin can participate in water manage4 9
decision-making.'
ment
Generally, stakeholder participation works best when stakeholders
feel that they can make a tangible difference through their interventions.' ' This will only be effective, however, if the rights of the stakeholders are enforceable.
A. SOUTH AFRICA

The National Water Act, the principal water management legislation in South Africa, only states that the CMAs should promote public
participation and makes no direct provision for representative bodies

140.

See SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & DANIEL D. BRADLOW, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR

WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STuDY 59-60 (2006).
141.
DEPARTMENT FOR FOOD, ENVIRONMENT AND RURAL AFFAIRS, RIVER BASIN PLANNING

GUIDANCE, 2006, at 40-41, availableat

http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/water/wfd/pdf/riverbasinguidance.pdf.
142. Water Environment and Water Services (Scot.) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 3), 17, available at www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2003/pdf/asp-20030003_en.pdf.
143. William Blomquist, Andrezej Tonderski & Ariel Dinar, Institutional and Policy
Analysis of River Basin Management: The Warta River Basin, Poland 10-11 (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3528, 2005).
144. National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 8, (S. Afr.) availableat
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf.
145. Id. § 9(g).
146. Id. § 81(1).
147. See, e.g., id. § 36; id. § (81).
148. Lei. No. 9.433 de 8 deJaneiro de 1997, D.O.U. de 09.01.1997. (Brazil), available
at http://www.brasilemb.org/environment/waterpolicy.shtml.
149. World Commission on Dams, ContributingPaper: Water Resources NationalPolicy in
Brazil at 9 (2000) (prepared by Raymundo Garrido), available at http://www.wcainfonet.org/cds-upload/ 1067863393045_brazil.pdf.
150. See, e.g.,
European Comm'n, supra note 117, at 186 (discussing stakeholder
cooperation on the catchment level in the Eman River Basin, Sweeden).
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to act as advisory bodies at the catchment level.'' However, it should
be noted that the National Water Resources Strategy states that it is the
intention of the relevant ministry to create representative bodies in
each Water Management Area 52 for the purposes of consultation exercises,' 5' with a view to reducing the likelihood of consultation fatigue. 4
In the current absence of such bodies, the National Water Act seeks to
include the public as a whole in decision-making, rather than identifying sectoral users and targeting these as stakeholder representatives.
In addition to this, however, the National Water Act establishes
stringent requirements regarding the constitution of CMA governing
The Minister selects appointees for the boards, and final
boards.
membership must be consistent "with the object of achieving a balance
among the interests of water users, potential water users, local and provincial government and environmental interest groups."' 7 Schedule 4
of the National Water Act then sets out the rules applicable to Governing Boards, which include mechanisms for the recovery of improperly
obtained profits and details of reporting requirements. 15 In the interest of both transparency and predictability, the National Water Act
clearly identifies the criteria the responsible authority will consider
when issuing water use licences. 5 Finally, CMAs are obliged to "strive
towards achieving co-operation and consensus in managing the water
resources under [their] control."'"
B. POLAND
Poland had already begun to conform to a catchment-based water
management system at the beginning of the nineteen ninties when it
created a system of Regional Boards of Water Management ("RWMAs")
151.

National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 8(5), (S. Ar.) availableat

http://ivww.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf.
152. There are nineteen such areas, based on catchments. See the establishment of
the water management areas and their boundaries as a component of the national
water resource strategy in terms of section 5(1) of the National Water Act. See GN 1160
at
available
1999,
October
1
of
GG20491
in
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Notices/PROCL.doc.
153. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, FirstEdition of the National Water Resources Strategy, § 4.3.1 (September 2004), available at

www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/Sep2004/pdf.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., National Water Act 36 of 1998, §§ 8-10, (describing the creation of
catchment management strategies and the consultation exercises that catchment management agencies must follow).

156.

Id. §§ 81-83.

157. Id. § 81(1)-(3). Although the minister makes appointments, he or she must
make the appointments in conjunction with an appointments advisory board.
158. Id. at sched. 4(8), (32).
159. See id. § 27.
160. Id. § 79(4).
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with the purpose of improving water quality, protecting drinking water
sources, and aiding water users and water user organizations develop
and implement rational water management. This was a departure from
the previous centralized water management system operated during
the Soviet-dominated era, where, as was the case in Kazakhstan, technical planning and large engineering projects were prevalent and focused mainly on supporting industrial and agricultural development.'6'
Although Poland decentralized water supply sanitation and waste disposal to the local level before the nineteen-nineties, the quality of
planning and management of the water resource was poor, especially
in more rural areas. 2 Poland, therefore, had no history of managing
the water resource in a holistic catchment-based manner. Participation
by stakeholders using the resource was also very limited.' 3
Possibly because of this historical context, public participation in
the RWMAs was never really well developed. Also, many of the boards
never consisted of more than a single individual, acting as a director,
and charged by the Ministry of Environment with management of the
basin.' This naturally hampered consistent and effective water management.'
Poland enacted a new water law in 2001."6 The basic principles of
the water law are based on sustainable and rational resource use. 7
Since Poland recently joined the European Union,'68 the WFD ultimately governs its water. 9 Although significant institutional changes
have occurred since the reforms started in 1990, (for instance, there is
a rational system of water tariffs in place, along with wastewater discharge controls and water resource planning processes),9 the central
government still controls strategic and fundamental financial means,
limiting the power of the RWMAs. In addition, Poland has no mechanism for catchment-level stakeholder participation. Organizational responsibilities and relationships are, in reality, less integrated than the
water law and policy would indicate, a factor that further hampers the

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Blomquist et al., supra note 143, at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
See id.

166. Prawo wodne [Law of 18July, 2001, Water Law], Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of
Laws] No. 115, Pos. 1229, availableat http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/pol60008.pdf
(in Polish only).
167. See Blomquist et al., supra note 143, at 17; Andrzej Tonderski, Warta River Basin
Case Study: Poland,Background Paper22 (World Bank Research Working Paper, 2004).
168. Blomquist et al., supra note 143, at 16.

169.
170.

See id. at 23.
Id. at 21.

Issue 1

A CASE STUDY FROM THE NURA RIVER

IWRM."' As a result, Poland is not enforcing the important principle
that policy and planning should inform one another.'
C.

FRANCE

The European Union Water Framework Directive also binds
France, an EU member.13 However, France had a system of basin
management in place prior to the advent of the WFD. The country has
seven basins which it manages in six parts,'74 each with its own Basin
Committee and Water Agency, which act as an executive implementation arm. 7

5

The Board of Directors of the Water Agency contains rep-

resentatives of the Basin Committee. The Agency must consult the
Committees in relation to certain subjects, including the setting of the
tariffs levied for water withdrawals and pollution discharges, and on
the priorities the Agencies must follow in their five year programs.
The Prefect of the Basin charges each Basin Committee to prepare
and approve the Master Development and Water Management Plan
This plan sets out "the basic guidelines for the balanced
("SDAGE").
management of water resources,' 7 8 and Basin Committees must seek
the participation of relevant state and government bodies. 9 If those
bodies do not submit comments within four months, the Basin Committee can assume the state and government bodies approve the
SDAGE.'8 0
The members of these Basin Committees come from three principal sectors: the state (including representatives from relevant ministries); water users (including environmental uses); and relevant regional and local councils.' These are substantially-sized bodies, with

171. Id. at 20.
172. See id. at 31.
173. Council Directive 2000/60, supranote 138, art. 24.
174. See Organization of Water Management in France,
http://semide.oieau.fr/EN/topics/part-a.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) for a list of
the six river basins.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Law No. 92-3 ofJanuary 3, 1992,Journal Officiel de la Rrpublique Franiaise
U.O] [Official Gazette of France],Jan. 4, 1992, art. 3 available at
http://oieau.fr/anglais/gest-eau/Iois/westlaw92.htm.
178. Id.
179. Id.

180.

Id.

http://www.eau-rhinRhin-Meuse,
de leau
181. See generally L'agence
meuse.fr/anglais.htm; IOWater - Organization of Water Management in France,
http://oieau.fr/anglais/gesteau/parta.htm (breaking down the membership of all
basin committees. The tendency appears to be that representatives of users, communities and "socio-professionals" together make up around half of each committee, in
contrast to the position in Kazakhstan).
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around one hundred members, which the seventy-seven member Comit6 National de l'Eau represents at the national level.8
With respect to information availability, the Arhus Convention
has been implemented directly in France through Law No. 2002285 of February 2, 2003. ' There have been no approaches made by
the public to the Compliance Committee regarding possible transgressions by France in the implementation of this Law," 4 which may indicate either that the public is unaware that such a procedure is possible,
or that the law is working well.
D. SCOTLAND

Although Scotland is another EU nation governed by the Water
Framework Directive, the approach has been less formalized than the
French approach. Scotland's approach has been to establish River Basin District Advisory Groups ("RBDAGs"), which the Scottish Parliament created under the WFD transposition legislation, the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003."' Despite the fact
that Scotland has only one principal River Basin District covering the
vast majority of the country, " there are ten RBDAGs, eight of them in
the Scotland RBD.' 7 In addition, there is a National Stakeholder Forum, which has no legislative basis, and is representative of the major
water users and NGOs in Scotland.'
The water regulator, the Scottish

182. Scottish Parliament Information Centre SPICe Briefing 02/96, Water Environment and Water Services Bill: River Basin Planning,at 8 SB 2/96 (August 26 2002), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf resbrief/sb0296.pdf.
183. Law No. 2002-2855 of Feb. 28, 2002,Journal Officiel de la R~publique
Francaise JO] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 1, 2002, p. 3904; The Arhus Convention was transposed into European Community law through Directive 2003/4/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28January 2003 on public access to
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC. Council
Directive 2003/4, art. 3, 11 2003 O.J. (L 41) 28 (EC). See also the declarations made by
the EC and a number of its members, including France, on signature, approval or
ratification of the Arhus Convention, availableat
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ctreaty.htm.
184. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Arhus Convention Compliance Committee, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.htm.
185. Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 3), 17,
availableat www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2003/pdf/asp-20030003-en.pdf.
186. Water Framework Directive (WFD) Scotland: River Basin Management,
http://www.sepa.org.uk/wfd/rbmp/index.htm.
187. Water Framework Directive (WFD) Scotland: River Basin Management,
http://www.sepa.org.uk/wfd/rbmp/aag.htm.
188. Water Framework Directive (WFD) Scotland: Stakeholder Groups,
http://www.sepa.org.uk/wfd/stake/index.htm. See also
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Environment/Water/ 17316/NSFNovember2004
(showing that the most recent minutes available from meetings of this group date back
to November 2004).
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Environmental Protection Agency ("SEPA"), which is responsible for
establishing the remit of the RBDAGs, takes the view that the fundamental function of the groups is to prepare sub-basin plans for their
respective areas.' 9
Local priorities and issues heavily influence the membership of
these RBDAGs, but SEPA says the membership will represent public
authorities, major water users and local stakeholders.9 SEPA envisions
that the RBDAGs themselves will set up broader forums in their respective areas to allow wider membership beyond that of the groups
represented on the advisory groups."'
Like France, Scotland, as a part of the United Kingdom, is bound
by the Arhus Convention as implemented through Directive
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information.9 This has
been transposed into Scots law by the Environmental Information
(Scotland) Regulations 2004.'9IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the approaches taken elsewhere in the world, it appears that
States are increasingly using representative basin bodies because they

Scottish Environment Protection Agency [SEPA] River Basin PlanningStrategy for
189.
the Scotland River BasinDistrict at 14 (2005) available at
http://www.sepa.org.uk/pdf/wfd/rbmp/strategy/rbmp-strategy.pdf. Such sub-basin
plans are intended to cover the following:
* identify key priorities for environmental improvement and protection within
the area;
* identify actions and measures to deliver environmental improvement and protection;
" provide advice on the use of alternative objectives (seesection 1.4);
* identify improvements in the coordination and integration of different plans
help to better protect the water environand policies for the area that will
ment and promote its sustainable use;
• coordinate relevant consultation and participation activities within the area;
and
* consider the need for, and use of, further detailed plans and programmes. (id.
at 14).
Id.
190.
Id. at 18.
191.
Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 art. 10, 2003 O.J. (L 041) 26 (EC), available at
192.
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/environmental-info-reg/detailed
specialist-guides/european-directive_ (eur-lex) .pdf.
193. The Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations, 2004, 520, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/ssi2004/20040520.htm; see also Freedom
of Information (Scotland) Act, 2002, (A.S.P.13), availableat
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/en2002/aspen-20020013_en.pdf (providing a general right, with some exceptions, to the information held by public authorities in Scotland (§ 1), and establishes the post of Scottish Information Commissioner
(§ 42) to oversee compliance with both the Act and the Environmental Information
(Scotland) Regulations).
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are anxious to improve the level of public participation in water management. The success of these efforts is less certain, however. Although States generally accept the value of such bodies in principle,
assessing the success of their implementation is more difficult, given
that most are recent, or planned, innovations. Kazakhstan, and the
Nura River in particular, demonstrate the specific problems of effective
implementation. These problems result from a number of broad factors, chief among them:
" uncertainty caused by vague, contradictory, or missing legislative provisions;
" institutional issues, caused by a mismatch between the powers endowed by legislation and the functions of the institution, or capacity problems;
" inadequacy and paucity of available information;
" a focus on the RBC as the fundamental means for achieving
stakeholder participation; and
" slow acceptance on the part of institutions and stakeholders
regarding the involvement of the latter in decision-making.
Merely improving the legal regime would be an inappropriate tool
to properly address issues relating to physical institutional capacity
problems. An improved regulatory system, however, could affect the
other factors, although it is clear that making the legal framework
more effective is not the only mechanism that Kazakhstan might utilize.
It must be borne in mind that the governance framework within
which the water management regime operates, must establish the credibility and legitimacy of the bodies involved. Without these elements,
the respect that organizations engender from stakeholders will fail rapidly. Credibility and legitimacy are achieved through good governance. The World Bank has argued that four principles underlie good
government: accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency. 194
These, then, are the "ingredients" of good governance, and must
be in place if policies are to be successfully implemented. In this case,
the policy goal is IWRM. The authors of this paper would suggest that
if a State is to satisfy these four "ingredients" of good governance, the
following elements must be in place in the state's regulatory framework
for water resource management:

194. Asian Dev. Bank [ADB] Governance:Sound Development Management, 7-13,
(1999), availableat
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/govpolicy.pdf.
195. Id. at 4.
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1. Clear standards of behaviour / performance;
2. Clearly set out functions and responsibilities;
3. Enforcement capacity, commensurate with rights and responsibilities;
4. Rigorous compliance monitoring;
5. Clearly laid out procedures;
6. Open availability of information;
7. Comprehensive / unambiguous criteria to be applied in decision-making; and
8. Protection of 'silent' interests (for example, ecosystems, gender
balance, and disadvantaged social groups).
This paper principally addresses stakeholder participation, but states
cannot achieve the above four factors independently of one another.9
Consequently, if a state's aim is effective participation, then stakeholders must see participation in the wider context of good governance. This links well with the principles of IWRM, one of which emphasizes the importance of a participatory approach. 97' It also means
that states cannot see River Basin Councils, for example, in isolation
from the governance framework within which they have to work.
A.

UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BYVAGUE, CONTRADICTORY, OR MISSING

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

A number of significant problems have been identified above, all of
which would have a potential effect on the extent to which stakeholders become involved in decision-making. The licensing of water use is
tainted by factors such as the fact that licensing is not governed by
clear, unambiguous criteria, as is the case for example in South Africa.
Ambiguity swathes the procedures for suspension and termination of

196. See also Global Water Partnership, Technical Comm. [TEC], Effective Water Governance, 28 TEC Background Papers No. 7 (February 2003) (prepared by Peter Rogers &
Alan W. Hall), availableat
9 6
http://www.wcainfonet.org/servlet/BinaryDownloaderServlet?filename=10625000 2
of
levels
on
all
depends
crucially
("Participation
48_governance.pdf&reflD=102368
government following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing policies. Broad participation is built on social mobilisation and freedom of association and
speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively. Transparency and accountability are built on the free flow of information. Governance institutions and systems
need to communicate among the actors and stakeholders in very direct ways. Correctly
done, this will lead civil society to be socialised into governance over a wide range of
issues.").
197. See The Int'l Conference on Water and the Env't, Dublin Statement on Water and
SustainableDevelopment (Jan. 31, 1992), availableat
http://www.inpim.org/files/Documents/DublinStatmt.pdf.
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water use rights, and these problems combine to increase the possibility that the law is perceived as being inconsistently applied.
The uncertainty relating to basin agreements does not improve
stakeholder involvement. In addition to the lack of clarity regarding
the aims and objectives of basin agreements, there is nothing in the
Water Code to refute the idea that basin agreements might be bilateral. The implication, then, is that it may be possible for a single basin to
be associated with a number of basin agreements, encompassing different users and different regulatory authorities, with no strict requirements as to signatories or priority. Serious questions then arise
with respect to the way in which RBCs would interact with each basin
agreement grouping, and how a variety of possibly bilateral agreements
might best serve the cause of IWRM on any particular basin.
The distinction between primary and secondary users may also be
of great importance when identifying stakeholders. For example,
should River Basin Councils count farmers or industrial users who take
water from commercially-run canals as stakeholders for the purposes of
River Basin Council membership, even though they are not connected
to the licensing authority in any direct way? If not, stakeholder involvement has the potential to be under-representative, with representation only for commercial users of water, as primary users. There appear to be no binding rules regulating the balance of members in
RBCs, and it appears that the guidelines that do exist have been
flouted in the Nura basin. This does nothing to embolden NGOs or
individuals to get involved with RBCs, especially as they are unable to
participate in the RBC meetings, unless the RBC expressly invites
them.198
B. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (CAUSED BY MISMATCHES BETWEEN THE
POWERS ENDOWED BY LEGISLATION AND THE FUNCTIONS OF

INSTITUTIONS), OR CAPACITY

ADB and UNDP projects have extensively documented institutional
problems in the water management field in Kazakhstan." Ultimately,
too many bodies are involved in the management of Kazakhstan's waters, but none has ultimate managerial responsibility. Ground and
surface waters are also not managed in an integrated manner, as different organizations have varying responsibilities over each."'0 There
are perennial problems with the lack of capacity of the RBO, both in
the form of a lack of financial resources, and the absence of staff who

198.
199.

See STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR RIVER BAsIN CouNciLs, supra note 97, 8.
See Schwaiger, supra note 24; KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER
REsOURCES MANAGEMENT & WATER EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT 2005, supra note 23.
200. See KAZAKHSTAN NATIONAL INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT& WATER
EFFICIENCY PLAN, DRAFT 2005, supranote 23, § 11.1.
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are able to monitor and enforce decisions."' Consequently, the RBO
must rely on the users themselves for the information it needs to monitor compliance, and this leads directly to allegations and suspicions of
institutional impotence by users. Both these allegations and the fact
that the Committee for Water Resources is not wholly impartial, and
cannot hope to compete with local executive bodies unless it becomes
a ministry in its own right, damage the RBO's credibility.
With respect to the River Basin Council, its general inability to
produce binding recommendations, other than potentially for the basin scheme, must be regarded as detrimental to its effectiveness. It is
true, as the UNDP points out, the body at this stage is not fully formed,
and it will develop as users become more confident in their ability and
desire to get involved."'2 As the stakeholders' voices get louder, they
will be able to assume more powers. However, the RBC will need a
robust base in the regulatory framework, with detailed provisions setting out mechanisms for its involvement, something that is currently
missing. Its membership should be clearly defined, although without
identifying the individual organizations to be represented, such that
the appropriate balances between interested parties are set and adhered to. The Scottish system, which will identify stakeholders in the
context of each water body, would seem useful in that regard. However, the non-binding recommendations regarding balancing members
that exists in Kazakhstan already, if implemented, would be far more
useful. It raises the more general question of the role of the RBO in
running the RBC. The RBO controls membership in the RBC to a very
large degree, and the RBC is dependent upon the RBO for its financing.
C. INADEQUACY AND PAUCITY OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION

As the article stated above, the RBOs rely on Kazhydromet for data
on surface waters, but suffer from the latter's inclination to produce
inaccurate information for exorbitant sums.2 ' This must hamper the
RBO's ability to fulfill even the limited functions it currently has, and
thereby further diminishes its standing among stakeholders. This
problem necessitates an increase in funding for Kazhydromet, to enable it to upgrade its monitoring network and produce more realistically
priced data. It may be that the culture of the organization needs to
change. One must also ask if the RBOs should continue to rely on
Kazhydromet for data at all if the latter remains at least semicommercial in character. Kazakhstan could address this problem by
strengthening the RBO's monitoring capacity.
201.
202.
203.

Id. § 8.1-8.2.
Id.§9.1.
See TWiNBAS FINAL WORK PACKAGE REPORT, supra note 35, at app. 3.
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More generally, the Kazakh government must adhere to its obligations under the Arhus Convention. 4 In its Decision, the Compliance
Committee found Kazakhstan specifically in breach of Articles 3, 4, and
9 of the Convention, with respect to the availability of environmental
information and access to justice,2

15

and Article 6 in relation to public

participation 6 Although Kazakhstan has had Communications critical
of its implementation of the Convention submitted to the Compliance
Committee four times, more than any other Party, only two of these
have formed the basis of further action. 7 Interestingly, the rationale
behind the Decision of the Parties appears to lie in the practicalities of
implementing the existing provisions in Kazakh law that purport to
transpose the Arhus obligations, and are based on communications
passed to the Committee by Kazakh NGOs
It therefore seems that
the provisions that exist in Kazakh legislation are going in the right
direction, but will rely on further education, and possibly financing, at
relevant institutions and courts. Also, Kazakhstan would be welladvised to implement the Convention in a single cross-cutting instrument, as has been the practice in the European Union, instead of relying on individual provisions, and attempting to safeguard access to
information added to legislation on a case-by-case basis.0
D. SLOW ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF INSTITUTIONS AND
STAKEHOLDERS REGARDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE LATTER IN
DECISION-MAKING
The Arhus Convention Compliance Committee specifically complained that institutions and stakeholders in Kazakhstan have been
slow to accept the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making. '
The authors hope that Kazakhstan will address this issue as above,
principally through educational means. This process will take time,
204. See Ministry of Env't Prot. of the Republic of Kaz. & Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., supra note 83, at 4.
205. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 135, 1 1. Committee that was critical
of Kazakhstan's implementation of the Convention to the Compliance Committee four
times, more than any other Party, only two of these complaints gave the Committee
basis for further action. The second meeting of the Parties took place in Almaty, and
the next meeting must occur within two years of the last one, unless the parties agree.
206. Id. 3.
207. Arhus Convention, supranote 126, art. 10(1).
208. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Compliance Committee,
supra note 184, for all public communications to the Compliance Committee.
209. Within the context of the Arhus Convention, it should be pointed out that
commentators have raised questions regarding the potential for obstruction to justice
for those bringing cases under environmental protection legislation. See, e.g., Yuliya
Mitrofanskaya & Daulet Bideldinov, Modernizing Environmental Protection in Kazakhstan,
12 GEO. INT'L ENrL. L. REiw. 177, 205 (1999-2000).
210. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 135, 1 3.

Issue 1

A CASE STUDYFROM THE NURA RIVER

and will rely on the stakeholders establishing sufficient trust in the system and in the relevant institutions, until their legitimacy becomes
entrenched. It is the view of the authors that this process will only take
place when Kazakhstan makes changes in the regulatory framework, so
that good governance is clearly in place.
E. A Focus ON THE RBC AS THE FUNDAMENTAL MEANS FOR ACHIEVING
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

The River Basin Council system is, to some degree, novel. Kazakhstan might make a greater effort to ensure that other methods
beyond the establishment of RBCs are adopted to ensure stakeholder
participation. The South African system outlined above seeks to control the directors of management authorities, as well as ensure that
stakeholder participation occurs at the implementation level. Kazakhstan should adopt this approach as well. This will encourage
transparency, with corresponding impacts on accountability, and will
lead to an increased quality of governance. Kazakhstan, by seeking to
improve governance, can only increase the standing and value of the
RBC.
It appears from the above conclusions that the Republic of Kazakhstan is driving its policies and regulatory framework in the right
direction to improve its water management, but a number of factors
are hampering progress. The solution to overcoming these problems
lies partly in institutional reorganization and improvements to relevant
legislation to ensure that institutions with appropriate powers and
commensurate enforcement capacity manage Kazakhstan's waters effectively and sustainably. Kazakhstan must also incorporate stakeholder views into decision-making, as its international obligations demand.
Kazakhstan's introduction of River Basin Councils is a step forward in
achieving stakeholder involvement, but this in itself will not be the panacea that some anticipate. It must accompany the introduction of
RBCs with other enhancements to the governance regime if these organizations are to fulfil their full potential. Institutional inertia and
unwillingness on the part of some stakeholders to accept their new
roles will doubtless slow the process down. The authors would suggest
that the above recommendations would go some way towards making
sure that the basin councils provide a forceful voice for stakeholders in
the context of properly integrated water resource management in Kazakhstan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the historical development of Colorado water law, a
select number of doctrines and principles have reigned supreme. The
first principle is the doctrine of prior appropriation found in the Colorado Constitution.' After the Colorado Supreme Court's 1968 decision
in Fellhauer v. People,' the principle of maximum utilization and the
challenges inherent in integrating this principle into a system of vested
water rights added another layer of complexity With the enactment

1. COLO. CONST. art. 16, §6.
Fellhauerv. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
2.
In re Rules Governing New Withdrawals of Ground Water in Water Division No. 3
3.
Affecting the Rate or Direction of Movement of Water in the Confined Aquifer System ("Confined
Aquifer New Use Rulesfor Division 3 ),No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 5 (Dist. Ct. Colo. Water
Div. No. 3, Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter In re Rules], affd sub nom. Simpson v. Cotton Creek
Circles, L.L.C., 181 P.3d 252 (Colo. 2008).
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of Senate Bill 222 in 2004,' the Colorado Legislature has now developed the doctrine of maximum utilization further, requiring the state
engineer to consider the sustainability of optimum or maximum use.
In light of this new principle, and pursuant to the legislative mandates in House Bill 98-1011' and Senate Bill 04-222,' the state engineer
promulgated the Rules Applying to Groundwater Withdrawals in the
San Luis Valley ("the Rules") on June 30, 2004.8 When Cotton Creek
Circles, LLC challenged the Rules' validity in the Division Three Water
Court and subsequently appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court,9 the
Court had its first chance to review both the constitutionality of the
legislation's sustainability mandates and the state engineer's specific
application of this concept in the Rules.
II.THE SAN LUIS VALLEY
A. THE SAN LUIS VALLEY HYDROLOGIC SYSTEM

Located between the San Juan and the Sangre de Cristo mountain
ranges, the San Luis Valley ("Valley") encompasses Colorado's entire
Water Division Three.'" The Valley's highly complex hydrologic and
geologic systems are "unique when compared to other river basins
within the state."" Though the high-altitude Valley has a short growing
season and average annual precipitation of only 7.5 inches, the traditional irrigation practices have sustained a productive agricultural
economy. 2
Colorado's obligations under the Rio Grande Compact command
substantial surface water flows from the Rio Grande and Conejos rivers,

4. S.B. 04-222, 64th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 2004), ch. 235, 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 77779 (2004). Senate Bill 04-222 added Section 37-92-501(4) (a) through (4) (c), COLO.
REv. STAT. (2007), and is still in effect.

5. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 5; see also State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc.,
856 P.2d 496, 505 (Colo. 1993).
6. H.B. 98-1011, 58th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 1998), ch. 231, 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws
852. The Legislature enacted House Bill 98-1011 in 1998, and has since repealed it in
part. House Bill 98-1011 added Section 37-90-102(3) (a), CoLo. REV. STAT. (2003) (repealed 2004); it also added Section 37-90-137(12) (a), CoLo. REV. STAT. (2007), subsection (12) (b) (1) (repealed 2004), and subsection (12) (b) (II); it also added Section 3792-305(6) (c), COLO. REv. STAT. (2007).
7. Colo. S.B. 04-222.
8.

Order of the Colo.State Eng'r Approving The Rules Governing New Withdraw-

als of Ground Water in Water Division 3 Affecting the Rate or Direction of Movement
of Water in the Confined Aquifer System (2004) [hereinafter "Rules"].
9. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op., affd, Simpson, 181 P.3d 252.
10. Simpson,181 P.3d at 254.
11. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 4.
12. Alamosa-LaJaraWater ProtectiveAss'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 917 (Colo. 1984).
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the two major rivers in the Valley." In addition to these surface waters,
the Valley contains both a confined aquifer and an unconfined aquifer.'
The unconfined aquifer lies above the confined aquifer, and
"relatively impermeable beds of clay and basalt" separate them.'" These
impermeable beds are not present around the perimeter of the Valley,
so surface flows recharge the confined aquifer system in those areas."'
The higher elevation of these recharge areas produces artesian pressure in the confined aquifer, "resulting in the free flow of water from
some artesian wells and springs at natural breaks in the confining
layer."' 7 "In some places ... water from the confined aquifer will leak
upward through the confining clay layers into the unconfined aquifer."
18 As a result, there are varying hydrological connections between the
9
unconfined aquifer, the confined aquifer, and the surface streams.'
B.

HISTORICAL WATER USE IN THE SAN LuIs VALLEY

Because of the Valley's agricultural history, water has been a vital
resource for well over one hundred and fifty years." Water users decreed their uses in the area as early as 1852.2' These water users also
rapidly developed the Valley's surface streams for irrigation use during
the mid-to-late 1800s, resulting in the over-appropriation of all streams
in the Valley by 1900.22 "High spring runoff and low summer flows in
the valley streams, coupled with years of severe drought, resulted in
undependable water supplies for irrigation," so water users began to
look for new ways to supplement their water supply."
As a result, water users began to rapidly develop the Valley's
groundwater. Water users first discovered the confined aquifer in
1887; by 1891 there were approximately 2,000 artesian wells in the Valley.2 ' By 1958, the number of wells had risen to 7,500." By contrast,
users did not significantly develop the unconfined aquifer until the
1930s.2 The advent of modern technologies such as powerful large13. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 12-13; Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 53
Stat. 785 (1939).
14. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 255.
15.
In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 9 (citing Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 91718).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
(Colo.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
See id. at 18-28.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19 (citing Alamosa-Lajara Water Protective Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 918
1984)).
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
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capacity pumps and center pivot sprinkler irrigation systems, coupled
with the state's increasing curtailments of surface diversions to meet
Rio Grande Compact requirements, led to water users increasing use
of both the confined and unconfined aquifer. 7 As a result, the level of
artesian pressure in the confined aquifer has declined for many years,
and "the dramatic effect of the record low snowpack and stream flow in
8'
2002 [] significantly worsened the condition of the confined aquifer.
C. HISTORICAL WATER REGULATION IN THE SAN LuIS VALLEY

The discrete water supply and irrigation-dependent economy in
the Valley has produced much controversy regarding the state engineer's administration of water rights. In 1972, pursuant to the 1969
Water Right Determination and Administration Act,2 the state engineer imposed a moratorium on well permits for new appropriations
from the confined aquifer and from the unconfined aquifer outside of
the Closed Basin Division ("Closed Basin").3 In 1981, the state engineer expanded the moratorium to include well permits for new appropriations from the unconfined aquifer within the Closed Basin,31"effectively ending new appropriations of groundwater in the Valley."
The state engineer has strictly administered surface water in the
Valley ever since 1966, when Texas and New Mexico sued Colorado in
the United States Supreme Court for violations of the Rio Grande
Compact.12 As part of a settlement agreement, the parties stipulated
that the litigation "would be stayed if Colorado met its delivery obligation on an annual basis going forward, and used all available administrative and legal powers to assure compliance."" Pursuant to this stipulation, the state engineer has increasingly curtailed diversions from the
Rio Grande and Conejos rivers to meet the Rio Grande Compact obligations.34
In 1975, the state engineer promulgated rules for administration of
the Rio Grande Compact and regulation of groundwater within the
Valley. 3 After numerous appeals and remands between the Division
27.

Id. at 23-24.

28.

Id. at 16.

29. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973)).
30. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 28; San Luis Valley Project, Closed Basin
Division, Colorado, Pub. L. No. 92-514, 86 Stat. 964-70 (authorizing the creation of the
Closed Basin Division). The Closed Basin Division is located in the northeast portion

of the Valley, and is one of two water divisions in the San Luis Valley Project area.
31. Id.
32.

Alamosa-LaJaraProtectiveAss'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 919 (Colo. 1984).
Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, L.L.C., 181 P.3d 252, 256 (Colo. 2008) (citing
Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 919).
34. In re Rules, No. 04-CWAr-24, slip. op. at 16.

33.
35.

Id. at 30.
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Three Water Court and the Colorado Supreme Court, the Colorado
Supreme Court eventually remanded the rules back to the state engineer for reconsideration in light of the principles of reasonable means
of diversion and maximum utilization.36
However, the state engineer did not promulgate new rules regulating existing groundwater use in the Valley.37 Rather, the state engineer
continued to administer wells from both the confined and unconfined
aquifer "to ensure that all groundwater users comply with the restrictions of their well permits and/or their groundwater rights' decrees. '""
Additionally, the state engineer and water users took further steps to
"address issues relating to the overappropriation of both aquifers, the
protection of senior surface rights, and the Rio Grande Compact obligations." 9
During this same period, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation began
the Closed Basin Project to help Colorado fulfill its obligations under
the Rio Grande Compact." The Closed Basin Project aimed to salvage
shallow groundwater that would otherwise be lost to evaporation or
evapotranspiration and deliver the water to the Rio Grande River.4 In
addition to the development of the Closed Basin Project, nearly all of
the major water users in the Valley entered into what is known as the
"60/40 Agreement."4 The agreement called for water users to provide
supplemental water necessary "to allow existing users to maintain their
current levels of production and usage without injuring senior users,"
thereby addressing water users' concerns regarding the impacts of
groundwater well production on surface waters within the Valley."
However, because the Closed Basin Project has consistently produced
less than fifty percent of the expected amount of supplemental water,
water users were dissatisfied with the 60/40 Agreement as a solution to
groundwater issues in the Valley, and deemed it insufficient "to protect

36. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 256 (citing Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 935-36).
37. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 31.
38. Id. at 32.
39. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 256.
40. See Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v. Rio Grande Water ConservationDist., 734 P.2d
627 (Colo. 1987) (discussing the Closed Basin Project); 53 Stat. 785 (1939); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-66-101 (2005).
41. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 32.
42. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 256-57 (citing the Resolution Regarding the Allocation of
the Yield of the Closed Basin Project (the "60/40 Agreement") (Feb. 19, 1985); see also
supra text accompanying note 30. The agreement is known as the 60/40 Agreement
because sixty percent of the usable yield from the Closed Basin Project was to go into
the Rio Grande River, and forty percent of the usable yield was to go into the Conejos

River.
43.

Simpson, 181 P.3d at 256-57.
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senior vested water rights from injury caused by groundwater pumping.,44

Ill. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BACKGROUND
A. LEGISLATION MANDATING RULES: HOUSE BILL

98-1011 AND SENATE

BILL 04-222
In light of the water users' dissatisfaction with the administration of
water within the San Luis Valley, and the need to increasingly curtail
diversions and well pumping to meet Colorado's obligations under the
Rio Grande Compact, the General Assembly mandated that the state
engineer promulgate new rules governing water use in the Valley. 5
The General Assembly mandated these rules in different bills.
The first mandate came in House Bill 98-1011 ("HB 98-1011").46
HB 98-1011 recognized the need for more comprehensive information
regarding the hydrologic relationship between the confined aquifer
and the surface streams within Water Division Three.4 7' The Bill stated
that the state engineer should promulgate new rules that were "based
upon specific study of the confined aquifer system." 4' Despite insufficient knowledge of the aquifer system, the Bill provided that "new
withdrawals of groundwater from the aquifer system in Division Three
could materially injure vested water rights. 4' The Bill also required "a
plan for augmentation for any application in Water Division 3 that involves new withdrawals of groundwater that will affect the rate or direction of movement of water in the Confined Aquifer System. '0 Any such
augmentation plan must "recognize that unappropriated water is not
made available and injury is not prevented as a result of the reduction
of water consumption by nonirrigated native vegetation.""
Following HB 98-1011's mandate for a specific study of the confined aquifer system, the state engineer and the Colorado Water Conservation Board undertook the Rio Grande Decision Support System
study (the "RGDSS Study"), a comprehensive analysis of the San Luis

44. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 33. The Colorado state legislature heard
the water users' remarks during the hearings for Senate Bill 04-222. See also Simpson,
181 P.3d 257 n.6.
45.
46.
852.
47.
102(3)
48.
(2003)
49.
50.
51.

See generally Simpson, 181 P.3d at 257.
H.B. 98-1011, 58th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 1998), ch. 231, 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws
In re Rules, No. 04-CWN-24, slip. op. at 40 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90(a) (2005)).
Simpson, 181 P.3d at 257 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(12)(b)(I)
(repealed 2004)).
Id. at 257 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102(3) (a) (2003) (repealed 2004)).
In re Rules, No. 04-CWAI-24, slip. op. at 40 (discussing HB 98-1011).
Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-305(6) (c) (2005)).
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Valley's geology and hydrology.2 The state engineer and the Colorado
Water Conservation Board performed the RGDSS study from 1998 to
2004, expending some five million dollars in state funds." In the
course of this study, the state engineer developed a computerized
groundwater model ("the RGDSS Model") "to simulate, among other
things, the flow of groundwater in the confined aquifer."'
The second legislative mandate came in 2004, when the General
Assembly enacted Senate Bill 04-222 ("SB 04-222")." SB 04-222 required the state engineer to consider the sustainability of the underground water supply, based largely on maintaining the traditional
range of artesian pressure levels in the aquifer systems in the Valley.56
SB 04-222 also required the state engineer to recognize that the reduction of water consumption by phreatophytes is not a valid method of
creating "new" water, whether that water is to be used "as a source of
replacement water for new water uses or to replace existing depletions,

or as a means to prevent injury from new water uses.""
B. THE RULES

Pursuant to the legislative mandates of both HB 98-1011 and SB 04222, and based on the results of the RGDSS Study, the state engineer
promulgated and adopted the Rules in 2004.58 The Rules applies to
any new withdrawals from the confined aquifer in Division Three that
affect the rate or direction of movement of water in that aquifer system.5 9 The state engineer uses the RGDSS Model to determine if a new
withdrawal will affect the rate or direction of movement of water.' In
accordance with general water law principles, Rule 6 requires that any
new withdrawal of water from the confined aquifer "must prevent in52. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 257 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(12) (b) (I) (repealed 2004)); see also In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 41.
53. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 41.
54. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 257.
55. S.B. 04-222, 64th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 2004), ch. 235, 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 77779 (2004), discussed in Simpson, 181 P.3d at 258; see also In re Rules, No. 04-CNA-24, slip.
op. at 41. In its opinion, the trial court stated:
"If Fellhauerv. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968) opened the curtain
on 'the new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of vested rights,' the 1969 Water Right Determination and Administration Act would represent the 'second act' of administration and creative augmentation. SB 04-222 begins the 'third act' with
a guiding principle that an optimum or maximum use must be sustainable."
In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 5 (citation omitted).
56. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 258 (discussing SB 04-222).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-501(4) (b) (III) (2005).
58. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 1 (discussing the Rules); see also supra text
accompanying note 8.
59. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 258.
60. Id. (citing Rule 6.A.1).
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jury to the vested water rights of others that would be caused by the
new withdrawal."'"
Some of the Rules' requirements are particularly relevant to the
Simpson case. First, Rule 6.B.2 requires an applicant to make a one-forone replacement of the proposed new withdrawal in order to prevent
injury to vested rights.

2

However, this provision also gives applicants

the opportunity to show that "recharge or injection of water into the
confined aquifer system can prevent injury to the vested water rights of
others." 3 Second, the Rules provide that any new withdrawals "shall
not be allowed to cause fluctuations in artesian pressures in the Confined Aquifer to fall outside of the ranges that occurred" between 1978
and 2000, and average artesian pressure levels must remain similar to
those that occurred during the same time period.64 Third, the Rules
state that any nonirrigated native vegetation water usage reductions do
not make available unappropriated water or prevent injury to vested
water rights, and water users may not use this water to offset new withdrawal depletions. 5
IV. LITIGATION
A. INITIAL TRIAL

Cotton Creek Circles, LLC, the San Luis Valley Water Co., and the
Colorado Association of Home Builders (jointly, "opposition"), filed
statements of opposition to the Rules in the Division Three Water
Court ("water court")." After a twenty-six-day trial from January until
March of 2006, the water court issued a lengthy opinion denying the
opposition's protests and affirming the validity of the Rules "in what
may well be the6 most
comprehensive decision ever issued by a Colora7
do water court.

B. THE PARTIES

The proponents of the Rules were the state engineer, the Rio
Grande Water Conservation District, the Rio Grande Water Users Association, and the Conejos Water Conservancy District.' The primary
party of opposition to the Rules was Gary Boyce, the owner of Cotton

61. Id. (citing Rule 6.B).
62. Id. (citing Rule 6.B.2).
63. Id. (citing Rule 6.B.2).
64. Id. at 258-59 (citing Rule 6.B.4).
65. Id. (citing Rule 6.B.7).
66. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 1-2 (Dist. Ct. Colo. Water Div. No. 3, Nov.
9, 2006).
67. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 259.
68. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 2.
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Creek Circles, LLC and the San Luis Valley Water Co.' Cotton Creek
Circles is a 4,700-acre cattle ranch in the northeastern San Luis Valley.
The name Cotton Creek Circles comes from the ranch's several center
pivot irrigation systems, and Cotton Creek, which flows westward onto
7
the property from the Sangre de Cristo mountain rangeY.
The ranch's
decreed surface water rights can control the entire flow of Cotton
Creek, and nine decreed wells that draw water from the confined aquifer supplement the ranch's water supply. All of these water rights existed before the promulgation of the Rules, which means they are exempt from the Rules. However, Cotton Creek Circles claimed at trial
that it might be interested in water development opportunities in the
future - projects
that would likely require new withdrawals from the
1
aquifer system.7
C. THE WATER COURT'S DECISION
During pretrial conference, the opposition stipulated to the withdrawal of many of its objections to the Rules. 3 On its remaining
claims, the opposition argued that the Rules violated both the Colorado Constitution and the state engineer's statutory authority.74 The opposition also claimed that the state engineer's failure to adequately
regulate existing wells was a "key component in the overappropriation
of water in the aquifers and invalidates the assumptions of the RGDSS
[Model].
Based on several key findings, the water court upheld the validity of
the Rules and denied the opposition's various challenges. First, the
water court found that the hydrology and geology of the Valley are
highly complex, and that all available water in the Valley is overappropriated, including its surface streams, the confined aquifer, and the
unconfined aquifer.6 Second, the water court found the current rate
of withdrawal from the aquifers exceeds the recharge rate, resulting in

69. Maria E. Hohn, Note, Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights: The Great Sand Dunes
National Park Application for Absolute GroundwaterRights, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 427,
429 (2007).
70. Allen Hale, Hale-Friesen, LLP, Oral Argument before the Colorado Supreme
Court (December 4, 2007), availableat

http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme-Court/OralArguments/Index.cfm/y
ear/2007 (follow "Dec 07" tab, then follow "07SA42" hyperlink).

71.
72.

Id.
Id.

73.
74.
75.

In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 2.
Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, L.L.C., 181 P.3d 252, 259 (Colo. 2008).
In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 18.

76.

Id. at 4.
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groundwater mining." Thus, any new withdrawals would exacerbate an
already dire situation. 8
Next, the water court found that the Rules' requirements for replacement water, including a one-for-one replacement in most situations, were "necessary to prevent injury to senior water rights, to comply with standards and principles in section 37-92-501(4) (including the
maintenance of a sustainable water supply), and to avoid interfering
with Colorado's ability to meet its Rio Grande Compact obligations."'9
Lastly, the water court found the RGDSS Model to be "reasonably accurate and reliable, and sufficient for its intended uses under the
rules."8 In fact, the water court even commended the wisdom of the
General Assembly in mandating the requirement of decision support
systems such as the RGDSS, calling the RGDSS an "enormous step forward in understanding the hydrogeology of the Rio Grande Basin. 81
Based on these findings, the water court reached several legal conclusions. First, the water court upheld the provisions of SB 04-222,
which mandate sustainability of the aquifers and provide for a baseline
period to measure artesian pressure as a means of evaluating sustainability 12

The court further concluded that the evidence presented at

trial supported the legislative mandate regarding phreatophyte water
consumption as a source of additional water and that this mandate was
within the authority of the General Assembly." Second, the water
court held that the Rules complied with state statutory requirements,
and that neither the Rules, nor the provisions of HB 98-1011 or SB 04222, violated the Colorado or United States Constitutions." Based on
these legal conclusions, the water court found that the opponents had
not met their requisite burden of proof to demonstrate that the water
court should disapprove the Rules. Thus, the water court approved
the Rules. 6 The opposition then appealed to the Colorado Supreme
Court.
D. APPEAL TO

THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT

On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the opposition renewed several of its challenges to both the Rules and the underlying
statutes. The opposition argued that the Rules, HB 98-1011, and SB
77. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 259 (citing In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 4 (internal
citations omitted)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 259 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-501(4) (2005)).
80. Id. (citing In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 5).
81. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 4.
82. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 259 (citing In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 5).
83. In re Rules, No. 04-CW-24, slip. op. at 5.
84. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 259-60.

85.

Id. at 260.

86.

Id.
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04-222 violated the Colorado Constitution by denying the right to appropriate. 7 Specifically, the opposition claimed that the Rules' artesian pressure provision, one-for-one replacement provision, and nonirrigated native vegetation provision denied the right to appropriate water, and thus were unconstitutional and contrary to established Colorado water law.'
The court first addressed the opposition's argument that the artesian pressure provisions in the Rules and SB 04-222 violated the Colorado Constitution by denying the right to appropriate, thus "locking
up unappropriated water." 9 The court rejected this argument on two
grounds. First, the court found that the constitutional right to appropriate only applies in situations where there is unappropriated water
available for appropriation." Because there was no unappropriated
water in either the confined or the unconfined aquifers, limiting new
groundwater withdrawals did not deny the constitutional right to appropriate. "' Second, the court found that several rational bases justify
the Rules' artesian pressure provision, including the protection of
vested water rights, maintenance of a sustainable water supply in the
confined aquifer, and prevention of groundwater use interfering with
Colorado's ability to fulfill its obligations under the Rio Grande Compact." Thus, the court upheld the artesian pressure provisions of the
Rules and SB 04-222. 3
Similarly, the opposition argued that the Rules' replacement provision, which essentially requires a one-for-one replacement for new
withdrawals from the confined aquifer, also denied the constitutional
right to appropriate water." The court rejected this argument on the
same basis as the opposition's first argument, reasoning that because
the constitutional right to appropriate only applies to unappropriated
water, requiring one-for-one replacements in an overappropriated system does not deny the constitutional right to appropriate.95
The court then analyzed the opposition's claim that the Rules' and
HB 101
l's provisions regarding the reduction of water use by phreatophytes "radically altered Colorado water law."9 The court found that
several rational bases justified these provisions, including public policy
and environmental considerations such as balancing "the potential
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 261-62.
Id.
Id.
Id.

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 261-62.
Id.

94.

Id. (discussing Rule 6.B.2).

95.

Id. at 262.

96. Id. at 252 (quoting Opening Brief for Opposer-Appellant at 51, Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, L.L.C., No. 04-CW-24 (Colo.June 25, 2007)).
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environmental consequences of encouraging eradication of phreatophytes against the potential benefits of salvaging water.""
The opposition also argued that the Rules created an irrebuttable
presumption of injury in the instance of every new withdrawal from the
confined aquifer, and "eliminate[d] any possibility of showing that a
particular diversion will not in fact cause injury to vested water rights."98
Though the Colorado Supreme Court previously held in Alamosa LaJara Water Protective Ass'n v. Gould that a general aquifer-wide presumption of injury was permissible, it upheld the rules at issue in that case
because they preserved the right of individuals to rebut this presumption.' In rejecting the opposition's argument, the court noted that the
state engineer based the Rules on a factual finding that a new withdrawal from the confined aquifer would cause injury unless the water
user properly augmented the withdrawal.

'

Further, the court found

that the Rules preserved the individual right to rebut the presumption
of injury, as in Alamosa La-Jara,0 ' by providing an opportunity to rebut
the presumptions of the RGDSS Model regarding the effect of a new
withdrawal on artesian pressure. '
The court next analyzed the opposition's arguments regarding the
failure of the state engineer to adequately regulate existing water users.
The opposition first claimed that "by failing to regulate existing wells,
the state engineer [was] abdicating his responsibility."'0 3 The court
roundly rejected this argument, noting that the state engineer enjoys
wide discretion in regulating the use of groundwater, and that "nothing in the rules precludes further regulation of existing wells.' 0 4
Lastly, the opposition argued that two of the Rules' distinctions violated the Equal Protection clause of both the Colorado Constitution
and the United States Constitution. First, the opposition argued that
the Rules violated Equal Protection by regulating potential future water users, but not existing water users.' Second, the opposition argued
that the Rules also violated Equal Protection by regulating withdrawals
from the confined aquifer, but not the unconfined aquifer.'
The
8
court found that rational bases supported both distinctions.' The different physical characteristics of the two aquifers rationally supported
97. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 262.
98. Id.at 263.
99. Id. at 262 (citing Alamosa-LaJara Water Protective Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914,
931 (Colo. 1984)).
100. Id. at 263.
101. Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 931.
102. Simpson, 181 P.3d at 263.
103. Id.at 263.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 263-64.
106. Id. at 263.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 264.
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the distinction between the confined and unconfined aquifer."° The
fact that "[t]here are fewer, if any, due process issues with regulating
potential users who do not have any existing water rights as compared
with those who have perfected a water right by actual beneficial use"
rationally supported the different treatment afforded to new versus
existing water users. ' Therefore, the court found that both distinctions in the Rules and the underlying legislative mandates do not violate equal protection under either Constitution."'
V. CONCLUSION
In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court made it clear that the
General Assembly may properly require the state engineer to consider
sustainable use principles when promulgating water rules, particularly
in overappropriated water systems. Therefore, even in areas with agricultural economies, Colorado courts will likely uphold administrative
rules that may result in little or no new water development, so long as
these rules are constitutional, within the statutory power of the state
engineer, and in accord with the principle of sustainable use.
Peter C.Johnson

109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
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Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Water War in the Klamath Basin:
Macho Law, Combat Biology, and Dirty Politics, Island Press, Washington, D.C. (2008); 261 pp; $30.00; ISBN 978-1-59726-394-8, paperback.
Water War in the Klamath Basin: Macho Law, Combat Biology, and Dirty
Politics tells the story of the impact of listing three fish species under
the Endangered Species Act on farmers, environmentalists, Indians,
and government agencies in the Klamath Basin. According to the authors, "[t]he title tries to capture the most salient features of events in
the Klamath Basin from the late 1990s through 2007." First, "war,"
describes the conflict over Klamath water between farmers, environmentalists, Indian tribes, and government agencies. Second, "macho
law," refers to prior appropriation and the Endangered Species Act,
which are winner-take-all legal regimes directly opposed to one another. Third, "combat biology," describes how each side in the conflict
used science to bolster its position and attack the opposition. Finally,
"dirty politics," describes improper political interference in the conflict
over Klamath water. The media described this conflict as farmers versus fish; however, the authors delve deeper, explaining the historical
roots of the conflict and the various parties involved.
The book consists of eight chapters, a preface, and an afterword.
The authors start with an overview of the Klamath crisis in the Preface
and in Chapter 1. Chapters 2 through 4 provide background on the
history, geography, ecology, and economy of the Klamath Basin.
Chapter 5 explains the Endangered Species Act and its application in
the Klamath Basin. Chapter 6 explores the role of science in the Klamath conflict. Chapter 7 explains the lessons learned from the conflict. Chapter 8 discusses solutions to the Klamath water war and to
conflicts in western water basins, generally. The afterword provides an
update on the Klamath Basin as of December 2007, including information about a complex settlement that could help resolve the conflict.
The Preface provides background information on the Klamath Basin
and the events that led to the conflict. Specifically, the listing of three
fish species under the Endangered Species Act forced the Bureau of
Reclamation to close the headgates to the Klamath Project in 2001.
This was the first time that the Bureau of Reclamation shut down a
federal reclamation project due to environmental concerns. The Klamath Project is one of the oldest reclamation projects in the country,
which farmers in the region rely on to irrigate their crops. The Bureau
of Reclamation's closure of the Klamath Project headgates meant far-
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mers could not access Klamath water and exercise their water rights.
The closure of the Klamath Project headgates led to the Klamath water
war between farmers, environmentalists, Indian tribes, and government agencies.
Chapter 1, A Water Crisis Exposes PoliticalFault Lines, explains how
the closing of the Klamath Project headgates exacerbated existing conflicts between farmers, fishermen, Indian tribes, environmentalists, and
government agencies. According to the authors, the Klamath Basin
offers lessons for other western basins. The authors explain the "Klamath conflict illustrates four general themes fundamental to understanding conflicts over natural resources anywhere: the historic entrenchment of resource entitlements granted without recognition of
competing interests; the clash of fundamental values closely intertwined with natural resource use; pervasive uncertainty; and a 'problem
shed' extending across political and other boundaries." Furthermore,
the authors offer some basic principles to resolve natural resource conflicts, including requiring a workable vision of a sustainable landscape
based on carrying capacity to achieve a satisfactory resolution.
Chapter 2, A Remote, Upside-Down Watershed, explores how the geography and economy of the Upper and Lower Klamath Basins led to
the water wars. The Upper Klamath Basin is a high desert area prone
to periodic droughts. Even though the Upper Klamath Basin is an arid
region, the economy of this region relies on irrigated farming. In contrast, the Lower Klamath Basin is wet and forested with an economy
based on recreation and commercial fishing. These differences in
both geography and economy of the Upper and Lower Basins contributed to the conflict. Specifically, farmers in the more arid Upper Basin need water for irrigation, while fishermen and recreational users in
the Lower Klamath Basin need water to sustain fishing and recreation
activities. These uses are not compatible, particularly in drought years
like 2001. These incompatible uses led to the Klamath water war.
The Upper and Lower Klamath Basins have different species of fish
because of ecosystem differences and dams that prevent fish migration
between the Upper and Lower Basins. The Upper Basin supports Lost
River and Shortnose suckers while the Lower Basin supports several
species of salmon, including Coho salmon. Federal agencies listed the
Lost River and Shortnose suckers and Coho salmon under the Endangered Species Act. These listings led the Bureau of Reclamation to
keep additional water in Klamath Lake in the Upper Basin for the
suckers, and also led to additional releases of water into the Lower Basin system for the salmon. Thus, area farmers had less water available
to appropriate for irrigation purposes.
In 2001, a drought struck the region, resulting in an insufficient
supply of water to satisfy the needs of both farmers and of fish. The
Bureau of Reclamation closed the irrigation headgates to leave more
water in the Klamath Basin for fish. The Bureau believed that it had
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no other option but to close the irrigation headgates in order to comply with the Endangered Species Act. Closure of the headgates meant
that there was little water for farmers, threatening their livelihood and
cultural identity. The headgate closure exacerbated conflicts between
those that wanted Klamath water for irrigation and those that wanted
water for fishing, recreational, and environmental uses.
Chapter 3, Reclamation Comes to the Klamath, explains how appropriative water rights and federal reclamation projects made irrigation
possible in the Klamath Basin. First, an appropriative water right system is based on the concept of beneficial use that prioritizes current
human use, such as irrigation, over future use or use for the environment. Second, the Klamath Basin Compact, which California and
Oregon negotiated and Congress approved in 1957, places irrigation
use above all other uses. Third, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Upper
Klamath Basin is dry and without the federal reclamation project diverting water from the Klamath River, farming would not be possible in
the Upper Klamath Basin. The Klamath Project allowed diversion of
most of the Upper Klamath Basin's water for agriculture.
However, in addition to irrigation, the Klamath Project also has a
hydroelectric component and a waterfowl protection component. For
example, there are five hydropower dams on the Upper Klamath River,
which require certain minimum flows. Conflicts arise when there is
not enough water to meet the needs for irrigation, hydroelectricity
generation, or waterfowl protection. In order to meet these needs and
achieve a more sustainable use of Klamath water, the authors believe
cuts in irrigation are necessary.
Chapter 4, Those at the Margins: Indians and Wildlife, describes the
Indian tribes that live in the Klamath Basin, their history, and their
water rights. This chapter also describes the wildlife that lives in the
Klamath Basin, including the three listed fish species. The authors
explain the marginalization of the interests of both the Indian tribes
and wildlife in the Klamath Basin.
Chapter 5, BringingMarginalInterests toward the Center, discusses how
environmental laws, particularly the Endangered Species Act, address
marginalized interests. Specifically, the Endangered Species Act puts
wildlife conservation at the center of federal actions, including reclamation. In the Klamath case, the Endangered Species Act put the protection of fish at the center of the controversy. Because the Indian
tribes of the Klamath Basin rely on fish as a source of food and income,
the listing put their interests at the center of the controversy as well.
Chapter 6, Water Wars Become Science Wars, discusses how the Endangered Species Act requires a scientific basis for a listing decision.
However, the Klamath conflict illustrates how each side in the conflict
turned to science to support its position and attack the opposing view.
In addition, the authors explain that while science can inform water
management decisions, science cannot determine water allocation de-
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cisions, because decision makers must also consider public policy and
management priorities.
Chapter 7, Searchingfor Solutions, explains "how the law influences
four major institutional responses to the water crisis of 2001-the political process, litigation, the marketplace, and ad hoc stakeholder-driven
consensus negotiations." The authors describe the competition for
control over Klamath water between farmers, Indian tribes, environmentalists, and government agencies. Additionally, the authors offer
lessons learned from the conflict in the Klamath Basin, including how
reliance on litigation and politics led to parties' negative actions and
hampered a sustainable solution to the Klamath crisis.
Chapter 8, When is a Train Wreck a Good Thing?, discusses the problem of balancing human and environmental uses of rivers. The authors suggest utilizing bioregionalism and place-based experimentation
to address the conflict. Bioregionalism defines the geographic scale of
management, then identifies stresses and methods to relive those
stresses, and devises institutions to implement those methods. The
authors conclude with cautious, but not blind, optimism that we can
resolve the Klamath conflict through these methods.
The Afterword discusses the latest developments of the Klamath conflict as of December 2007, including a complex proposed settlement
between farmers, tribes, fishermen, and government agencies. The
settlement would remove four hydroelectric dams and provide for
adaptive management and long-term monitoring.
Water War in the Klamath Basin Macho Law, Combat Biology, and Dirty
Politics is a useful case study of what happened in the Klamath Basin
and the issues other western water basins may face in the future. The
analysis of the competing legal regimes and their impact on water resource management is of particular interest to a legal reader. The book
provides an informative and interesting story illustrating how history,
culture, law, science, economics, and ecology impact water rights that
goes beyond the paradigm of farmers versus fish.
Roberta Kennedy

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the EPA's approval of Kentucky's designational methodology
and application for identifying "high quality" waters was not arbitrary
or capricious, but that the EPA's approval of six Kentucky exemptions
from the Clean Water Act's Tier II "high quality" status was arbitrary
and capricious, including one for coal-mining discharges that was unlawful).
To achieve part of its water quality goals of eliminating pollutant
discharge into national navigable waters and protecting fish and wildlife, the Clean Water Act ("CWA") requires that states create their own
water quality standards. The CWA mandates that states establish comprehensive water quality standards and goals for all intrastate waters.
The state-set water quality standards must develop and implement a
statewide "antidegradation policy." The policy requires sufficient mitigation of further degradation of existing beneficial uses of navigable
waters. The standards must be consistent with the three tiers into
which the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") divides federal
water quality protection levels.
The Tier I standard applies when the water body requires the water
quality necessary to maintain and protect existing in-stream water uses.
The Tier II standard applies when water quality exceeds levels needed
to support wildlife, fish, and shellfish propagation and human
recreation, unless the state finds that socio-economic development
necessitates reducing water quality. The socio-economic exception
does not apply if the proposed pollution increase would prevent the
watershed's ability to support its designated uses, i.e. prevent "assimilative capacity." Tier III applies to waters of exceptional ecological significance, such as those in national parks. The state must submit its water quality standards to the EPA for review and approval. If the state
water standards do not fulfill CWA requirements, the EPA must notify
the state and specify relevant revisions.
The Kentucky Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (the
"Cabinet") unsuccessfully submitted its antidegradation policy to the
EPA several times for approval from 1995 through 1999. Shortly before the Cabinet submitted a revised set of antidegradation rules to the
EPA, Kentucky Waterways Alliance (the "Alliance") and other organi-
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zations filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky ("district court"), challenging Kentucky's antidegradation policy. After Alliance filed a summary judgment motion in
January 2005 requesting the court to order EPA to promulgate Kentucky's antidegradation rules, but before the court ruled on the motion, the EPA approved Kentucky's revised antidegradation rules. Alliance filed a motion for summary judgment in September 2005, disputing Kentucky's antidegradation implementation procedures. The
district court denied Alliance's motion for summary judgment and
granted the EPA's cross-motion for summary judgment. Alliance appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, contending that the EPA's approval of Kentucky's categorization of certain
waters as Tier I instead of Tier II waters was arbitrary, capricious and
otherwise unlawful. Alliance also contended that the EPA's approval of
Kentucky's exemption of six kinds of pollution discharges from Tier II
status was arbitrary, capricious and unlawful.
The court reviewed the district court's decision de novo and reviewed the EPA's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard
of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Kentucky's "high quality
water," one step down from "exceptional water," receives Tier II protection, while its "impaired water," for watersheds that have at least one
designated impaired use, receives Tier I status. The Alliance asserted
that the EPA's approval of Kentucky's exclusion of impaired waters
from Tier II status to Tier I status was arbitrary and capricious for three
reasons. Alliance argued: (1) that Kentucky's body-by-water-body ("designational") approach was inconsistent with CWA statutory and regulatory goals; (2) that even if the EPA allowed the designational methodology, Kentucky's classification of waters as impaired under the statute was arbitrary and capricious; and (3) that Kentucky's exclusion of
impaired water from Tier II status excluded a significant amount of
state watersheds from Tier II status.
The court held that Kentucky's designational approach was not inconsistent with the CWA because the EPA explicitly allows states to
choose either the designational approach or the parameter-byparameter approach, citing advantages to each. The CWA regulation
is unclear as to whether "levels" refers to specific pollutant levels or
more general water quality levels for relevant uses. Based on this ambiguity, the court held it must defer to the EPA's interpretation, which
allows either approach. Accordingly, the court could not find EPA's
approval of Kentucky's designational approach arbitrary, capricious or
unlawful. Further, the court did not find that Kentucky applied its
designational methodology in an arbitrary or capricious manner because it found that a water body's impairment is sufficient to exclude it
from Tier II status if all impaired watersheds receive equal treatment
for antidegradation. The court held the decision was not arbitrary or
capricious because under CWA regulations, a water body must only fail
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to meet one use to exclude it from Tier II status, not both, as Alliance
maintained. Finally, the court disagreed with Alliance that the EPA's
approval of ninety percent of Kentucky waters for Tier II status meant
that the EPA would actually grant ninety percent of the waters Tier II
status; the court held that the regulations do not require a minimum
threshold for the proportion of a state's waters that must earn Tier I
status.
The court agreed with Alliance that the EPA's approval of six exemptions from Tier II was arbitrary and capricious, holding that five of
them would result in significant water quality degradation, not de minimus, under Tier I status. The court held the EPA must determine
whether Kentucky's regulations would result in significant degradation.
The court focused on how much of the water body's assimilative capacity would decline by shifting the five sets of discharges from Tier II to
Tier I status. However, instead of assessing the impact of individual
exemptions on degradation, the court held that the EPA must calculate the cumulative impact of the exemptions on degradation. The
court also held that the EPA must quantify and justify its assimilative
capacity results and remanded the issue back to EPA to resolve these
deficiencies.
Finally, the court found Kentucky's coal-mining discharge exemption invalid because the EPA unlawfully relied on a Cabinet commitment it falsely interpreted. The EPA violated federal APA approval
procedure by convincing the Cabinet it could demonstrate socioeconomic necessity for coal-mining discharges to exempt them from
Tier II status. The court held that the existing regulations unambiguously precluded Tier II exemptions for coal-mining discharges. The
EPA violated procedural rules and undermined the CWA public participation process by accepting a mere assurance from the Cabinet that it
would show socio-economic necessity for the discharges instead of requiring Kentucky to amend its regulations, as the Act requires.
The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA for the
EPA's approval of Kentucky's methodology for Tier II selection status
and for the EPA's approval of Kentucky's application of that methodology for impaired waters. The court reversed summary judgment for
the EPA on its approval of Kentucky's five de minimus exemptions,
holding it arbitrary and capricious and remanding reconsideration of
the exemptions to the EPA. The court also reversed summary judgment for the EPA on the coal-mining discharge exemption, holding
the action unlawful and remanding it to the EPA for reconsideration.
Suzanne Lieberman
TENTH CIRCUIT
Utah Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. United States, 528 F.3d
712 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding: (1) Utah had standing to litigate ownership of disputed property; (2) the district court did not abuse its discre-
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tion in upholding a water mark stipulation and then vacating a resultingjudgment; (3) the district court did not err in allowing the State of
Utah to raise the landowners' lack of title to disputed property in an
amended complaint; and (4) the district court did not err in quieting
title against the landowners in light of the Color of Title Act).
To determine the boundaries separating the lakebed of Utah Lake
and surrounding private land holdings, the State of Utah ("State")
filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Utah ("district court") first in 1997 against the United States and a private landowner, and then again in 1999 adding 200 private landowners to the
suit. The latter complaint included the Clinger Family Partnership
("Clinger Family"), whose appeal is the subject of this opinion. The
appellate court's decision followed a convoluted procedural history
and a decade of litigation centering on conflicting interpretations of
statehood-era water marks and land patents.
As background, the State and Clinger Family each argued conflicting lakebed boundaries in the Powell Slough area, both looking to
United States Geological Survey ("USGS") marks from 1856 and 1874
to determine the mean high-water elevation mark, called the "meander" line. In short, the 1856 line was eastward and higher in elevation
than the line from 1874.
In its suit, the State claimed that it automatically acquired the lakebed of Utah Lake - a navigable, 150-square-mile freshwater lake west of
Provo - at statehood in 1896 under the Equal Footing Doctrine. The
State claimed it owned the lakebed up to the ordinary high water mark
at statehood and submitted the 1856 USGS meander line as best evidence of the mark, a scenario that would negate any United States or
private property rights between the mark and the water's edge. The
Clinger Family owned property on the east side of the lake in the Powell Slough area and traced its title to an 1881 patent from the United
States to predecessor James Clinger. The Clinger Family argued they
owned the land below the 1856 mark for the following reasons: they
had possessed, used and farmed the disputed property; they had paid
taxes on part of the property; and they had included the property in
deeds from 1887 forward, describing conveyances as stretching from its
deeded ground to the water's edge.
In September 2001, the district court rejected Utah's claim that the
1856 meander line was appropriate, finding that the actual water line
from the year of statehood was not discernable and the State's reasoning not persuasive. The district court instead employed a standard
from a series of cases where the Utah Supreme Court held that the
State had the burden to prove the location of the ordinary high water
mark at statehood and, when it did not, the court quieted title to those
landowners that could offer proof of historical title, use, and possession at statehood. The district court applied that standard in the instant case, but excepted the Powell Slough property.
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In 2002, the State and Clinger Family agreed to a stipulation to determine the level of historic private use on the disputed property. The
effort resulted in an agreed upon ordinary high water mark of 4,481
feet above sea level. The parties then filed a joint motion, granted by
the court, to quiet title in the Clinger Family property claim to that
designated elevation. However, in a surprise move seven months later,
the State motioned to set aside the court's judgment. The State
claimed that when it posed the joint motion establishing the 4,481 elevation mark, state land officials had not understood that the United
States' original assignment of rights did not include property in Powell
Slough. As a result, the State argued its then-counsel did not have authority to enter into an agreement with the Clinger Family. The district court denied the State's motion to set aside the 4,481 stipulation,
but did set aside its earlier judgment in favor of the Clinger Family,
agreeing that the State's former counsel did not have authority to
make the agreement without approval of state land officials.
The State filed a separate motion for partial summary judgment
against the Clinger Family and other property owners in the Powell
Slough, arguing that the Clinger Family's predecessors did not receive
patents to the lake, as the United States had owned parcels between
the lake and the Clinger Family parcel at the time of the 1881 patent.
In a cross-motion, the Clinger Family argued the State did not have an
interest in the property between the two meander lines and between
the 1856 line and 4,481 stipulated ordinary high water mark because
the Clinger Family had occupied, used, and possessed the property
since 1878. The Clinger Family also argued that the State lacked standing as it admitted in its own motion that it did not have claim to the
land between the two meander lines. The district court sided with
Utah on all accounts, finding first that Utah did have standing, as part
of its sovereign lakebed could have been above the lower meander
line, and second, that only the United States' unpatented lands were
subject to the earlier Utah Supreme Court test, as the Clinger Family's
"overreaching" deed did not establish claim to the United States' unpatented land separating the private landowners' land from Utah Lake.
In the present action, the Clinger Family unsuccessfully appealed
four points: (1) the State lacked standing; (2) the district court abused
its discretion in vacating the earlier judgment; (3) the district court
erred in ruling on lack of title by the Clinger Family to the disputed
property as the issue was not pled in litigation; and (4) the court erred
in its interpretation of the Color of Title Act.
The court found no merit to the latter two claims, holding that the
record provided sufficient evidence that the property was in dispute
and that the Clinger's color of title claim against the federal government was a separate, unrelated issue. However, the court gave a greater response to the Clinger Family's first two claims, even though they
were ultimately unsuccessful.
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Pointing to prior court opinions and a Utah public use statute, the
Clinger Family specifically claimed the State lacked standing to litigate
property ownership above the second meander line established in 1874
and to assert claims as a third party on behalf of the United States.
This argument did not persuade the appellate court. The State had
standing because it had asserted a right to the lands above the 1874
mark throughout the prior district court proceedings. In addition, the
parties' competing argument regarding the marks was sufficient to
establish standing. The Utah public use statute also did not diminish
the State's standing, as it did not address boundaries between a lakebed and surrounding property. Finally, the United States' interest did
not diminish the separate interests of the State in the matter.
The Clinger Family's second claim regarded the district court's decision not to vacate the 4,481 stipulation itself, but then to vacate the
judgment that resulted from the stipulation. The district court had
offered two grounds for its decision: first, while the State's formal
counsel had authority to enter into the stipulation itself, counsel
lacked authority to enter into the resulting order; second, the judgment relied on an improper language construction of the stipulation.
However, in its appeal, the Clinger Family had concentrated only on
the court's first analysis. The appellate court denied the appeal, focusing on the fact that the Clinger Family had failed to challenge the improper language construction. The court also found the district court
did not abuse its discretion in separating the stipulation from the
judgment, as the stipulation did not address the Clingers' land specifically and did not set an ultimate boundary.
Nicole A. Bonham Colby
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding: (1) although the government breached its contract
providing water rights to the contracting party, an agency's action to
preserve an endangered species is a sovereign act that shields the
agency from liability; and (2) when the federal government requires a
water rights holder to divert water to comply with the Endangered
Species Act, the diversion results in a compensable physical taking under the Fifth Amendment).
Casitas Municipal Water District ("Casitas") brought this action
against the United States for breach of contract and a physical taking
of a property interest under the Fifth Amendment when the Bureau of
Reclamation ("Reclamation") executed a directive requiring Casitas to
construct, operate, and divert water into a fish ladder facility to comply
with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Casitas and Reclamation
entered into a contract to construct the Ventura River Project
("Project") in 1956. Under the terms of the contract, Reclamation
would build the Project and Casitas would repay Reclamation over a
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period of 40 years for the cost of construction. Casitas was responsible
for any costs associated with the operation and maintenance of the
Project. The contract also granted Casitas the perpetual right to use
any water that became available through the construction and operation of the Project. To acquire these rights, Casitas paid the State of
California to appropriate the water for the Project and obtained permits to use the available water.
The Project diverted and stored water from Coyote Creek and the
Ventura River to provide water for Ventura County, California. The
Project included the Casitas Dam and its reservoir, Lake Casitas, the
Robles Diversion Dam, and Robles Casitas Canal. The Robles Diversion Dam diverted water from the Ventura River into the Robles Casitas Canal, which emptied into Lake Casitas. The water then traveled
through a series of pipes, pumping stations, and balancing reservoirs
for agricultural, industrial, municipal, and domestic uses. In 1959,
Reclamation completed the Project and subsequently transferred it to
Casitas.
Almost 40 years later, the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") listed the steelhead trout as an endangered species under
the ESA. In response to the listing, Reclamation consulted with the
NMFS to avoid any liability under the ESA because the operations of
the Project at the time would result in a "taking" of the West Coast
steelhead trout. The NMFS issued a Biological Opinion, which Reclamation later incorporated into a 2003 directive. The directive compelled Casitas to construct a fish ladder and divert water from the
Project into the fish ladder. Casitas complied with the directive and
constructed the fish ladder at the intersection of the Ventura River,
Robles Diversion Dam, and the Robles-Casitas Canal.
Because diverting water in the fish ladder resulted in a permanent
loss of available water, on January 26, 2005, Casitas filed suit in the
United States Court of Federal Claims against the United States for
breach of contract and a taking without just compensation. Casitas
claimed Reclamation breached its contract by requiring Casitas to divert water into the fish ladder, effectively violating the contract's term
that granted Casitas the right to use the water the Project made available. In response, the government filed a motion for summary judgment for the breach of contract claim and a motion for partial summary judgment for the takings claim. In seeking partial summary
judgment, the government asked the trial court to decide whether the
appropriate standard for Casitas' takings claim was a physical or regulatory taking. The trial court held the sovereign acts doctrine sheltered
the government from liability in a breach of contract claim and
granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the contract claims. The trial court also held the proper standard for Casitas'
takings claim would be a regulatory taking standard, which led Casitas
to concede that it would not prevail. As such, the trial court dismissed
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the case. Casitas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
On appeal, Casitas argued the trial court erred in granting the government summary judgment on its breach of contract claims because:
(1) Reclamation breached the contract when it required Casitas to allocate a portion of its contractual water rights to the operation of the
fish ladder; (2) the sovereign acts doctrine did not apply to the case
because the government could still perform its obligations under the
contract without violating the ESA; and (3) the trial court did not apply the appropriate standard in evaluating its takings claim because
Reclamation's directive required Casitas to divert its water rights, which
resulted in a physical taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision on the breach of contract
claims, but reversed the trial court's finding that the takings claim fell
within the ambit of a regulatory taking.
First, the court held Reclamation breached the contract when it
required Casitas to divert a portion of its water rights under the contract to supply the fish ladder. The contract gave Casitas a perpetual
water right to any water made available by the Project. Reclamation
argued that the wording of the contract did not entitle Casitas to divert
all available water that vested water rights holders on the Ventura River
did not use. Instead, the contract granted Casitas water rights to water
stored in Lake Casitas. The court rejected the government's argument,
finding, by specifically identifying the Robles Diversion Dam as part of
the Project, the clause gave Casitas the right to water made available
from the various attributes of the project, not just Lake Casitas. In addition, the State of California regulated Casitas' water rights and, because Casitas obtained a license that provided the amount of water
Casitas may divert through the Project, the contract clause was a guarantee that the government would not appropriate the water for other
users. As such, the court found Casitas had a right to use the water and
Reclamation's directive compelling Casitas to divert those rights into a
fish ladder denied Casitas a portion of those rights.
The court disagreed, however, with Casitas' argument that the sovereign acts doctrine did not apply because the government could still
perform under the contract and comply with the ESA through a more
modest fish ladder or other systems. Instead, the court found the action of Reclamation to implement the NMFS's Biological Opinion was
a sovereign act that made it impossible for Reclamation to perform its
obligations under the contract. Therefore, the court could not hold
the government liable for breaching the contract.
In addressing Casitas' takings claim, the court found that by directing Casitas to divert water for the operation of the fish ladder, the government appropriated Casitas' water for its own use, resulting in compensable physical taking of Casitas' property right. The court relied on
three cases where the government pursued the acquisition of water
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rights for government use. First, in International Paper Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court held a government order that required Niagara Power Company to terminate the diversion of water to International Paper, Niagara's lessee, to increase power production, was a direct appropriation of water for the benefit of a third party, the public.
Similarly, in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock, the Supreme Court analyzed downstream riparian water rights holders' claim that Reclamation took their water rights by constructing a dam that stored water
and diverted the stored water to upstream landowners, leaving the
downstream water rights holders with a dry riverbed, as a physical takings claim. Lastly, in Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court analyzed a
case factually similar to Gerlach as a physical takings claim because a
Reclamation dam left the downstream water rights holders with insufficient water to meet their needs. The government argued Casitas' case
was distinguishable from the trio of Supreme Court cases because Reclamation did not directly appropriate the water for its own use, nor for
the benefit of a third party. The court rejected the government's arguments and held that, like the trio of cases, Reclamation directly appropriated Casitas' water when it required Casitas to divert the water
for the operation of the fish ladder. In so doing, the government took
Casitas' vested property interest to protect the steelhead trout for the
benefit of the public. As such, the court reversed the trial court and
found the diversion resulted in a physical taking of Casitas' water
rights.
The dissent argued the court should analyze Casitas' takings claim
as a regulatory taking for two reasons: (1) because California, not Casitas, is the legal owner of the water; and (2) because Reclamation did
not take the license or make any proprietary use of the water, which
made the claim fall in the ambit of a regulatory taking. The dissent
argued that Casitas merely held a permit to use the water because, under California law, the public owns all of the water sources in the state.
As such, the United States government cannot physically take the water, leaving Casitas without a claim. The dissent argued that the requirement was more akin to a restriction because it did not take a proprietary interest in the water. The dissent reasoned the requirement
was a limitation on the quantity of water available to Casitas, which relates to the amount of water necessary to maintain Ventura River's hydrological cycle. By maintaining the hydrological cycle, Reclamation
ensures the preservation of the steelhead trout for the public good. In
addition, because the government did not take a consumptive or proprietary use of the water, the requirement is part of Reclamation's regulatory criteria in operating the Project. As such, the dissent would
hold a court should analyze the case as a regulatory taking.
In conclusion, even though Reclamation may have breached its
contract with Casitas when it required Casitas to divert the water for
the operation of a fish ladder to comply with the ESA, the court could

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 12

not hold Reclamation liable. The court found, however, that Casitas
had a physical takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.
Elizabeth A. Dawson
UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. C1. 202 (CI. Ct. 2008) (holding
that the U.S. Forest Service violated Nevada ranchers' Fifth Amendment right after the agency built fences blocking the ranchers access to
the stream, and when stream flows dropped due to an agency policy of
encouraging vegetative growth along the stream and preventing the
ranchers from trimming that growth).
The Hages, ranchers in central Nevada, owned several grazing
permits and vested water rights in streams originating in the Toiyabe
National Forest. After numerous trespassing violations, the United
States Forest Service ("USFS") revoked their grazing permits. In four
earlier decisions, the United States Court of Federal Claims held that
the revocation of grazing permits did not constitute a taking because
the permits were a license, not a property right. Here, the Hages alleged that subsequent USFS policies impaired their vested water rights,
resulting in a regulatory taking.
Beginning in the 1990s, the USFS instituted an elk habitat improvement program that encouraged riparian growth and beaver dams
along the upper reaches of a stream from which the Hages had vested
water rights. The USFS also built fences around the upper reaches that
prevented cattle but allowed elk to reach the water source. The court
used a two-part inquiry to determine if those policies resulted in a taking: (1) whether the Hages would have put the missing water to a
beneficial use to satisfy their usufructory right; and (2) whether the
government actions constituted a taking. The court held the Hages
would have put the water to beneficial use by irrigating the remaining
ranchland as they had in the past when flows were larger.
The court spent more time on the takings question. The court
emphasized that the revocation of the Hages' grazing permits was not a
taking because those permits were licenses, not property rights. However, if the Hages could distinguish their water rights from their grazing rights, the court could perform a takings analysis. The USFS constructed fences around streams from which the Hages' cattle drank
water. The court found the physical impediment to the streams constituted a physical taking because it actively prevented the Hages from
exercising their water rights.
Next, the court analyzed the effects of the USFS policies encouraging riparian growth. In Ennor v. Raine, the Nevada Supreme Court
recognized the right of downstream water users to go upstream and
clear impediments to stream flows. However, the USFS threatened and
did prosecute the Hages when they attempted to clear the brush upstream. To determine whether the USFS had committed a regulatory
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taking, the court applied the three-factor test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City: (1)
the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investmentback expectations; (2) the character of the government action; and (3)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. The court
held that the Hages purchased the water rights with the ranch, satisfying the first factor. The behavior of the USFS, which consisted of
threats, letters, and personal visits, amounted to intimidation, souring
the USFS case for the second factor. The USFS argued the Hages could
have applied for a special use permit, but that the Hages would have
been limited to the use of hand tools. Nevertheless, the court held that
because the amount of resultant work would be so extensive, that stipulation amounted to a prohibition. Lastly, the court held that the ranch
was economically unviable without the water rights.
Thus, the court held the USFS had taken the Hages property, more
than 17,000 acre-feet. At $162.50 an acre foot, the court awarded just
compensation of $2.8 million.
Zachary Smith
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
United States v. Robertson Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 2d
210 (D. D.C. 2008) (holding (1) the United States maintains fee simple
title to the lands it holds, subject to trusts for the public benefit; (2)
the doctrine of accretion only applies to natural increases of riparian
land; and (3) riparian owners qualified right to lay fill and construct
wharves on appurtenant land is subject to governmental regulation).
The United States brought this quiet title action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia against the record-title holders to all
lands, submerged and fast, along the Potomac River waterfront in
Alexandria, Virginia. The Old Dominion Boat Club ("Old Dominion"), one of several named defendants, held record title to two disputed areas, the North and South Tracts, of the Alexandria waterfront.
In this case, Old Dominion moved for summary judgment on the basis
that it had the right to possess the fast land at issue, regardless of
whether the land existed east of the defining "1791 mark." The court
granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The land at issue along the Potomac River originally belonged to
the King of England. Before the American Revolution, the King
granted all the land of what is now the State of Maryland to Lord Baltimore, including the bed of the Potomac River. Lord Baltimore's land
and title passed to Maryland following the American Revolution, and
in 1791 Maryland ceded the land to the United States for the District
of Columbia. Thus, the United States maintained title to the bed of
the Potomac River since 1791.
Old Dominion presented four arguments against the United States'
assertion of title. First, it argued the United States only held trust title,
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rather than fee title, to the bed of the Potomac River. Second, Old
Dominion argued it held title to the fast land on the North and South
Tracts pursuant to the doctrine of accretion. Third, it argued even if it
did not have title, Old Dominion was a riparian owner and had the
fight to lay fill and construct wharves on the beds of navigable waters
appurtenant to its property. Finally, Old Dominion argued several
equitable defenses barred the United States from asserting title to the
land in question: the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel prevented the United States from bringing suit; Congress had effectively
ratified the existence of privately owned fill and wharves on the Alexandria Waterfront; and Old Dominion was a bona fide purchaser, thereby precluding any title action.
The United States principally contended Old Dominion built additions on top of land to which it held title, so the United States therefore owned them. It argued Old Dominion did not have tide to fast
land east of the 1791 mark because the United States held fee simple
title to the land. The United States also asserted Maryland law, as it
existed through the Organic Act of 1801, governs riparian rights within
the District of Columbia. As such, riparian owners must gain authorization to lay fill or construct wharves. However, if Old Dominion did
have a right to act, it was a qualified right subject to regulation by the
United States. Further, any right to lay fill and construct wharves requires riparian owners to allow public access.
Regarding title, the court determined the United States held fee
tide, not just trust title, to the bed of the Potomac River. However,
such title remained subject to a public trust for navigation and fishery,
so the United States could not use the land in any way that would interfere with the trust. Thus, the United States retained fee simple title to
the riverbed, regardless of whether Old Dominion constructed fast
land on top of it.
In addition, the court dismissed Old Dominion's misinterpretation
of Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan that the United States only held the bed of
the Potomac River in trust for future states. Although Hagan held the
United States holds lands in trust for future states, and title passes to a
new'state upon formation, the court noted the District of Columbia is a
territory in which the United States has the express power to exercise
municipal jurisdiction and sovereignty. In addition, because the District of Columbia is not merely a territory that may one day become a
state, the United States does not hold the land in trust for that purpose. Therefore, the United States, through its express municipal
powers, appropriately held fee title to the beds of navigable waters
within the boundaries of the District of Columbia.
The court next addressed Old Dominion's assertion of title
through the doctrine of accretion. In particular, it clarified "accretion"
only refers to natural increases of riparian land through the gradual
deposit of solid material, such as mud or sand. Accretion does not re-
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fer to the purposeful addition of land to waterfront property, such as
Old Dominion's fill and wharves. As such, Old Dominion could not
assert title to the land through the doctrine of accretion.
Regarding a riparian owner's right to lay fill and construct wharves,
the court agreed with the United States that Maryland law of 1801 governed Old Dominion's rights. The Supreme Court in Shivley v. Bowiby
ruled the law of the state that is sovereign over the body of navigable
water at issue determines the riparian rights; in this case, Maryland law
of 1801 governs the District of Columbia. Such law provided riparian
owners a qualified right to lay fill and construct wharves, subject to
United States' regulation.
Additionally, the court ruled that riparian owners do not, merely as
a result of this qualified right, obtain title to the land and/or water
underneath these structures. However, it determined that Old Dominion may construct and possess fill and wharves on the North and
South Tracts, so long as these structures remain within harbor lines.
Thus, the court ruled that Old Dominion was entitled to possess all
structures that it could prove were built within harbor lines. A material
question of fact existed as to whether Old Dominion may possess all of
the open pile structures on the North and South Tracts, as well as the
solid fill on the North Tract.
The court next rejected, for lack of foundation, the United States'
assertion that the law requires a riparian owner to allow public access
to wharves and fill on its land. The United States failed to overcome a
riparian owner's general right to construct wharves and fill for private
purposes.
Lastly, the court rejected all of Old Dominion's equitable defenses.
First, the laches defense never applies to the United States for its title
claims, and the United States brought this action to protect the public
right to the riverbed; therefore Old Dominion could not assert this
defense. Second, Old Dominion failed to satisfy all the elements of
equitable estoppel, namely that it relied on a statute to its detriment.
As such, nothing estopped the United States from asserting title.
Third, Congress' knowledge of private wharves on the Alexandria waterfront did not substantiate an argument that it officially approved of
and ratified them. Finally, not only had the United States never
granted title to the land at issue, as Old Dominion conceded, but Old
Dominion was not even a subsequent grantee of the United States'
originally held land. Therefore, the trial court rejected the bona fide
purchaser defense.
In conclusion, the court held Old Dominion could possess the land
because there was no dispute of material fact that all of the fast land on
the North Tract and all of the open pile piers on the South Tract were
within the appropriate harbor lines. However, there were disputes of
material fact as to the following: (1) whether all of the solid fill on the
South Tract was within harbor lines; (2) whether Old Dominion was
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entitled to possess the open pile structures on the North and South
Tracts; and (3) whether Old Dominion was entitled to possess the solid
fill on the North Tract. As such, the district court granted Old Dominion's motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part.
Brandonj Campbell
STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, No. 1 CA-CV 06-0442, 2008 WL
2895941 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 29, 2008) (holding: (1) Strawberry Water
Company had standing to sue in a utility tampering action because it,
or its predecessor, provided water services to the pipe from which Paulsen diverted water; (2) Strawberry Water Company had standing to sue
for conversion of its water because the water was personal property
while it maintained actual possession and control; and (3) comparative
fault applied to a conversion claim because the water was personal
property).
Frank Parkinson owned a water company in Strawberry, Arizona.
He installed a pipe that diverted water from his company's line to fill a
pond at his personal residence. Strawberry Water Company ("Strawberry") was the successor in interest to the water line from which Parkinson diverted water. Randall and Virginia Paulsen ("Paulsen")
owned Parkinson's house and the accompanying pond. Strawberry
sued Paulsen, alleging conversion and utility tampering for unlawfully
diverting Strawberry's water to fill the pond. The jury found for Strawberry and awarded damages. Paulsen appealed to the Arizona Court of
Appeals and claimed Strawberry lacked standing because it had not
established an ownership interest in the water. Additionally, he
claimed that comparative fault applied to the award of damages.
The court first addressed whether Strawberry had standing. Arizona uses the real party in interest test, which requires the plaintiff to
show that it has an interest in the outcome of the litigation. In an action for utility tampering, the law does not impose a requirement of
ownership. Any public utility may bring the action if it shows that "it or
its predecessors were providing water to the pipe from which the water
was diverted." Here, Paulsen acknowledged that Strawberry provided
the water in the pipe. Since Strawberry provided the water, it had an
interest in the litigation's outcome and thus had standing to sue.
To have standing in an action for conversion, however, the plaintiff
must show ownership of the chattel. Water rights represent an interest
in real property. Specifically, groundwater is a usufructuary right,
which means a right to use, not own. Since water is not personal property, water rights are not susceptible to a claim for conversion. When,
however, the holder of water rights pumps water though pipes and
reduces it to actual possession and control, the water becomes personal
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property. It remains personal property until the owner abandons or
loses control over the water.
The court found that Strawberry owned the water as personal
property. Strawberry pumped the water through its pipes and thus
reduced it to actual possession and control. The court also read the
conversion and water tampering statutes together. Such reading
created a rebuttable presumption of ownership in Strawberry because
it pumped the water from its well and Paulsen diverted the water by
bypassing the meter. Since Strawberry pumped the water from its well
and maintained possession and control of the water in its pipes, the
court held that Strawberry had standing to bring a claim for conversion.
Paulsen's final argument was that the trial court erred by not
giving the jury a comparative fault instruction. Paulsen claimed that
such an instruction was necessary to apportion fault to previous owners
of the pond. Comparative fault applies to actions for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death. Since the conversion claim involved personal property, the court held that comparative fault applied. Thus, the trial court erred when it denied Paulsen's request for
the comparative fault jury instruction. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a new trial.
Williamj Garehime
CALIFORNIA
Brewer v. Murphy, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
that a lower riparian owner may acquire a prescriptive water right as a
result of adverse use by diverting water from an upper riparian holder's
property).
In August 2003, Lyle and Elizabeth Brewer ("Brewers") brought
this action to quiet title to their water rights and for a judgment to acknowledge that they owned a prescriptive easement in Dean Murphy
and Keith Klein's (collectively "Murphys") land. Since the time the
Brewers purchased their property in 1979, a spring located on the
Murphys' property has been their water source. The water came from
a spring box located in an intermittent stream. Even though the intermittent stream ran from the Murphys' property to the Brewers'
property, the water flowed through a galvanized pipe that crossed other parcels of land to reach the Brewers' property. The Murphys, however, were unaware there was a spring located on the property, or that
the Brewers were using water diverted from the spring for residential
use.
The Brewers acquired a right to use the water from the spring from
the California State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") in
2001. Shortly thereafter, Stephen Hagg ("Hagg"), an owner of one of
the parcels that the water line crossed, filed a water right complaint
with the SWRCB. In its response report, the SWRCB stated that Hagg
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could use the water in the line pursuant to a riparian right. Similarly,
the Brewers and other property owners downstream of the Murphys'
property could also use the water under a riparian right. The report
indicated, however, that the amount of flow in the water line might
limit the riparian rights of downstream owners. In addition, the
SWRCB recommended all parties get permission from the Murphys to
the water line's diversion point on the Murphys' property.
The Brewers contacted the Murphys to get permission to access to
the spring. The negotiations failed, however, partly because the Brewers refused to abandon their claims of any prior water rights. As such,
the Brewers filed suit against the Murphys in the Superior Court of
Fresno County. After a bench trial, the court determined that the
Brewers had a prescriptive easement over the Murphys' property as
well as a right to divert water from the spring pursuant to the Brewers
permit from the SWRCB. The Murphys appealed the trial court's decision to the California Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Murphys argued that, under the California Water
Code, a party cannot adversely possess water rights. To rebut the Murphy's argument, the Brewers argued that, as riparian landowners, they
fell within an exception to the rule. The Murphys supported their argument with the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Shirokow, which held an upstream landowner could not claim a prescriptive
water right against the state. The court distinguished the Brewers'
claim, noting the holding in Shirokow applied to prescriptive easements
against the state. In rejecting the Murphys' argument, the court relied
on Lindsay v. King and Saxon v. DuBois, which held a lower riparian
owner can acquire a prescriptive water right by diverting water from an
upper riparian land owner. As such, the court held that a lower riparian owner can acquire a prescriptive water right from an upper riparian owner through adverse use.
Next, the Murphys argued the Brewers were not riparian right
holders because the Brewers' property was not adjacent to a watercourse. The court determined that sufficient evidence demonstrated
the existence of the intermittent stream between the Murphys' property and the Brewers' property. As such, the Brewers' property was adjacent to a watercourse, providing the Brewers with riparian water rights.
Lastly, the court found the Brewers met all the elements necessary
to acquire prescriptive water rights. The Brewers' use of the water was
actual, open and notorious, hostile and adverse to the Murphys, continuous and uninterrupted, under a claim of right, and for a period of
over twenty years.
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
ElizabethA. Dawson
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INDIANA
Bowyer v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 882 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that a state agency may determine the average normal
water level of a public lake through a procedure in related code sections when the applicable code section does not specify a method for
determining this level, and the related code sections address the same
subject).
The Indiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") filed suit
against the current and former owners of a campground, Larry Bowyer
and Karen Garling (collectively "Bowyer") to stop the illegal dumping
of debris into Lake Cicott, a lake adjacent to the campground. Bowyer
requested a determination of whether the lake was public, and thus
subject to DNR regulation. The Circuit Court of Cass County found
that Lake Cicott was public. Bowyer appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Indiana and the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The
DNR obtained a temporary restraining order against Bowyer from
conducting any construction activities below the shoreline of Lake Cicott. Thereafter, the DNR determined the shoreline to be 702 feet
above sea level, and filed a motion to hold Bowyer in contempt for violating the temporary restraining order through continued construction activities below the DNR-determined shoreline. The trial court
found Bowyer in contempt.
The court reversed the trial court's finding because the temporary
restraining order was too vague in the meaning of "shoreline" and the
DNR failed to give Bowyer notice of its shoreline determination.
Bowyer filed a motion with the trial court for a formal determination
of the average water level of Lake Cicott, and the trial court ordered
the DNR to file a report pursuant to Indiana Code Chapter 14-26-4
("Chapter 4"). After reviewing the report, the trial court entered
judgment, finding the legal lake level for Lake Cicott to be 702 feet
above sea level. The trial court based its judgment on the DNR's procedure for measuring the shoreline of a lake, found in Indiana Code
Chapter 14-26-2 ("Chapter 2"). The DNR prepared a report and attached the data necessary to establish the legal lake level of Lake Cicott, pursuant to Chapter 4. Bowyer did not present any credible evidence to counter the level that the DNR calculated. Bowyer appealed
the judgment.
Bowyer argued that the trial court should have determined the average normal water level using Chapter 4, the average normal water
level statute, instead of Chapter 2, the lake preservation statute. According to Bowyer, Chapter 4 was the governing statute and it required
at least ten years of observation to determine the average normal water
level. The DNR, in one day, calculated the average normal water level
of Lake Cicott by taking the average of nine points along the line of
demarcation on the lakebed.
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The Court concluded that Bowyer's argument was a challenge to
the trial court's construction of the statutes. The Court said that the
goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. If the legislative intent is clear
from the language of the statute, the language prevails and the court
will give it effect. Where statutes address the same subject, they are in
pari material,and the Court will harmonize them if possible.
In this case, the Court stated that Chapter 4 authorized the DNR to
determine Lake Cicott's average normal water level. However, Chapter
4 did not specify the procedure for measuring the average normal water level. The trial court analyzed related code sections for procedures
to measure the average normal water level of Lake Cicott, and found a
procedure in Chapter 2. Because Chapters 2 and 4 both governed the
management of public lakes, the two chapters were in pari material,and
the Court determined that the trial court did not err in using a Chapter 2 procedure for measuring the level of a public lake when no procedure existed in Chapter 4. Additionally, the Court concluded that
Bowyer incorrectly construed Chapter 4. The Court stated that the
plain language of Chapter 4 required a report that contained the data
necessary to compute the ten-year high water level of Lake Cicott, but
the report need not compute that figure. The DNR correctly used the
procedure in Chapter 2 to calculate this level.
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court establishing the
legal level of Lake Cicott to be 702 feet above sea level.
Adam Hernandez
Ctr. Townhouse Corp. v. City of Mishawaka, 882 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (affirming the district court holding that construction of a
footbridge across a river, connecting two pieces of city owned property,
constituted a taking of certain riparian rights of adjacent private landowners, but holding further that Indiana does not recognize a riparian right to an unobstructed view of the water).
Center Townhouse Corporation and individual riverfront property
owners ("Landowners") brought an inverse condemnation action
against the City of Mishawaka ("City") arising from the construction of
a pedestrian bridge across a river, connecting two pieces of city property. The Landowners sought damages on the claim that construction of
the bridge resulted in a taking of certain riparian property rights without just compensation, including the right to an unobstructed view of
the river. The City argued that as the bridge was built entirely on City
property and did not physically occupy private property, it was not a
taking. In addition, the City claimed that the bridge did not substantially interfere with Landowners' riparian rights or otherwise diminish
property values. The City also noted that its riparian rights are equal
to Landowners' riparian rights and should not be subordinate.
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The St. Joseph County Circuit Court held that a taking had occurred, and where state action infringes on riparian rights, the owners
are entitled to compensation for the loss they suffered. Specifically,
the court held that the City had taken an interest in the Landowners'
riparian rights to ingress and egress, to construct a pier or dock, and to
boat on and fish in the river. The trial court also found that such interference with Landowners' riparian rights caused a loss in property
value. However, the trial court declined to rule upon whether Indiana
recognized a riparian right to an unobstructed view. Upon receiving
instructions not to consider any potential loss of view, a subsequent
jury trial to determine damages returned a verdict of zero damages.
The Landowners appealed the jury instruction and damages judgment
to the Indiana Court of Appeals, and the City cross-appealed the decision that a taking had occurred.
The court began its analysis by stating the issues as follows: (1)
whether the trial court erred in holding that construction of the bridge
constituted a taking; (2) whether Indiana recognizes a riparian right to
an unobstructed view of the water; and (3) whether the trial court
erred in instructing the jury not to consider any loss of view when determining damages. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision regarding the takings question on procedural grounds, despite
the City's claim that the evidence did not support the trial court's findings. The court held that the City's failure to produce a transcript of
the trial court decision, and therefore its failure to establish evidence
necessary to evaluate the trial court's findings, worked as a waiver of its
argument. The court further held that waiver notwithstanding, the
City also failed to meet its burden of establishing the trial court's
judgment was clearly erroneous.
The court next addressed the Landowner's claim that the court
should recognize the loss of view as an injury to riparian rights and
include that loss as a compensable element of damages. After a review
of the relevant Indiana law of takings and riparian rights, as well as a
brief survey of whether other states conceive loss of view as a compensable riparian right, the court declined to hold that riparian rights in
Indiana include the right to an unobstructed view. Rather, the court
held that determining the scope of a landowner's view, and the parameter of permissible obstruction, is inappropriate for the court and
better left to the legislature and local zoning authorities who are
equipped to proscribe unwanted uses and protect landowners' view of
state waters. In addition, the court noted that even if Indiana recognized an unobstructed view as a compensable property right, the loss
of view must substantially interfere with property rights to be compensable under established takings law, which might not have been the case
here.
Finally, the court declined to hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to disregard any loss of view when determining dam-
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ages. After establishing that its review of the trial court's jury instructions is highly deferential and that it will not disturb the trial court absent an abuse of discretion, the court agreed with the lower court's
judgment that, given the nature of testimony regarding the view of the
river, such an instruction was necessary to prevent confusion to the
jury. The court held that the instruction was neither misleading, nor
misstated the law, and found no error.
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the district court ruling, holding that the City's construction of the bridge constituted a
taking of landowners' riparian fights, that Indiana does not recognize
a riparian right to an unobstructed view, and accordingly, that jury instructions not to consider any loss of view when determining damages
was not in error.
Jeff McGaughran
Lukis v. Ray, 888 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding the various
standards for determining the riparian zones of contiguous lakefront
properties are fluid and best applied on a case-by-case basis depending
on the characteristics of the shoreline and position of the property
with respect to the shoreline).
The dispute between appellant-respondent Michael Lukis ("Lukis")
and appellees-petitioners Dean Ray, John Blackburn and Thomas
Blackburn (the "Blackburns"), involved the the parties' riparian rights
as owners of contiguous shoreline properties. Lukis's property was on
the western boundary of the Blackburns' property and Ray's property
was on the eastern boundary of the Blackburns' property. All of the
parties' lots were irregularly shaped, and none of the lots intersected
the lake at right angles. Ray's and the Blackburns' properties were part
of the Gleneyre Association ("Association") and subject to the Association's constitution, bylaws, and restrictive covenants.
The conflict arose when Lukis installed a pier measuring eightynine feet long and twenty-seven feet wide, which was located ten feet
closer to the Blackburns' property than the prior owners' pier. Consequently, the Blackburns had to relocate their pier thirty feet farther
east, which left Ray with no access to the lake from the west side of his
pier. Ray had to shorten his pier by twenty feet and park his boat on
the east side of his pier, outside of his property boundaries with the
permission of his neighbors.
Following Lukis's refusal to decrease the size of his pier or move his
pier westward, Ray instituted an action with the Indiana Natural Resources Commission ("NRC") to resolve the dispute. In response to
Ray's claim, Lukis filed a counterclaim against Ray and .a cross-claim
against the Blackburns alleging unreasonable interference with his
riparian rights.
On June 8, 2006, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a
hearing and issued a non-final order on August 16, 2006. The ALJ
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found that no set rules exist for determining the extension of property
boundaries into a lake, and that courts have used two general principles to make this determination. The first principle, as stated in Bath
v. Courts, applies to properties with boundaries perpendicular to a relatively straight shoreline. In this situation, "the boundaries are determined by extending the onshore property boundaries" into the lake.
The second principle, as applied in Nosek v. Stryker, states that the
boundary lines "should divide the available navigable waterfront in
proportion to the amount of shoreline of each owner." This principle
is applied when the shoreline is irregular because drawing lines at right
angles to the shoreline would not result in a just apportionment of the
property owners' boundaries. Lastly, while the court did not address
how far the boundaries of the parties' riparian zones extended into a
lake, it stated that the determination would be made using the "reasonableness" test, which accommodates the various characteristics of
Indiana lakes versus using depth or length to determine the boundaries.
Despite the irregularity of the parties' shoreline, the ALJ found
that extending the onshore property lines into the lake still resulted in
a just apportionment between the properties based on the owners' respective shorelines. The ALJ also found that the Association's covenant governing the determination of riparian zones of lakefront owners was consistent with the decision to extend the onshore property
lines into the lake. While Ray argued that Lukis' pier was longer and
wider than other piers in the area, the ALJ found that the lengths and
widths of piers in the area vary and that the evidence did not support
Ray's assertion.
Ray and the Blackburns filed written objections to the non-final
order; however, the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act Committee of the NRC issued a final order adopting the ALJ's non-final
order. On review, the trial court concluded that the ALJ erred by extending the onshore property boundaries into the lake to establish the
parties' respective riparian zones. The trial court found that the ALJ
should have applied the apportionment method of establishing the
riparian zones because the shorelines at issue were not straight. That
method allocates navigable waterfronts in proportion to the width of
the property owner's shoreline. On September 24, 2007, after a hearing, the trial court remanded the dispute to the NRC holding that the
ALJ's decision was contrary to law. Lukisappealed the trial court's order.
The Court of Appeals of Indiana began its discussion by explaining
four general rights associated with riparian ownership in Indiana. The
court stated a riparian owner has "(1) the right of access to navigable
water; (2) the right to build a pier out to the line of navigability; (3)
the right to accretions; and (4) the right to reasonable use of the water
for general purposes .

. . ."

Based on the principles set forth in Bath
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and Nosek, the court agreed with the trial court and the ALJ that no set
rule exists for establishing the property boundaries into a lake between
contiguous shoreline properties. While the court found that the apportionment method of determining riparian rights was appropriate,
the State of Indiana has never adopted this as the fixed rule for establishing the riparian zones of contiguous shoreline property owners.
Therefore, the court found that the trial court erred in its conclusion
that the NRC's decision to forgo the apportionment method was contrary to law.
Lastly, while Ray argued that he lacked exclusive access to navigable water, and that the NRC decision effectively resulted in a taking of
property, the court declined to address these issues. Ultimately, the
court reversed the trial court's holding because it found that the NRC's
determination of the parties' riparian zones was appropriate.
Kimberly Folk
LOUISIANA
Hamel's Farm, L.L.C. v. Muslow, 988 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir.
2008) (holding that an avulsion which changes land and water borders
does not deprive a landowner of title to real property, and to obtain
land via acquisitive prescription one must exclusively use every part of a
property for the requisite time frame).
Hamel's Farm, L.L.C. ("Hamel's Farm") brought action to quiet
title, and sought the court to declare it the owner of 12.62 acres of
property, the majority of which was covered by a lake. The First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo found that the defendants,
Ike and Bertie Muslow ("the Muslows"), were the owners of the portion
of the property under the lake's surface, but that Hamel's Farm had
acquired ownership of the dry property via acquisitive prescription.
Hamel's Farm appealed ownership of the portion underwater to the
Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Muslows
cross-appealed the judgment, asserting they were owners of the dry
portion. Both parties, as the basis for appeal, stated they had lawful
ownership of the entire property through valid tile, or alternatively,
through acquisitive prescription. Hamel's Farm also argued that it
acquired the property when alluvion formed the land.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's holding for clear or
manifest error. The court first examined each party's title. Hamel's
Farm presented two deeds to support its position: one from 1941, and
another from 1957 conveying the property to Hamel's Farm. Although
the deeds mentioned several parcels of land by their common names,
they did not name the property in dispute by its common name, Dixie
Gardens. The Muslows' title was traceable back to a 1928 deed that
named Dixie Gardens and the plats in dispute. The court upheld as
reasonable the trial court's finding that the Muslows held valid tile.
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Both parties presented expert testimony regarding how the dry
land came into existence and how the lake formed over the part of the
property. Hamel's Farm asserted that the disputed dry property came
into existence due to alluvion, the slow process of accretion or dereliction of land bordering water. When alluvion causes land formation,
Louisiana law awards the ownership of the newly dry land to the owner
of the adjacent land, in this case Hamel's Farm. The Muslows contended that the entire land was dry when their predecessors-in-title
purchased it, and an avulsion covered part of it by the lake. An avulsion is a sudden change to the river course, which covers or exposes
land. However, an avulsion does not deprive a landowner of title, even
if the government compensates a landowner for the land. The Muslows presented evidence that local levee board compensated their ancestor-in-title for land lost when a levee was constructed. The Muslows'
expert testified that this lost land was the portion of the disputed
property now under water.
The court reiterated the standard that the factfinder must determine the credibility of competing expert testimony. The court held
that the record supported the trial court's finding that alluvion did not
create the dry property, but that an avulsion caused the lake to cover
part of the dry land. Therefore, the trial court affirmed that the Muslows held valid title to the land unless Hamel's Farm had acquired it
through acquisitive prescription.
The court next examined if the trial court erred in determining
that Hamel's Farm gained possession to any portion of the property
through acquisitive prescription. The trial court determined that Hamel's Farm owned the property through prescriptive acquisition, which
it attained under Louisiana law when it used the property for thirty
years. However, in order for Hamel's Farm to acquire the property by
prescription, it must have truly and exclusively possessed every part of
the property. Both Hamel's Farm and the Muslows used the property
primarily for recreation, so Hamel's Farm did not use it to the exclusion of others. The court held because Hamel's Farm could not show
actual possession of the entire property either by "inch by inch" use or
enclosure of the property, it did not have the actual possession required to gain ownership by prescription.
The court found the Muslows were the owners of the disputed
12.62 acres under a valid title, and held Hamel's Farm did not own any
portion of the disputed property via title or acquisitive prescription.
The court overturned the trial court's award of the dry portion of the
property to Hamel's Farm and upheld the remaining judgment that
the Muslows owned the portion of the property under the lake.
Julie R. Andress
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MASSACHUSETTS
Houghton v. Johnson, 887 N.E.2d 1073 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding
the previous owner of upland property did not expressly sever tidal
flats from upland property, that the parties lacked the intent required
to find an implied easement, and that beach users failed to prove prescriptive easements in tidal flats).
In August 2004, LindaJean Johnson posted no trespassing signs on
the beach frontage seaward of her property on Cape Cod Bay in Eastham, Massachusetts. NancyJ. Houghton and fifty-nine other plaintiffs
(hereinafter "beach users") sought declaratory judgment on claims of
implied and prescriptive easements to allow their continued use of the
seaward portion of Johnson's property for customary beach activities.
The Land Court granted Johnson's motion for summary judgment.
The beach users appealed to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, arguing that Johnson did not demonstrate ownership of the tidal flats,
and that the trial court erred in concluding the beach users did not
possess implied or prescriptive easements.
The court had to decide whether the previous landowner severed
the tidal flats from the upland property. To determine whether a
property owner severed tidal flats from the upland property in a conveyance, the court considered the presumed intent of the grantor, the
written conveyance, and the attendant circumstances. Here, the court
traced the title history of Johnson's property. A previous owner
showed no intent to sever the tidal flats: the previous owner failed to
reserve any right to the tidal flats in the deeds to later owners, and never claimed any interest in the flats. Because there was no evidence of
an express severance of the upland property from the tidal flats, title to
the tidal flats accompanied title to the upland property.
The court also addressed the issue of implied easement. An implied easement exists by the presumed intent of the parties, based on
the language of the conveyance in light of the circumstances, the physical condition of the premises, and the knowledge of the parties. The
court held that a 1924 plan for this subdivision did not indicate plans
for the property to be part of a community beach, nor was there any
evidence of a discernable pattern of language in the deeds to indicate
prior owner Houghton's intent to create a community beach. In addition, the beach users claimed long-standing use of the property as support for an implied easement. However, without a finding of an existing implied easement, the court saw no need to consider that argument.
The beach users claimed a prescriptive easement based on their
use of the property before Johnson owned the property. Each beach
user had the individual burden of establishing a prescriptive easement.
This required showing, by clear proof, that he or she used the property
in a manner that has been open, notorious, adverse to the owner, and
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continuous or uninterrupted over a period of no less than twenty years.
Here, none of the beach users established a prescriptive easement in
Johnson's property. The previous owner ofJohnson's property allowed
beach users to use the property, but exercised control in matters of
importance and concern to her, including directing beach users to stay
off the dunes. In addition, each beach user had to show more than a
collective, but individually sporadic and nonexclusive, use ofJohnson's
property for the court to grant a presumptive easement. However, the
beach users did not confine their use of the beach to Johnson's property; they used the seaward parts of many properties in the area. The
court held that none of the beach users had any right to use Johnson's
property seaward to the mean low water mark. However, the beach
users still had the right to fish, fowl, or navigate between the mean
high and mean low water marks of the property.
The court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment because Johnson owned the tidal flats and the beach users could not establish implied or prescriptive easements in the property.
HeatherRutherford
NEBRASKA
Upper Big Blue Natural Res. Dist. v. Neb. Dep't of Natural Res., 756
N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 2008) (holding that a state agency did not exceed its
authority in enacting a rule requiring consideration of hydrological
connections when determining the appropriated status of a river basin).
In 2006, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"),
acting under authority of the Nebraska Ground Water Management
and Protection Act (the "Act"), determined that the Upper Platte River
Basin was fully appropriated. Such a determination imposed certain
restrictions with respect to the use of surface water and groundwater in
the affected geographic area. To reach this determination, the DNR
included a small geographic area located in the Big Blue River Basin
because there is a hydrological connection between its groundwater
and the surface water in the Upper Platte River Basin. The geographic
area located in the Big Blue River Basin was within the boundaries of
the Upper Big Blue Natural Resources District ("District").
The District sued the DNR in the District Court of Lancaster County, alleging that the DNR exceeded its statutory authority under the Act
when it considered a geographic area located in the Big Blue River
Basin as part of the fully appropriated Upper Platte River Basin. The
trial court found that the DNR did not exceed its authority and affirmed the actions of the DNR. The District appealed the trial court's
decision and the Supreme Court of Nebraska granted bypass of the
Court of Appeals.
The DNR adopted a rule that specified the method for determining areas within which the DNR considered surface water and ground-
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water to be hydrologically connected. The District argued that the
DNR exceeded its authority in adopting this rule because no statute
permitted the DNR to cross natural resources district boundary lines
when making determinations regarding the appropriated status of river basins, subbasins, and reaches. Moreover, the District argued that
the Act expressly provided that the DNR should evaluate independently the hydrological connection in each of the state's river basins. According to the District, the language implied that the DNR should not
consider areas outside a river basin in determining appropriated status.
The court held that the Act authorized the DNR to adopt a rule
that considered the geographic area in one river basin when making its
determination that a second river basin was fully appropriated. The
court examined the legislative history of the Act and found that the
legislature was aware of the hydrological connections between surface
water and ground water, and wanted to protect those resources. The
legislature also considered, that the hydrological connections often
affected more than one natural resources district when drafting the
Act. Additionally, the legislature explicitly required that the DNR consider hydrologically connected areas in making determinations of the
appropriated status of a river basin. The Act explicitly requires consideration of hydrological connections in determining the appropriated
status of river basins, but the Act did not set forth any limitations on
the DNR's ability to define the connection.
The court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the DNR did
not exceed its authority in adopting a rule that considered the geographic area in one river basin when making its determination that a
second river basin was fully appropriated.
Adam Hernandez
NEVADA
Adaven Mgmt., Inc. v. Mountain Falls Acquisition Corp., 191 P.3d 1189
(Nev. 2008) (holding that: (1) water rights are freely alienable property interests separate from the land to which they are appurtenant; and
(2) the anti-speculation doctrine does not limit an entity's ability to
acquire water rights from a private owner separately from the land to
which the right is appurtenant).
E.A. Collins Development Corporation ("E.A. Collins") purchased
520 acres of land in Nevada, along with the appurtenant water rights.
Later, E.A. Collins received a loan from Commercial Federal Bank
("CFB") that pledged the water rights as security, but not the land to
which the rights were appurtenant. Subsequently, CFB foreclosed on
the secured property following E.A. Collins' bankruptcy. CFB purchased the water rights at the foreclosure sale and then resold those
rights to Mountain Falls Acquisition Corporation ("MFAC"). After the
foreclosure sale, Adaven Management, Inc. ("Adaven") purchased the
land to which the water rights were appurtenant, and the deed in-
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cluded "Ia]ll water rights relating to, upon, benefiting, belonging or
appertaining to the real property." When Adaven applied to change
the water use, CFB learned of Adaven's asserted ownership interest
and, on behalf of MFAC, asserted its interest in the water rights. Adaven's complaint to quiet title followed. The Fifth Judicial District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of MFAC and Adaven appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
Adaven argued that.Section 533.040 of the Nevada Revised Statutes
("NRS") and the anti-speculation doctrine prevented E.A. Collins from
pledging the water rights without either (1) pledging the land to which
the water rights were appurtenant, or (2) seeking severance of the water right from the land pursuant to NRS Section 533.040. NRS section
533.040(1) provides that beneficially used water is "deemed to remain
appurtenant to the place of use," and NRS Section 533.040(2) allows
property owners to sever water rights from the land to which they are
appurtenant and put them to beneficial use elsewhere, but only after
meeting certain conditions. Adaven asserted that transferring the water rights separately from the land to which they were appurtenant
amounted to severing the water rights from the land, and the statute
required that the State Water Engineer approve the transfer, approval
that the transferring parties did not obtain.
The Supreme Court of Nevada found NRS Section 533.040 governs
the place where the owner may put the water to beneficial use, but
does not prevent the transfer of water rights ownership to someone
other than the owner of the land. The court noted the transfer of
ownership does not allow the new owner to automatically use the water
at a new location. Here, none of the changes in ownership altered
where the owner could put the water rights to beneficial use, and the
water continued to benefit the land to which it was appurtenant.
The court rejected Adaven's assertion that the anti-speculation
doctrine limited an entity's ability to acquire appurtenant water rights
from a private owner separately from the land's water benefits. According to the court, the anti-speculation doctrine limits an entity's
ability to demonstrate beneficial need when it does not have definite
plans to put the water to beneficial use or a contractual relationship
with an entity that has such plans. However, the court clarified the
anti-speculation doctrine by itself does not limit transfers of water
rights ownership, even if a transfer separates the ownership of the water right from the ownership of the land it benefits.
In sum, the court held water rights are freely alienable. The court
concluded that NRS Section 533.040 and the anti-speculation doctrine
focus on maintaining water's beneficial use, not its ownership, and as
such, MFAC validly owns the water rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment for MFAC where no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Adaven's notice of CFB's
interest in the disputed water rights.
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Julie K. Anderson
Anderson Family Assocs. v. Hugh Ricci, P.E., 179 P.3d 1201 (Nev.
2008) (holding that although vested water rights are subject to state
regulation under Nevada law, an application for a change of use permit does not subject the water rights to an impairment statute because
vested rights cannot be impaired or diminished in value unless intentionally abandoned).
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether Carson City
("City") lost priority on certain vested water rights after the State Engineer canceled the City's change of use permit application. Both the
City and Anderson Family Associates ("AFA") own water rights in Ash
Canyon Creek. The Ash Canyon Creek waters were originally granted
as part of an 1885 court decree.
After obtaining additional water rights in Ash Canyon Creek, the
City applied for a change of use permit to exercise the rights. However, the City failed to fulfill the permit's conditions. The State Engineer
canceled the permit, but later reinstated it once the City satisfied the
conditions. AFA then petitioned the State Engineer, contending that
the City's water rights were subject to Nevada Revised Statute §
533.395, which provides that the cancellation of a permit replaces the
original appropriation date with the date the petitioner filed the petition to rescind the cancellation. The State Engineer disagreed, answering that Nevada Revised Statute § 533.085(1), Nevada's nonimpairment statute, prohibited him from applying § 533.395 to the City's
water rights because the rights had vested before Nevada enacted the
current statutory code. AFA petitioned the district court for judicial
review of the State Engineer's decision, but the district court denied
AFA's petition. This appeal followed.
The court first discussed the general framework of water rights in
Nevada. Appropriators can hold one of three types of water rights:
vested, permitted, or certificated. The court defined vested rights as
those that existed under Nevada common law, before the enactment of
Nevada Revised Statute Chapter 533 in 1913. The State Engineer
grants permitted rights. Certificated rights are perfected permitted
rights. The court held that vested rights are not subject to Nevada's
Statutory Rights provisions because they were decreed before such
provisions were enacted. Additionally, the court held that vested, prestatutory rights can only be lost through intentional abandonment.
In support of its position, the court relied on several previous Nevada opinions. Citing Ormsby County v. Kearney, the court explained
that although vested rights are subject to state regulation, no one can
impair or diminish in value such rights. Additionally, relying on In re
Waters of Manse Spring, the court explained that one who acquired
rights before 1913 can only lose them through intentional abandonment. Thus, because the City's rights were decreed in 1885 and had
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not been abandoned, the Court found that they were exempt from any
loss of priority provision.
The court rejected AFA's claim that law as presented in DesertIrrigation, Ltd. v. State of Nevada controlled. Although the Desert Irrigation
holding supported AFA's claim that the City should suffer a loss of
priority as a result of a canceled permit, the court clarified that the
holding applies only to certificated water rights and not vested, prestatutory rights.
Because Nevada case law supported its construction of §
533.085(1), and there was no evidence of intentional abandonment by
the City, the court affirmed the State Engineer's decision.
Allison Graboski
NEWJERSEY
In re Stream Encroachment Permit, 955 A.2d 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. 2008) (holding that the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection may place conditions on permits for projects that are highly
complex, and that the wetlands area in question was not a "waterway"
under the statute because it could not support any water-dependent
use).
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("NJDEP") approved The Mills Corporation and Mack-Cali Realty Corporation's (jointly "Mills") joint application for various permits in connection with the Meadowlands Xanadu development project. The
Sierra Club, New Jersey Environmental Federation, and New Jersey
Public Interest Research Group (collectively "Sierra") and Hartz
Mountain Industries ("Hartz") appealed the NJDEP's approval. The
mixed-use project required Mills to fill in 7.69 acres of wetlands. As
part of the application process, Mills made an original submission of
information, supplemental submissions, and made available an environmental report. Additionally, the NJDEP held a public hearing. On
October 4, 2004, the NJDEP approved the permits subject to certain
conditions. Sierra and Hartz filed appeals with the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
On appeal, Hartz and Sierra argued that the NJDEP did not use
sufficient facts to approve the permits and that regulations prohibited
the NJDEP from issuing conditional permits. In determining whether
there was a sufficient factual basis for NJDEP's approval, the court
found because Mills and associated groups submitted numerous original materials, numerous supplemental reports, a report concerning
the environmental concerns of the project, and because the NJDEP
held a public hearing and a comment period, that a sufficient factual
basis did exist for the NJDEP to consider and grant the permits. The
court further determined that although it may not have agreed with all
of the NJDEP's conclusions, because the NJDEP based the conclusions
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on the factual submissions they were not arbitrary or capricious, and
therefore the court gave great deference to the agency.
The court also rejected Sierra and Hartz's argument that regulations prohibited the NJDEP from issuing conditional permits. In evaluating the argument, the court relied on precedent that held conditional permits were appropriate when the application basically satisfied
the regulations governing construction projects, and when the subject
matter involved an evolutionary and highly complex project. Therefore, the court rejected Sierra and Hartz's arguments for both reasons.
The court first rejected the argument because the Mills' application
had basically satisfied the construction regulations. The court also rejected the argument because the Xanadu project was vast and many of
the complex components were subject to market and economic conditions.
Sierra and Hartz further argued that regulations prohibited the development and filling in of the wetlands. The prohibition of filling in
the area was determinate upon whether the wetlands area was a waterway. The court found no definition of waterway in the regulation, nor
was there a common definition of the word. However, because the
wetlands area was not wide enough or deep enough for a boat or ship
to travel, nor was it an area that could sustain a water dependent use,
the court determined the area was not a waterway. On the other hand,
the area did fall into the definition of wetlands, which is an area saturated enough to support hydrophytic vegetation. Because the area was
a wetland and not a waterway, the court determined the statutes allowed filling in the property for development. Additionally, in areas
that are not waterways, such as the Xanadu project area, New Jersey
regulations merely discourage the filling in of water areas. If the Department finds there is a public interest in filling in an area, they may
issue a permit provided the developer takes compensating or mitigating measures. The court determined the NJDEP found that the
project was in the public interest because of the beneficial impacts the
project had on the region and state. Furthermore, the project included significant mitigation by providing a 587-acre area dedicated to
wetlands space, while only filling in eight acres.
Sierra and Hartz also argued that neither they nor the public
would be able to comment on future submissions by Mills regarding
the fulfillment of the conditions the NJDEP imposed on the Xanadu
project. The court agreed with the argument and remanded this portion back to the NJDEP to establish a way to permit a public comment
period on all submissions Mills makes in the future.
The court affirmed in all other respects, holding the NJDEP's decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and the conditional
permit was appropriate. It further held that the wetlands area was not
a waterway under statute and therefore the developer could fill them
in for the Xanadu project.
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JonathanHiller
NEW MEXICO
Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749 (N.M. 2007) (holding: (1)
New Mexico follows the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial
use and does not recognize a mining operation exception to these doctrines; and (2) absent any language in the deed to the contrary, the
relationship between lessor and lessee does not implicate the agency
doctrine).
A complicated transactional history led to two separate entities
claiming ownership of a mining lessee's water rights developed in connection with the mining claims of the lessor. Plaintiff, Hydro Resources Corporation ("Hydro"), claimed ownership of the water rights
through the lessee, Inspiration Development Company ("Inspiration").
Defendants, Harris Gray and William J. Frost (jointly, "Gray"), claimed
ownership through the lessor, Copper Flat Partnership ("CFP"). On
competing motions for summary judgment, the Seventh Judicial District Court for the State of New Mexico ruled in favor of Hydro without
issuing an opinion. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed.
Upon review to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, both parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed and that the court could resolve
this issue as a matter of law, as each party claimed principles of New
Mexico water law entitled them to ownership of the water rights.
Gray argued the court should rule New Mexico law states "(1) a lessee can acquire water rights on leased land by appropriating water and
placing it to beneficial use, and [that] (2) a lessee does not generally
act as the agent of the lessor." However, Hydro argued a mining operation's water rights become "necessarily linked" and indispensible to
the land and revert to the lessor upon termination of the lease. In addition, Hydro claimed because CFP, the lessor, used the water in connection with a mining operation, CFP developed water rights as Inspiration's, the lessee's, agent.
After review, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions to quiet title to the water rights in favor of
Gray. The court held developing water rights and putting them to
beneficial use did not make them appurtenant to the mineral rights,
and CFP did not qualify as an agent of Inspiration.
New Mexico law, not federal law, governs water rights in New Mexico, and, in allocating water rights, New Mexico adheres to the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use. While the legislature
created an exception to this rule, for water used for irrigation, the
court ruled that the judiciary could not take the place of the legislature
and expand the law (and the exemption) to include mining. In specific cases, water used for irrigation is appurtenant to the irrigated land
and remains with conveyed property unless the deed specifies otherwise. In the context of mining interests, however, New Mexico does
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not consider the water rights appurtenant to the land under lease.
McCasland v. Miskell states New Mexico's general rule that water rights
not appurtenant to the land constitute separate pieces of property,
which the owner may convey separately from the land.
The court emphasized its ruling in Walker v. United States, where the
court overruled prior case law that stated that the right to use water "is
indispensible to the enjoyment of the land." Furthermore, the court
refused to distinguish between ground water rights and surface water
rights, stating that the same body of substantive law governs both
sources. Next, the court stressed that in order for a landowner to obtain the right to use from either source, the landowner must appropriate and apply the water to beneficial use before the landowner can
obtain a water right. Lastly, the court reinforced its ruling by citing
New Mexico water policy, which describes water as a scarce resource in
New Mexico that must adapt to changing societal needs. The court
further discredited Hydro's argument by explaining that water will always be "necessary" to the enjoyment of the land because it remains a
scarce resource in the West. The court believed that its ruling would
not force drastically negative consequences onto Hydro, who can simply purchase or lease "necessary" water rights on the free market.
Regarding Hydro's argument that it is entitled to the water rights
through the doctrine of agency, the court recognized that the relationship of lessee and lessor does not implicate agency. In Hansler v. Bass,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that agency exists when one
party (the principal) authorizes another party (the agent) to act on his
behalf, so long as the principal retains control over the acts and decisions of the agent. However, in this case, CFP did not act as Inspiration's agent because Inspiration never controlled CFP's mining operations.
In addition, a lease creates merely a contractual relationship, not a
fiduciary relationship that indicates agency. While agency can arise if
the principal bears the responsibility for the acts of the agent, the lease
in this case expressly stated that CFP bore all risk under the lease. Finally, no language existed in the lease that either expressly, or indirectly, indicated that the parties intended to create an agency relationship.
Absent any language to the contrary, New Mexico law presumes that
no agency relationship exists between lessor and lessee.
Because the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed and
petitioned the court to determine the dispute as a matter of law, the
court ruled that it could not remand the case back to the trial court for
any reason but to enter judgment in favor of Gray.
Daniel Woody
NORTH DAKOTA
Buchholz v. Barnes County Water Bd., 755 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 2008)
(holding that an downstream landowner does not have a general duty
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to keep a water course free of naturally occurring vegetation, but such
a duty applies only when the landowner affirmatively and deliberately
obstructs the flow of water on his land).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Barnes
County Water Board ("Board") after it found no evidence to substantiate a claim that the Board had a duty to require downstream landowners to maintain the flow of water in the watercourse. North Dakota Century Code § 61-01-07 provides that any person who "illegally obstructs" any "ditch, drain, or watercourse" is liable for damages to the
party suffering an injury from the obstruction. Buchholz, the upstream
landowner, contended that he lost farming profits because the downstream landowner failed to encourage the flow of water off of his land
by burning and mowing the vegetation growing in his waterway.

Buchholz alleged that not only did the downstream landowner have a
duty to clear such natural vegetation under § 61-01-07, but also that the
Board was negligent because it did not find that such a duty existed.
On appeal, the court considered whether Buchholz had drawn the
district court's attention to anything in the record that created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board and downstream
landowners had violated the statute.
First, the court stated that for the statute to place a duty upon
downstream landowners, the Board must make a finding that the statute applied. While all of the parties agreed that the statute applied
generally, the court found, based on a close reading, that an affirmative duty to keep a waterway clear only applied to "assessment drains."
No evidence in the record indicated there was an assessment drain
located on the downstream landowners' land or that Buchholz had
ever petitioned for the designation of one. The court held that although the Board is responsible for implementing a series of procedures to ensure that assessment drains remain unobstructed and working properly, the Board need not implement such procedures where it
has not designated an assessment drain. Consequently, to preclude
summary judgment, Buchholz should have highlighted material facts
in the record pointing to the Board's dereliction of duty when it failed
to designate an assessment drain on the downstream landowners'
lands.
Furthermore, the court held that the terms of the statute only apply if a landowner "affirmatively and deliberately acts to obstruct or
divert" the flow of water off of his land. It does not impose a duty on
the landowner to keep a watercourse free of naturally occurring vegetation. Thus, the court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Board.
Allison Graboski
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OREGON
Fort Vannoy Irrigation Dist. v. Water Res. Conm'n, 188 P.3d 277 (Or.
2008) (holding a landowner lacked authority to change the points of
diversion associated with water fights set forth in two certificates without the consent of an irrigation district because the district held the
water rights in trust for the beneficiary landowner).
Ken-Wal Farms ("Ken-Wal"), a landowner and member of the Fort
Vannoy Irrigation District ("District"), raises its crops using water delivered through the District's irrigation system pursuant to two water
rights certificates the State Engineer issued to the District in 1930. In
November of 1999, Ken-Wal applied to the Water Resources Department ("Department") to change the points of diversion. The District
refused to give its consent and contended that the Department could
not approve the application without the District's consent because
Oregon Revised Statute § 540.510(1) provided only the "holder of any
water right subject to transfer may.. . change the use and place of use,
the point of diversion or the use theretofore made of the water in all
cases without losing priority of the fight theretofore established." Despite the District's objection, the Department approved Ken-Wal's application without the District's consent. The Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed the Department's order, concluding that the "holder" of the
water right is the party to whom the State Engineer issued the water
right certificate.
The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review to consider the meaning of the phrase "holder of any water use subject to transfer" within
Oregon Revised Statute § 540.510(1). Ken-Wal argued that it was the
holder of the water rights because it was the party who put the water to
beneficial use, and it owned the land appurtenant to the water. On the
contrary, the District argued for its ownership of the water rights based
on the fact the State Engineer issued the water right certificates to the
District, and the existence of trustee-beneficiary relationship between
the District and its members.
After concluding that the phrase "the holder of any water use subject to transfer" referred to a party with an ownership interest in the
water rights, the court addressed the parties' four arguments. First, the
court considered the issuance of the water right certificates to the District and concluded the party to whom the water right certificate was
issued was the party who had a vested ownership interest in the right.
In this case, because the District completed the statutory procedure for
the issuance of the certificate, the District became the "holder" of the
water rights established in the certificates. The District's second argument was that the issuance of the certificate to the District created a
trustee-beneficiary relationship between the District and its members.
Oregon Revised Statute § 545.253 provides legal title to water rights
acquired through a certificate from the Water Resources Commission
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"shall immediately vest in the irrigation district and shall be held by it
in trust for and hereby is dedicated and set apart to the uses and purposes set forth in the Irrigation District Law." The court concluded
that in order to make the foregoing language consistent with the statute, the court would construe the phrase "holder of any water use subject to transfer" as referring to the District as the "holder."
Next, the court considered Ken-Wal's two additional arguments.
First, it dismissed the contention the "holder" of the water right was
the one who put the water to beneficial use. The court stated that
beneficial use was just one of several actions required before a certificated water right could come into existence. Thus, Ken-Wal's status as
the sole beneficial user of the certificated water was insufficient to
make it the "holder." The court also noted that in similar disputes it
held parties could accomplish beneficial use an agency relationship
such as the one between Ken-Wal and the District. Second, the court
considered the argument that Ken-Wal was the "holder" because it
owned the land to which the certificated water rights were appurtenant. The appurtenant land argument failed because the court concluded that nothing in Oregon water law prevented a situation where a
certificated water right resided with one party, while the ownership of
the appurtenant land resided with another. Therefore, Ken-Wal's
ownership of the appurtenant land did not necessarily entail ownership of the certificated water rights benefiting the land.
The court held the District was the "holder" identified in the statute that allowed the "holder of [a] water use subject to transfer" to
change points of diversion. Because Ken-Wal was not the "holder" of
the water rights established in the two certificates, it was not authorized
to change the points of diversion without the consent of the District.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellate court's ruling.
Mary Kate Finnigan

